Today's learning is dedicated to my mother Betty Greene on her yahrzeit.
Back in the late 1980s the Conservative Movement debated whether or not halachicly women could be rabbis. In 1988 the Jewish Theological Seminary published the book The Ordination of Women as Rabbis: Studies and Responsa edited by Simon Greenberg. Today’s daf TB Berachot 20 was at the center of the debate.
Back in the late 1980s the Conservative Movement debated whether or not halachicly women could be rabbis. In 1988 the Jewish Theological Seminary published the book The Ordination of Women as Rabbis: Studies and Responsa edited by Simon Greenberg. Today’s daf TB Berachot 20 was at the center of the debate.
Rabbi Joel Roth, my very first Talmud teacher when I was an
undergrad at JTS, discusses in his paper amongst many things the status of
women vis-à-vis the mitzvot from which they are legally exempt. The Mishnah
begins by enumerating what women, slaves, and minors are exempt from observing.
The list includes the recitation of the Shema and the wearing of tefillin.
Nevertheless, the Mishnah says that women, slaves, and minors are obligated to
recite the Amidah, have mezzuzot, and recite Grace after Meals. The Gemarra
explains why women are exempt.
With regard to the mishna’s statement that women are exempt
from the recitation of Shema, the Gemara asks: That is obvious,
as Shema is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and the halakhic
principle is: Women are exempt from any time-bound, positive mitzva, i.e.,
any mitzva whose performance is only in effect at a particular time. Shema
falls into that category as its recitation is restricted to the morning and the
evening. (sefaria.com translation)
A person can fulfill another person’s obligation by reciting
the prayer with the listener saying, “Amen.” A classic example of this is
Kiddush Friday night. One person recites kiddush for everybody around the table
and fulfills their obligation of kiddush when they respond “Amen.” The rabbis
understood that the reciter and the listener have to have the same level of
obligation to act as an agent. Ravina raises a question how can women who don’t
have the same level of obligation as men to say Grace after Meals and behalf a
man.
Ravina said to Rava: We learned in the mishna that women
are obligated in the mitzva of Grace after Meals. However, are they
obligated by Torah law or merely by rabbinic law? What difference
does it make whether it is by Torah or rabbinic law? The difference is
regarding her ability to fulfill the obligation of others when reciting
the blessing on their behalf. Granted, if you say that their obligation is
by Torah law, one whose obligation is by Torah law can come and fulfill
the obligation of others who are obligated by Torah law. However, if you
say that their obligation is by rabbinic law, then from the
perspective of Torah law, women are considered to be one who is not
obligated, and the general principle is that one who is not obligated
to fulfill a particular mitzva cannot fulfill the obligations of the many
in that mitzva. Therefore, it is important to know what is the
resolution of this dilemma. (Sefaria.com translation)
In his paper Rabbi Roth shows the plurality of rabbinic
opinions from the most stringent of those who say women may not be permitted to
fulfill positive time bound commandments to those rabbinic authorities who
permit women to take upon themselves the obligation to fulfill positive time
bound mitzvot. He concludes his first section of the paper “by noting that it
is possible to assume there could be for potential categories of women.
1. Those who reaffirm the traditional exemption from
positive time bound commandments and generally refrain from observing those
mitzvot from which women are legally exempt.
2. Those who would reaffirm the traditional exemption from
positive time bound mitzvot, but choose sporadically to observe some of them or
all of them without viewing their own observance as obligatory in any way.
3. Those who would reaffirm their exemption from mitzvot,
but voluntarily accepts themselves as obligatory, with failure to comply with
those mitzvot considered a sin. Were woman to adopt such a practice, but
without proviso that failure to observe is sinful, she would be a member of
category 2.
4. Those who, though recognize themselves to be legally
exempt, would accept upon themselves as obligatory the observance of all
mitzvot from which women are legally exempt, with failure to comply with any of
those mitzvot to be considered a sin. Should a woman choose to do so, but
reject the notion of sin is the consequence of noncompliance, she too, would
stand legally will in category 2.
We have, we hope, made it abundantly clear that the obligatory
status of voluntary observance must be taken very seriously if it is to have
the legal status of obligation. That seriousness is reflected in the recognition
that, for that woman there is no viable option to compliance with the norms.
That, in traditional terms, means the recognition of sin is the consequence of
noncompliance.” (Page 148)
In Rabbi Roth’s view women may certainly become rabbis and
act as an agent for her congregants if they accepts upon themselves all the
commandments like every other male Conservative Rabbi. Whether you agree with
him or not, his position paper is a great example how the Conservative Movement
doesn’t treat Jewish law as static, but as a living organism that can grow and
change organically.
In case you’re wondering how the gemarra resolves the above
dilemma, here is the Talmud’s solution.
And according to your reasoning, is a minor
obligated by Torah law to perform mitzvot? Everyone agrees that a minor is
exempt by Torah law, yet here the baraita said that he may recite a
blessing on behalf of his father. There must be another way to explain the baraita.
With what we are dealing here? With a case where his father ate a
quantity of food that did not satisfy his hunger, a measure for which
one is only obligated by rabbinic law to recite Grace after Meals. In
that case, one whose obligation is by rabbinic law can come and fulfill the
obligation of another whose obligation is by rabbinic law. (sefira.com
translation)
No comments:
Post a Comment