A look back at the ordination of women debate TB Berachot 20

Today's learning is dedicated to my mother Betty Greene on her yahrzeit.

Back in the late 1980s the Conservative Movement debated whether or not halachicly women could be rabbis. In 1988 the Jewish Theological Seminary published the book The Ordination of Women as Rabbis: Studies and Responsa edited by Simon Greenberg. Today’s daf TB Berachot 20 was at the center of the debate.

Rabbi Joel Roth, my very first Talmud teacher when I was an undergrad at JTS, discusses in his paper amongst many things the status of women vis-à-vis the mitzvot from which they are legally exempt. The Mishnah begins by enumerating what women, slaves, and minors are exempt from observing. The list includes the recitation of the Shema and the wearing of tefillin. Nevertheless, the Mishnah says that women, slaves, and minors are obligated to recite the Amidah, have mezzuzot, and recite Grace after Meals. The Gemarra explains why women are exempt.

With regard to the mishna’s statement that women are exempt from the recitation of Shema, the Gemara asks: That is obvious, as Shema is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and the halakhic principle is: Women are exempt from any time-bound, positive mitzva, i.e., any mitzva whose performance is only in effect at a particular time. Shema falls into that category as its recitation is restricted to the morning and the evening. (sefaria.com translation)

A person can fulfill another person’s obligation by reciting the prayer with the listener saying, “Amen.” A classic example of this is Kiddush Friday night. One person recites kiddush for everybody around the table and fulfills their obligation of kiddush when they respond “Amen.” The rabbis understood that the reciter and the listener have to have the same level of obligation to act as an agent. Ravina raises a question how can women who don’t have the same level of obligation as men to say Grace after Meals and behalf a man.

Ravina said to Rava: We learned in the mishna that women are obligated in the mitzva of Grace after Meals. However, are they obligated by Torah law or merely by rabbinic law? What difference does it make whether it is by Torah or rabbinic law? The difference is regarding her ability to fulfill the obligation of others when reciting the blessing on their behalf. Granted, if you say that their obligation is by Torah law, one whose obligation is by Torah law can come and fulfill the obligation of others who are obligated by Torah law. However, if you say that their obligation is by rabbinic law, then from the perspective of Torah law, women are considered to be one who is not obligated, and the general principle is that one who is not obligated to fulfill a particular mitzva cannot fulfill the obligations of the many in that mitzva. Therefore, it is important to know what is the resolution of this dilemma. (Sefaria.com translation)

In his paper Rabbi Roth shows the plurality of rabbinic opinions from the most stringent of those who say women may not be permitted to fulfill positive time bound commandments to those rabbinic authorities who permit women to take upon themselves the obligation to fulfill positive time bound mitzvot. He concludes his first section of the paper “by noting that it is possible to assume there could be for potential categories of women.

1. Those who reaffirm the traditional exemption from positive time bound commandments and generally refrain from observing those mitzvot from which women are legally exempt.

2. Those who would reaffirm the traditional exemption from positive time bound mitzvot, but choose sporadically to observe some of them or all of them without viewing their own observance as obligatory in any way.

3. Those who would reaffirm their exemption from mitzvot, but voluntarily accepts themselves as obligatory, with failure to comply with those mitzvot considered a sin. Were woman to adopt such a practice, but without proviso that failure to observe is sinful, she would be a member of category 2.

4. Those who, though recognize themselves to be legally exempt, would accept upon themselves as obligatory the observance of all mitzvot from which women are legally exempt, with failure to comply with any of those mitzvot to be considered a sin. Should a woman choose to do so, but reject the notion of sin is the consequence of noncompliance, she too, would stand legally will in category 2.

We have, we hope, made it abundantly clear that the obligatory status of voluntary observance must be taken very seriously if it is to have the legal status of obligation. That seriousness is reflected in the recognition that, for that woman there is no viable option to compliance with the norms. That, in traditional terms, means the recognition of sin is the consequence of noncompliance.” (Page 148)

In Rabbi Roth’s view women may certainly become rabbis and act as an agent for her congregants if they accepts upon themselves all the commandments like every other male Conservative Rabbi. Whether you agree with him or not, his position paper is a great example how the Conservative Movement doesn’t treat Jewish law as static, but as a living organism that can grow and change organically.

In case you’re wondering how the gemarra resolves the above dilemma, here is the Talmud’s solution.

And according to your reasoning, is a minor obligated by Torah law to perform mitzvot? Everyone agrees that a minor is exempt by Torah law, yet here the baraita said that he may recite a blessing on behalf of his father. There must be another way to explain the baraita. With what we are dealing here? With a case where his father ate a quantity of food that did not satisfy his hunger, a measure for which one is only obligated by rabbinic law to recite Grace after Meals. In that case, one whose obligation is by rabbinic law can come and fulfill the obligation of another whose obligation is by rabbinic law. (sefira.com translation)