Three things I did know about tefillin TB Menakhot 32-36

TB Menakhot 32b  Scoring

Although I knew that the Torah scroll and the mezuzah scroll needed to be scored, I didn’t know that the scrolls inside the tefillin didn’t needed to be scored.

“§ The baraita indicates that if it were permitted to reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity to a level of lesser sanctity, one could make a mezuza from phylacteries that became worn. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But a mezuza requires scoring, i.e., the parchment must have lines etched in it before writing, as Rav Minyumi bar Ḥilkiya says that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says that Rav says: Any mezuza that is not scored is unfit, and Rav Minyumi bar Ḥilkiya himself says concerning this: The scoring of a mezuza is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. With regard to phylacteries, by contrast, he does not teach that their parchment requires scoring.

“The Gemara answers that this is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yirmeya says in the name of our teacher, Rav: Phylacteries and mezuzot may be written when the scribe is not copying from a written text, and their parchment does not require scoring.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Gail Budiansky sent me the reason why tefillin doesn’t need scoring. “The reason is that the purpose of scoring is to straighten the writing, to preserve its beauty. Since tefillin are not designed to be read, as they are covered with hide and sewn up, this act is unnecessary. A mezuza, by contrast, can be open and read it at any time (Meiri citing Rambam). Others suggest that the reason is that the mezuza is examined and read carefully every seven years, whereas tefillin are checked only once every 50 years (Ran on Megilla 18b). Yet others say that the differences do to the fact that tefillin a written a very thin parchment, which might be torn scoring (Nimmukei Yosef) The Meiri says that in fact this is the effect, not because. Since tefillin do not require scoring, they are written on thin parchment.” (Notes, and Bavi Noe edition)    

TB Menakhot 34b Rash and Robben Tam’s tefillin

The shel rosh, the tefillin worn on the head, has for different compartments, corresponding to the four different times tefillin that are mentioned in the Torah. The four citations are “קַדֶּשׁ־לִ֨י-Sanctify Me” (Exodus 13:1-10); “-It shall come to pass when (God) brings you” (Exodus 13:11-16); “-Shema Yisrael” (Deuteronomy 6:4-9); and “-It will be that if you hearken” (Deuteronomy 11:13-21).

I knew that Rash’s shel rosh and his grandson’s Robben Tam’s shel rosh disagreed on the order of the four citations. The basis of this disagreement is found on TB Menakhot 34b.

“The Sages taught in a baraita: How does one arrange the four passages inside the phylacteries? The passage of: “Sanctify unto Me” (Exodus 13:1–10), and the passage of: “And it shall be when He shall bring you” (Exodus 13:11–16), are placed on the right; the passage of: “Listen, O Israel” (Deuteronomy 6:4–9), and the passage of: “And it shall come to pass, if you shall hearken diligently” (Deuteronomy 11:13–21), are placed on the left.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rashi understands this baraita to mean you place the parchments in the order they appear in the Torah starting on the right and moving chronologically until one reaches the far left compartment. Robben Tam understands this writer to mean you start with on the far right compartment with דֶּשׁ־לִ֨יקַ followed by והָיָ֞ה כִּֽי־יְבִֽאֲךָ֤ יְ-הוָֹה֙. Then you place in the farthest left compartment שְׁמַ֖ע יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל moving right with וְהָיָ֗ה אִם־שָׁמֹ֤עַ. That means that וְהָיָ֗ה אִם־שָׁמֹ֤עַ and וְהָיָ֗ה אִם־שָׁמֹ֤עַ are in the middle two compartments.

The vast majority of Jews only put on Rashi’s tefillin; however, there are some Jews who put on both Rashi’s and Robben Tam’s tefillin understanding of this mitzvah to fulfill both understanding of this mitzvah.  

TB Menakhot 36a One blessing or two?

“§ Rav Ḥisda says: If one spoke between donning the phylacteries of the arm and the phylacteries of the head, he must recite the blessing again when donning the phylacteries of the head.

“The Gemara notes: One can infer that if he spoke, yes, he must recite a blessing when donning the phylacteries of the head, but if he did not speak, he does not recite a blessing. The Gemara challenges this: But Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, sent a ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: On the phylacteries of the arm one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us to don tefillin. On the phylacteries of the head one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us concerning the mitzva of tefillin. This indicates that one always recites a blessing when donning the phylacteries of the head.

“Abaye and Rava both say, to resolve this apparent contradiction: Rabbi Yoḥanan meant that if one did not speak, he recites one blessing; if he spoke, he recites two blessings, when donning the phylacteries of the head as well as when donning the phylacteries of the arm.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Based on the ambiguity of Rav Ḥisda’s statement two different traditions arose. The Sefardim only recite one blessing for both the shel yad, the shel rosh tefillin placed on the arm, in the shel rosh. They only recite “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us to don tefillin.” If a person talks in between placing the shel yad and the shel rosh, he repeats this blessing.

The Ashkenazim recite two blessings. : On the tefillin of the arm one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us to don tefillin. On the tefillin of the head one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us concerning the mitzva of tefillin.   If he talks between the placing the shel yad and the shel rosh, he repeats the first blessing again and then continues with the second blessing.

Ashkenazi Jews have the custom of reciting the phrase “בָּרוּךְ שֵׁם כְּבוֹד מַלְכוּתוֹ לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד: -Blessed [is His] Name, Whose glorious kingdom is forever and ever” which annuls an unnecessary blessing. Since there’s a doubt whether the second blessing is absolutely needed, they take no chances and recite the above phrase.

I have been hacked

 

If you have received an email from me inviting you to a gathering on January 30, do not respond. I have been hacked.

 

Menakhot 9 Tosefot highlights a weak proof

Three times on today’s daf TB Menakhot 9 Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish find themselves on opposite sides of a disagreement. One of these disagreements concerns whether you’re allowed to mix the oil in the minkha offering outside the walls of the Temple courtyard. The mixing of the oil and the flour was a three-step process. Yetzika (יצִיקה)-the oil was placed at the very bottom of the bowl. Then the fine flour was added on top of it. Belilah (בְּלִילָה)-oil was placed on top of the flour and then it was mixed together.

“It was stated: If one mixed the oil of a meal offering into it outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is disqualified, and Reish Lakish says that it is valid. Reish Lakish says: It is valid, as it is written: “And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense upon it” (Leviticus 2:1), and then it is written: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall remove” (Leviticus 2:2).

“Reish Lakish explains: The Sages derived from here that from the removal of the handful onward the rites performed with the meal offering are solely a mitzva of the priesthood. Accordingly, the verse taught about pouring and mixing that they are valid when performed by a non-priest. And from the fact that the priesthood is not required for the mixing, it may be derived that it is also not required that its performance be inside the walls of the Temple courtyard.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Tosefot ד"ה וּמִדִכְהוּנָה notices that Reish Lakish’s argument is not a very strong one. One cannot draw the conclusion that just because a non-priest may do the mixing doesn’t mean the mixing can be done outside the Temple courtyard. A non-priest may slaughter the animal sacrifice (shekhita-שְׁחִיטָה), but it has to take place within the walls of the temple courtyard.

Tosefot provides two solutions. Conceptually shekhita may be permitted outside the Temple courtyard, but practically it is impossible for the following reason. Only a kohen may capture the blood spurting forth from the neck of the animal in a bowl and bring it to the altar. For obvious reasons, this has to be done immediately after the animal is slaughtered and within the Temple courtyard. Their second solution is already recorded earlier in the Gemara. Animal sacrifices are inherently different than minkha offerings. One cannot necessarily learn a law from each other.

As always, the halakha follows Rabbi Yoḥanan over Reish Lakish. See Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, Sefer  Avodah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit, Chapter 11, Halakha 6.

TB Menakhot 7 How to succeed in learning

Today’s daf TB Menakhot 7 teaches us how to succeed in our learning. The Gemara relates the story of Rabbi Avimi and his student Rav Ḥisda.

“Rabbi Avimi was learning tractate Menaḥot in the study hall of Rav Ḥisda. It doesn’t make sense that Rabbi Avimi was studying in the study hall of his student Rav Ḥisda. Rav Ḥisda should have been studying his teacher’s study hall. It’s like saying that one of my Talmud professors came to study Talmud in one of my adult education classes.

“Avimi was in fact the teacher, but tractate Menaḥot was uprooted for him, i.e., he forgot it, and Avimi came before his student Rav Ḥisda to help him recall his learning. The Gemara asks: If Rav Ḥisda was in fact Avimi’s student, let Avimi send for him and Rav Ḥisda come to Avimi. The Gemara responds: Avimi thought that this would be more helpful in this matter.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rashi ד"ה מִסְתַיְיעָא מִילְתָא explains why Rabbi Avimi felt it would be more helpful for him to go to his student rather than his student come to him. He quotes TB Megillah 6b. “Because (If one says) I have labored and I have found success, believe him.” By going the extra mile in order to learn successfully, Rabbi Avimi thought the reversal of the normal procedure would be worth it.

Putting in the extra effort and working hard to achieve your goals in any endeavor will be a guarantee of success.

TB Menakhot 4- 5 What happens when the ’omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake?

On the second day of Passover , the 16^th day of Nisan, an ’omer of barley was offered up on the altar. All new grains were permitted to be eaten after this minkhat ha’omer, the omer of meal offering, was placed on the altar. What happens when the ’omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake? The Gemara provides three different answers.

Opinion #1 “Rav says: With regard to the omer meal offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:9–14), if the priest removed a handful from it not for its own sake it is disqualified. It is disqualified since an omer meal offering came for a specific purpose, namely, to permit the consumption of the new crop, and this meal offering did not permit the consumption of the new crop because its rites were performed not for its own sake” (Sefaria.org translation) In other words, a brand-new minkhat ha’omer needs to be offered up and no new grain can be eaten until this is accomplished. (TB Menakhot 4a, Sefaria.org translation)

Opinion #2 “And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, with regard to an omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake, that it is valid and the handful is burned on the altar. But its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until a priest brings another omer meal offering on the same day and thereby permits the first offering for consumption, as the prohibition against consuming the new crop remains in effect.

“The Gemara asks: But if its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until they bring another omer meal offering, how can the handful removed from this omer meal offering be sacrificed upon the altar? Before the omer meal offering is sacrificed, the new crop is forbidden for consumption, and the verse states: “From the well-watered pastures of Israel; for a meal offering, and for a burnt offering, and for peace offerings” (Ezekiel 45:15), from which it is derived that one may sacrifice only from that which is permitted to the Jewish people.

“Rav Adda bar Ahava said in response: Reish Lakish holds that an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day. Accordingly, since the new crop will be permitted for consumption on the same day that this handful was removed from the omer meal offering, it is already considered fit to be sacrificed upon the altar.” (TB Menakhot 5, Sefaria.org translation) Reish Lakish presents a middle position where the minkhat ha’omer is permitted on the altar (which is but a handful from the container with the barley) and the left over which is usually consumed by the priest cannot be eaten until a new minkhat ha’omer is offered.

Opinion #3 “The Gemara previously cited the opinion of Rav that an omer meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified. The Gemara also cited the opinion of Reish Lakish that this meal offering is valid but another omer meal offering is necessary to permit the new crop for consumption. And Rava says: With regard to an omer meal offering from which the priest removed a handful not for its own sake, it is valid and its remainder is consumed, and it does not require another omer meal offering to permit it for consumption. The reason is that improper intent is effective [mo’elet] to disqualify an offering only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.

“Rava elaborates: The condition that improper intent disqualifies only when expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the intent of a blemished priest, who is disqualified from performing the Temple service. The condition that it disqualifies only when expressed with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the omer meal offering, which is generally unfit for the Temple service, as it is a novelty, in that it is brought from barley whereas most meal offerings are brought from wheat. And finally, the condition that it disqualifies only when expressed in a place that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude sacrificial rites that were performed with improper intent while the altar was damaged. At such a time improper intent does not disqualify an offering, and therefore if the altar is repaired on the same day, the offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rava has the most lenient opinion. No do over is necessary at all because the minkhat ha’omer is kosher and the new grain now is allowed to be eaten. Rashi explains that barley under most circumstances is not fit for the Temple service. Consequently, we can conclude that Rava doesn’t believe that the minkhat ha’omer isn’t a real Temple service to permit the new grain. It’s just a mitzvah. What allows new grain to be eaten? As soon as the sun rises over the eastern horizon we may eat the new grain.

Rambam poskins according to Rava’s position because he is quoted last in this sugiya. (Sefer Avodah, Laws of sacrifices rendered unfit, chapter 14, halakha 3)

Love and patience will help your words be heard #Vaera#devartorah#parashathashavua

Winnie the Pooh famously said, “If the person you are talking to doesn’t appear to be listening, be patient. It may simply be that he has a small piece of fluff in his ear.”

I’ve learned over the years that Winnie might be on to something. When someone won’t listen to you even though following your counsel would be to their advantage, it may be that their reticence is nothing more than a small piece of fluff in their ear. Or there may be another hindrance: Some folks find it hard to listen well because they’re broken and discouraged.

In this week’s Torah portion  Vaera God tells Moses to say to the Israelites: “I will free you from the labors of the Egyptians and deliver you from their bondage. I will redeem you with an outstretched arm and through extraordinary chastisements. And I will take you to be My people, and I will be your God. And you shall know that I, YHVH, am your God who freed you from the labors of the Egyptians. I will bring you into the land which I swore to give to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and I will give it to you for a possession, I YHVH” (6:6-8) Thanking God for delivering us out of slavery, we drink 4 cups of wine, one for each language of redemption at the Seder table.

Despite promising to redeem the Jewish people by emphasizing it with four and possibly different languages of redemption, they didn’t listen because their spirits were broken and their lives were hard. “But when Moses told this to the Israelites, they would not listen to Moses, their spirits crushed by cruel bondage.” (6:9). Who can blame them? They were discouraged as the result of their bitter enslavement in Egypt. That being the case, Israel’s reluctance to listen to Moses’s instruction called for understanding and compassion, not censure.

What should we do when others won’t listen? Winnie the Pooh’s words enshrine wisdom: “Be patient.” Love and patience along with understanding and compassion will help your words being heard.

 

 

 

Daf TB Menakhot 2 cites Rabbi Shimon in two different baraitot which contradict each other.

Baraita #1 “Rabbi Shimon says: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice and they even satisfy the obligation of the owner. The baraita continues: Conversely, consecrated animals that were sacrificed not for their sake do not fulfill the obligation of the owner, as in this regard meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. The difference is that when one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, its mode of preparation proves that it is in fact for the sake of a pan meal offering, as the two offerings differ in appearance. Similarly, with regard to a dry meal offering, e.g., the meal offering of a sinner, which contains no oil, whose handful is removed for the sake of a meal offering that is mixed with oil, its mode of preparation proves that it is for the sake of a dry meal offering, and one’s improper intent is therefore disregarded. But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so, as there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings. Since the differentiation between slaughtered offerings is established only through intention, one who sacrifices an animal offering not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. Rabbi Shimon apparently disagrees with the tanna of the mishna on two counts: First, he claims that if the handful of a meal offering was removed not for its own sake it satisfies the obligation of the owner, whereas the mishna teaches that the obligation is not fulfilled. Second, Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy, and the other types of meal offerings.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Baraita #2 “§ The Gemara cites the baraita that is the basis for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon, which was mentioned in the previous discussion: And a Sage raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse written concerning the meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), indicates that there are some meal offerings whose halakha is like that of a sin offering, and there are some whose halakha is like that of a guilt offering.

"Rabbi Shimon elaborates: The halakha with regard to the meal offering of a sinner is like that of a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is disqualified, just like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Conversely, the halakha with regard to a voluntary meal offering is like that of a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is valid, like a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake.  

Rabbi Shimon adds: And a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering in another aspect as well: Just as a guilt offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, so too, a voluntary meal offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon here apparently contradicts his ruling that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake satisfy the obligation of the owner.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The contradiction is easily summarized. In baraita #1 the minkha offering not for its sake is kosher and the owners get a check mark for fulfilling their obligation. In baraita #2 the minkha offering not for its sake is kosher and the owners don’t get a check mark for fulfilling their obligation.

Three different sages try to resolve this contradiction beginning on daf 2 and continuing on today’s daf 3.

Rabba’s solution: “Rabba said in resolution of this contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rava’s solution: “The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Ashi’s solution: “The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.

“Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara concludes why each Sage didn’t agree with the other two.

“§ Three resolutions have been suggested for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two baraitot concerning whether or not a meal offering whose handful was removed not for its own sake fulfills the obligation of its owner. Rabba’s answer was that there is a difference between intent for another meal offering, in which case the owner fulfills his obligation, as the intent is recognizably improper, and intent for someone else, which is not recognizably improper. The Gemara comments: All the other Sages, i.e., Rava and Rav Ashi, do not say as Rabba did in resolving the contradiction, as they do not accept his reasoning, claiming that on the contrary, the Merciful One disqualifies recognizably false intent.

“The Gemara continues: Rava resolved the contradiction by saying that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicating that there is one law for all meal offerings, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering does not effect acceptance. Rabba and Rav Ashi do not say as Rava did in resolving the contradiction, as the verse that states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” does not indicate to them that there should be one law for all meal offerings.  

“The Gemara continues: Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction by saying that when one removes the handful from a meal offering for the sake of a vessel the meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as intent concerning the vessel itself is inconsequential, whereas when one removes the handful for the sake of another meal offering, the meal offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Rabba and Rava did not say as Rav Ashi did in resolving the contradiction because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, from a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of a mixed one. Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation even though his intent concerns the meal offering itself, not the vessel.

“The Gemara notes: The matter that is obvious to Rabba in one way, i.e., that with regard to meal offerings recognizably false intention is disregarded, but when the false intention is not recognizable the offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, and that is obvious to Rava in the other way, i.e., that in cases of recognizably false intention the offering should not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is a dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. ” (Sefaria.org translation)