The sixth chapter of our massekhet dealt with blemishes that disqualify the bekhor, firstlings of sheep, goats, and cattle. Every unblemished firstling was offered up as a sacrifice on the altar and the kohenim received their usual gifts. If the bekhor was blemished, the entire animal was given to the kohen. Whether blemished or unblemished, one is not allowed to shear or work the bekhor. The experts who determine whether the defect was a real blemish are not had to know what were the blemishes that disqualified the bekhor.

The seventh chapter of our massekhet transitions to the topic of those blemishes which disqualify a kohen from performing the avodah, the sacrificial service. “There are three categories of blemishes in Kohenim: (1) Blemishes common to both Kohenim and animals [disqualifying the former from performing the avodah and the letter from being offered as sacrifices]; (2) blemishes disqualify Kohenim but not animals; (3) blemishes that are not strictly speaking blemishes, but for which the Rabbis nevertheless disqualify a Kohen from serving because of their unsightly appearance [מַרְאִית הָעַיִן]

“The significance of these classifications is that a Kohen with a blemish of the first category who performs the avodah not only violates the law but renders the offering invalid, whether his violation was intentional or not. Furthermore, if the violation was intentional, he is subject to the punishment of malkot [lashes]. A Kohen with blemishes of the second category who performs the avodah violates a prohibition but does not render the offering invalid.[Whether he is nonetheless liable to malkot is the subject of the dispute…] A Kohen processing a blemish of the third category who performs the avodah neither invalidates the offering nor is he subject to the penalty of malkot, since only a Rabbinic prohibition has been transgressed…” (Art Scroll introduction to TB Bekhorot Chapter 7)

One of my bat mitzvah candidates complained that these rules are unfair. Why should a blemish disqualify a kohen? The answer lies in the biblical understanding of holiness (קדש). The British anthropologist Mary Douglas in her book Purity and Danger explains why both kohenim and animals had to be unblemished to serve in the Temple and be offered up on the Altar.

“The precepts and ceremonies alike are focused on the idea of the holiness of God which men must create in their own lives. So this is a universe in which men prosper by conforming to holiness and perish when they deviate from it. If there were no other clues we should be able to find out the Hebrew idea of the holy by examining the precepts by which men conform to it. It is evidently not goodness in the sense of an all-embracing human kindness. Justice and moral goodness may well illustrate holiness and form part of it, but holiness embraces other ideas as well.

“Granted that its root (קדש-gg) means separateness, the next idea that emerges is the Holy as wholeness and completeness. Much of Leviticus is taken up with stating the physical perfection that is required of things presented in the temple and of persons approaching it. The animals offered in sacrifice must be without blemish, women must be purified after childbirth, lepers should be separated and richly cleansed before being allowed to approach it once they are cured. All bodily discharges are defiling an disqualifying phone approach to the temple. Priests may only come into contact with the death when their own close can die. But the high priest must never have contact with the dead

Levit, xxi

Speak to Aaron and say: No man among your offspring throughout the ages who has a defect shall be qualified to offer the food of his God. No one at all who has a defect shall be qualified: no man who is blind, or lame, or has a limb too short or too long; no man who has a broken leg or a broken arm; or who is a hunchback, or a dwarf, or who has a growth in his eye, or who has a boil-scar, or scurvy, or crushed testes. No man among the offspring of Aaron the priest who has a defect shall be qualified to offer GOD’s offering by fire; having a defect, he shall not be qualified to offer the food of his God. 

“In other words, he must be perfect as a man, if he is to be a priest.” (Pages 50-51) The kohenim exemplify God’s holiness, wholeness and perfection, on earth as they approach Him in the Temple through the avodah service.

Returning to my bat mitzvah candidate, I explained to her although a blemish may disqualify a kohen from the avodah, no blemish disqualifies a person from a position of leadership. Some of the greatest biblical heroes had disabilities. Isaac became blind but still is regarded as one of the forefathers. Jacob limped the rest of his life after his wrestling match with that Angel. Moses was a stutterer and he was the greatest prophet who ever lived. Ehud son of Gera, a judge, was left handed. (Today’s daf TB Bekhorot 45b disallows a left-handed kohen from performing the avodah service) He saved the Israelites from Eglon the king of Moab who enslaved the Israelites! (Judges 3)

 

#Vayera#devartorah#parashathashuva# Don’t sacrifice your life

Ever since the binding of Isaac and God’s rejection of human sacrifice in this week’s Torah portion Vayera, Judaism has forbidden it. Although the actual practice has been abolished, Gregg Krech wrote about the most common human sacrifice we still follow today.

“When we find ourselves in circumstances which are unpleasant or disappointing there are two common strategies our minds use to escape:   We idealize the future or romanticize the past.

“The first strategy is to think about the future and idealistically imagine what our lives might be like down the road.  “Once X happens, then I will be happy.”  X can be the vision you have of living overseas, or getting the job you really want, or getting married (or getting divorced), or having kids, or anything that hasn’t happened yet, but that you expect or even hope will happen in the future.

“The second strategy is to look backward and romanticize the past.  “Life was so much better before you!”  We remember when we lived near the ocean, or when we were active and healthy, or when we were in college, or before we had kids, or before we went bankrupt.  In both cases we don’t like our present circumstances, so we idealize or romanticize as an escape.  As a result, we sacrifice our present situation, as though it has nothing to offer us but suffering.

“But our real challenge is to find joy or value in the present circumstance of our lives.  That is the only real life we have.  Even if we are working toward making changes in our lives for the better, we have to find value in the effort we are making, while we’re making it.

“Let’s say I live in Vermont, and I am going to take a train to Chicago to visit my mother.  I’ll be on the train all day.  If I spend the time on the train simply anticipating how wonderful it will be when I get to Chicago, then I have missed a whole day of my life.  So I have to find joy on the train.  Maybe there is some interesting scenery.  Perhaps I can talk to people and make some new acquaintances.  Or I might write a haiku. (for me, it would be studying some Torah-gg)”

“Once you get to the future (which never really happens) you will find that it is not ideal.  Like most situations, it will offer you both pleasure and discomfort.  The question of whether the life that awaits you exceeds your expectations or disappoints you has more to do with your attitude than your circumstances.

“But regardless of what the past was like, and what kind of future awaits us, the one thing we all have to work with right now is the situation we are in. “Right Now” you are in the best situation that is possible – because there is no other situation that is available.

“So find some joy or beauty, even if just a moment’s worth, in your present circumstance.

“Don’t sacrifice your life, not for a day, not even for an hour.  Don’t substitute an imaginary life for a real one.”

 

 

TB Bekhorot 36 We need to check the trustworthiness of the priest and of the politician.

When the Temple stood a bakhor, the firstborn of the sheep, goat, and cow, was offered up on the altar and the priests received their gifts like the keva, one of the stomachs. If the animal had a blemish, the whole animal belonged to the priest. After the Temple was destroyed, the priests had to wait until the animal became blemished before he could eat it. Obviously he could not purposely blemish the animal. If he did so, the animal was forever forbidden for him.

The priest could neither shear nor work the bakhor. All he could do is wait until the bakhor developed a blemish on its own. Generally speaking in many aspects the trustworthiness of the priest is beyond reproach. Daf TB Bekhorot 36 discusses how trustworthy the priest was concerning a bakhor. Taking care of the bakhor was time-consuming and expensive until it ultimately if ever developed a blemish. Priests are human too. They might shortcut the process by inflicting a blemish themselves. The question how they trustworthy are they when they declare that the bakhor had a blemish. The answer is simple. A people only won’t lie if they can be easily fact checked otherwise there trustworthiness is suspect.

“A priest is deemed credible to say: I showed this firstborn animal to an expert and he ruled that it is blemished.

“GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A priest is deemed credible to say: An Israelite gave me this firstborn animal with its blemish already inflicted upon it. What is the reason? With regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it. Since the Israelite can be questioned with regard to the veracity of the priest’s claim, it is assumed that the priest will not risk lying. Rav Ashi said: We learn a similar principle in the mishna as well: A priest is deemed credible to say: I showed this firstborn animal to an expert and he ruled that it is blemished. What is the reason the priest’s claim is deemed credible? Is it not because we say that with regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it?” (Sefaria.org translation)

The following story teaches that even a learned priest is not automatically trusted.

“The Gemara relates: Rabbi Tzadok, an erudite priest, had a firstborn animal. He placed barley in wicker baskets for it, and while it was eating, its lip split, rendering the animal blemished. Rabbi Tzadok came before Rabbi Yehoshua, to ask whether or not he is suspected of intentionally causing a blemish in his firstborn animal offering. Rabbi Tzadok said to him: Didn’t we differentiate between a priest who is a ḥaver, i.e., learned, and a priest who is an ignoramus, with regard to their credibility about blemishes found on a firstborn animal? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Yes, we did. Since you are a learned priest, you are deemed credible to testify that this blemish was caused inadvertently.

“Rabbi Tzadok then came before Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi and head of the academy of Yavne at the time. Rabbi Tzadok said to him: Didn’t we differentiate between a priest who is a ḥaver and a priest who is an ignoramus with regard to credibility about blemishes found on a firstborn animal? Rabban Gamliel said to him: No, we did not. Rabbi Tzadok said to him: But Rabbi Yehoshua said to me that yes, we did differentiate in this manner. Rabban Gamliel said to Rabbi Tzadok: Wait until the masters of the shields [ba’alei terisin], a reference to the Torah scholars who battle in the war of Torah, enter the study hall, at which point we will discuss this issue.

“When the Torah scholars entered the study hall, the questioner stood before everyone present and asked: With regard to blemishes found on a firstborn animal, didn’t we differentiate between a priest who is a ḥaver and a priest who is an ignoramus? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, we did not. Rabban Gamliel said to him: But they said to me in your name that yes, we did differentiate.

“Rabban Gamliel continued: Yehoshua, stand on your feet and they will testify against you that you did, in fact, say that we differentiated in such a case. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: How should I act in this situation? If I were alive and Rabbi Tzadok were dead, the living can contradict the dead, and I could deny issuing that ruling. Now that I am alive and he is alive, how can the living contradict the living? I have no choice but to admit that I said it.

“In the meantime, Rabban Gamliel was standing and lecturing, and Rabbi Yehoshua all the while was standing on his feet, as Rabban Gamliel did not instruct him to sit. He remained standing in deference to the Nasi. This continued for some time, until it aroused great resentment against Rabban Gamliel, and all of the people assembled began murmuring and said to Ḥutzpit the disseminator: Stop conveying Rabban Gamliel’s lecture, and he stopped.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Midterm elections are just over a week away. Before we vote for any candidate, we should do our due diligence and investigate how trustworthy is the candidate. Of course, we want a candidate who supports Israel and the Jewish community facing the rising tide of anti-Semitism. We also need candidates who obey the law, who won’t violate the Constitution, and who defend our freedoms and democracy against those with autocratic power tendencies. Do they lie even when they are easily fact checked? We need candidates who are willing to work for us and only serve to enrich themselves at the public expense.

 

TB Bekhorot 33b What’s the difference between דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין and pesik raisha?

I fully didn’t really understand the difference between דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין and פָסִיק רֵישָא וְלֹא יָמוּת until Art Scroll elucidated them. Remember one may not actively create a blemish on the firstborn animal. The case under discussion is may a person blood let a firstborn animal that was congested with excess blood, even if the animal will die if one does not let the excess blood?

“Rabbi Shimon permits one to blood let the firstborn animal even though it will cause a blemish. “Rabbi Shimon’s ruling is based on his general position thatדָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין, an unintended act is permitted. That is, a person may carry out a permissible act, even if-as an unintended consequence-a second, forbidden act might also be performed. [For example, one who drags the chair across the lawn might make a furrow in the ground (which is forbidden on the Sabbath under the category of plowing). Rabbi Shimon permits dragging the chair, since the person’s intent is to move the furniture, not to make a furrow.] In our case, Rabbi Shimon permits bloodletting although a blemish might result, because it is not the Kohen’s intent to render the animal permitted for his own use by blemishing it; rather; his focus is on saving the animals life. {The Sages and Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibit bloodletting, hold that and “unintended” act is forbidden.]

“[Rabbi Sherman permits an “unintended” act only if the forbidden consequences is a possible result, not an inevitable one (פָסִיק רֵישָא וְלֹא יָמוּת). Thus, Rabbi Shimon’s dispensation in our Mishna is limited to where the bloodletting might-but will not necessarily-inflict a blemish. If it will certainly inflict one, Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is forbidden.” (Art Scroll, TB Bekhorot 33b2, note 13)

 

God's promises vs politician's promises

Prince Albert of England once visited the laboratory of a scientist named Lyon Playfair. According to Playfair’s Biographer Sir Wemyss Reid, as the Prince and the scientist stood near a cauldron of boiling lead, Playfair asked, “Has Your Royal Highness any faith in Science?”

“Certainly,” answered Prince Albert. Playfair watched the Prince’s hand in a special solution and then told him to use his hand to ladle out some of the hot metal. The Prince plunged his hand into the cauldron and scooped up some in his palm-and he wasn’t injured.

If Prince Albert could place that kind of faith in a respected scientist, how much more so may we trust God’s promise to us! In this week’s Torah portion, Lekh Lekha, God promises Abraham and his descendants (us!) By saying, “Look toward heaven and count the stars, If you’re able to count them. He added, “So shall your offspring be.” And because he (Abraham) put his trust in the Lord, He reckoned it to his merit.” (Gen. 15:5-6)

Abraham sets an example we would be wise to follow. He didn’t waver at the God’s promises even though he was tested 10 times. (Pirke Avot 5:4) It’s not always wise to trust in the assurances made by human beings. Midterm elections are only two weeks away. Vote wisely because promises made by politicians are conveniently forgotten after the election. As Jonathan Swift popularized the expression in his 1783 book Polite Conversation where a character says, “I beg your pardon, My Lords, promises and pie-crust are made to be broken. But when we are afraid we surely we can put our confidence In the Lord as The Psalmist Sings: “Israel, Trust In The Lord-He Is Their Help And Shield.” (Ps. 115:9)

TB Bekhorot 31 I’m the Taxman

The end of the fourth chapter of our massekhet discusses the disqualification of a person whose is suspect of violating halakha or other unacceptable behaviors. One such person who is disqualified the tax collector. “The Sages taught in a baraita: Initially, the Sages would say with regard to one who is a ḥaver and became a tax collector that he is rejected from his status as a ḥaver. Even if he later resigns from his position as a tax collector, he is not accepted. In later generations they went back to saying that if he resigns from his position as a tax collector he is like any other person and may be accepted once again as a ḥaver.” (TB Bekhorot 31a, Sefaria.org translation)

“A ḥaver denotes a member of a society or order ("chaburah," "chaburta," "k'neset" = "aggregation," "company," "union"), or of a union of Pharisees, for the purpose of carrying out the observance of the laws of food purity to their fullest possible development. In their eyes, any person whose observance of the food purity or tithing laws was doubtful was an am ha'aretz, whose contact was defiling.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaver_(title)) To become a ḥaver, had to appear before three people and swear or promise that he will carry out the observance of the food purity to the full possible development. A ḥaver had to be a pious and scrupulous person in his behavior.

Like all governments, Rome needed taxes to be collected to run smoothly. Rome farmed out to individual people the job of collecting taxes. Each tax collector was told how much he had to collect. Rome didn’t care how much the tax collector collected on top of that amount. Tax collectors were known to charge much more than the tax to line their pockets. People resented paying these exorbitant taxes after paying the mitzvot Torah obligates them for the upkeep of the Temple. They also felt that the tax collectors were collaborating with the enemy.

Some things never change especially about paying taxes. The Beatles summed up the high tax rate they had to pay in England in the song Taxman.

One, two, three, four
One, two (one, two, three, four!)

Let me tell you how it will be

There's one for you, nineteen for me
'Cause I'm the taxman
Yeah, I'm the taxman

Should five per cent appear too small?
Be thankful I don't take it all
'Cause I'm the taxman
Yeah, I'm the taxman

I'll tax the street
(If you try to sit, sit)
I'll tax your seat
(If you get too cold, cold)
I'll tax the heat
(If you take a walk, walk)
I'll tax your feet (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMdcE8jdz70)

Being a tax collector during the Roman occupation was inconsistent to say the least with the vision, goals, and purpose of a ḥaver. Consequently, a tax collector could not be a ḥaver.

The Gemara proceeds to tell the following story about a tax collector who resigns and was re-accepted as a ḥaver. “The Gemara relates that one time the Sages needed Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya for a certain matter. Rabba and Rav Yosef and four hundred pairs of Sages ascended to his home. When he heard that they were coming, he tied for them four hundred chairs [takhtekei] to sit on. Eventually the Sages heard that he had become a tax collector. They sent him the following message: Go to your important position as a tax collector, and go to your former status, as we no longer need you. He sent to them the following message: I have repented and am no longer a tax collector. Rav Yosef did not go to him, but Rabba went to him.

“Rav Yosef said in explanation of why he did not go: We learn in a baraita that even if such an individual resigns from his position as a tax collector he is not accepted. Rabba said: We learn in the baraita that in later generations they went back to saying that if he resigns from his position as a tax collector he is like any other person and may be accepted once again as a ḥaver.” ( (TB Bekhorot 31a, Sefaria.org translation)

 

Paying teachers who teach Torah is a relatively new phenomena. TB Bekhorot 29

Daf TB Bekhorot 29 lists mitzvot one is not allowed to accept payment for. Surprisingly one is teaching Torah. “This halakha is also taught in a baraita: “Behold, I have taught you statutes and ordinances, as the Lord my God commanded me” (Deuteronomy 4:5). Just as I learned from God for free, so too, you learned from me for free. And from where is it derived that if one cannot find someone to teach him for free that he should learn even by giving payment? The verse states: ‘Buy the truth, and do not sell it; also wisdom, and instruction, and understanding” (Proverbs 23:23). And from where is it derived that one should not say: Just as I learned by giving payment, so too, I will teach it by receiving payment? The verse states: ‘Buy the truth, and do not sell it.’” Sefaria.org translation)

“The Rambam (פרק ג' מהל' תלמוד תורה הלכה י') rules that it is forbidden to involve oneself in Torah alone and survive on Tzeddakah, and not do any other work which will enable him to earn a living, and to do this is in fact a Chillul Hashem, and a disgrace to the Torah, because it is prohibited for one to derive benefit from the words of Torah in this world; he then cites some of the sources presented above to back up this view that one must have a means of support for himself other than Torah.  The Rambam reiterates this position, albeit in brief, in his Peirush HaMishnayos in Nedarim (פרק ג' משנה ד'), and he rules this way as well elsewhere in his Mishneh Torah (פרק י' מהל' מתנות עניים הלכה י"ח), saying that even a great Talmid Chochom must engage, if necessary, in even a disgusting type of work rather than accept money from others, and he cites examples of Gedolei Yisrael who had menial jobs and refused to accept money offered to them by other people.  This position is also quoted by the Tur (יורה דעה סימן רמ"ו); in the Shulchan Aruch, the Ramo (שם סעיף כ"א) writes that one should not plan to become wealthy by being involved in Torah, because one who thinks that he will, will not achieve the crown of Torah, and then he too quotes the position cited by the Rambam (שם) and by the Tur (שם) prohibiting one to derive personal benefit from the Torah.” (Rabbi Michael Taubes, https://www.koltorah.org/articles/receiving-payment-for-teaching-torah-by-rabbi-michael-taubes)

Over time, practical economic realities made full-time unpaid Torah scholarship impossible, leading to widely accepted exceptions.

The Chasam Sofer too (שו"ת חתם סופר חלק חושן משפט סימן קס"ד) writes that because the Torah will be lost unless people will get paid to be involved in its study, it is permissible today to derive personal benefit from the Torah, and he says as well that the community must hire someone whose job it is to be available for Torah guidance.  Rav Moshe Feinstein (שו"ת אגרות משה יו"ד חלק ב' סימן קט"ז) agrees to this position as well, and encourages people to accept whatever rewards are necessary in order to continue to grow and develop in terms of Torah.  A full analysis of this subject, including a description of many of the sources cited above, is presented in the Sefer Shaarei Talmud Torah (שער ו' פרק ג'), while a brief synopsis is presented by the Mishnah Berurah, in his Biur Halacha (אורח חיים סימן רל"א בד"ה בכל), who notes that under certain conditions, even the Rambam would agree that one may get paid for one's involvement in Torah. (Rabbi Michael Taubes, https://www.koltorah.org/articles/receiving-payment-for-teaching-torah-by-rabbi-michael-taubes)

Here are some other rationalizations why teachers deserve to get paid today.

Compensation for Time (Sechar Batalah): Teachers are technically paid not for the sacred knowledge itself, but as compensation for lost working time or wages they could have earned elsewhere.

Childcare and Supervision: Payment for teaching young children is permitted because it includes watching, disciplining, and caring for the students rather than just pure instruction.

Written vs. Oral Law: Some authorities distinguished between the Written Torah (Mikra) and the Oral Law (Gemara/Talmud), though standard communal practice evolved to support rabbis and educators through full-time stipends.

Communal Need: Later authorities—such as Rabbi Yosef Karo (Kessef Mishneh)—ruled that setting aside the rule is permissible under the principle of Eis la'asos la-Shem (it is a time to act for God to keep Torah from being forgotten)