Judging others justifying ourselves#devartorah#parashathashavua#Shoftim

There was once a widowed trapper who lived deep in the Alaskan wilderness with his 2 year old son. On one occasion their food supplies had run out and the trapper was forced to go and catch some more food. The weather outside was so fierce he reluctantly decided to leave his son behind, entrusted to the care of his faithful dog. While outdoors the weather had got even more violent and the trapper was forced to take refuge overnight in a stand of trees.

When the trapper returned the next morning, he got to the cabin to find the door open and the furniture overturned. A fierce struggle had taken place. There was no sign of his son and his dog lay in the corner looking at him guiltily, with blood all over his mouth. The trapper was deeply distressed, and quickly figured out what had happened. The dog, without food, had turned on his son and killed him. Gathering his axe from his side in a fury the trapper killed his dog.

He then set about searching furiously for some sign of his son. There was still a faint chance his son was alive. As the trapper frantically searched he heard a familiar cry, coming from under the bed. He tipped the bed up to discover his son. He was unharmed, without a scratch or drop of blood upon him. The trapper, flooded with relief, gathered his son in his arms. When he turned around he saw a dead wolf, lying in the corner of the cabin. Then the trapper realized why his faithful dog had been covered in blood. It was the one who had saved his son.

How often we can be like that trapper, quickly assuming to know the truth about a person when in reality our judgements are terribly off mark. 

This week’s Torah portion begins with the verse, “Judges and police you shall place for yourself.” (Dt. 16:18) “Rabbi Simcha Bunim of Pashischo commented: Make for yourselves judges and police, that is, before you go and make judgments about other people, judge yourself first. As the Sages (Bava Batra 60b) have said, ‘First correct yourself and only then correct others.’ (cited in Otzer Chayim)” (Growth through Torah by Rabbi Zellig Plishkin, page 424)

Too often judging others is easier than looking at ourselves in the mirror and seeing our own shortcomings.  Perhaps we should add a new Al Chet to the Yom Kippur liturgy, “For the sin we have committed for condemning in others what we also do while justifying our own actions.”

 

What was he thinking? TB Ketubot 56

Usually the ketubah is written at the time of marriage (nesuin-נִּשּׂוּאִין) and the groom becomes liable at that time for both the sum of 100 or 200 zuz and the tosefet. Sometimes the Gemara records cases that the ketubah was written at the time of betrothal (erusin-אֵרוּסִין). Everybody agrees that the groom becomes liable for the 100 or 200 zuz, with the writing and signing of the ketubah. But the Mishnah on daf TB Ketubot 54b records a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariya. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariya holds that the husband only obligates himself to pay the tosefet at the time of nesuin. “Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If she is widowed or divorced from marriage, she collects the total amount, but if she is widowed or divorced from betrothal, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars. This is because he wrote the additional amount for her in the marriage contract only in order to marry her.” (Sefaria.org translation 

Starting with yesterday’s daf and continuing on today’s daf TB Ketubot 56 we learn about the principle of assessing a person’s intention (umdana- אוּמְדָּנָא) because Rabbi Elazar ben Azariya bases his decision on what was the groom’s mindset.

The Gemara wonders which rabbi, Rav or Rabbi Natan, holds the principle of umdana. “The mishna states that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says that a woman who collects the payment for her marriage contract after marriage receives the main and additional sums, while one who collects it after betrothal receives only the main sum. It was stated: Rav and Rabbi Natan differed with regard to this issue. One said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And one said the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.” (Sefaria.org translation) In the end the Gemara comes to the conclusion that both rabbis hold the principle of umdana. “In any case, it has been established that Rav also follows the principle of assessing one’s intention, which calls into question the conclusion that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, the Gemara concludes: Both Rav and Rabbi Natan follow the principle of assessing intention, and the debate can be explained in a different way.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Since divining the mindset of another person is very subjective, both Rav and Rabbi Natan can still hold the principal of umdana, but come to opposite conclusions. “According to the one who says the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, this works out well. According to the one who says the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, here too, this is an assessment of his intention. Why did he give her the additional sum of the marriage contract? It was due to a sense of intimacy between them, as they were betrothed and were planning to get married. Since he did demonstrate a sense of intimacy with her, the assessment is that he intended to give her the additional sum.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara goes back and forth whether the halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azariya or not. Despite Rav Naḥman vehement assertion that the halakha doesn’t follow Rabbi Elazar ben Azariya, the Gemara overrules him. “And Rav Naḥman also said his own statement: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And the Sages of Neharde’a say in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The Gemara comments: And although Rav Naḥman cursed them and said: Any judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, such and such unspecified misfortune will happen to him, even so the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Since the Gemara presented a number of different opinions, it concludes: And the practical halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.” (Sefaria. org translation)

Both Rambam in his Mishneh Torah (Laws of Marriage, chapter 10, halakha 11) and the Shulkhan Arukh (Even Ha’ezer 55:6) poskin that halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azariya understanding of the groom’s mindset and intention concerning the tosefet.

Tosefet ketubah TB Ketubot 55

The fifth chapter of our massekhet begins on daf TB Ketubot 54b. It introduces the topic of tosefet ketubah (תוספת כתובה), the additional amount of money the groom adds to the base amount of the ketubah. “MISHNA: Although they said as a principle that a virgin collects two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract and that a widow collects one hundred dinars, if the husband wishes to add even an additional ten thousand dinars, he may add it.” (Sefaria.org translation) The basic amount of money of the ketubah was a significant sum to discourage frivolous divorces or to provide for the widow. Why with the groom want to add to that some of either 100 or 200 zuz? The Talmud Yerushalmi suggests a couple of answers. By adding more money to the bottom line of the ketubah, the groom looks like a better catch in the eyes of an important family. Alternately, this additional amount is a means to encourage the father-in-law to provide a larger dowry.

Once the groom stipulates additional money this money becomes indivisible of with the original 100 or 200 zuz. “Rabbi Aivu said that Rabbi Yannai said: The stipulation in the marriage contract as well as additional amounts he chooses to add to the contract are comparable to the marriage contract itself. (תְּנַאי כְּתוּבָּה כִּכְתוּבָּה דָּמֵי)” (Sefaria.org translation) Today’s daf TB Ketubot 55 provides 14 different practical differences of this principle.

“This principle produces a practical difference with regard to many issues. It is relevant to one who sells her marriage contract, indicating that such a sale includes the additional sum of the marriage contract; and to one who waives her marriage contract to her husband or his heirs, teaching that the additional sum is included in this relinquishing of rights to payment of the contract; and to a rebellious woman, from whom the court deducts a specific amount from her marriage contract each week until there is nothing left. These deductions come from the additional sum as well.

“And this principle also results in a practical difference to one who vitiates her marriage contract, as one who states that she received part of the payment for her marriage contract does not receive the remainder without taking an oath, and the additional sum is included in this halakha; to one who demands payment for her marriage contract, as the Sages ruled that from the time she begins to demand the payment she waives her right to further sustenance, and this applies with regard to one who demands the additional sum as well; and to one who violates the precepts of halakha or of Jewish custom, who may be divorced without receiving payment for her marriage contract, including the additional sum.

“It is also relevant to an increase in value, as she does not collect the main or additional sums from the increased value of the property in a case where the husband’s estate was not sufficient at the time of his death to pay the entire cost of her marriage contract but the heirs later increased the value of the property; to an oath, because if the wife is required to take an oath in order to receive her marriage contract, the additional sum is also included in that oath; and to the Sabbatical Year, as the marriage contract is not annulled with other debts in the Sabbatical Year, and this includes the additional sum as well.

“And with regard to one who writes a document transferring all of his property to his sons and leaves his wife a specific plot of land for her marriage contract, this teaches that she receives both the main and the additional sums of her contract only from that land. The aforementioned halakha also teaches that she collects the payment only from land, and specifically from land of inferior quality; and that a widow loses her ability to collect the main and additional sums as long as she is in her father’s home for more than twenty-five years after her husband’s death; and the principle also applies to the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit their mother’s dowry when her husband passes away in addition to the inheritance they receive together with their other brothers. These halakhot apply equally to the additional sum of the marriage contract.” (Sefsria.org translation)

At least in the United States, the tosefet ketubah is pro forma. Written in the ketubah the groom agrees to add another 100 or 200 zuz depending upon the original amount of the ketubah. I once attended a wedding in Israel when the rabbi asked the groom how much he money was adding as the tosefet ketubah. The groom responded with some sum. The Rabbi rejected this amount of money as too low and told the groom to offer a higher amount of money which he did!

One sharp bride TB Ketubot 54

The estate was required to provide sustenance for the widow. Nevertheless, there was a time limit to which an estate had to provide such sustenance for the widow. Who could determine when the estate had to stop providing substance? Was it the widow herself when she went to court and claimed her ketubah sum or was it the estate who said enough, dayenu “Here’s your ketubah”.

 Well the Mishnah on TB Ketubot 52b describes two opposing traditions. “Similarly, if he omitted from the marriage contract the clause: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days you live as a widow in my house, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court. The mishna comments: The residents of Jerusalem would write in this manner, that a widow may remain in her husband’s house throughout her widowhood, and the residents of the Galilee would write in this manner as well, like the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In contrast, the residents of Judea would write: Until the heirs want to give you your marriage contract. Consequently, if the heirs wish, they may give her marriage contract to her and release her, and she must find her own living arrangements and provide for herself.” (Sefarias.org translation)

In the course of discussing this Mishna on today’s daf TB Ketubot 54 we learn when husband and wife have different traditions, which tradition do we follow?

“The mishna taught: And the residents of Jerusalem and of the Galilee would write the marriage contract in this manner, i.e., that if the woman is widowed, she may remain in her husband’s house and receive her sustenance from his property throughout her widowhood. Conversely, the residents of Judea would write that she may live in his house and be sustained from his estate until the heirs decide to give her the marriage contract. It was stated that the amora’im argued over this issue. Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the custom of the residents of Judea, and Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the custom of the residents of the Galilee and Jerusalem.

“Gemara comments: Babylonia and all of its surrounding towns [parvadaha] act in accordance with the opinion of Rav; Neharde’a and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman of Meḥoza who was married to a man from Neharde’a. They came before Rav Naḥman to discuss her marriage contract. He heard from her voice that she was from Meḥoza, whose residents had a distinctive accent.

“Rav Naḥman said to them: Babylonia and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Rav. They said to him: But she is marrying a resident of Neharde’a. He said to them: If so, Neharde’a and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara asks: And until where is the boundary of Neharde’a? Up to any place where the kav measurement of Neharde’a is used. The entire area that utilizes the system of Neharde’a measurements is considered part of its surroundings for the purposes of this halakha.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The bride was pretty sharp. She use the knowledge that the tradition follows the husband’s when there’s a conflict between husband’s tradition and wife’s tradition. Now she determines when the estate need no longer provide her sustenance.

כְּתּוּבַת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין-the male child stipulation TB Ketubot 52-3

The ketubah is like a combination of a divorce settlement or a life insurance policy to protect the woman. If the marriage ends either because of divorce or death, the wife is entitled to the amount of money stipulated in the ketubah. The base amount is either 100 zuz or 200 zuz. No matter what, the woman is not left high and dry without any resources. We have previously learned that the base amount of either 100 zuz or 200 zuz comes from the Torah. The rabbis added other obligations for the groom and for the bride. The Mishnah on TB Ketubot 52b elaborates that even if some conditions were not explicitly written into the ketubah, the court still enforces them. The first one on the list is “male children-בְּנִין דִּכְרִין”

To appreciate this male children stipulation, let me provide some background. The first case is one husband and one wife. A man marries a woman, but unfortunately she dies first. The husband inherits her whole estate. When the husband dies, the estate is divided amongst the male heirs.

Let’s say the man has two wives. Both wives die; consequently both estates go to the husband. When the husband dies, the estate is divided equitably amongst the male heirs regardless of how many children each mother had.

Now that we see the second scenario, we can appreciate “the stipulation of male children” from the standpoint of one of the grandfathers. “If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and therefore takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated.” (Sefaria.org translation) The father-in-law fears that if he gave his daughter a large dowry at the time for wedding the entire dowry will not solely go to his future grandchildren, but also to his grandchildren’s half-brothers. These grandchildren’s half-brothers are not related to him at all. The father-in-law might not be willing to give his daughter such a large dowry because it will not remain in the family when she dies.

The rabbis wanted to incentivize the father-in-law to provide a large dowry which will make his daughter a more attractive marriage candidate. They assured him that all his male grandchildren will receive two ketubah line items. They will receive the dowry and the ketubah sum of either 100 or 200 zuz. The groom will be more willing to make a large monetary contribution towards the marriage if he knows the bride will receive a large dowry which he will enjoy the dividends throughout their marriage.

The Gemara answers: This also applies by Torah law, as it is written: “Take wives for yourselves and bear sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands” (Jeremiah 29:6). This verse requires clarification. Granted, sons are in his hands, i.e., a father can select wives for them, but daughters, are they in his power that he can select husbands for them? It is not the manner of a woman or her family to court a man.[1]

“Rather, the verse teaches us this, that the father should dress her and cover her and give her something, i.e., property, so that men will take the initiative with her and come to marry her. When the verse instructs fathers to marry off their daughters, it means that they must make efforts to ensure this outcome, including bestowing a dowry. The Gemara asks: And up to how much must a father give his daughters? Abaye and Rava both say: Up to one-tenth of one’s property should be handed over to his daughter for her dowry.” (Sefaria.org translation)

There is a financial limit to this rabbinic stipulation. If the estate is less than one dinar, the estate is divided equally amongst all the male heirs. The male child stipulation - כְּתּוּבַת בְּנִין דִּכְרִיןis a rabbinic law. Inheritance is a Torah law. The rabbis were unwilling to uproot a Torah law of inheritance with the rabbinic dictums.

“But if this is the reason for this enactment, say that it should apply even though there is no more than a dinar beyond the value of the marriage contract that the father left over in his estate. The Sages stated that if no property is left for the inheritance, all the sons share the inheritance equally, in accordance with Torah law. The Gemara answers: In a case where their decree would entirely uproot the halakha of inheritance by Torah law, the Sages did not enact the marriage document concerning male children.” (Sefaria.org translation)

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[1] Times have changed. See: https://alphamom.com/parenting/big-kid/teens-and-dating/

Giving tzedakkah the correct way #devartorah#Re-eh#parashathashavua

Everybody knows the importance of tzedakkah. One of the scriptural basis for this mitzvah is found in this week’s Torah portion Re-eh. “If, however, there is a needy person among, one of your kinsmen in any of your settlements…do not harden your heart and shut your hand against your needy kinsman. Rather, you must open your hand…” (Dt. 15:7-8) Ibn Ezra teaches us in his commentary that it is insufficient just to give the poor person money. He explains the phrase “do not harden your heart” to mean “by refraining from addressing comforting words to him.”

Rabbi Zelig Pliskin in his book Growth through Torah tells this story about Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, one of the most important Orthodox poskim, deciders of Jewish Law, in the 20th century.

“Once Rabbi Moshe Feinstein and a student accompanying him were rushing to an important meeting; they were already quite late. A poor elderly Jew stopped them for a donation, and then started talking about his problems. The Rosh HaYeshiva (Rabbi Feinstein) gave him several dollars and then stood listening to him as if he had all the time in the world. The student wondered if perhaps the Rosh HaYeshiva had concluded that they were too late for the meeting.

“Finally the poor man finished and the Rosh HaYeshiva started to walk even more quickly than before. The student asked him, ‘Why did the Rosh HaYeshiva stand and listen? Couldn’t he have just given the money and gone on, since we’re in such a rush?’

“The Rosh HaYeshiva answered that listening to someone unburden his heart is worth more to the person than money.” (page 418-419)

Leo Buscaglia was correct when he said: “Too often we underestimate the power of a touch, a smile, a kind word, a listening ear, an honest compliment, or the smallest act of caring, all of which have the potential to turn a life around.” Don't harden your heart as we prepare for the High Holidays. You never know whose life you will turn around.

Are the daughters sustained by movable property as well? TB Ketubot 51

According to Jewish law one may only have a lien against land but not against movable property. We learned from the Mishna on daf TB 49a that when the father dies, his sons inherit and his daughters are sustained from the estate. “This exposition was expounded by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages in the vineyard of Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father’s death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother’s marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father’s estate….” (Sefaria.org translation) The daughters’ sustenance is considered a lien. Starting on yesterday’s daf and continuing on today’s daf TB Ketubot 51, the amoraim and tannaim, in reverse chronological order, argue whether the daughters may also be sustained from movable property.

Here are some amoraim discussing whether the daughter may be sustained with movable property as well. “The Gemara relates: There was an incident of this kind that came before the court in Neharde’a, and the judges of Neharde’a ruled that the daughters must be supported from the movable property that their father had left. Likewise, a case occurred in Pumbedita, and Rav Ḥana bar Bizna collected the sum from movable property. Rav Naḥman said to the judges: Go reverse your decisions, and if not, I will collect your houses [appadnaikhu] from you in order to compensate those you ruled against.

“The Gemara further relates: Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi thought to issue a ruling requiring a man’s heirs to sustain his daughters from the man’s movable property. Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said to them: This is a matter about which Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish did not take action, i.e., they did not issue a ruling to this effect; will you take action in this regard? If those great Sages were not sure enough of the halakha to issue a practical ruling, how can you do so?” (daf Ketubot 50b, Sefaria.org translation)

Rabbi Yehuda  HaNasi and Rabbi Shimon ben Lazar, two tannaim, are having the same disagreement “The Sages taught: With regard to both property that has a guarantee, i.e., real estate, and property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable objects, the court removes them from the orphan heirs for the sustenance of the wife and for the daughters. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to property that has a guarantee, the court removes it from the possession of the sons, who are the heirs, for the sake of the sustenance of the daughters.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara concludes this sugiya by stating that the halakha is accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. “The Gemara comments: Even though we maintain in general that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with his colleague, and therefore the halakha should follow his ruling rather than that of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, here the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As Rava said: The halakha is that a woman can collect her claim from land but not from movable property, whether for the marriage contract, for sustenance, or for her livelihood.” (Sefaria.org translation)

If you think that the matter is closed and halakha never changes, here’s the rest of the story. The Tosefot ד"ה מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי וְלָא מִמְּטַלְטְלִי concludes by saying that now daughters are sustained by movable property as well thanks to a takana of the Geonim! I think that’s progress.

Is there a limit to a person’s generosity? TB Ketubot 50

Between yesterday’s daf and today’s daf TB Ketubot 50 we learned of five different takanot the Sanhedrin issued. The first takana on today’s daf deals with the topic of tzedakkah. Is there a limit to a person’s generosity?

“Apropos the ordinances instituted by the Sages in Usha, the Gemara cites another one. Rabbi Ile’a said: In Usha the Sages instituted that one who dispenses his money to charity should not dispense more than one-fifth. That opinion is also taught in a baraita: One who scatters should not scatter more than one-fifth, lest he render himself destitute and need the help of other people. And an incident occurred involving a certain individual who sought to dispense more than one-fifth of his property as charity, and his friend did not let him act upon his wishes. And who was this friend? Rabbi Yeshevav. And some say that Rabbi Yeshevav was the one who wanted to give too much charity, and his friend did not let him do so, and who was the friend? Rabbi Akiva.

“(Even though 20% of a person’s income is the maximum amount one should donate to tzedakkah is a rabbinic institution, the rabbis always try to find a biblical verse to support their enactment-gg) Rav Naḥman said, and some say it was Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov who said: What is the verse that alludes to this maximum amount of charity? “And of all that You shall give me, I will surely give a tenth of it [aser a’asrenu] to You” (Genesis 28:22). The double use of the verb that means to donate one-tenth indicates that Jacob, who issued this statement, was actually referring to two-tenths, i.e., one-fifth.

“The Gemara asks: But the latter tenth is not similar to the first tenth, as it would be one-tenth of what remained after the first tenth had been removed. Consequently, the two-tenths would not equal one-fifth of the original total. The Gemara answers that Rav Ashi said: Since the verse could have said: I will surely give one-tenth [aser a’aser], and instead stated: “I will surely give a tenth of it [aser a’asrenu],” it thereby alludes to the fact that the latter tenth is like the first one.” (Sefaria.org translation)

According to Jewish law a person should give somewhere between 10% and 20% of his income to tzedakkah. Today’s daf explains the 20% ceiling. Jewish tradition considers one who gives less than 10% is considered a miser.

We probably all should be contributing more tzedakkah than we are right now

Should public shaming be allowed? TB Ketubot 49

According to the Torah there is no obligation of father to feed his children. Nevertheless, Jewish law obligates the father to feed his children up to the age of six because he is obligated to sustain his wife. Up to the age of six the children are considered an extension of the mother; consequently, just as the must sustain his wife he too must sustain her children. From six years old onward, the children are on their own. Quoting a baraita, two out of three tannaim on today’s daf TB Ketubot 49 hold that a father feeding his children is the proper thing to do.

“As it is taught in a baraita, it is a mitzva to sustain daughters, and the same applies by an a fortiori inference to sons, who are engaged in the study of Torah. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a mitzva to sustain sons, and the same applies by an a fortiori inference with regard to daughters, due to the dishonor they will suffer if they are forced to go around begging. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: It is an obligation to sustain the daughters after their father’s death; however, during their father’s lifetime both these and those, sons and daughters alike, are not sustained.” (Sefaria.org translation)

After the destruction of the Second Temple, the Sanhedrin went into exiled as is recorded in TB massekhet Rosh Hashanah. “The Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone (in the Temple)…to Yavne, and from Yavne to Usha (in the Galilee)…and from Usha to Shefaram, and from Shefaram to Bet She’arim, and from Bet She’arim to Tzippori, and from Tzippori to Tiberias” (Talmud Rosh HaShana 31a).” In Usha, the sages made a series of takanot, rabbinic enactments. The first takana on our daf ordained that fathers should sustain their children until the age of bar/bat mitzvah. “Rabbi Ile’a said that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥanina: In Usha the Sages instituted that a man should sustain his sons and daughters when they are minors” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara wonders whether this was an obligation of a father or just the proper thing to do. It cites three different cases where the Rabbi involved didn’t force the father to feed his minor children, but rather used social pressure or shaming to achieve the appropriate end. These cases leads us to believe that a father is still not obligated to feed his children past the age of six years old.

“When they would come before Rav Yehuda to complain about a father who refused to sustain his children, he would say to them: The jackal [yarod] bears offspring and casts the obligation to feed them on the residents of the town? Even a jackal feeds its young, and it is certainly proper for a father to support his children.

“When they would come before Rav Ḥisda to register a similar complaint, he would say to them: Turn over a mortar for him in public, as a raised platform, and let that father stand up and say about himself: The raven wants to care for its sons, and yet this man does not want to support his sons…

“When an incident of this kind would come before Rava, he would say to the father: Is it satisfactory to you that your sons are sustained through charity? All these incidents prove that the halakha is not in accordance with the enactment of Usha; although these Sages stated forcefully that it is proper for a father to support his children, they did not force him to do so by the authority of the court.  The Gemara adds: And we said this halakha only when he is not wealthy and must toil hard to provide food for his children, but if he is wealthy we coerce him against his will to sustain them. Like this case of Rava, who coerced Rav Natan bar Ami, who was a wealthy man, to donate to charity, and collected from him four hundred dinars for charity. This shows that even in the absence of a particular obligation, the court will compel a person to give charity if he can afford it. The same reasoning certainly applies to a man’s own children.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Shaming the father rather than forcing him to sustain his children is the more usual course of action codified by the Shulkhan Aruk. “A man is obligated to provide sustenance to his sons and daughters until they are 6 years of age, even if they own property that came to them through their mother's father's house. From then and on, we provide for them as a decree of the sages until they are adults. If he does not want to, we denounce him and shame him and antagonize him [until he does]. If he [still] does not want to, we denounce him in public and say, "So-and-so is cruel and does not want to provide for his children! He is worse than a non-kosher bird that [at least] provides for its chicks!" But we do not force him to provide them sustenance. When does this ruling apply? When there is no economic estimation. But if the estimate shows that there is enough money for them to get charity, we remove it from him by force, for charity purposes, and we feed them until they become adults” (Even Ha’Ezer, 71:1)

We have to ask ourselves the question “Does public shaming achieve its goals?” “Public shaming is nothing new. It has been effectively used as punishment across societies for centuries. Aided by the rise of technology and accessibility of information, public shaming has evolved and moved on from pillories to social media platforms. Twitter, Facebook and Instagram now all serve as the modern mediums through which digital mob justice is served. 

“Singapore even has its very own portal for social justice warriors, Stomp, which has over 600,000 likes on Facebook. The phrase “after you kena Stomp” has even become part of the Singaporean consciousness and colloquial vernacular, serving as a warning to others on the risks of being shamed through the platform for their behaviour.

“Public shaming has proved itself as a capable deterrent to prevent bad or inappropriate behaviour. It has made a difference to problems such as animal cruelty and copyright issues, while also increasing awareness of social and safety problems. This is evident from the rise of public mask shaming in Singapore, in the wake of COVID-19. Since April 2020, there were 80 reported cases of disputes involving commuters who did not mask up in public, with many of them going viral, and about 40 of them being fined^[1]. 

“But it is not without drawbacks. Public shaming has also given rise to modern-day character assassinations, witch hunts and occurrences where decent people are punished for minute transgressions, or for what amounts to no real transgressions at all. Some are even punished for just their opinions. In the end, all it does is create an environment of surveillance, fear and conformity. 

“The ability to wield such a form of humiliation and the potential cost leads to many questions. Is it a means for positive social change? Or a form of toxic harassment? How does it all play out in Singapore? To find answers, we turn to Dr Brandon Koh, an Industrial-Organisational Psychologist and Lecturer in Human Resource Management programme at SUSS, to provide insights.

“The anticipation of being publicly shamed may be a useful deterrent against violating social norms. That said, public shaming can be harmful.

“Whilst public shaming is intended at reducing undesired behaviours, the recipient of public shame often suffers a loss of reputation, self-esteem, and sense of belonging to the community. These effects may be long-lasting and disproportionate to the act. For instance, the shamed behaviour may be a single mistake or momentary accident that does not truly reflect a person’s moral character. Yet, when netizens view or react to public shaming social media posts, they may over generalise, condemning the person as a whole. To make matters worse, some netizens may treat such content as light-hearted entertainment and gossip, even though the consequences to the shamed individual are very real. This further exacerbates the negative effects of public shaming.

“How has technology and social media changed and enabled public shaming behaviour?

“Koh: Firstly, technology and social media platforms can offer people a shroud of anonymity, lowering the barrier to initiate or participate in public shaming. Secondly, follow-up comments often echo the original message whilst those who oppose rarely express their objections. This provides a biased perception that the masses endorse the public shaming of a certain incident or person, which could be untrue. Thirdly, social media magnifies the reach of such public shaming acts to a wider audience.

“In short, social media amplifies the negative effects of public shaming. In fact, one might notice the resemblance between public shaming on social media and cyberbullying…

“During the COVID-19 pandemic, is shaming those who do not wear a mask on social media a reasonable action? Do you think individuals who engage in public shaming sometimes cross the line when it comes to taking the law into their own hands?

“Koh: To be fair, people may express their own opinions on social media platforms. Instead, I would question the newsworthiness and impact of public shaming. As I alluded to earlier, public shaming generates much negativity, causing disproportionate harm to the targeted individual, whilst on-lookers may use these contents for personal entertainment or social gossip. To top it off, public shaming may not even really reduce the undesired norm-breaking behaviour because it reaches a limited audience.

“Is public shaming the way forward for keeping the bad behaviour in check

“Koh: Certainly not. I hope that we can cultivate positive norm-abiding behaviours through fostering a sense of belonging and shared responsibility in our communities. We can also exemplify desired behaviours through education, cultural teachings, and role models instead of punishing undesirable ones via public shaming.

“However one views the act of public shaming, be it as a useful deterrent, cyberbullying in disguise or a slippery slope which requires treading with caution and control, there is no doubt that it is here to stay. While being an activist for a cause or calling someone out on their error may be admirable acts, there is ultimately never a reason to gang up and shame someone online or to support and engage in doxxing.

“Jon Ronson perhaps sums it up best in his book So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, stating that “Well-meaning people, in a crowd, often take punishment too far.[2]” We have to know and do better. It is important to keep our own behaviour in check and not engage in public shaming. If not, what does it actually say of us?” https://www.suss.edu.sg/blog/detail/putting-public-shaming-to-shame#:~:text=Public%20shaming%20has%20proved%20itself,of%20social%20and%20safety%20problems.

Would you shame a person in public?

What exactly are the husband’s responsibilities? TB Ketubot 48

Yesterday we learned some of the benefits a husband acquires when he marries his wife. Starting at the very bottom of daf TB Ketubot 47b and continues on today’s daf Ketubot 48, we learn some of the husband’s responsibilities towards his wife. Everybody agrees that the husband has to provide his wife with food, clothing, and conjugal visits. Some believe that these requirements are Torah based laws or others believe some of the 3 are rabbinic enactments.

“Rava said: This tanna, in the baraita cited below, maintains that the obligation of a husband to provide his wife’s sustenance applies by Torah law, as it is taught with regard to the verse pertaining to a husband’s obligations toward his wife: “If he takes another wife for himself, her food [she’era], her clothing [kesuta], and her conjugal rights [onata], he shall not diminish” (Exodus 21:10). “She’era”; this is sustenance, and it likewise states: “Who also eat the flesh [she’er] of my people” (Micah 3:3). “Kesuta” is understood in its literal sense as referring to clothing. “Onata”; this is her conjugal rights, which is stated in the Torah, and so it says: “If you shall afflict [te’aneh] my daughters” (Genesis 31:50), which indicates that a husband may not deprive his wife of her conjugal rights.

“The baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar says: “She’era”; this is her conjugal rights, and so it says: “None of you shall approach to any who is near [she’er] of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6), which demonstrates that the word she’er is used in the context of sexual relations. “Kesuta” is understood in its literal sense as referring to clothing. “Onata”; this is sustenance, and so it says: “And He afflicted you [vayanekha], and made you suffer hunger, and fed you with manna” (Deuteronomy 8:3).” (Sefaria.org translation) Both Rava and Rabbi Elazar agree that these responsibilities are Torah laws. They just disagree which word describes which responsibility.

Rambam (Moses Maimonides) holds that food, clothing, and conjugal rights are Torah enactments.  (Mishneh Torah, Sefer Nashim, Laws of marriage, chapter 12 halakha 2,) Ramban (Moses Nachmanidies) holds that food and clothing are rabbinic enactments. See his extended commentary of these obligations on Exodus 21:10. The Magid Mishnah holds that clothing and conjugal rights are Torah laws while food is a rabbinic enactment.

“Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that she’era and kesuta should be interpreted as follows: In accordance with her flesh [she’era], i.e., her age, give her clothing [kesuta]. This means that he should not give the garments of a young girl to an elderly woman, nor those of an elderly woman to a young girl. Similarly, kesuta and onata are linked: In accordance with the time of year [onata], give her clothing [kesuta], meaning that he should not give new, heavy clothes in the summer, nor worn-out garments in the rainy season, i.e., the winter, when she requires heavier, warmer clothes. The entire phrase, therefore, refers only to a husband’s obligation to provide clothing for his wife.” (Sefaria.org translation) The halakha demands at the husband provide appropriate clothing to his wife. (Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Sefer Nashim, Chapter 13, halakha 1; Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’Ezer, 73:1)

Rav Yosef teaches that intimate relations should really be intimate. I think what he is trying to teach us is that husband and wife should enjoy each other’s body. “Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: “She’era,” this is referring to closeness of flesh during intercourse, which teaches that he should not treat her in the manner of Persians, who have conjugal relations in their clothes.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Finally even in death, he must treat her in the lifestyle that she has become accustomed to. “Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife died, the court enters his property and buries her in accordance with his dignity. The Gemara asks: Does the court act in accordance with his dignity and not in accordance with her dignity? What if she came from a more dignified family than her husband?

“The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin meant: Even in accordance with his dignity, i.e., if his family was more distinguished than hers, he must bury her in accordance with the dignity of his family. The Gemara adds: This comes to teach us that she ascends with him to his social status and does not descend with him, and this principle applies even after her death, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna.” (Sefaria.org translation)[1]

 

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[1] The Mishnah concludes “Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman for his wife’s funeral.” (Sefaria.org translation) Check out the scenes from one my favorite plays /movies A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=doKP3Il9R1k and noticed the mourners in the background be willing the dead https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1EtA0HrUrYM

The entitlements and responsibilities of a father and of a husband TB Ketubot 47

Starting with the Mishnah on daf TB Ketubot 46b, our massekhet pivots by leaving the subject of adultery and turns its attention to the entitlements and the responsibilities of the father and the husband. The Mishnah lists these basic benefits and responsibilities.

“A father has authority over his daughter with regard to her betrothal through money, through a marriage document, or through intercourse. Likewise, a father is entitled to items she has found, and to her earnings, and to effect the nullification of her vows, i.e., a father may nullify his daughter’s vows. And he accepts her bill of divorce on her behalf if she is divorced from betrothal before she becomes a grown woman. And although he inherits her property when she dies, e.g., property she inherited from her mother’s family, he does not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime.” (Sefaria.org translation) The Gemara discusses the source for each one of these entitlements and responsibilities.

On today’s daf TB Ketubot 47 we learn the reason why the father is entitled to the items his daughter has found. The Gemara gives a two word answer “due to enmity (מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה).” (Sefaria.org translation) According to the Torah, a father is only obligated to support his children until they reach the age of six years old. These young children are subordinated to and dependent upon their mother. Since the husband is obligated to support his wife, he has to support his children until they are no longer subordinated to and dependent upon the mother. I can’t imagine a father unwilling to support his children above and beyond the letter of the law. I am happy to report that later on we shall learn that the rabbis enacted an ordinance that fathers have to support their daughters until the age of bat mitzvah.

Rashi ד"ה מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה explains that if the younger daughter does not turn over what she has found (think of it like a winning lottery ticket), the father might bear a grudge and not provide her with sustenance. Tosefot ד"ה מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה explains the grudge differently. Since the father has the right to marry off his young daughter to anyone he pleases, he might exact revenge upon his daughter for not sharing what she has found by marrying her to an unworthy or disgusting looking man. Either interpretation doesn’t shine a good light upon the father.

The second half of the above Mishnah discusses the entitlements and the responsibilities of the husband. “If the daughter married, the husband has more rights and obligations than her father had before the marriage, as he consumes the produce of her property during her lifetime, and he is obligated to provide her sustenance, her redemption if she is captured, and her burial upon her death” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara begins to explain that these entitlements and responsibilities are based on reciprocity between husband and wife. “They instituted that a husband must provide his wife with her sustenance in exchange for his rights to her earnings; and it is his duty to provide her with redemption from captivity in exchange for his right to consume the produce of her property; and it is his obligation to attend to her burial in exchange for the fact that he inherits the dowry that she brought into the marriage and which is written in her marriage contract. Consequently, a husband may consume the produce of her property.” (Sefaria.org translation)

What’s the significance of “Consequently, a husband may consume the produce of her property?” One might have thought that if the produce he enjoyed was only worth $1000 and the captives demand a $2000 ransom, the husband could say that he will ante up $1000 and the rest is his wife’s problem to raise. The rabbis did not put a cap on either the produce he ate or the sum of money necessary to redeem his wife. No matter how much produce he enjoyed, the husband is obligated to redeem his wife no matter what the ransom is.

 

 

 

Hopefully the discussions of the defamed betrothed na’ara are more theoretical than common TB Ketubot 45-6

The Torah provides the punishments in the case of defamation, motzi shem r’a- מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע    for a betrothed na’ara, a girl between the age of 12 and 12 ½ years old. If the husband is lying, he is lashed, fined 100 shekels, and can’t divorce his wife. If indeed the betrothed girl committed adultery, she is stoned.

“A householder^*householder takes a woman [as his wife] and cohabits with her. Then he takes an aversion to her and makes up charges against her and defames her, saying, “This is the party I took [to wife]; but when I approached her, I found that she was not a virgin.”

“In such a case, the girl’s father and mother shall produce the evidence of the girl’s virginity before the elders of the town at the gate. And the girl’s father shall say to the elders, “To this party I gave my own daughter to wife, but he has taken an aversion to her; so he has made up charges, saying, ‘I did not find your daughter a virgin.’ But here is the evidence of my daughter’s virginity!” And they shall spread out the cloth before the elders of the town. The elders of that town shall then take that party and flog him, (ס) and they shall fine him a hundred [shekels of] silver and give it to the girl’s father; for [that householder] has defamed a virgin in Israel. Moreover, she shall remain his wife; he shall never have the right to divorce her.

“But if the charge proves true, the girl was found not to have been a virgin, ס) then the girl shall be brought out to the entrance of her father’s house, and her town’s council^*town’s council shall stone her to death; for she did a shameful thing in Israel, committing fornication while under her father’s authority. Thus you will sweep away evil from your midst.” (Deuteronomy 22:13-21, Sefaria.org translation)

Dappim TB Ketubot 45 and 46 spend a lot of time discussing issues surrounding capital punishment for this unfortunate girl if it is found to be true that she committed adultery. Hopefully, such cases were rare in Israel and a lot of this discussion is only theoretical. I also think the rabbis were trying their best to limit this bad outcome. First of all, they limited the window of opportunity in this case to six months alone. Secondly, all capital cases had to be adjudicated by Sanhedrin of 23 judges. Both the husband and the wife were able to bring witnesses to bolster their case. These witnesses were grilled. We shall learn “A Sanhedrin that puts a man to death once in seven years is called a murderous one. R. Eleazar ben Azariah says, 'Or even once in 70 years.' R. Tarfon and R. Akiva said, 'If we had been in the Sanhedrin, no death sentence would ever have been passed';” (TB Makkot 1:10) I take solace in this knowledge.

The places of stoning was some distance from the entrance of the parents’ house, the city gate, or the court. Even this distance was provided to help the condemned. “The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a betrothed young woman who committed adultery, one stones her at the entrance to her father’s house. If she does not have an entrance to her father’s house, one stones her at the entrance to the gate of that city. And in a city that is mostly populated by gentiles, where she cannot be stoned at the city entrance, one stones her at the entrance to the court.” (TB Ketubot 45b, Sefaria.org translation) Many Rishonim explained that this unfortunate girl is not stoned immediately in front of the court that sentenced her. Rebeinu Aharon Halevi in Shitah Mekubetzet explains the reason why the place of stoning is that some distance from the court. Perhaps (hopefully in my view) while the condemned is walking to the place of stoning, new witnesses will appear and exonerate her.

Of course this na’ara needs to be warned to be culpable. TB Ketubot 46 teaches that the defamer also needs to be warned. “The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the warning, i.e., the prohibition that serves as the source for the flogging for a defamer? Rabbi Elazar says that the prohibition is derived from the verse “You shall not go up and down as talebearer” (Leviticus 19:16). Rabbi Natan says that it is derived from: “Then you shall keep yourself from every evil thing [davar ra- דָּבָ֥ר רָֽע]” (Deuteronomy 23:10), which is expounded to mean dibbur ra- דִיבּוּר רָֽע, evil speech.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The next Mishna on today’s daf moves on to completely different topics. More about that tomorrow.