Why Moses had to annul his vow with in the presence of Yitro TB Nedarim 65

On today’s daf TB Nedarim 65 the Gemara learns a new halakha based on yesterday’s story concerning Moses and his vow to his father-in-law Yitro.

“It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:12): With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another, they dissolve the vow for him only in the presence of the one who is the subject of the vow. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Naḥman said: As it is written: “And the Lord said to Moses in Midian: Go, return to Egypt; for all the men are dead” (Exodus 4:19). Rav Naḥman notes that the verse specifies where God spoke to Moses, and explains that God said to him: In Midian you vowed to Yitro that you would not return to Egypt, go and dissolve your vow in Midian. And where does it say that Moses vowed to Yitro? For it is written: “And Moses was content [vayo’el] to dwell with the man” (Exodus 2:21). The word vayo’el is related to the word ala, and ala means nothing other than an oath, as it is written: “And he…brought him under an oath [ala]” (Ezekiel 17:13), and the halakhot of dissolution of oaths are identical to those of dissolution of vows.”

The Ron ד"ה תַּנְיָא: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ אֵין מַתִּירִין לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו cites Yerushalmi’s two reasons why the vow has to be dissolved before the one who was the subject of the vow. The first reason is embarrassment (בּוּשָה). If the vow benefits the other person, the rabbis didn’t want the person who made the vow to rush and annul it. If he is embarrassed by dissolving the vow, he might think twice before doing so. The second reason is suspicion (חָשׁוּד). If he annuls his vow without the other party knowing, people will suspect him of violating his vow without knowing the circumstances. By having both parties together, news will spread that the vow has been dissolved. The Ron qualifies the difference between the two reasons. If the reason is embarrassment, then the two parties always have to be together when the vow is dissolved. If the reason is suspicion and the annulment is announced, then the two parties don’t have to be together when the vow is dissolved.

Moses’ vow certainly benefited Yitro. He vowed that he would not leave Midian with his new wife. Even though God gave him the petakh to annul his vow, Moses had to do so in front of his father-in-law. I think both reasons can work in tandem to explain why God insisted Moses dissolve his vow in front of Yitro.

When the vow benefits the subject of the vow, some commentators explain that the phrase “in his presence (בְּפָנָיו)” means that the subject of the vow must also agree to the annulment. Otherwise the vow still remains in force. See the Rosh. Obviously, Yitro must have given his consent as well.

Is a nolad, new circumstance, a good enough opening, petakh, to dissolve a vow? TB Nedarim 64

With today’s daf TB Nedarim 64 we begin chapter nine in our massekhet. We leave behind the discussion on the precise meaning of words in vows and start learning how a person can extricate himself from his vow. A petakh (פֶּתַּח) is the justification by which a Sage rabbinic court annuls a vow in a case where the one who vowed expresses regret having done so by saying he/she didn’t fully appreciate its implications.

Rabbi Eliezer and the sages disagree about nolad (נּוֹלָד), an unexpected new circumstance that the one who made the vow now regrets it. “And Rabbi Eliezer further said: They may broach dissolution by asking about a new situation, but the Rabbis prohibit it. How might they broach dissolution by asking about a new situation? …If one said: Entering this house is konam for me, and that house became a synagogue, and he said: Had I known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed, in this and all such cases Rabbi Eliezer permits the halakhic authority to use this as a basis for the dissolution of the vow, and the Rabbis prohibit it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Ḥisda provides the scriptural proof for Rabbi Eliezer’s position. “Rav Ḥisda said: For the verse states that God told Moses he could return to Egypt from Midian, despite having vowed to Yitro that he would not do so: “For all the men are dead that sought your life” (Exodus 4:19), and he took the vow only because it would be dangerous for him to return to Egypt. The Gemara explains the proof: But death is a new circumstance, and Moses’ vow was dissolved based on the men dying. Therefore, it can be understood from here that they may broach dissolution by asking about a new situation.” (Sefaria.org translation)

We begin the book of Exodus in three weeks and learn about Moses’ early life. Here are the rest of the details that the Gemara takes for granted that you already know. Moses protects an Israelite slave by killing an Egyptian taskmaster. Fearing for his life, Moses flees to Midian. There he meets his future wife by the well, marries her, and works as his father-in-law’s shepherd. According to the Gemara daf TB Nedarim 65a his father-in-law Yitro insisted that Moses swear to him that he would never leave without his permission (based on Exodus 2:21). God spoke to Moses out of a burning bush that was not consumed sending him to free the Israelite slaves out of the land of Egypt.

Now we understand the petakh God supplied Moses to extricate him from his vow. “For all the men are dead that sought your life.” Their death is the new circumstances by which Moses’ vow is dissolved. There is one slight problem. Tradition identifies these men as Datan and Aviram, fellow Israelites, who actually died much later in the wilderness during Korakh’s rebellion. They were not dead when God spoke to Moses. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi provides a new understanding to what death encompasses that supports Rabbi Eliezer’s position.

“Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:… And it was taught in a baraita: Four are considered as if they were dead: A pauper, and a leper, and a blind person, and one who has no children. A pauper, as it is written: “For all the men are dead” (Exodus 4:19). As explained above, they were not actually dead but had descended into poverty, and yet they were considered dead.” Datan and Aviram lost all their possessions and their status in the community. Consequently they were dead men walking.

The Ron ד"ה ירושלמי cites the Yerushalmi to explain the rabbis’ position why death cannot be considered a new circumstance. “Isn’t death a new circumstance (for those who know Hebrew this turn of the phrase is delicious-וְהָא מִיתָה דְּנוֹלָד הוּא)” Rabbi Zeira said both poverty and death are too common to be considered new circumstances.”

"Nobody believes a liar...even when he is telling the truth!" #devartorah#Vayigash#parashathashavua

Do you remember Aesop’s fable about the boy who cried Wolf?

There once was a shepherd boy who was bored as he sat on the hillside watching the village sheep. To amuse himself he took a great breath and sang out, "Wolf! Wolf! The Wolf is chasing the sheep!"

The villagers came running up the hill to help the boy drive the wolf away. But when they arrived at the top of the hill, they found no wolf. The boy laughed at the sight of their angry faces.

"Don't cry 'wolf', shepherd boy," said the villagers, "When there's no wolf!" They went grumbling back down the hill.

Later, the boy sang out again, "Wolf! Wolf! The wolf is chasing the sheep!" To his naughty delight, he watched the villagers run up the hill to help him drive the wolf away.

When the villagers saw no wolf they sternly said, "Save your frightened song for when there is really something wrong! Don't cry 'wolf' when there is NO wolf!"

But the boy just grinned and watched them go grumbling down the hill once more.

Later, he saw a REAL wolf prowling about his flock. Alarmed, he leaped to his feet and sang out as loudly as he could, "Wolf! Wolf!"

But the villagers thought he was trying to fool them again, and so they didn't come.

At sunset, everyone wondered why the shepherd boy hadn't returned to the village with their sheep. They went up the hill to find the boy. They found him weeping.

"There really was a wolf here! The flock has scattered! I cried out, "Wolf!" Why didn't you come?"

An old man tried to comfort the boy as they walked back to the village.

"We'll help you look for the lost sheep in the morning," he said, putting his arm around the youth, "Nobody believes a liar...even when he is telling the truth!"

Even though I’m pretty sure that Avot deRabbi Natan did not know Aesop’s fables, this collection of aggadah on this week’s Torah portion Vayigash comes to the same conclusion. "Nobody believes a liar...even when he is telling the truth!" Joseph sends his brothers back to Canaan to bring the rest of the family to Egypt so he could sustain them during the famine. “They went up from Egypt and came to their father Jacob in the land of Canaan. And they told him, “Joseph is still alive; yes, he is ruler over the whole land of Egypt.” His heart went numb, for he did not believe them.” (Genesis 45:26)

We live in an age of conspiracy theories, misinformation, and outright lies. My Congressman-elect George Santos has admitted that he lied about his life. He never graduated college; he never worked for Wall Street firms; he never owned property; and his grandparents are not Jewish let alone survived the Holocaust. So far he is refusing to resign his seat. If he does take his seat, he will feel quite at home with all the other Congressman who accept the big lie that the 2020 election was stolen.

Telling the truth has become even more important than ever. Rabbi Hannina ben Hama teaches “The seal of the Holy One is truth.” (TB Shabbat 55a) I have taught that if you tell the truth, you have God’s seal of approval. When you have God’s seal of approval, the truth you speak will ultimately triumph over lies. 

Context is everything Nedarim 63

Today we finish the eighth chapter of our massekhet. Previously we understood the expression “until it will be Passover-הַפֶּסַח עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא” to mean through the end of Passover. The Mishnah on today’s daf TB Nedarim 63 teaches us that you have to take the context of the vow into consideration in order to understand exactly what the person meant. The Mishnah will give us three examples when the context will provide the expiration date of the vow.

Example #1 “Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of one who says: Wine is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be Passover, it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the night of Passover, i.e., until the time when it is customary for people to drink wine in order to fulfill the mitzva of drinking the four cups, but he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to fulfill this mitzva.” Everybody knows drinking 4 cups of wine is at the Seder. Obviously the person wants to fulfill this mitzvah; consequently, even though he use the expression “until it will be Passover-הַפֶּסַח עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא” everybody understands the vow will expire right before Passover begins so he may fulfill the mitzvah of drinking 4 cups of wine.

Example  #2 “Similarly, if he said: Meat is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be the fast of Yom Kippur, he is prohibited from eating meat only until the eve of [leilei] the fast. This is because it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the time when it is customary for people to eat meat in the festive meal before the fast, and he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to participate in that meal.” Since it was a custom to eat meat before a holiday even including Yom Kippur, everybody understands that the vow will expire right before Yom Kippur because everybody eats meat to prepare for the fast.

Example #3 “Rabbi Yosei, his son, says: One who vows: Garlic is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be Shabbat, it is prohibited for him to eat garlic only until the eve of Shabbat, as it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the time when it is customary for people to eat garlic.” (All three translations come from Sefaria.org) Back during Talmudic times, Jews regularly ate garlic (and even today.) The Gemara (TB Baba Kama 82a) enumerates different excellent qualities of garlic. They believed it strengthens the body and they used it for medicinal purposes to treat different sicknesses. Eating cooked garlic was considered effective to increase a man’s virility. Therefore Ezra ordained the custom was to eat garlic erev Shabbat. Everybody knows why a person eats garlic Friday night; consequently, the person’s vow will expire before the onset of Shabbat.

When comes to understanding a person’s vow we have to take two things into consideration. What was the common meaning of the words of vow when he made the vow and what was the context in which the vow was spoken? 

Appropriate and inappropriate behavior TB Nedarim 62

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 62 teaches us how a scholar, Sage, or Rabbi should behave. “It is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “To love the Lord your God, to listen to His voice, and to cleave to Him” (Deuteronomy 30:20). This verse indicates that a person should not say: I will read the written Torah so that they will call me a Sage; I will study Mishna so that they will call me Rabbi; I will review my studies so that I will be an Elder and will sit in the academy…Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok says: Do things for the sake of their performance, not for any ulterior motive, and speak words of Torah for their own sake. Do not make them a crown with which to become glorified, and do not make them nor make them a dolabra [kordom] with which to hoe, i.e., do not use Torah study as a means of earning a livelihood. And this is an a fortiori inference: If Belshazzar, who made use only of sacred vessels that had become non-sacred vessels, was uprooted from the world, one who makes use of the crown of Torah, whose sanctity is permanent, all the more so shall he be uprooted from the world.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Would only rabbis have enough humility to live by these words! Far too often rabbis abuse their position and pull rank. I tried to remember these words and live by them. Hopefully I succeed more often than not. Sometimes some rabbis believe they are above the law and commit serious crimes. These crimes really profane the holy name of God (Hilul Hashem ‘חִלוּל  ה).

On the other hand there are some common procedures that are allotted to kohanim (priests) out of respect (kavod כָּבוֹד) “And a priest, from where do we derive that he takes his portion first? As it is written: “And you shall sanctify him, for he offers the bread of your God” (Leviticus 21:8). And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The phrase “and you shall sanctify him” applies with regard to every matter of sanctity: to open first, to recite a blessing first, and to take a fine portion first.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Most commentators explain “to open first” means that a kohen is honored with the first aliyah to the Torah. The Rosh understands this phrase in a social context. In a public discussion, the kohen is given the honor of speaking first. The Ron explains the phrase “to recite a blessing first” means he is given the honor to lead Grace after meals. Rashi expands this honor to include reciting the motze (מוֹצִא) over the bread at the beginning the meal on behalf of the community. The Rosh expanses honor to include all blessings over other foods like eggs, cookies, fruit (birahkot nehenim ברכות נהנים)

The Ron explains “to take a fine portion first” means when portions are distributed equally, a priest can choose his share first. Many Akhronim point out that even though taking his share first is the kohen’s privilege, it is better not to put him in a morally uncomfortable position. Consequently, the kohen not taking the better portion is the preferable course of action. Rashi explains the case thusly. When a family of brothers all who are kohanim, the most scholarly amongst them takes his share first.

Of course since the rabbis compose the Talmud, they gave themselves the same privileges as a kohen.

Do their views have to be consistent? TB Nedarim 61

 The Mishnah back on daf TB Nedarim 60 records a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei. “If he takes a vow that wine is forbidden to him until Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. If he said: Until it will be Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover ends, as he may have intended for the vow to apply as long as it was still Passover (Rosh). If he said: Until before Passover (עַד לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח), Rabbi Meir says: It is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. Rabbi Yosei says: It is forbidden to him until it ends.” (Sefaria.org translation) לִפְנֵי can mean before or it could have the meaning close to (לִפְנוֹת) i.e. the end of Passover. Passover is a seven day holiday in Israel and an eight day holiday in the Diaspora. When the person says “until before Passover,” he could be referring to the first day of Passover or the second day of Passover or the third day of Passover, etc. Rabbi Meir says people can live with ambiguity and rules that the vow is over at the onset of Passover. Rabbi Meir believes people can’t live ambiguity. To make sure Passover must be over before the vow has been completed.

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 61 raises a problem consistency between our Mishna and a Mishna found in massekhet Kedushin 64b.

Ҥ It was taught in the mishna that if one vows that wine is forbidden to him until Passover, he is prohibited from drinking wine until the Festival arrives. However, if one vows that wine is forbidden to him until before Passover, there is a dispute as to whether the vow remains in effect until the beginning or the end of the Festival. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Meir, who holds that it is prohibited only until the beginning of Passover, maintains that a person does not place himself in a position of uncertainty, and Rabbi Yosei holds that a person does place himself in a position of uncertainty?

“The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following mishna (Kiddushin 64b): In the case of one who has two groups of two daughters born to him from two women, e.g., he has two daughters from his first wife, and after his first wife died he remarried and had two daughters with his second wife, and he said: I betrothed my older daughter to someone, but I do not know if I meant the older of the older group of daughters; or if I meant the older daughter of the younger group; or if I meant the younger daughter of the older group, who is nevertheless older than the older daughter of the younger group, then all three of those daughters are prohibited to marry another man due to the uncertainty, as he failed to clarify which daughter was betrothed. This applies to all the daughters apart from the younger daughter of the younger group, who is certainly not betrothed. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

“Rabbi Yosei says: They are all permitted to marry, apart from the older daughter of the older group. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Meir, one must take into account any of the possible meanings of the imprecise expression: My older daughter, whereas Rabbi Yosei maintains that only the narrowest possible meaning of the phrase is taken into account. This contradicts the mishna here.” (Sefaria.org translation)

In the case of the daughters the position of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei are reversed. Obviously, the Gemara would like the rabbis to hold consistent positions. Our Gemara simply solves this problem thusly. “In response to this question, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Avdimi said that Rav said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, i.e., the views stated in the mishna here must be reversed in order to reconcile them with the mishna in Kiddushin. And it is indeed taught in a baraita that this is the principle: With regard to any vow which specifies a fixed time, i.e., an event that occurs on a particular date, and one said that the vow applies until before that event, Rabbi Meir says the vow applies until the event ends, and Rabbi Yosei says that the vow is in effect only until the event arrives. This is another proof that the opinions in the mishna here must be reversed.” (Sefaria.org translation)

This whole sugiya is also found in massekhet Kiddushin. The Ron on our daf ד"ה והתניא says that one need reverse the opinions. He comments that these tannaim are not arguing about ambiguity, but rather how people speak in their day-to-day life. Rabbi Meir holds that when people say “until before Passover” they mean when Passover is over while Rabbi Yosei holds they mean until Passover begins. The day today language concerning betrothal is completely different; consequently, the tannaim can rule differently than they did in Nedarim. He prefers this explanation because when there is a disagreement between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Meir, the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei. Since were studying vows, having the original Rabbi Yosei position as the halakha is more logical. He knows that Rambam agrees with him, but notes that Ramban poskins like Rabbi Meir.

 

Does anybody know what time it is? TB Nedarim 60

With daf TB Nedarim 60 we begin the eighth chapter of our massekhet. This chapter clarifies what a person means when he sets a time component to his vow. For example what’s the difference between saying “today- hayom הַיּוֹם” and “one day-yom ekhad-יוֹם אֶחָד” “MISHNA: If one vows: Wine is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam], and for that reason I will not taste it today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until the conclusion of that day at nightfall, and not for a twenty-four hour period….but if he said that wine is forbidden to him for one day…he is prohibited from drinking wine from the day and time he took the vow to the same time the next day” (Sefaria.org translation) you can imagine how some people might make a mistake in concluding their vow by confusing the two terms, hayom and yom ekhad.

“GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one says: Wine is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam], and for that reason I will not taste it today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until nightfall. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Even when darkness falls he is not permitted to drink wine immediately; rather, he is required to request that a halakhic authority dissolve his vow.

“The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason that he must request the dissolution of the vow once it has already expired? The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef said: The Sages issued a rabbinic decree in the case of one who said that his vow applies today, due to the confusion that might be caused in a case where one said that his vow applies for one day, and is therefore forbidden to drink wine for twenty-four hours. There is a concern that if one who said that his vow applies today is permitted to drink wine that night, one who took a vow for one day will think that his vow also expires as soon as it is nightfall.” (Sefaria.org translation) The halakhic authority will ascertained by his questions whether the person vowed “today” or “one day” and tell him when his vow is over.

Even though we spent two months studying massekhet Nedarim and immersing ourselves in all the details of vows, the rabbis frowned upon people making vows. There is enough in the Torah that is forbidden that we don’t have to add to that list. Don’t think that making a vow forbidding something permitted makes you more pious. The result is even worse than just the opposite. It’s as if you have worshiped idols.

“Ravina said: Mareimar said to me: Your father said as follows, in the name of Rav Yosef: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha taught by Rav Yirmeya bar Abba? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: Anyone who vows, it is as if he has built a personal altar, which is forbidden because one must bring all offerings to the Temple. And one who fulfills the vow, is as though he burns portions meant for the altar in the Temple upon it, i.e., the personal altar, thereby increasing his sin.” (Safaria.org translation)

How do we view the new growth of something prohibited? Part three TB Nedarim 59

This is the third day that we been discussing agricultural laws pertaining to the Sabbatical Year (the shemita year in Hebrew), orla (the first three years of a fruit tree’s life), and mixed seeds (kelayim) amongst others. The Gemara wants to know how we view the new growth of something prohibited. Is this new growth just a continuation of the original growth and prohibited or is it considered a new entity and permitted? If the new growth is considered like the original growth and prohibited, can it be annulled when is mixed with permitted other growth?

We are in the middle of massekhet Nedarim whose topic is vows. We have to ask ourselves what triggered this agriculture tangent. Finally today’s daf TB Nedarim 59 connects this discussion back to the Mishna on daf TB Nedarim 57a. We need to remember that Rabbi Yannai holds the position that the new growth is considered a completely new entity while Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yonatan both hold that the new growth is just considered the continuation of the original growth.

“Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai based on the mishna (57a): For one who says: This produce is konam upon me, or it is konam upon my mouth, or it is konam to my mouth, it is prohibited to partake of the produce, or of its replacements, or of anything that grows from it. If he says: This produce is konam for me, and for that reason I will not eat it, or for that reason I will not taste it, it is permitted for him to partake of its replacements or of anything that grows from it. This applies only with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown. However, with regard to an item whose seeds do not cease after it is sown, it is prohibited for him to partake even of the growths of its growths (The reason that growths of growths are still prohibited is because the person who made the vow is treating the forbidden food like hekdesh, something sanctified as a donation to the Temple. Once something has this sanctification, it cannot be replaced and its growths are also considered hekdesh-gg). Apparently, permitted growths do not neutralize the prohibition.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara defends Rabbi Yannai’s position by saying that vows are different than that much discussed onion planted during the shemita year. “Rabbi Abba said: Konamot are different; since if he wishes to do so he can request that a halakhic authority dissolve the vows and render the objects of the vows permitted, their legal status is like that of an item that can become permitted, and its prohibition is not nullified by a majority of permitted items.” (Sefaria.org translation) Rabbi Yannai can hold the position that new growth is considered a new entity after the Sabbatical Year and new growth is considered a continuation the original growth involves a person making a vow. The new growth of the vow is not nullified because it is an item that can be permitted (דָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מַתִּירִין, וְאֵין בָּטֵיל בָּרוֹב).

The classic example of something that can be permitted that is never nullified (דָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מַתִּירִין, וְאֵין בָּטֵיל בָּרוֹב) is the egg that is laid on the holiday. One may not eat this egg.  If this unfortunate a gets mixed up with other eggs, all these eggs are forbidden to be eaten on the holiday because the unfortunate egg is not nullified by a majority. This unfortunate egg will be permitted to be eaten once the holiday is over. It is better to wait to eat these eggs when they are permitted than eat a potentially forbidden egg on the holiday.

A vow is something that can be permitted. The person who made the vow can go to a Sage and have the vow annulled. That’s how Rabbi Yannai can hold both positions that new growth is just a continuation of the old growth and forbidden as in our Mishna and new growth is a new entity when discussing that shemita onion planted during the first year of a brand-new seven-year cycle.

The Gemara tries to compare the vow found on the Mishna we’ve been discussing and a person making a declaration that this portion of his harvest is terumah, the tithe given to the priests. Before the produce is given to the priest, the person can change his mind and go to a Sage and have his declaration annulled. The original produce goes back to the state of untithed produce, tevel, and he has to designate something else as terumah.

Ultimately the Gemara rejects this comparison. “Rather, say that there is another distinction between konamot and other cases where one may request dissolution by a halakhic authority. Granted, in the case of konamot, there is a mitzva to request that a halakhic authority dissolve them, due to the statement of Rabbi Natan, as Rabbi Natan said: Anyone who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar outside the Temple, and one who fulfills that vow, it is as though he burns an offering upon it. However, in the case of teruma, what mitzva is there to request that a halakhic authority dissolve its designation? Therefore, items forbidden by konamot are considered items that can become permitted, and teruma is not.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Tomorrow we begin the eighth chapter of our massekhet.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

How do we view the new growth of something prohibited, part two? TB Nedarim 58

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 58 continues yesterday’s discussion. The Gemara wants to know how we view the new growth of something prohibited. Is this new growth just a continuation of the original growth and prohibited or is it considered a new entity and permitted? If the new growth is considered like the original growth and prohibited, can it be annulled when is mixed with permitted other growth?

Remember during the Sabbatical Year (in Hebrew Shmita) the land lays fallow. We are only allowed to eat the produce grown. We are not allowed to be involved in any commerce with this produce. At the end of the growing season, this produce must be destroyed. With this information Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar shows that new growth is considered a new entity. When Shmita leeks (ḥasayot) i.e. grown during the Sabbatical Year are replanted in the eighth year, they are permitted. The new growth is considered a new entity and since is greater than the original bulb it may be annulled.

“Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the ḥasayot belong to a Jew who is suspect about observance of the Sabbatical Year, at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year it is permitted to weed with him, as there is no concern that there might be Sabbatical-Year sanctity.” (Sefaria.org translation)  

This baraita refutes what opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yonatan expressed in yesterday’s daf that new growth is just a continuation of the original growth and prohibited. The Gemara now defends Rabbi Yoḥanan’s and Rabbi Yonatan’s position.

“The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yonatan, who stated regarding orla and food crops in a vineyard that their permitted growth does not neutralize the prohibition of the original fruit or food crops respectively. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The Sabbatical-Year produce is different. Since its prohibition is engendered by means of the ground, its nullification is effected by means of the ground as well. The prohibition can be neutralized by means of the growth that results from replanting the forbidden plant in a permitted manner.” (Sefaria.org translation)  

At first glance this is a strange position. Only Sabbatical Year produce is prohibited because it is grown in the ground?! All agricultural produce is grown in the ground. The Ron explains the qualitative difference between the Shmita year on the one hand and on the other hand orla and kelayim. The Torah tells us that the land itself is impacted by the Sabbatical Year as it is written “the seventh year the land shall have a sabbath of complete rest…” (Leviticus 25:4) When it comes to orla time is the deciding factor for only during the first three years of the trees life are the fruits of the tree forbidden. When it comes to kelayim, the forbidden mixture of different kinds of seeds planted together is the deciding factor.

This conversation on our question continues on tomorrow’s daf as well.

 

 

How do we view the new growth of something prohibited? TB Nedarim 57

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 57 asks a very interesting question which is triggered by the Mishna. The Mishna teaches the formula of a vow that will prohibit exchanges and growth as if it were hekdesh, sanctified to the Temple. Conversely, it also teaches the formula of a vow which will not prohibit exchanges and growth. The latter formula has proviso. “This applies only with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown. However, with regard to an item whose seeds do not cease after it is sown, e.g., bulbs, which flower and enter into a foliage period and repeat the process, it is prohibited for him to partake even of the growths of its growths, as the original, prohibited item remains intact.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara wants to know how we view the new growth of something prohibited. Is this new growth just a continuation of the original growth and prohibited or is it considered a new entity and permitted? If the new growth is considered like the original growth and prohibited, can it be annulled when is mixed with permitted other growth?

“Yishmael, a man of Kefar Yamma, and some say, a man of Kefar Dima, raised a dilemma with regard to an onion that one uprooted during the Sabbatical Year, which was therefore sanctified with the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, and he then planted it during the eighth year, and its growths that developed in the eighth year exceeded its principal original Sabbatical-Year onion. And this is the dilemma that he raised: Its eighth-year growth is permitted, and its Sabbatical-Year principal is prohibited. Since its growth exceeded its principal, do those permitted growths neutralize the prohibition of the onion, or do they not? Yishmael came and raised the dilemma before Rabbi Ami, and he did not have an answer readily available.” (Sefaria.org translation) The onion is an item who seeds do not cease. The only thing were allowed to do with the produce of the Sabbatical Year is eat it. At the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year all the produce grown must be destroyed.

Answering this question the Gemara provides three answers, one declaring that the new growth is a brand-new entity and two deciding that the new growth is just a continuation of the old growth and prohibited.

“Yishmael came and raised the dilemma before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who resolved it for him from that which Rabbi Ḥanina Terita’a said that Rabbi Yannai said: With regard to an onion of teruma that one planted, if its growths exceeded its principal, it is permitted. Here too, the eighth-year growth should neutralize the prohibition of the Sabbatical-Year onion.”(Sefaria.org translation) When there is 100 times more non-teruma (in this case onions) mixed together with the teruma produce, then the teruma produce is annulled and permitted. Rabbi Yannai holds that the new growth is a new entity.

Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees and holds that we consider the new growth as a continuation of the old growth and forbidden. “Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a young vine within three years of its planting, whose fruits are orla and forbidden, that one grafted onto an old, permitted vine, and there were fruits on the younger vine, even though the younger vine added two hundred times the number of fruits that were there when it was grafted, and those additional fruits are permitted because they draw their nourishment from the older vine, the fruit that was on the younger vine before it was grafted is forbidden. Although, in principle, when the permitted part of the mixture is two hundred times the forbidden orla, the prohibition is neutralized, in this case, the prohibition is not neutralized, as the forbidden fruit was there from the outset.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

Rabbi Yonaton also disagrees and holds that we consider the new growth as a continuation of the old growth and forbidden. “And Rabbi Shmuel bar Rabbi Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: With regard to an onion that one planted in a vineyard, creating a forbidden mixture of food crops in a vineyard, and then the vineyard was uprooted, and most of the onion grew in a permitted manner, it is forbidden. Apparently, both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yonatan disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, and therefore, there is no clear resolution to the dilemma.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

This question how we view the new growth of something prohibited continues on tomorrow’s daf when our Mishna is brought into play.

 

What the heck is a dargash? TB Nedarim 56

The mishnayot on today’s daf TB Nedarim 56 all follow the same pattern. If one makes a vow prohibiting something general, does that include something that is specific and related but not identical to it? The first Mishna on our daf not only gives a good example, but highlights a difference of opinion. “For one who vows that a house is forbidden to him, entry is permitted for him in the upper story of the house; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: An upper story is included in the house, and therefore, entry is prohibited there as well. However, for one who vows that an upper story is forbidden to him, entry is permitted in the house, as the ground floor is not included in the upper story.” (Sefaria.org translation) The Rabbis and Rabbi Meir also disagree in the next Mishna. “For one who vows that a bed is forbidden to him, it is permitted to lie in a dargash (דַּרְגֵּשׁ), which is not commonly called a bed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: A dargash is included in the category of a bed. Everyone agrees that for one who vows that a dargash is forbidden to him, it is permitted to lie in a bed.”  (Sefaria.org translation)

You won’t be surprised that even the sages in the Talmud weren’t exactly clear what exactly a dargash (דַּרְגֵּשׁ) is. Our daf provides two different explanations with the first being much more interesting than the second. Everybody agrees that is a type of small bed upon which nobody sleeps. Ulla provides the first explanation. “GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is a dargash? Ulla said: It is a bed of good fortune, placed in the house as a fortuitous omen, and not designated for sleeping.” (Sefaria.org translation) I wonder whether people carrying a rabbit’s foot for good luck is similar to having a small bed in the house for good luck.

Tosefot describes it as a bed upon which nobody sits on because it made for honor and good luck. Similarly the Goanim describe it as something very beautiful and ornamental. The Ron comments that they had the custom to make a bed for the house’s good luck. =מזלגד. It is similar to what is found at the end of the chapter “what a woman may go out with on Shabbat” massekhet Shabbat 67b “One who says: My fortune be fortunate [gad gaddi] and be not weary by day or by night;” (Sefaria.org translation) The Rosh and the Arukh defines gada (גדא) as a heavenly being and the bed is made in his honor for good luck. The Sheta Mekubetzet defines it just a little differently. This bed is prepared for the mazal of the house which is like a heavenly being appointed over the house. It is said that nothing happens down on earth that doesn’t have a heavenly being watching over it in heaven. This bed is in honor of God’s agent. One should not think this is idolatry for this comparable to Elijah’s seat at a brit milah.

Rav Taḥalifa provides the second interpretation what is a dargash. “When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: I asked one of the Sages about the meaning of dargash, and Rav Taḥalifa, from the West, was his name, who frequented the tanners’ market. And he said to me: What is a dargash? It is a leather bed.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Many other commentators define a dargash like a small bed or stepstool to aid somebody getting to the larger and higher bed. (Rambam’s commentary on the Mishna, the Meiri, the Bartenura, and others) This definition works well with Rav Taḥalifa’s interpretation.

 

 

 

 

 

Rava shows us the way TB Nedarim 55

On today’s daf TB Nedarim 55 we read a powerful story of humbly admitting your mistake. Both the Amoraim in Israel and in Babylonia didn’t speak Hebrew. They spoke Aramaic. Palestinian Aramaic is slightly different than Babylonian Aramaic. The Aramaic Targum, the translation of the Bible into Aramaic, translates the Hebrew word tevua (תְּבוּאָה), grain as alata (עֲלַלְתָּא). Rava asks his teacher Rabbi Yosef what the word alata encompasses. And now here’s the rest the story.

“The Gemara relates: The son of Master Shmuel commanded his workers that they give thirteen thousand dinars to Rava from the crop [alalta] produced in his fields on the banks of the Panya River. Rava sent this question before Rav Yosef: What is called alalta; what crops are included in the category of alalta? Rav Yosef said: It is as it is taught in the baraita cited above: And they agree with regard to one who vows that tevua is forbidden to him that it is prohibited for him to eat from only the five species of grain; just as tevua includes only the five species, so too alalta includes only the five species. Abaye said to him: Are the two cases comparable? Although tevua means grain and includes only the five species, alalta means crop and includes all items that grow.

“The messengers returned with the answer to his question and came before Rava. He said: That was not a dilemma for me, i.e., the fact that alalta means all items that grow. This is the matter that is a dilemma for me: What is the legal status of profits from the rent of houses and the rent of boats? Do we say: Since they depreciate, their legal status is not comparable to that of a crop? Only items that are consistently profitable are similar to crops. House boats deteriorate with use, and their depreciation diminishes the profits. Or perhaps, since their depreciation is not conspicuous, their legal status is comparable to that of a crop. The Rabbis stated Rava’s reaction before Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said: And since he does not need us, and he believes that he knows the answer himself, why did he send us the question? Rav Yosef became angry with Rava.

“Rava heard that Rav Yosef was angry and came before him on Yom Kippur eve to appease him. He found the attendant of Rav Yosef, who was diluting a cup of wine with water before him. Rava said to the attendant: Give me the cup so that I will dilute the wine for him. The attendant gave it to him and Rava diluted the cup of wine. While Rav Yosef, who was blind, was drinking the wine, he said: This dilution is similar to the dilution of Rava, son of Rav Yosef bar Ḥama, who would dilute wine with more than the standard amount of water. Rava said to him: Correct, it is he.

“Rav Yosef said to Rava: Do not sit on your feet until you tell me the explanation of this matter: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And from the wilderness Mattana and from Mattana Nahaliel, and from Nahaliel Bamot” (Numbers 21:18–19)?

“Rava said to him that it means: Once a person renders himself like a wilderness, deserted before all, the Torah is given to him as a gift [mattana], as it is stated: “And from the wilderness Mattana.” And once it is given to him as a gift, God bequeaths [naḥalo] it to him, as it is stated: “And from Mattana Nahaliel.” And once God bequeaths it to him, he rises to greatness, as it is stated: And from Nahaliel, Bamot, which are elevated places. And if he elevates himself and is arrogant about his Torah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, degrades him, as it is stated: “And from Bamot the valley” (Numbers 21:20). And not only is he degraded, but one lowers him into the ground, as it is stated: “And looking over [nishkafa] the face of the wasteland” (Numbers 21:20), like a threshold [iskopa] that is sunken into the ground. And if he reverses his arrogance and becomes humble, the Holy One, Blessed be He, elevates him, as it is stated: “Every valley shall be lifted” (Isaiah 40:4). When Rav Yosef heard that interpretation, he understood that Rava was aware of the error of his ways in acting arrogantly toward his teacher, and was pacified by Rava’s display of humility.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Too many people in power whether they are leaders in government, leaders in business, or leaders in the synagogue are guided by pride and not humility. The Bershider Rebbe said: “One must beware of pride, since pride needs no foundation on which to build. A man may be lying on his bed; his house may be called; he may be covered with a torn blanket, and yet he may think in his heart: ‘I am great! I am great!’” (The Hasidic anthology, page 353) Rava teaches us an important lesson. Only a humble person is able truly to repent.

I wonder how many of us at the moral courage and fiber to humbly admit that we were wrong. By humbling admit that we were wrong, we begin to show that we have the potential for greatness.

There is no hamburger meat. May I buy liver instead? TB Nedarim 54

With daf TB Nedarim 54 we begin the seventh chapter of our massekhet. This chapter continues the same theme of the previous one. It clarifies what the terms used meant in a vow during the time of the Talmud. The first Mishna of our chapter raises an interesting question. Does consultation mean inclusion? When you send somebody to the supermarket to pick up a piece of meat and the supermarket is out of it and your personal shopper asks you whether he may substitute something else in its stead, is that new item included in the vow a person makes? For example, if a person makes a vow not to eat meat, does this include hooves, intestines, and the windpipe or may he eat them? That is the disagreement between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna.

“The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree? The Gemara explains that the Rabbis maintain: Any item with regard to which an agent must consult the person who dispatched him before purchasing it, is not considered the same type. Since the agent must ask whether he can purchase gourds, apparently they are not a vegetable. And Rabbi Akiva maintains: Any item with regard to which an agent must consult is considered the same type. With regard to food of a different type, he does not consult. Abaye said: Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to lashes that the one who vowed is not flogged if he ate gourds, as the issue of whether or not he violated his vow is not entirely clear.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara wants to know who the anonymous Tanna Kamma is. The Ron explains the reason why. When deciding the halakha when there’s a disagreement between Rabbi Akiva and another Tanna, the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva. When deciding the halakha between Rabbi Akiva and a group of rabbis, the halakha follows the rabbis.

By careful analysis the Gemara learns that the Tanna Kamma is none other than Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. “The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna here? The Gemara answers: It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a dispute in the baraita: For one who vows that meat is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to eat all types of meat, and it is prohibited for him to eat meat of the head, and of the feet, and of the windpipe, and of the liver, and of the heart, although people do not typically eat meat from those parts of the body. And it is prohibited for him to eat meat of birds, as it too is popularly called meat. However, it is permitted for him to eat of the meat of fish and grasshoppers, as their flesh is not called meat.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who vows that meat is forbidden to him, is forbidden in all types of meat, and is permitted to eat meat of the head, and of the feet, and of the windpipe, and of the liver, and of the heart and of birds, and needless to say he may also partake of fish and grasshoppers. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would likewise say: Innards are not considered meat, and one who eats them is not a person, meaning that the innards are not fit for human consumption. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to one who eats them, in terms of the halakhot related to their consumption, e.g., vows, they are considered as meat. However, with regard to purchase, one who purchases them is not a person. In any case, apparently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, as he maintains that although if an agent fails to find meat he is required to consult his employer before replacing it with liver, it is not considered meat with regard to vows.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Now we know that consultation does not mean inclusion. Just make sure that the grasshoppers of the kosher kind.