Paying back a debt is a mitzvah TB Ketubot 86

Today’s daf TB Ketubot 86 discusses different issues surrounding the collection of debts.

Here is a very straightforward case. “Ameimar said in the name of Rav Ḥama: With regard to one who has incumbent upon himself the obligation of his wife’s marriage contract and also owes money to a creditor, and he possesses land and possesses money, the obligation to the creditor is settled with the payment of money, whereas the debt to the woman of her marriage contract is settled with the payment of land, this one in accordance with his law, and that one in accordance with her law. Since the creditor gave him money, it is fitting that he should receive ready cash in return. The woman, in contrast, did not give him anything but relied upon the lien on his land, so she is therefore given land.” (Sefaria.org translation)

What happens when the debtor only has enough money to pay the creditor or the ketubah to the wife? “And if there is only one plot of land, and it is adequate for the payment of only one debt, we give it to the creditor, and we do not give it to the woman.” (Sefaria.org translation) Rashi supplies the reason why the creditor takes precedence over the former wife. The rabbis want to encourage people to lend money. If the lenders were not sure they would be paid back, they would never lend money to anybody.

Paying back a debt or loan is more than an obligation, it is a mitzvah. “Rav Kahana said to Rav Pappa: According to your opinion, that you say the repayment of a creditor is a mitzva, if the debtor said: It is not amenable to me to perform a mitzva, what would be the halakha? If there is no obligation to repay a loan other than to perform a mitzva, then what happens if someone is not interested in performing the mitzva? He said to him: We already learned this halakha in a baraita: In what case is this statement said, that one is liable to receive forty lashes for committing a transgression? It is said with regard to negative mitzvot. However, with regard to positive mitzvot, for example, if the court says to someone: Perform the mitzva of the sukka, and he does not do so, or: Perform the mitzva of the palm branch, and he does not do so, the court strikes him an unlimited number of times, even until his soul departs, in order to force him to perform the mitzva. The payment of a debt is a positive mitzva, and one who refuses to pay a debt can be compelled to do so in this manner.” (Sefaria.org translation)

First of all, I don’t believe the rabbis meant that you whip the debtor until he is dead because the creditor would never get his money back. The whipping would just be an incentive for the debtor to say something to the fact, “I’ll pay my debt now.” I think the rabbis were only exaggerating like when I say, “If I told you once, I’ve told you a million times.”

Secondly, where in the Torah is paying back a debt is one of the 613 mitzvot? There is no explicit mitzvah of paying back a debt. Once again Rashi supplies the answer how paying back a debt is a mitzvah. He writes that paying back a debt is keeping one’s word. Keeping your word is a mitzvah. As the proof text, he quotes TB Baba Metzia 49a. “Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: “A just ephah, and a just hin, shall you have” (Leviticus 19:36)? But wasn’t a hin included in an ephah? Why is it necessary to state both? Rather, this is an allusion that serves to say to you that your yes [hen] should be just, and your no should be just. Apparently, it is a mitzva for one to fulfill his promises.” (Sefaia.org translation)

Creditors v Heirs TB Ketubot 84-85

Dappim TB Ketubot 84-85 shares a lot of case law. When a man loans money he expects his borrower will pay them back. When the borrower does pay him back, the creditor gives him the loan document and the borrower will tear it up. The Gemara discusses what happens when there’s more than one creditor besides the widow and when the borrower dies before the loan is repaid. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon have completely different opinions in the Mishna. “With regard to one who died and left behind a wife, and a creditor to whom he owed money, and heirs, all of whom claim payment from his property, and he had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others, Rabbi Tarfon says: The deposit or the loan will be given to the weakest one of them, … Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. If the halakha is that it belongs to one party, one follows the halakha and leaves aside considerations of mercy. Rather, the halakha is that the money will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath. They therefore have a more absolute right than the others to their father’s property.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara goes on to define who the weakest one according to Rabbi Tarfon is. “The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: To the weakest? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It means that the money is given to the one whose proof is the weakest, i.e., the one with the latest date on the document attesting to the debt. His document is the weakest, as one can collect from property that was sold by the deceased only if it was sold subsequent to his incurring the debt. Therefore, the others can collect from property that has been sold before the date listed on his document. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is referring to the wife’s marriage contract. The Sages instituted halakhot in marriage contracts that were to the advantage of women and to make them feel more secure in their marriages, due to the fact that they wanted men to find favor in the eyes of women.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The amoraim Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan continue the disagreement started by Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon with Rav Naḥman on Rabbi Akiva’s team and Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Tarfon’s side. Rav and Shmuel add a further complication within Rabbi’s Tarfon’s position. A creditor may seize goods in the public domain from the borrower for the outstanding loan as long as the original loaner is alive. Once the original creditor dies, everything reverts back to the estate of the deceased. The halakha follows Rabbi Akiva’s opinion.

The first case I am sharing puts all these moving pieces together and for little more excitement the original rabbis offering their halakhic decision have a vested interest in the outcome because they too are creditors.

“A man called Yeimar bar Ḥashu was owed money by a certain man who died and left behind a boat. Yeimar bar Ḥashu said to his agent: Go and seize the boat for me. The agent went and seized it. Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, encountered him. They said to him: You are seizing assets for a creditor in a situation where your action will cause a disadvantage for others, as the debtor owed money to other people as well. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others has not acquired it. He cannot act to the detriment of others without their consent, and his acquisition harms the other creditors. Those Sages were also owed money by that same man, so they both seized the boat for himself. Rav Pappa steered it with an oar, while Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, pulled it with a rope. This Sage said: I acquired all of it; and that Sage said: I acquired all of it.

“Rav Pineḥas bar Ami encountered them and said to them: What of the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: And this, that whoever first takes possession has acquired them, is the halakha provided that the items are arranged in a pile and placed in the public domain, which is not the case with this boat? They said to him: We too seized it from the current of the river, i.e., the middle of the river, which has the status of a public domain.

“They came before Rava to ask him who had acquired the boat. He said to them: You are white geese [kakei ḥivvarei], in reference to their white beards, who remove people’s cloaks, i.e., your actions were unlawful from the start. This is what Rav Naḥman said: And this, that whoever takes possession has acquired them, is the halakha provided that one seized them from the debtor while he was alive. In this case, however, the boat was seized after the debtor’s death, when the heirs had already taken possession of it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

In the second case I like to share the case study when Rava relied upon his wife who is only known our daf as Rav Ḥisda’s daughter. What is significant is that two witnesses are needed for valid testimony and neither can be a woman. Perhaps Rava was a man ahead of his time trusting in the testimony of his wife. “There was a certain woman who was obligated to take an oath in order to avoid payment in Rava’s court. The daughter of Rav Ḥisda said to Rava, her husband: I know that she is suspect with regard to taking a false oath. Rava reversed the obligation of the oath so that it fell onto the other party, who now had the option of taking an oath that the woman owes him money and collecting his debt. This is how to act when the court does not trust the one who is obligated to take an oath.

“The Gemara continues: On another occasion, Rav Pappa and Rav Adda bar Mattana were sitting before Rava. A certain document was brought before Rava to be examined in court. Rav Pappa said to Rava: I know about this document, that it records a debt that has already been paid. Rava said to him: Is there another person who can testify with the Master about the document? He said to him: No, I am the only one who knows. Rava said to him: Although there is the Master here who attests that the document has been paid, one witness is nothing.

“Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: And should Rav Pappa not be trusted like Rav Ḥisda’s daughter, who as a woman is disqualified from testimony? Rava replied: I relied on Rav Ḥisda’s daughter because I know with certainty about her that she is always truthful. However, I cannot rely on the Master because I do not know with the same degree of certainty about him that he is always truthful, and I cannot rule on the basis of one witness unless I have complete certainty.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The last case I would like to share teaches that the judges need to use their common sense when deciding a case. “The Gemara examines cases involving disputes concerning the property of the deceased. There was a certain man who deposited seven pearls [marganita] tied up in a sheet in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Meyasha passed away without instructing the members of his household on his deathbed, and without explaining to whom the gems belonged. Rabbi Meyasha’s family and the depositor came before Rabbi Ami to discuss the ownership of the gems. He said to them: They belong to the claimant, first of all, since I know about Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that he is not wealthy enough to be able to afford such gems. And furthermore, the depositor has provided a distinguishing mark that proves that he is the owner.

“The Gemara comments: And we said that a distinguishing mark is effective only if the claimant does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exits there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object, and he merely saw it there and was able to provide distinguishing marks.” (Sefaria.org translation)

If you’re interested the Gemara brings a case study asking the question is there a difference between an agent of the creditor or the creditor himself when seizing property in lieu of the loan. Another interesting case study discusses whether the judges may write any document, excluding the bill of divorce, before the event has happened.

You matter to God #devartorah#Shabbatshuvah#Yimkippur

American author Julia Ward Howe is remembered chiefly for her poem “Battle Hymn of the Republic.” According to her daughter, Howe once invited her friend US Senator Charles Sumner to meet a rising young actor. But he declined her invitation, saying, “I don’t know that I should care to meet him. I have outlived my interest in individuals.” Julia later wrote in her diary “Fortunately, God Almighty had not, by last account, gotten so far.”

Be glad on this Yom Kippur that the Lord hasn’t gotten beyond caring about people.  In fact, the Ribbono shel Olam, the Master of the Universe, is interested in every individual member of the human family.  In the prayer Unetaneh Tokef we declare “On this day we all pass before You, one by one, like a flock of sheep. As a shepherd searches for his flock, and has his sheep pass under his staff, so You review every living being…”

Rabbi Elie Kaunfer explains the line “‘As a shepherd searches for his flock, and has his sheep pass under his staff…’ The beginning of this line (As a shepherd searches for his flock) recalls the intimate image of the relationship between God and Israel presented in Ezekiel 34:12. There God acts as shepherd to stray sheep, which are explicitly compared to the most vulnerable of society: the sick, the injured, and lost. God castigates Israel for not tending this flock and steps in as the ultimate shepherd to seek out the lost and neglected. It is at once an image of intimacy with the downtrodden and a critique of the powerful. This is not an impartial, unfeeling judge, but a justice demanding shepherd.” (Who by Fire, Who by Water edited by Rabbi Lawrence A Hoffman, page 99) I would add continuing with this metaphor that our Shephard is a most compassionate judge.

Are you a lost sheep needing God to find you? Call out to Him today. Remember, you matter to God.

Protecting the women’s interests TB Ketubot 82

 We finished the eighth chapter of our massekhet with TB Ketubot 82 on the first day Rosh Hashanah 5783. At the very conclusion of this chapter we learn why the ketubah for a virgin is 200 dinars and for a previously married woman 100 dinars. In the case of death or divorce, the ketubah serves as an insurance policy or a divorce settlement so that the woman is not left high and dry without a means of support. All of the man’s property is mortgaged for the ketubah to give the woman peace of mind that the money will be there for her no matter what.

Although Judaism permits divorce, the rabbis believed that marriage was good for both men and women as the Torah says in Genesis “It is not good for man to be alone; I will make a fitting helper for him." (2:18) When the rabbis saw circumstances that prevented men from marrying women or saw how easy a husband could divorce his wife, they enacted ordinances to encourage and preserve a marriage.

“The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract. Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract.

“At first they would write for a virgin two hundred and for a widow one hundred dinars, and they would grow old and would not marry women, since the women were concerned that their marriage contract money would be wasted or lost, and they had no guarantee that it would be collected. The Sages therefore instituted an ordinance that they should place it, the sum of the marriage contract, in her father’s house, thereby ensuring its safekeeping. And still problems arose, as when he was angry at his wife, he would say to her: Go to your marriage contract, as it was too easy for them to divorce.

“Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that they would place it in her father-in-law’s house, i.e., in her husband’s house. And wealthy women would craft their marriage contract money into baskets of silver and of gold, while poor ones would craft it into a large vessel for the collection of urine, as their marriage contract was large enough only for a small vessel.

“And still, when he was angry at her he would say to her: Take your marriage contract and leave, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that he does not actually give her the money for her marriage contract. Rather, he should write to her: All my property is guaranteed for her marriage contract, and it is not localized to a particular place or object. Consequently, he would need to sell some of his property if he wished to divorce her, and would therefore think carefully before undertaking such a drastic course of action.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

 

Good advice for whom? TB Ketubot 80-81

When a husband dies childless, his widow (her technical status term is a yevama), must marry her deceased brother and fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum, levirate marriage, or break this tie through the halitza ceremony. If the brother chooses to marry her, he just replaces his brother. This is not considered a brand-new marriage. He does not give his yevama a new ketubah, but takes responsibility for her original ketubah agreed to by his brother. Although he inherits his brother’s property, he may not sell it because the properties are used as a lien to guarantee the ketubah. The Mishnah on daf TB Ketubot 80 teaches that a man cannot give his yevama the worth of the ketubah in movable goods like a gold necklace in order to remove the lien and sell the property as he wishes.

“After the yavam has married her, her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except that the responsibility for payment of her marriage contract is carried out through mortgaging the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam.

“Therefore, the yavam may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. He may not set aside a designated sum of money for this payment. Rather, all of the first husband’s property is mortgaged for her marriage contract as long as he has not divorced her. And similarly, in general a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract.” (Sefaria.org translation)

At least that’s what we thought until we studied today’s daf TB Ketubot 81. What the Mishnah describes isn’t the halakha, but only good advice. To better understand the true meaning of the Mishnah, I’m sharing the entire discussion in the Gemara.

“Rava sent Abaye the following related difficulty by way of Rav Shemaya bar Zeira: And can the marriage contract of a yevama be collected during his lifetime?

“But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Abba says: I asked Sumakhos: With regard to a yavam who wants to sell his brother’s property but is unable to do so because all his brother’s possessions are mortgaged to the yevama, how can he proceed? He replied: If he is a priest, who is prohibited from remarrying his divorced wife, he should prepare a feast for his wife after yibbum has been performed, and during the feast he should persuade her to allow him to sell the late brother’s property. If he is a regular Israelite, who may remarry his divorced wife, he can divorce her with a bill of divorce, at which point he is obligated to pay her only the sum of her marriage contract, and the rest of the property is then no longer mortgaged for it. While they are divorced he may sell the property and subsequently remarry her.

“And if it enters our mind that a marriage contract can be collected during his lifetime, why is all this necessary? Let him set aside for her part of the property that corresponds to the amount of the marriage contract, and the rest let him sell. Abaye replied: And according to your reasoning, rather than asking this question based on a baraita, let him raise this difficulty from the mishna, which teaches that he may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table for you. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. Why can’t he designate property equivalent to the sum of her marriage contract and sell the rest?

“The Gemara answers: The tanna in the mishna there teaches us good advice, i.e., that one should not do so ab initio, so as to ensure that the amount set aside for her marriage contract is not lost, which would necessitate writing a new marriage contract. However, it should not be inferred from the mishna that it is prohibited to do so. As, if you do not say so, that it is merely good advice, consider the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches: And similarly, a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. If he wants to sell, here too, may he not sell? Rather, in that case the tanna teaches us good advice, and therefore here too, with regard to a yevama, he teaches us good advice.” (Sefaria.org translation)

What is this good advice? Rashi says it is good advice for the yavam, the deceased’s brother. The movable goods over time could get lost and the he would have to make good the ketubah out of his own pocket. Rashi’s son-in-law Rabbi Yehuda bar Natan explains that this is good advice for the yevama. The yavam would not quickly divorce his yevama. The Shita Mekubetzet explains this is good advice for the yevama. The woman prefers that all of deceased husband’s property be a lien against her ketubah as opposed to just some of them because that would give her a greater security and peace of mine lest what was set aside get lost.

 

Legally hiding your assets TB Ketubot 79

There are all sorts of reasons why a person may want to hide his assets. For example, the cost of a nursing home is exorbitant and could eat up a person’s entire estate leaving nothing for the inheritance. To hide assets and let Medicare and or Medicaid help foot the nursing home’s bill, a person can transfer his estate to his child and thus protected his child’s inheritance from the nursing home. If I’m not mistaken, this transfer has to be in effect at least five years before admittance to the nursing home otherwise the nursing home can go after the estate.

Today’s daf TB Ketubot 79 shows the correct procedure how a woman may hide her nikhsay makug (נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג) assets from her husband and reclaim her property in the event of her marriage termination either by husband’s death or divorce. The topic is introduced with a story.

“The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was about to remarry after she was divorced or widowed, who sought to distance the rights to her property from her future husband. She therefore wrote a document stipulating that her property be given as a gift to her daughter before marriage. Ultimately, the daughter was married and then divorced. She wanted her daughter to return the property, and her daughter claimed that it was given to her as a gift. The mother came before Rav Naḥman for judgment. Rav Naḥman tore the document, accepting her claim that she did not intend to transfer ownership of her property.

“Rav Anan went before Mar Ukva, the Exilarch, and said to him: Let the Master observe Naḥman the farmer, how he tears people’s documents. Rav Anan was upset that Rav Naḥman destroyed a legitimate document. Mar Ukva said to him: Tell me, please, what was the actual incident?

“Rav Anan said to Mar Ukva: This and that transpired; i.e., he apprised him of all the details. Mar Ukva said to him: Are you saying it was a document of evasion? This is what Rav Ḥanilai bar Idi said that Shmuel said: I am an authority who issues rulings and have issued the following directive: If a document of evasion comes to my hand, I will tear it, as it is clear that it was not intended for the actual transfer of property but merely to distance it from someone else.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Shmuel is saying that when examining a document of evasion, a person needs to look at the intent of the document and not just what’s written therein. One should not think that the mother’s intent was really to gift the estate to her daughter because “Rav Naḥman replied: Even so, where her interests clash with those of her daughter, her own interests are preferable to her, and therefore she did not intend to waive her rights.” (Sefaria.org translation) Interesting, Rashi comments that the woman testifies in front of witnesses that this document is a document of evasion so her husband cannot use the nikhsay makug.

The Gemara provides the correct language for this document. “She writes to him in the document that the gift is granted from today and the gift is in effect only while I still wish to give it. In that case, if the one to whom she gave the gift comes to take possession of it, she can say that she no longer wants to give the gift and can thereby invalidate the document….the ruling that the document of evasion is void, is in a case where the document was written about all of the property, as clearly a person does not give away all his property as a gift and leave himself with nothing.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Today I suggest you consult a lawyer when you want to hide assets. You really need to protect yourself for all contingencies. I heard a terrible story that an elderly man transferred his entire estate to his daughter assuming that she would use the estate for his benefit as well as protect his daughter’s inheritance if he needs to go into a nursing home. Unfortunately the daughter died before her father. Of course, her husband inherited everything the daughter owned. Then son-in-law took the money and ran and basically abandoned his father-in-law leaving the father penniless.

 

When can a woman sell her nikhsay makug (נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג)? TB Ketubot 78

With daf TB Ketubot 78 we begin the eighth chapter of our massekhet. The Talmud delineates two types of property a woman brings into a marriage. The first kind of property is nikhsaay tzon barzel (נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל). These are “assets that she brings into the marriage by way of a dowry. Their being set in stone, so to speak, refers to the fact that her husband may use as much of them as he wants, but that he will always be liable to replace anything that he uses, and the assets in full will revert into her possession with his death, or with his giving her a divorce.” (https:// https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/57470/whats-the-difference-between-%D7%A0%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%A6%D7%90%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%96%D7%9C-and-%D7%A0%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92)

 The second kind of property is nikhsay makug (נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג). These are “assets that a woman brings into the marriage, or which falls to her as either an inheritance or as a gift after she has married, but which are not included in the value of the ketubah. The word melog comes from the Aramaic מליגה, which means "plucking": her husband has rights to these assets, but may not use them up entirely. He also, therefore, need not replace anything that he uses.” (https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/57470/whats-the-difference-between-%D7%A0%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%A6%D7%90%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%96%D7%9C-and-%D7%A0%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92)

The eighth chapter primarily discusses issues revolving around nikhsay makug (נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג). The opening Mishnah discusses when the woman acquired the nikhsay makug (נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג) and when she wishes to sell them. The Mishnah presents for scenarios.

“(1) With regard to a woman to whom property was bequeathed before she was betrothed, and she was then betrothed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give the property as a gift, and the transaction is valid.

(2) However, if the property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell it as long as she is betrothed, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell it. Both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold it or gave it away as a gift, the transaction is valid.

(3) If the property was bequeathed to her after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold the property or gave it away, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers.

(4) If she inherited the property before she was married and then was married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold or gave the property away, the transaction is valid." (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara presents a different opinion of Rabban Gamliel in a baraita that contradicts the statement in the Mishna. Even after marriage “Rabban Gamliel said to them: Even this one may sell the property and gives it away, and her action is valid.” (Sefaria.org translation) Rashi harmonizes the Mishna with the baraita by emending the Mishnah while Tosefot emends the baraita. The Gemara provides a third solution that different amoraim had different traditions of what Rabban Gamliel actually said.

This whole sugiyah ends with the sages definitively deciding the halakha. “Our Rabbis returned and voted after discussing this issue and decided that whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was subsequently married, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Looking good is not good enough #devartorah#Roshhashana

Researchers from Virginia Tech University, along with police administrators, determined that distracted drivers put others in more danger than aggressive drivers. Drivers who eat, discipline children in the backseat, or talk on the phone are the most hazardous. I read on facebook: “If you want to talk to God, find a quiet corner and He will always listen to you. If you want to see God, text while driving.”

When residents in Grand Rapids, Michigan, were asked about the bad habits of drivers that made the highways unsafe, most felt that others caused more problems than they themselves. One woman said that she talked on her cell phone a little, but at least she didn’t dial the phone numbers while on the road. She concluded her comments by stating that others “aren’t following the rules of the road . . . . They put us all at risk.”

It’s our nature to point a finger at others. It all goes back to Adam and Eve. When God asked Adam, “Did you eat of the tree from which I had forbidden you?” Adam passed the buck to Eve and God replying, “The woman You put at my side-she gave me of the tree and I ate.” Of course Eve blamed the snake saying, “The snake duped me.” (Gen. 3:11-13)

When we don’t look at our own actions but instead compare ourselves with others, we often come out looking good. But, looking good and being good are two different things. The goal of our High Holidays is to help us become the people we truly want to be so that we are good through and through. If we succeed, surely God will inscribe us in His book.

Shabbat Shalom and Shanah Tovah

Grounds for divorce part two TB Ketubot 77

Up to now the Gemara has been discussing grounds for divorce for men. Today’s daf TB Ketubot 77 finally discusses grounds for divorce for women. You have to remember in classical Judaism only the husband has the ability to divorce his wife. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel defined the type of major blemishes a woman could demand the court force her husband to divorce her. “. The Gemara inquires: And what are these major blemishes of a husband that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel considers grounds for divorce? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel explained: For example, if his eye was blinded, or his hand cut off, or his leg broken.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The last Mishna in our chapter with other defects in the husband that are grounds for divorce. “: And these are the defects for which the court forces him to divorce her: One afflicted with boils; or one who has a polyp; or one who works as a gatherer, or one who works as a melder of copper, or one who works as a tanner of hides, all of whose work involves handling foul-smelling materials. Whether he had these defects before they got married, or whether they developed after they got married, the court forces them to divorce. And with regard to all of these, Rabbi Meir said: Even though he stipulated with her ahead of time that he suffers from this particular ailment or this is his line of work, she can nevertheless demand a divorce and say: I thought I could accept this issue but now I realize I cannot accept it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

“The Gemara inquires about several unclear terms which appear in the mishna: What is one who has a polyp? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is one who has a foul odor of the nose. It was taught in a baraita: A polyp is a foul odor of the mouth. Rav Asi teaches the reverse, that Shmuel is the one who said a polyp is odor of the mouth. And he provided a mnemonic device for his opinion: Shmuel did not close his mouth from our entire chapter, meaning that he studied it and commented on it extensively. This statement was formulated in a way that contains a hint that Shmuel’s opinion involves the mouth.

“The mishna taught, in the list of defects for which the husband is forced to divorce his wife: Or one who works as a gatherer. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of a gatherer? Rav Yehuda said: This is referring to one who gathers dog excrement for use in tanning. (Later the Gemara will define a gatherer as a small scale tanner as opposed to a large scale tanner-gg)…

“What is the meaning of a coppersmith? Rav Ashi said: A kettle smith, that is, one who beats copper in order to make kettles; his handling of copper leaves him with a bad odor. Rabba bar Ḥanna said: This is one who hews copper from its source in the ground. The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Ḥanna: Who is a coppersmith? This is one who hews copper from its source….” (Sefaria.org translation)

Even these defects were disclosed before the marriage and the woman accepted them, they are still grounds for divorce. “Whether he had these defects before they got married, or whether they developed after they got married, the court forces them to divorce. And with regard to all of these, Rabbi Meir said: Even though he stipulated with her ahead of time that he suffers from this particular ailment or this is his line of work, she can nevertheless demand a divorce and say: I thought I could accept this issue but now I realize I cannot accept it.”  (Sefaria.com translation)

Tomorrow we begin the eighth chapter of our massekhet.

  

3 diiferent solutions for 1 problem TB Ketubot 76 with a little of daf 75

 The Mishna on daf TB Ketubot 75a describes who has the burden of proof when the groom took a vow not to marry a woman with blemishes and he discovers that she has blemishes. After betrothal, kidushin, the bride still lives in her father's house for a full year before marriage, nesuin. The Mishnah differentiates when the blemishes are discovered. "MISHNA: If she has blemishes and she is still in her father’s house, as she has not yet gotten married, the father must bring proof that these blemishes appeared on her after she became betrothed, and therefore his field was flooded, i.e., it is the husband’s misfortune, since she developed the problem after the betrothal. (She does not lose her ketubah money-gg) But if she has already gotten married and entered the husband’s domain when her blemishes are discovered, the husband must bring proof that she had these blemishes before she was betrothed, and consequently the transaction of betrothal was a mistaken transaction. (She loses her ketubah money-gg)" (Sefaria.org translation)

What difference does it make where the blemishes are found? There seems to be an internal contradiction. The Gemara tries to resolve this contradiction. Yesterday we learned Rabbi Elazer's solution. The Mishna is disjointed. Rabbi Yehoshu is the author of the second case because he follows the presumptive status of a monetary claim, חֲזָקָה דְמָמוֹנָא. Rabban Gamliel is the author of the first case because he follows the presumptive status of the body,חֲזָקָה דְגוּפָא.

This is an inelegant solution that the Gemara usually doesn't like. Consequently, two other solutions to resolve this internal contradiction are brought. Rava interprets the entire Mishna according to Rabban Gamliel. "Rava said a different answer to the contradiction in the mishna: In the first clause of the mishna, where the blemishes were discovered while she was still in her father’s house, the assumption is that since they were discovered here, they were also created here. In other words, since the blemishes were found while she was still in her father’s house, there is a presumption that they were also present at the earlier stage, prior to the betrothal. Consequently, the burden of proof is on the father who claims the blemishes developed at a later stage. In the latter clause of the mishna as well, since the blemishes were discovered when she was in the husband’s house, it is assumed that since they were discovered here, in the husband’s domain, they were also created here, after the marriage." (Sefaria.org translation)

On today's daf TB Ketubot 76 Rav Ashi provides a third solution. He too attributes the entire Mishna to Rabban Gamliel. "Rav Ashi said that the contradiction between the first and last clauses of the mishna can be resolved in the following manner: The first clause is similar to a claim made by one who says: My father has one hundred dinars in your possession. When the blemishes were discovered he had not yet married her, and therefore the payment for the marriage contract would go to the woman’s father, and not to her. And the latter clause is referring to a married woman who claims the marriage contract for herself, and it is therefore as though she says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession. The presumptive status of her body enables her to claim money only for herself, not on behalf of someone else, including her father." (Sefaria.org translation)

When the bride is still in her father's house, the father is making the claim that the groom has to return the betrothal money that he gave him. Rav Ashi teaches that the father's claim that the bride develop those blemishes after kiddushin is not strong because the body in question is not his. Consequently, he has to bring proof that the blemishes appeared after kiddushin. When the bride is making the claim that she developed these blemishes appeared before kiddushin, she is making a strong claim because it is her body. Consequently, the groom has to prove that these blemishes appeared before kiddushin.

Which solution makes the most sense to you?

Blemishes TB Ketubot 75

Kadosh is generally translated as holy. I learned from the great British anthropologist Mary Douglas in her book Purity and Danger the meaning of the word kadosh. Beyond being separate, kadosh has the connotation of being whole, pure, unadulterated, and perfect. Since God is kadosh, the altar, the sacrificial animal, and the kohen, priest, must strive to represent this expansive definition of kadosh. Consequently, the Torah in parshat Emor (Leviticus 21:16-22) enumerates the physical blemishes of a kohen to offer up sacrifices upon the altar. They are:

These blemishes include:

1.   blindness

2.   lameness

3.   an excessively low nasal bridge (such that a straight brush could apply ointment to both eyes simultaneously)

4.   disproportionate limbs

5.   a crippled foot or hand

6.   cataracts

7.   a white streak that transverses the junction between sclera and iris

8.   certain types of boils

9.     crushed testicles (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_disqualifications_for_the_Jewish_priesthood)

I’m uncomfortable with today’s Gemara’s discussion about blemishes in women. These discussions were held by men concerning women who were not their equal. I am just reporting what the Gemara says. Hopefully nobody answers a marriage today with such conditions.

Today’s daf TB Ketubot 75 enumerates other blemishes that would be grounds for divorce when the man betrothed a woman in the condition that she does not have blemishes. “The mishna teaches that all blemishes that disqualify priests disqualify women’s betrothal as well. The Sage taught in the Tosefta (Ketubot 87:9): To these, they added several additional blemishes applying only to women: Sweat, a mole, and a foul odor from the mouth.” (Sefaria.org translation)

When these blemishes occur impacts the efficacy of the condition. “If she has blemishes and she is still in her father’s house, as she has not yet gotten married, the father must bring proof that these blemishes appeared on her after she became betrothed, and therefore his field was flooded, i.e., it is the husband’s misfortune, since she developed the problem after the betrothal. But if she has already gotten married and entered the husband’s domain when her blemishes are discovered, the husband must bring proof that she had these blemishes before she was betrothed, and consequently the transaction of betrothal was a mistaken transaction. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Rabbis say: In what case is this statement, that a husband can claim to have found blemishes in his wife, on account of which he wants to void the betrothal, said? With regard to hidden blemishes. But with regard to visible blemishes, he cannot claim that the betrothal was in error, as he presumably saw and accepted them before the betrothal. And if there is a bathhouse in the city, where all the women go to bathe, even with regard to hidden blemishes he cannot make this claim, because he examines her through the agency of his female relatives. He would have asked one of his relatives to look over the woman he is about to marry.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Why should there be a difference whether the blemishes found in the father’s house or the husband’s house? The first answer of the Gemara is that the Mishna doesn’t represent the view of a single tanna. Rabbi Yehoshua is the author of the first half of the Mishnah because “It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said in a mishna (12a) with regard to a case when the wife claims that she was raped after her betrothal while her husband says it happened beforehand, that we don’t live from, i.e., we don’t rely on the words of her mouth, but rather she must substantiate her claim.” (Sefaia.org translation) Rabban Gamliel is the author of the second half of the Mishnah. “We arrive at the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who said that the woman is deemed credible when she says that the incident occurred after the betrothal.” (Sefaria.org translation) 

What was his intention when he had sex? TB Ketubot 73-74

If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she had no vows incumbent upon her and reaffirms this condition at the time of marriage, the condition wasn’t met. Consequently, she never became halakhically betrothed and of course there’s no marriage. The Gemara on dappim TB Ketubot 72b-74, discuss the case when the man betrothed the woman on the condition that she had no vows incumbent upon her, but married her and presumably had sexual relations with her without reaffirming his condition. When we shall study massekhet Keddushin, we shall learn that “A woman is acquired by, i.e., becomes betrothed to, a man to be his wife in three ways…She is acquired through money, through a document, and through sexual intercourse.” (TB Kiddushin 2b, Sefaria.org)What was the man’s intention when he had sex with her is the question that the Gemara discusses.

“It was stated that the Sages had a dispute concerning the following question: If he betrothed her conditionally, such as that she had no vows incumbent upon her, and he subsequently married her without specification, and then it was discovered that the condition had not been fulfilled, Rav said: Although he may divorce her without payment of her marriage contract, the betrothal is not nullified, and therefore she requires a bill of divorce from him. And Shmuel said: The betrothal was invalid from the outset, and therefore she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

“Abaye said: Do not say that Rav’s reason for requiring a bill of divorce is that since he married her without specification, this indicates that he waived his condition entirely, and therefore he must give her the payment of her marriage contract if he divorces her. Rather, Rav’s reason is because a person does not intentionally engage in licentious sexual intercourse. He is aware that the initial betrothal may possibly be nullified, rendering sexual intercourse licentious. Therefore, when he marries her, he does so with the intention that the consummation of the marriage serves as unconditional betrothal. However, as he does not entirely waive his condition, if it becomes clear that the condition was not fulfilled, she may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav holds that the very act of intercourse demonstrates his desire to marry this woman and that he renounces his vow because a person does not intentionally engage in licentious sexual intercourse. Don’t think that Shmuel believes that men do engage in licentious sexual intercourse. In our case the man is not having intercourse intentionally for the purpose of betrothal, he just believes he’s a married man having regular marital relations with his wife. Consequently, Shmuel holds that the original conditions remain and the woman never became halakhically betrothed. Because she never was halakhically betrothed, the groom doesn’t need to divorce her with a bill of divorce.

Rav and Shmuel were first-generation Babylonian amoraim, early third century. This conversation continued in the land of Israel into the next generation. Rabbi Yoḥanan, second generation Land of Israel amora, aligned himself with Shmuel’s position and Ulla, a late second-early third Land of Israel amora, aligned himself with Rav’s position.

I find it interesting that this discussion about the man’s intentions begins in Babylonia and continues in the land of Israel.

 

 

 

Grounds for divorce TB Ketubot 72

Today’s daf Ketubot 72 lists grounds for divorce. These are not no-fault divorces. When a husband is at fault, he divorces his wife and must pay the sums of money in the ketubah. When the wife is at fault, she is divorced and loses her ketubah.

The Gemara gives specific examples when the husband makes intolerable demands upon his wife; consequently, he must divorce his wife. “The mishna states: One who vows and obligates his wife not to go to a house of mourning or to a house of feasting for a wedding, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract, because it is as if he were locking a door in front of her. The Gemara asks: Granted, when he forbids her from going to a house of feasting, there is effectively an act of locking a door in front of her by withholding from her any possibility of rejoicing, but when he forbids her from going to a house of mourning, what locking of a door in front of her is there? He taught: In the future she too will die, and no person will eulogize her or take care of her, just as she did not do so for others. And some say: No person will value her or pay attention to her, since a person who does not visit the sick or console mourners cuts himself off from others.” (Sefaria.org translation) As Yogi Berra once famously said, “always go to other people’s funerals, otherwise they won’t come to yours.” For life to flourish, human beings need to live in reciprocal relationships with others. If a husband demands that his wife become isolated and cannot participate in the life of the community, he must divorce her.

“Or he said the vow will be void on condition that she fill something up and pour it into the refuse. The Gemara asks: And let her do it. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The mishna’s intention is that he demanded that she fill herself up and then shake herself out. This is a euphemistic way of saying that the husband wants her to take measures to prevent herself from becoming pregnant, and she is permitted to protest this” (Sefaria.org translation) In massekhet Yevamot, a reason was given why this is an intolerable demand. The wife wants to become a mother so that her children will take care of for in her old age.

“It was taught in a baraita: The case is that he told her to fill up ten jugs of water and pour them into the refuse, a task that involves pointless effort and appears foolish… according to the baraita, which explains that he simply wants her to engage in pointless work, what difference does it make to her? Let her do it. Rabba bar Ḥanna said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Because she would appear insane if she were to perform pointless actions, she may therefore demand a divorce. Rav Kahana said: One who vows and obligates his wife not to borrow or not to lend utensils that people generally lend, such as a sifter, or a sieve, or a mill, or an oven, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract, since by making such rules he causes her to develop a bad reputation among her neighbors, who will suspect her of stinginess or haughtiness.” (Sefaria.org translation) Great is the respect due to all human beings. When the husband demeans his wife by demanding she do things that others will misinterpret and think she’s crazy or acquire a bad reputation, he is not treating her with all due respect and must divorce her.

The Gemara moves on to provide examples where the wife breaks the fundamental trust that a husband and wife must have in order for the marriage to flourish.

“MISHNA: And these are examples of women who may be divorced without payment of their marriage contract: A woman who violates the precepts of Moses, i.e., halakha, or the precepts of Jewish women, i.e., custom. The Mishna explains: And who is categorized as a woman who violates the precepts of Moses? This includes cases such as when she feeds him food that has not been tithed, or she engages in sexual intercourse with him while she has the legal status of a menstruating woman, or she does not separate a portion of dough to be given to a priest [ḥalla], or she vows and does not fulfill her vows.

“And who is considered a woman who violates the precepts of Jewish women? One who, for example, goes out of her house, and her head, i.e., her hair, is uncovered; or she spins wool in the public marketplace; or she speaks with every man she encounters. Abba Shaul says: Also one who curses his, i.e., her husband’s, parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: Also a loud woman. And who is defined as a loud woman? When she speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Transgressing a Torah law does not automatically trigger a divorce. All the examples given in the Mishna have one thing in common. Their transgression effects the husband by making him culpable as well. For example, “The mishna stated: She feeds him food that has not been tithed. The Gemara attempts to clarify: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If he knows that the food is untithed, he should abstain and not eat it. And if he does not know that the food is untithed, then how does he know that she in fact fed him such food, so that he can divorce her? The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary when she tells him: So-and-so the priest rectified the pile of grain for me by tithing it, and he then went and asked the priest whether he did so, and it was found to be a lie. It is therefore clear that she did not tithe the food before she served it to him.” (Sefaria.org translation) In this case and all the other cases of Torah law, the Gemara explains that the wife lied to her husband thus causing him to sin as well. Lying destroys the trust necessary in the marriage. Without that trust the marriage cannot continue. Since the marriage dissolution is her fault, she loses her ketubah.

“The mishna stated: Abba Shaul says: Also a woman who curses her husband’s parents in his presence violates the precepts of Jewish women. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Even when she curses his parents in the presence of his children and not in his presence she is considered one who violates Jewish custom. And your mnemonic is “Ephraim and Manasseh will be to me like Reuben and Simeon” (Genesis 48:5), which teaches that grandchildren have the status of children. Cursing one’s husband’s parents in front of his children is tantamount to doing so in front of the husband himself. Rabba said: An example is that she said in the presence of her husband’s son: May a lion devour your grandfather.” (Sefaria.org translation)

We all know how wrong it is to speak badly about the other set of grandparents or to speak badly about an ex-spouse in front of the children. “It's painful to find out that someone has been saying bad things about you behind your back. Badmouthing can make you feel like you've had your dignity swiped from you. You may feel like doing damage control that may not be productive.

“Divorce and separation can often leave those involved feeling hostile and resentful, so it is not uncommon to find one or both people involved in badmouthing their ex-spouse behind their back.

“Unfortunately, sometimes it is the children that these two people share that become first-hand witnesses of this badmouthing. When one parent says mean, hurtful things about their co-parent in front of their kids, the children carry the emotional burden of having heard those things. That burden can lead to negative consequences like anxiety, stress, and even grief.

“Between one another, understanding what badmouthing is and dealing with it appropriately is a crucial step towards improving your co-parenting and protecting your children from divorce conflict.” (https://www.ourfamilywizard.com/blog/dealing-badmouthing-co-parent)