The goal is harmony TB Baba Kama 81

Today’s daf TB Baba Kama records that “The Sages taught in a baraita: Joshua stipulated ten conditions when he apportioned Eretz Yisrael among the tribes.” (Sefaria.org translation) The goal of many of these conditions was to ensure harmony amongst the tribes. 

I know from my professional life that siblings fight over the inheritance in a will. People become angry because one sibling inherited more than he did. The land of Israel was divided amongst the tribes and in some tribal lands were natural resources that other tribes did not. For example, the Sea of Galilee is in the tribal land of Naphtali. Consequently, Joshua instituted the following condition. And that they (all the tribes-gg) shall have the right to fish in the Sea of Tiberias, provided that the fisherman does not build an underwater fence to catch fish, thereby causing an impediment to boats. The Gemara comments: But one may fish with nets and with traps. The Sages taught in a baraita: Initially, the tribes stipulated with each other that one may not build an underwater fence to catch fish, thereby causing an impediment to boats, but one may fish with nets and with traps.” (Sefaria.org translation) Another possible interpretation suggested was that the fishermen were not allowed to attach on their boats and thus have an unfair advantage to catch more fish.

A story teaches it arrogance or insolence is also a stumbling block of the goal of harmony between people. “The next item on the list of conditions is: And they shall have the right to veer off to the sides of the roads onto private property because of hard protrusions of the road… (The protrusions make it difficult to walk in the road; consequently, one may walk on the side of the road even if there is private property.-gg)

 Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Ḥiyya were once walking along the road, and they veered off to the sides of the road. Rabbi Yehuda ben Kanosa was taking broad steps on the road, to avoid the protrusions without going off to the side of the road, while walking in front of them. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Who is this man who is showing off his supposed greatness in our presence? By acting more stringently than required by halakha, he is displaying insolence.

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Perhaps it is my student Rabbi Yehuda ben Kanosa. And if so, all of his actions are undertaken for the sake of Heaven; he is not acting out of haughtiness. When they reached him and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw him, he said to him: If you were not Yehuda ben Kanosa I would have cut off your legs with iron shears, i.e., I would have excommunicated you for your impudence.” (Sefaria.org translation)

God hates an arrogant person. The Midrash teaches “Everyone who is proud in heart is an abomination to the Lord. Anyone who is arrogant before his Creator, will not be cleansed from the judgment of hell. Rabbi Shimon said: anyone who is lowly in spirit, and is concerned in his heart to walk in the ways of the Holy One, he will be guaranteed that the Holy One will prepare his steps. As it is written: ‘The heart of the human will consider his ways and the Lord will prepare his steps.’ (Proverbs 16:9)” Midrash Rabba, Meshlei 13:3)

Rabbi Berel Wein teaches:

“The Talmud teaches us that the Lord, so to speak, cannot abide with the arrogant person. Unless one learns how to control one’s own ego and deal with one’s self and others fairly and realistically one shuts God out, again so to speak, from one’s life no matter how superficially observant and pious one appears to be.

“The relationship to God is built on recognition of one’s own human qualities, failures, foibles and successes. A realistic self-evaluation will always occasion a feeling of humility and subservience to the Divine.

“The person who always knows better and more than anyone else, who demands that others always bow to his will, is considered to be an evil person in the eyes of the Torah. Such a person is so full of himself and hubris that there is no room left within his heart and soul for Godliness to enter and reside. If the road to Hell is paved with good intentions it is also strewn with the debris of human arrogance and unwarranted hubris. Just ask Haman!

“An “I know better” attitude towards all problems, personal, societal or national, will undoubtedly lead to error and even disappointment and tragedy. The ability to listen to others, to consider others’ opinions and sensitivities and to reconsider one’s own previously held ideas and solutions constitutes the foundation step on the heavenly ladder of humility and holiness. Arrogance provides no avenue of escape for the angst of the human soul.

“The Torah warns us that arrogance leads to forgetfulness, especially the bitter forgetfulness of the Creator. We recite in the Rosh Hashanah prayers: “Fortunate is the person who has not forgotten You and the human being who has strengthened one’s self through You.” Arrogance is a disease that distorts and can even destroy memory. It occasions overwhelming pride in one’s own accomplishments whether they be deserved or not and warps one’s vision of one’s true place and purpose in the Godly scheme of things.” https://www.rabbiwein.com/blog/post-1445.html

The mitzvah of settling the land of Israel TB Baba Kama 80

Anti-Israel propaganda promulgates the lie that Jews are not indigenous to the land of Israel. Yesterday and today’s daf TB Baba Kama 80 is another proof that Jews have in in the land of Israel and protected it 500 years before the rise of Islam.

The Mishna on daf TB Baba Kama 79b shows the special relationship the Jews have always had with the land of Israel.  “The One may not raise small domesticated animals, i.e., sheep and goats, in settled areas of Eretz Yisrael, as they graze on people’s crops. But one may raise them in Syria, despite the fact that with regard to many other halakhot Syria is treated like Eretz Yisrael, and in the wilderness of Eretz Yisrael.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Most commentators say the reason one may not raise small domestic animals in the land of Israel is thievery. They were concerned that these animals were graze in other people’s property. Rashi explains why Moses “drove the flock into the wilderness, and came to Horeb, the mountain of God.” (Exodus 3:1) “INTO THE DESERT — in order to keep them away from private property (גֶזֵל i. e. things which can be appropriated only as the result of “robbery”) — that they should not graze in other people’s fields (Exodus Rabbah 2:3)” Nevertheless, others like the Kaftor Uferakh explain that the settling of the land of Israel is so important that small domestic animals are forbidden because they would destroy the land by overgrazing it or trodden on it.

The sons of Rav Pappa (the chain of traditional is broken in the Gemara gives three different possibilities of who said what) said three things and the third statement was “with regard to one who purchases a house in Eretz Yisrael, one writes a bill of sale for this transaction even on Shabbat.

“The Gemara turns its attention to the third statement: And with regard to one who purchases a house in Eretz Yisrael, one writes a bill of sale for this transaction even on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that one may write this bill of sale on Shabbat? Writing on Shabbat is a prohibited labor for which one is liable to receive the death penalty.

“The Gemara explains: Rather, this is as Rava said there, with regard to a similar issue, that one tells a gentile to do it, and he does so. Here, too, it is referring to a situation where he tells a gentile to write a bill of sale for the house, and he does it. And even though telling a gentile to perform an action that is prohibited for a Jew on Shabbat is generally a violation of a rabbinic decree, as the Sages prohibited telling a gentile to perform prohibited labor on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat, here the Sages did not impose this decree, due to the mitzva of settling Eretz Yisrael.” (Sefaria.org translation) Settling the land of Israel was as important if not sometimes more important than observing Shabbat.

 

What’s the difference between a thief and a robber? TB Baba Kama 79

Daf TB Baba Kama 79 explains a thief (ganav- גַנָּב) has to pay the penalty of four or five and a robber (gazlan- גַּזְלָן) only has to pay the penalty of kefel.

 His students asked Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai: For what reason was the Torah stricter with a thief than with a robber? Only a thief is required to pay the double, fourfold, or fivefold payment, not a robber. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to them in response: This one, the robber, equated the honor of the servant to the honor of his Master, and that one, the thief, did not equate the honor of the servant to the honor of his Master. The robber fears neither God nor people, as he is not afraid to rob in public. The thief does not fear God but he does fear other people, which demonstrates that he is more concerned about humans than God.

As it were, the thief establishes the eye below, i.e., God’s eye, as though it does not see, and the ear below, i.e., God’s ear, as though it does not hear. The Gemara cites verses that describe people who imagine that God does not see their actions, as it is stated: “Woe to them who seek deeply to hide their counsel from the Lord, and their works are in the dark, and they say: Who sees us, and who knows us?” (Isaiah 29:15). And it is written: “And they say: The Lord will not see, neither will the God of Jacob give heed” (Psalms 94:7). And it is written: “For they say: The Lord has forsaken the land, and the Lord does not see” (Ezekiel 9:9).” (Sefaria.org translation)

We learn two important Jewish principles why the thief only pays the penalty of four times the amount for a small animal’s, but pays five times the amount of a large animal. “Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great the power of labor is. The theft of an ox, which was forced by the thief to cease its labor, leads to a fivefold payment; whereas the theft of a sheep, which was not forced by the thief to cease its labor, as a sheep performs no labor, leads to only a fourfold payment.” Judaism values honest work. In fact some commentators believe that it is a mitzvah to work based on the fourth commandment on the two tablets Moses brought down from Mount Sinai. “Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy. Six days you shall labor and do all your work. but the seventh day is a sabbath of your God...” (Exodus 20:7-9) Just as we are commanded rest on Shabbat, we are commanded to work the other six days.

We have seen many times before the great is the dignity due human beings (גָּדוֹל כְּבוֹד הַבְּרִיּוֹת) who are created in God’s image. The penalty of four or five reinforces this value. “Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Come and see how great human dignity is. The theft of an ox, which walked on its own legs as the thief stole it, leads to a fivefold payment, whereas the theft of a sheep, which the thief carried on his shoulder as he walked, thereby causing himself embarrassment, leads to only a fourfold payment.” (Sefaria.org translation)

American law also makes distinctions between different kinds of theft.

“In New York the terms larceny and theft are interchangeable. There are different penalties for different acts of larceny. “Under New York laws, burglary occurs when an individual enters a building or vehicle without permission and with the intent to commit a crime. Burglary occurs whether or not anything is stolen and whether or not other intended crimes were committed. No one has to be in the building or vehicle for burglary charges to be pressed.

“A robbery, on the other hand, always occurs with the victim present. An individual commits robbery when they use force or threat of force to take any property from the victim.

“Penalties for Larceny

“Petty larceny, the theft of items valued at or under $1,000, is charged as a Class A misdemeanor in New York. Conviction of petty larceny can result in up to one year in prison and fines of up to $1,000.

“Grand larceny felony charges depend on the value of the item. The fines for grand larceny are typically twice that of the value of the property stolen, or $5,000, whichever amount is greater. Charges for grand larceny include:

• -Property valued over $1,000 up to $3,000 is a Class E felony. Conviction results in up to four years in prison, with a minimum sentence of one year.
• -Property valued over $3,000 and up to $50,000 is charged as a Class D felony. Conviction results in a minimum of one year in prison and up to seven years.
• -Property valued at more than $50,000 and up to $1,000,000 is a Class C felony. Conviction carries a minimum of one year in jail and up to 15 years in prison.
• -Property valued over $1,000,000 is a Class B felony. Conviction has a minimum sentence of one year in prison or ⅓ of the maximum given sentence and up to 25 years in prison.” (https://www.tsiglerlaw.com/theft-vs-larceny-vs-robbery-vs-burglary-new-york/)

 

The exception to the exception to the rule TB Baba Kama 78

I learned the following from a lecture given by Dr. Elana Stein Hain. (https://hadran.org.il/author-post/din-daf-getting-someone-else-to-do-your-dirty-work-episode-4/)

There is a general principle “a person’s emissary is as oneself-שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ.” When we studied massekhtot Kidushin and Gittin we saw that and emissary can effectuate betrothal and divorce on behalf of another person. There is an exception to this rule, “there’s no agency for a transgression-אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה.” A person can’t say, “I was just following orders.” On daf TB Baba Kama 78 we learn of an exception to this exception.

“What is this baraita teaching us? All of the halakhot it states are obvious. The first clause teaches us, through the case of one who stole an animal and gave it to another and that person slaughtered (or sold it), that in this case there is agency for transgression. Even though in the entire Torah there is a principle that there is no agency for transgression, here there is agency for transgression.” (Sefaria.org translation) The thief and not the butcher is liable for all penalties.

The Gemara provides two different reasons why ““there’s no agency for a transgression-אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה.” The first reason is found on this daf. “What is the reason that this case is an exception to the principle? It is because the verse states: “And slaughters it or sells it” (Exodus 21:37): just as one becomes liable for selling, which by definition is impossible without another party, i.e., the buyer, so too one becomes liable for slaughtering even when it is by means of another party.” It’s just based on interpretation of the verse, gezerat hakatuv (גזירת הכתוב)

Previously we learned another reason. “(Mishnah Bava Kamma 59b): In the case of one who sends an item that causes a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, one who is mental incoherent, or a minor, the one who sent it is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. If one sent it in the hands of a halakhically competent person, only the halakhically competent person is liable.

But why is the halakhically competent person liable? A person’s emissary is as oneself! There it is different, as there is no agency for transgression, as we say: When there is a conflict between the words of the Master, i.e., God, and the words of the student, i.e.,a human being, whose words should be listened to?” (TB Kiddushin 42, Sefaria.org translation) In other words, the agent or emissary knows right from wrong and should choose to do what God demands of him over what the human being asks.

There are couple reasons why there is an exception to the exception and we hold that there is agency for transgression.

The first example is an unwitting accomplice. “…If the thief gave the animal as payment for the redemption of his firstborn son, or as payment to a creditor, or conveyed it for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, or lent it to a borrower, or conveyed it for safeguarding to a paid bailee, or leased it to a renter, and he was leading out the animal and it died in the owner’s domain, the thief is exempt from payment. If that individual (i.e., the kohen, creditor, etc), following the thief’s instructions, lifted up the animal or led it out of the owner’s domain, and it subsequently died, the thief is liable for the theft. (Mishna Baba Kama 7:1)

 …It is not relevant to say: “the words of the master and the words of the student, whose words should one heed?” because the emissary is acting unwittingly. And so it sounds in Bava Kamma 79a, which says: if one stole a lamb from the flock and told the kohen, “Take this lamb which is mine,” or gave it to the kohen to redeem his firstborn son, but showed the kohen someone else’s lamb (to take); and it concludes that immediately when the kohen takes the lamb out of the domain of its owners, the thief is obligated (in compensation) by the pulling of the animal by the kohen. And Rabbeinu Yitzchak challenged there: But why is the thief obligated? We should say that there is no agent for a sin? And he answered that because the kohen does not know that the animal is stolen, it is not relevant to say “whose words should one heed?” (Tosefot TB Kiddushin 42b ד”ה אמאי)

The second example would be when the guilty party would say something to the effect, “I didn’t believe he would actually listen to me and do it.” “And only in the case where someone hired (false witnesses is that person obligated by the laws of Heaven to compensate), but one who simply told people to bear false witness is exempt even from the laws of Heaven because the person can argue that s/he did not think people would listen to her/him…For in our chapter we learn in a mishnah (BK 59b) “One who send forth fire with a deaf-mute, someone mentally incoherent or a minor is exempt from human law but obligated by Divine law. If one sent it with a mentally cogent adult, that adult is obligated,” suggesting that the one who did the sending is exempt even by Divine law!” (Tosefot TB Baba Kama 56a ד”ה אלא) 

“You can't always get what you want But if you try sometimes, well, you might find You get what you need” #Yitro#devartorah#parashathashavua

In this week’s parasha we shall read how Moses received on behalf of the Jewish people the 10 Commandments.  The very last of the 10 is “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house . . . nor anything that is your neighbor’s.” —Exodus 20:17

A store owner in Maine stubbornly refused to carry a new product. “You must remember, young feller,” said the storekeeper to the salesman, “that in this part of the country every want ain’t a need.”

Confusing our wants with our needs goes to the heart of coveting and explains why we are so often driven by the desire for more and more. We fail to see that life’s greatest fulfillment is not found in accumulating things but in knowing God.

The tenth commandment may seem like an add-on compared to such big-ticket items as murder, stealing, lying, and adultery, but it is foundational to all the other commandments and ensures peace and contentment. It is the only command that zeroes in on a forbidden attitude rather than an action. Yet it is a safeguard against the temptation to break the other nine commandments.

David’s covetous desire for another man’s wife led to adultery, stealing, and murder (2 Sam. 11). And a desire for more and more pleasure, power, or possessions can destroy family relationships and cause us to lie to others. Consequently, it also keeps us from having and maintaining a right relationship to God.

Contentment is wanting what you have, not having everything you want.

The best diet #Beshalach#devartorah#parashathashavua

Residents of Olten, Switzerland, were surprised by a shower of chocolate shavings covering the entire town. The ventilation system at a nearby chocolate factory had malfunctioned, sending cocoa into the air and dusting the area with confectionary goodness. The chocolate coating sounds like a dream come true for chocoholics 

While chocolate doesn’t adequately provide for one’s nutritional needs, God supplied the Israelites with heavenly showers that did. As they traveled through the desert, they began to grumble about the variety of food they’d left behind in Egypt. In response, God said He would “rain down bread from heaven” to sustain them (Exodus 16:4). When the morning dew dried up each day, a thin flake of food remained. The Israelites were instructed to gather as much as they needed for that day. On Erev Shabbat they collected a double portion for no manna fell on Shabbat. For forty years of their desert wanderings, they were nourished by God’s supernatural provision in manna.

We know little about manna except that it was “white like coriander seed and tasted like wafers made with honey” (v. 31). Though manna may not sound as appealing as a steady diet of chocolate, the sweetness of God’s provision for His people is clear. Consider for a moment, in connection with that which sustains life, that the Torah is also referred to as bread. “A human being does not live on bread alone, but that one may live on anything that God decrees.” (Deuteronomy 8:3) In this light we can appreciate what King David saying in Psalm 34 “Taste and see that the Lord is good.”

Does your diet include life-sustaining Torah?

 

 

How do we use our material blessings? #Bo#parashathashavua#devartorah

 By the end of the 10^th plague in this week’s Torah portion, God had seized the attention of Pharaoh and the Egyptians. Now they were dying to be rid of their Hebrew slaves. But God didn’t want the Israelites to leave Egypt empty-handed. After all, they had 400 years of back wages due them. So the Israelites asked their former masters for articles of silver, gold, and clothing, and they got them. Exodus 12:36 says that “The Lord had disposed the Egyptians favorably toward the people and they let them have their request….”

It wasn’t long, however, until our ancestors fell into idolatry. In parasha Ki Tisa They used their gold to make a golden calf, which they worshiped while Moses was on Mount Sinai receiving the 10 Commandments (32:1-4).

This tragic experience highlights the tension that we are required to maintain regarding our possessions. There is much in our society that we enjoy, but material things also pose grave dangers when we use them thoughtlessly. Author Os Guinness captures the Jewish approach to material goods. He says that we are “free to utilize” but “forbidden to idolize.” We must not become so enamored with “the riches of Egypt” that we grow complacent and forget our true mission to perfect this world as God’s partners.

Are we using our material blessings to serve the Lord? Or have we become slaves to them?

 

 

The person needs skin in the game TB Baba Kama 75

Today’s daf TB Baba Kama 75 discusses only one topic. If a person admits his guilt in court, he still has to return the item or its value; however, he is freed from the obligation of paying the fines of kafel and 4 or 5. An example would be a man steals another man’s sheep. He admits they stole it and even slaughtered it and he is only obligated to make restitution and not pay the fine of four or five.

Rav and Shmuel disagree in the case when a person admits his guilt and then witnesses come and testify that he indeed stole the object. Does the guilty party have to pay the fines or does his admission free him?

“It was stated with regard to one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine, and afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability, that Rav says he is exempt, and Shmuel says he is liable.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Hamnuna qualifies Rav’s exemption. For admission to exempt a person from the fines, he has to have some skin in the game. In other words his admission cannot free him from all liability. If there is no liability, the admission has no effect.

“Rav Hamnuna said: Rav’s statement is more reasonable in a case where the thief says: I stole an item, and subsequently witnesses came and testified that he stole that item. In that case it is logical that the thief is exempt from paying the fine despite the witnesses’ testimony, because he at least obligated himself to pay the principal amount via his admission.

“But if he says: I did not steal anything, and witnesses came and testified that he did steal an animal, and subsequently the thief says: Yes, I did steal the animal, and I also slaughtered it, or I also sold it, and witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered or sold it, he is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The reason he is liable is that through his admission he sought to exempt himself from any payment whatsoever. In order for an admission to exempt the perpetrator from a fine, it must include an admission that he is liable to pay some payment.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara quotes Rabbi Yoḥanan who lives in Israel showing that he agrees with Rav Hamnuna who lives in Babylonia.  The halakha follows Rav as explained by Rav Hamnuna.

Scheming witnesses (עדים זוממים) TB Baba Kama 72-74

For testimony to be accepted there must be two witnesses who testify. The Gemara recognizes that there are two categories of witnesses. The first category are two sets of witnesses contradicting each other (עדים מכחישים). In this case the court throws out both sets of witnesses and cannot render a decision.

The second category are scheming witnesses (עדים זוממים). In this case the Torah teaches “If the one who testified is a false witness, having testified falsely against a fellow Israelite, you shall do to the one as the one schemed to do to the other.” (Deuteronomy 19:19) Here is the scenario. Another set of witnesses comes forward and says about the scheming or conspiring witnesses, “We don’t know what happened concerning this case; however, the witnesses could not possibly testify in this case because they were with us at that time.” Because of the verse in the Torah, we believe the second set of witnesses and punish the first set of witnesses with the punishment they wished to inflict upon the defendant based on their testimony.

The first chapter of massekhet Makkot discusses the laws of scheming witnesses. We won’t begin that chapter until April 10, 2025! Dappim TB Baba Kama 72-4 discusses two aspects of scheming witnesses that are not discussed in massekhet Makkot. Both points of law revolve around a disagreement between Rava and Abaye.

“It was stated concerning a conspiring witness: Abaye says: He is disqualified retroactively, from when he provided his testimony. Any testimony he may have provided after that point in time is retroactively nullified. Rava says: He is disqualified only from that point forward, i.e., from when he was established to be a conspiring witness, but not retroactively from when he provided his testimony.

“The Gemara explains the reasons for the two opinions: Abaye says he is disqualified retroactively because it is from that time when he testified that he is considered a wicked man, and the Torah said: “Do not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness” (Exodus 23:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not allow a wicked man to serve as a witness. (Once the witnesses found to be wicked all his previous testimony is thrown out on the presumption he lied then too-GG)” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara provides two reasons for Rava’s position. “Rava says that he is disqualified only from that point forward because the disqualification of a conspiring witness is a novelty, i.e., it is not based on logic. The reason is that this is a case of two witnesses against two other witnesses, in which case neither testimony should be accepted. What did you see that causes you to listen to the second set of witnesses, who testify that the first set were not at the scene of the purported event? You could instead listen to the first set of witnesses, who testify to the event, and disbelieve the second set. Yet the Torah teaches that the second set of witnesses is always deemed credible and the first set is subjected to punishment as conspiring witnesses. Therefore, as the disqualification of the conspiring witnesses is an anomaly, you have the right to disqualify them only from the time of the novelty and onward, i.e., this counterintuitive disqualification is not applied retroactively.

“…here this is Rava’s reason for not disqualifying him retroactively: It is due to the potential monetary loss for purchasers, whose acquisitions had been validated by these witnesses between the time of the witnesses’ first testimony and when they were rendered conspiring witnesses. If the disqualification of the witnesses were applied retroactively, as by right it should, all these transactions would be nullified, which would cause a loss to these purchasers.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The halakhah in this case follows Abaye. This is one of the six cases in the Talmud where the halakhah follows Abaye.

The second case discusses whether one may overlay scheming testimony upon contradictory testimony.

“Rava says: Witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted by two other witnesses, and ultimately they, the first set of witnesses, were rendered conspiring witnesses, are killed, in accordance with the punishment for conspiring witnesses involved in a capital case, despite the fact that their testimony was already disqualified prior to the discovery of their conspiracy. The reason is that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, only the process has not yet been completed at the time of the contradiction.” (Sefaria.org translation) Abaye disagrees completely.

Abaye’s proof and the back-and-forth of the Gemara is complicated. As opposed to the first case, here the halakha follows Rava.

 

 

 

What’s the beef? TB Baba Kama 71-72

If a thief admits his guilt before he goes to trial, the penalty he would have been obligated to pay is absolved. The thief only has to replace the stolen object or its value. At the very bottom of daf TB Baba Kama 71b to the very top of 72a the Gemara wonders is there a case when a person could be obligated only to pay half of the penalty or would the entire fine absolved?

The Gemara presents two different scenarios.

1.                    “Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one stole an ox belonging to             two partners and slaughtered it, and subsequently admitted the theft to one of             the partners, which means that he is exempt from paying the fourfold or fivefold             payment to that partner, in accordance with the principle that one who admits his             own guilt is exempt from fines, what is the halakha with regard to payment to the         other partner

 “             The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The Merciful One states in the               Torah: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox” (Exodus 21:37), which indicates five             full oxen, but not five half-oxen. Or perhaps when the Merciful One states                 “five oxen,” this means that even five half-oxen must be paid in a case of this                 kind. Rav Naḥman said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” which             means five full oxen, but not five half-oxen.” (Sefaria.org translation)

            “Rava raised an objection to him from the mishna: If one stole an animal of his             father’s and then slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he pays         the fourfold or fivefold payment. But here, since his father died and the thief has         inherited part of the stolen animal himself, it is similar to the case of one who stole         from two partners and went ahead and admitted the theft to one of them, i.e., to             himself. In the case of the mishna he is exempt from paying the portion of the fine         that is for himself, and yet the mishna teaches that he pays the other heirs their                 portion of the fourfold or fivefold payment.

“Rav Naḥman said to Rava: With what are we dealing here? With a case where his father stood against his son the thief in his trial, and the son was convicted for the theft and slaughter of his father’s animal. In this case, the liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment was established before the father’s death, and at that time the payment was five full oxen.

“Rava asked him: And if the thief had not yet stood trial before the father’s death, what would be the halakha, according to your opinion? Would he not be required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna (74b): If one stole his father’s animal and the father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment; let the mishna make a distinction within the same type of case, as follows: In what case is this statement, i.e., that the thief is required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, said? It is when the thief stood trial in his father’s lifetime; but if he did not stand trial in his father’s lifetime he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

 

“Rav Naḥman said to him: Indeed, the mishna could have mentioned that case. However, since the tanna of the mishna has to cite the first clause, which discusses one who stole an animal of his father’s and slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he cites the latter clause as well, by means of a similar case: If one stole his father’s animal and his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold the animal.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

Although the second case looks complicated, it’s not so bad. The thief is not only a thief, he’s also an heir along with his other siblings. Now this case is analogous of a thief who confessed to one of the partners he stole the object from. Something interesting happened the next morning. Rav Naḥman reversed his decision. “On the following morning, Rav Naḥman retracted his statement and said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” and this means that even five half-oxen are included. Rav Naḥman explained his change of mind: And the reason that I did not say this to you last night is because I had not eaten ox meat.  (דְּלָא אֲכַלִי בִּשְׂרָא דְתוֹרָא.)”

What exactly did Rav Naḥman mean when he said I had not eaten ox meat? Rashi an Raavad explain that this is an idiomatic expression meaning that Rav Naḥman did not investigate the matter well enough. Tosafot ד"ה דְּלָא אֲכַלִי בִּשְׂרָא דְתוֹרָא. interprets this phrase to mean that Rav Naḥman was protein deficient because he was fasting the day before and couldn’t think straight. I know when am hungry I have a hard time focusing too. 

Saying thank you is a gratitude practice #Vaera#devartorah#parashathashavua

 Midrash (Shemot Rabbah 9:10) explains why Aaron struck the Nile to initiate the first two plague of blood and frogs. (Exodus 7:9, 19).  Because the Nile protected baby Moses in his basket as he floated down the river, Moses smiting the river would be inappropriate.  The Torah is teaching us an important lesson. We should develop a gratitude attitude. If we should show gratitude to water, an inanimate object which has no feelings, how much more so should we express our gratitude to human beings who have shown us kindness!

When I worked at Camp Ramah in New England either as a Hebrew or Judaic teacher, my job was a breeze compared to those who worked in the kitchen.  I only taught 4 period out of eight a day (of course I used some of the other periods to prepare the next day’s lesson plans). The kitchen staff had to prepare close to 1000 meals three times a day seven days a week, as well as washing the dirty dishes, and cleaning up the dining room after each meal so it would be ready for the next meal several hours later. 

While many grumbled that the food just wasn’t like the way mother made it, I tried to thank the kitchen staff after each meal to show my gratitude for all their hard work and effort. Working in a kitchen has to be one of hardest of all the camp jobs and I know they appreciated my words by the smiles on their faces.

Try a gratitude practice by saying “thank you” at least 100 times a day. Over time you’ll make a lot of people happy and you’ll discover that you’ll be a happier person too!

 

 

Ancient signs TB Baba Kama 69

Sometimes people will post funny signs to mark their territory. Here are some of my favorites. “Prayer is the best way to meet God. Trespassing is the fastest.” “The last car park here is still missing.” “Those who throw objects at the crocodiles, will be asked to retrieve them.”

Today’s daf TB Baba Kama 69 mentions three different signs people used to warn people about their property.

1.    The first sign concerns kerem revei (כֶּרֶם רְבָעִי). The fruit of a newly planted vineyard is completely forbidden for three years. During the fourth-year the fruit is sanctified. It either must be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there or redeemed by transferring the sanctification onto money. That money is taken to Jerusalem and used to buy food to be eaten there. “We learned in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 5:1): With regard to a vineyard in its fourth year, they would demarcate it with clods of earth [bikzozot] placed around it on the ground, to alert people that they may not eat or derive any benefit from its grapes without redeeming them. The Gemara interrupts its quotation of the mishna to explain: This particular distinguishing mark of earth is used because a vineyard in its fourth year is like earth: Just as with regard to earth there is permission to derive benefit from it through its cultivation, so too, with this fruit, when it has been redeemed by means of coins, it is likewise permitted to benefit from it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

2.    The second sign concerns orla (עׇרְלָה ), the first three years of the vineyards growth. “And a grapevine of orla is demarcated with potsherds [ḥarsit] placed around it, to alert people that its grapes may not be eaten nor may any benefit be derived from them at all (see Leviticus 19:23). The Gemara explains: This particular distinguishing mark is used because orla is like potsherds: Just as no benefit is derived from potsherd, so too, no benefit may be derived from this orla.” (Sefaria.org translation)

3.     Anybody was concerned about being in a state of ritual readiness like a priest or a khaver (חָבֵר), was not allowed to come into contact with anything dead including a grave. “The mishna continues: And an area of graves is demarcated with lime, to notify people that the demarcated area is ritually impure and will impart impurity to those who pass over it. The Gemara explains: The reason this particular distinguishing mark is used is that lime is white, like bones. The mishna further states: And one dissolves the lime in water and pours it out around the gravesite. The Gemara explains: This is performed in order that the lime should be whiter than in its non-dissolved form.” (Sefaria.org translation)

By the way traditional kohanim still won’t enter a cemetery except for the seven closest relatives, mother, father, wife, son, daughter, brother, and sister. We encircle the cemetery with a fence as a nonverbal sign warning them not enter. Tombstones are also a sign that this is a cemetery as well.

The debate on yayush continues TB Baba Kama 68

On today’s daf TB Baba Kama 68, amoraim continue to debate whether yayush  (יֵאוּשׁ), the original owner has despaired of retrieving the stolen object, is an effective method for the thief of acquiring the stolen object. Remember stealing is still wrong. Even if the thief acquires the stolen object as his own, he is still liable to make restitution and for the penalties the Torah imposes.

Whether the thief acquires the stolen object before or after yayush is a complicated sugiyah. To understand the positions of the different amoraim, we need to refresh our memory of the applicable verse in the Torah. “When any party steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, that person shall pay five oxen for the ox, and four sheep for the sheep.” (Deuteronomy 21:37)

Rav and Reish Lakish hold the position that yayush koneh  (יֵאוּשׁ קוֹנֶה), the original owner has despaired of retrieving the stolen object, is an effective method for the thief of acquiring the stolen object. Consequently, the above verse describes the scenario where the animal was slaughtered or sold before yayush. If yayush koneh, the stolen property now belongs to the thief and it is his right to sell or slaughter the animal. Therefore, the penalty of four or five does not imply any longer.

Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet both agree that yayush aino koneh (יֵאוּשׁ אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה), the original owner has despaired of retrieving the stolen object, is not an effective method for the thief of acquiring the stolen object. Nevertheless, they do disagree when the thief has to pay the penalty of four or five. Rav Naḥman holds that the thief must pay the penalty of four or five regardless of yayush. For him it is an ethical issue. The thief has sinned twice, stealing the animal and then selling or slaughtering stolen goods. Rav Sheshet holds for a thief to be liable for the penalty of four or five, yayush alone is insufficient. There also must be a complete sale (a change of domains-שנוי רשות) to effectuate the above penalty.

 

 

Shenui and Yayush TB Baba Kama 65-67

Dappim TB Baba Kama 65-67 discuss two basic topics in Jewish law. The first is when a thief acquires ownership of the stolen object. The general agreement is when a change  (שִׁינּוּי) happens to that object, the thief now owns it. There is a discussion whether there’s a difference when there is an actual change (שִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה) in the object or just the name changes (שִׁינּוּי הַשֵּׁם). Everybody agrees that the thief has to make restitution to his victim even though he gets to keep the stolen object. The stolen value is calculated at the time the animal or item was stolen which includes the kefel fine or double the value of the stolen object. The penalty of four or five times the worth of the animal is calculated at the time of judgment. The Gemara sees no difference between actual change (שִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה) and a name change (שִׁינּוּי הַשֵּׁם). Nevertheless, Tosefot ד"ה שִׁינּוּי הַשֵּׁם  כְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵ disagree and say that a name change by itself is insufficient when comes to a stolen object. For the thief to acquire the stolen object when the name changes, there has to be either be an actual change or the owner has to despair (יֵאוּשׁ) of ever retrieving the stolen object.

The second topic is when does the despairing of the original  owner (yayush  (יֵאוּשׁ) allows somebody to acquire the object. Everybody agrees concerning a lost object, the finder acquires it when the original owner despairs of ever finding it again yayush (יֵאוּשׁ) because the finder acquired it in a permissible way. However, there is a disagreement whether a thief acquires the stolen object because of yayush.

In the latter case there are three points of view. 1, Deoraita, according to Torah law, yes the thief acquires the stolen object because of yayush. 2, Derabanan, according to the rabbis decree, the thief acquires the stolen object. 3, Rav Yosef, Rav Ulla, and Rava all agree that the thief never acquires the stolen object because of yayush.

Tosefot ד"ה אָמַר עוּלָּא cites the Gemara later in our massekhet daf 114a where Ulla seemingly contradicts himself and holds the position that the thief acquires the stolen object because of yayush.  Rebbeinu Tam finds a qualitative difference between the two sugiyot. Generally speaking Rav Ulla holds that yayush is effective for the acquisition; however, the Gemara on daf 67 is speaking about a special case concerning sacrifices. May a thief offer up an animal that he has stolen as a sacrifice in the Temple? Rav Ulla forbids this sacrifice according to Rebbeinu Tam because one is forbidden to do a mitzvah whose origin is a sin (מצווה הבאה בעבירה). Because the animal was stolen which obviously is a sin, this animal cannot be used for a mitzvah, as a sacrifice on behalf of the thief.

 

How can you steal land? TB Baba Kama 63

 A thief doesn’t have to pay the penalty of kefel (כֶּפֶל) for everything he has stolen. There are some exclusions. Dappim 62-63 analyzes through a careful reading of Exodus 22:6-8 to learn these exclusions.  “When any party gives money or goods to another for safekeeping, and they are stolen from that other party’s house: if caught, the thief shall pay double; if the thief is not caught, the owner of the house shall depose before God and deny laying hands on the other’s property. (In all charges of misappropriation—pertaining to an ox, an ass, a sheep, a garment, or any other loss, whereof one party alleges, “This is it”—the case of both parties shall come before God: the one whom God declares guilty shall pay double to the other.” (Exodus 22:6-8)

Whether one uses the method of klal, ufrat, uklal (כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל) or ribui, me’ut, rebui (רבוי ומיעוט ורבוי) to expound the Torah, the answer is basically the same.  They both exclude land, Canaanite slaves, and financial documents. Using the method of klal, ufrat, uklal, the Gemara finds the common denominator between an ox, and ass, a sheep, and a garment. “just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too double payment is practiced with regard to any item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value. Land is excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves are excluded, as they are compared to land in many areas of halakha. Financial documents are excluded, as, although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value. The value of the material on which the document is written is negligible; documents are valuable only because they serve as proof for monetary claims. ” (Sefaria.org translation)

Of course land is not movable. How can it be stolen? Tosefot ד"ה יָצְאוּ קַרְקָעוֹת provides two answers. By moving the boundary marker in your favor, you steal somebody else’s property. A modern example would be fencing in your property and placing one of the sides of the fence on your neighbor’s property. In Hebrew this is called hasagat gevul (השגת גבוך). The second answer teaches that there are things that are physically attached to land, but not halakhically deemed attached. TB Shavuot 42b provides an example. “Rabbi Meir says: There are certain items that are physically on the land but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective, ... How so? If one makes the claim: I assigned you ten grapevines laden with fruit to safeguard, and the other one says: They are only five vines, Rabbi Meir deems the defendant liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim, and although the claim concerned grapevines, the primary aspect of the claim was the grapes.” (Sefaria.org translation) Although the sages disagree with Rabbi Meir, the assumption is five out of the ten grapevines laden with fruit were stolen which were physically attached to the land. Therefore part of the “land” was stolen.