Moving a grave TB Nazir 65

Today’s daf TB Nazir 65 is the penultimate daf in our massekhet. Interestingly enough we move away from the world of nazir and learn about other topics. Nevertheless, today’s topics are tangential to a nazir.

The first Mishna on our daf discusses the definition of a cemetery. “MISHNA: One who finds a corpse for the first time, i.e., he discovers a single corpse in a place that was not previously established as a cemetery, if the corpse is lying in the usual manner of Jewish burial, he removes it from there and also its surrounding earth. It is assumed that this corpse was buried there alone. There is no concern that this area is a cemetery and therefore the corpse may not be moved, nor does one take into account the possibility that another corpse may be buried in the vicinity.

“Similarly, if he found two corpses, he removes them and their surrounding earth. In a case where he found three corpses, if there is a space between this corpse and that corpse of four to eight cubits, in a standard design, this is a graveyard. There is a concern that this might be an ancient cemetery.

“One must therefore examine from that spot outward for twenty cubits. If one finds another corpse at the end of twenty cubits, he examines from that spot outward twenty cubits, as there is a basis for anticipating the matter. It is likely that he has stumbled upon an ancient gravesite. He is not permitted to relocate the corpses, despite the fact that if he had found the single corpse by itself at first he could have removed it and its surrounding earth.” (Sefria.org translation)

If one or two corpses are found buried outside a Jewish cemetery, we may reinter them in a Jewish cemetery. If three bodies are found, we are not allowed to disinter them. We must do a diligent search of 20 cubits in each direction for other bodies and ascertain whether we have stumbled upon an ancient Jewish cemetery.

The next Gemara teaches us forensic investigation to determine whether the bodies found were Jewish are not. From this text we can learn ancient Jewish burial practices.

“Rav Yehuda said the following inferences from the mishna: The phrase: He found, excludes a corpse that already had been found. If it was known that there was one corpse buried in a certain place, the discovery of two previously unknown corpses does not raise the concern that perhaps it is a forgotten graveyard. Similarly, the term corpse [met] excludes a killed [harug] person. Even if there were three corpses found, if there are signs that these people were killed, the area is not assumed to be a graveyard, as they may have been buried where they were found killed. Likewise, the term lying excludes a sitting person, as Jews were not generally buried in a seated position. The phrase: In the usual manner, excludes one whose head was placed between his thighs, as that is not the way Jews are buried.” (Sefaria.org translation)

What was the reason behind reburying the deceased in a Jewish cemetery? Why not let him rest in peace where he were found? I think the rabbis wanted to limit the area of the Land of Israel that was considered tamei for practical reasons. If a kohen was carrying his terumah and walked over such a grave, both he and the terumah would be tamei. He couldn’t officiate in the Temple and his terumah had to be burned. There goes his food up in smoke. If a person wanted to offer up a sacrifice and walked over such a grave, he could not enter the Temple because he became tamei. And we have already learned what a nazir must do if he becomes tamei met. By reburying the dead in a Jewish cemetery, more of the land of Israel would be tahor and a lot of problems would be avoided

 

Another leniency TB Nazir 64

Starting on yesterday’s daf and continuing on today’s daf TB Nazir 64 we learn a new leniency when it comes to tumah, ritual impurity or what I call ritual unreadiness. We don’t often have a chance to learn about the nitty-gritty details of  tumah and tahara. Before we begin today’s daf we have to remember certain laws concerning tumah.

1.     “וְכׇל סְפֵק טוּמְאָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים סְפֵיקוֹ טָהוֹר.-And the guiding principle in any case of uncertainty with regard to impurity in a public domain is that its uncertainty is ruled to be ritually pure.” The definition of a public domain is three or more people.

2.     “וכל ספק טומאה ברשות היחיד ספקה טמא-the guiding principle in any case of uncertainty involving impurity in a private domain is that the item with uncertain status is deemed impure.” The definition of a private domain is two or less people.

3.     Unlike a corpse, a dead creeping animal defined as a sheretz (שֶּׁרֶץ) can only make a person tamei through touching it.

With these rules in mind we can appreciate the leniency discussed in the Gemara. The case is the following. A nazir goes into a cave to immerse himself in the water. This water is a natural mikva, ritual bath. The cave is a private domain. In the water he sees a dead sheretz floating in the water. There is a doubt whether he touched it or not. Is this person tamei?

“How does one differentiate between a known and an unknown impurity? If a nazirite descended to immerse in a cave, and a corpse was found floating at the mouth of the cave, he is impure. The Gemara comments: A floating impurity does not render a person or item impure in the case of a carcass of a creeping animal (a sheretz -שֶּׁרֶץ). As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Teharot 5:6): With regard to the case of uncertain impurity, where an item might have touched something impure that was floating, either in water in a vessel or in water in the ground, e.g., a well, the item is pure. Rabbi Shimon says: If the impurity was floating in water that was in a vessel, the item is impure; if the impurity was in water in the ground, it is pure.

“What is the reason of the first tanna for declaring that in all uncertain cases of floating impurity the person or item remains pure? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: In the passage dealing with the impurity of creeping animals and the prohibition of eating them it is written: “With any swarming thing that swarms” (Leviticus 11:43), indicating that a carcass of a creeping animal renders items impure in any place where it swarms. And it is written: “All swarming things that swarm upon the earth” (Leviticus 11:42), indicating that it transmits impurity only if it is on the earth. How so? How can one reconcile these two verses? Definite contact with it renders one impure; one who has uncertain contact with it, e.g., the impurity is floating, remains pure.

"The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason for his opinion? Ulla said that as it is written: “Nevertheless a fountain or a cistern in which there is a gathering of water shall be pure” (Leviticus 11:36), this indicates that a creeping animal found in one of these places does not impart impurity. And it is written in the same verse: “He who touches their carcass shall be impure until evening,” which indicates that it does render one impure. How so? If the impurity was floating in water contained in vessels, the item it touched is rendered impure, but if the water was in the ground itself, e.g., in a spring or pit, the item it touched is pure.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Everybody agrees that if the sheretz isn’t grounded then in a doubtful case the person remains tahor, pure or ritually ready. The debate is over what is considered being grounded. The halakha follows the first tanna. If the sheretz is floating in the water or in a cup in the water and there is a doubt whether they person touched the sheretz, he remains tahor.

A brand-new concept, -טוּמְאַת תְּהוֹםtumat tahom TB Nazir 63

Today’s daf TB Nazir 63 introduces a brand-new concept, -טוּמְאַת תְּהוֹםtumat tahom. This term is hard to translate into English, but is readily explained. It is a person who is buried in the ground but nobody no longer knows that the body is there. This source of tumah, ritual unreadiness, is contrasted with טוּמְאָה יְדוּעָה-tumah yedu’ah.  In this case you may not know that body is buried in that spot, but somebody else does. The tumat tahom provides a leniency for the nazir.

“MISHNA: With regard to a nazirite who shaved for the conclusion of his naziriteship, and it later became known to him that during his naziriteship he was ritually impure from a corpse, if it was a known impurity, i.e., people were aware of the impurity when he became impure, he negates his entire naziriteship. And if it was ritual impurity imparted by a grave in the depths (-טוּמְאַת תְּהוֹםtumat tahom-gg), one that was unknown at the time, he does not negate his naziriteship. If he discovered he was impure before he shaved, he negates his naziriteship in either case.” (Sefaria.org translation) In other words, after the nazir has successfully completed the number of days for his nazirite vow, brought his sacrifices, and shaved his head and then learned that he walked over a grave that was tumat tahom, he remains tahor, ritually ready and doesn’t have to repeat his vow of nezirut.

The Gemara cites two possible sources in the Torah for the basis of the concept tumat tahom; however ultimately reaches the conclusion that this is just another halakha from Moses upon Mount Sinai. “Rather, it must be that the halakha of impurity imparted by a grave in the depths (-טוּמְאַת תְּהוֹםtumat tahom-gg), is learned as a tradition and not from the verses, which are cited merely in support.” (Sefaria.com translation)

Rambam poskins: “[The following rules apply when] a nazirite performed the shaving [required when completing his vow in] purity and afterwards discovered that he had contracted the ritual impurity [stemming from contact with a corpse] in the midst of the days of his vow. If he became impure due to a [the source for] impurity that was known [by others], all [of the days of his vow] are invalidated. He must bring the sacrifices [required when emerging from] impurity, perform the shaving [required when emerging from] impurity, count [the days of] another nazirite vow, and bring the sacrifices [required when completing his vow in] purity.

If he became impure due to [a source of] impurity [likened to] the depths, he does not invalidate [the days he observed]. This is a law communicated by the Oral Tradition.” (Mishneh Torah, Sefer Haflaah, Laws of a Nazir, chapter 6 halakha 16, Sefaria.org translation)

 

Uncomfortable truths about slavery that we can’t whitewash TB Nazir 61-62

 Slavery was a fact in the ancient world so we should not be surprised that dappim TB Nazir 61-62 discuss the issues surrounding Canaanite slaves making vows and becoming a nazir. Even though both women and Canaanite slaves may vow to become a nazir, the Mishnah on TB Nazir 61a makes the distinction between these two categories. “Women and Canaanite slaves do have naziriteship. The mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of women than in the case of slaves, as a master may force his slave to drink wine, shave his hair, or become ritually impure from a corpse, despite the slave’s vow of naziriteship, but a husband cannot force his wife to transgress her naziriteship (after his window of opportunity of annulling his wife’s vow has closed-gg).” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Mishnah on TB Nazir 62b continues the distinction between women and Canaanite slaves. “The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of slaves than in the case of women, as a man can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave, despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if he nullified the naziriteship of his wife it is permanently nullified, and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if he nullified the naziriteship of his slave by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave is emancipated he completes his naziriteship.” (Sefaria.org translation) Rava understands why the Mishnah says that the master cannot nullify his slaves’ vows is simple. There is no need to because the slave cannot make a vow at all. The Torah takes this ability away from him.

Our daf ends with a runaway slave whose master never gives up hope of getting him back. If the slave made a nazirite vow, must he keep it now that he has run away? “Rabbi Yosei, the one who says that he may drink wine, maintains that the slave will ultimately return and come back to his master, and therefore it is preferable for him to drink wine so that he should not be weakened by the time he returns. And according to Rabbi Meir, the one who says that he may not drink wine, he maintains that it is better that the slave should suffer by being deprived of wine, so that he will return to his master, as the desire to drink wine will spur him to return.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Especially so close to Passover, our festival of freedom, I find these discussions and conclusions hard to accept. During the Civil War arguments were made for and against slavery by Jews. I can honestly say that the majority of Jews were in the abolitionist’s camp. The debate is captured in the book A Documentary History of the Jews in the United States 1654-1875, edited with notes and introduction by Morris U. Schappes.

 Rabbi Morris Jacob Raphall gave a sermon at Congregation Bnai Jeshurun, New York on January 4, 1861 where he taught that slavery was not sinful. Michael Heilprin rebutted Raphall’s arguments in the New-York daily Tribune, January 15, 1861. I’m just going to quote the beginning of this editorial.

“The Rev. Rabbi Raphall, on the fourth of this month, preached a sermon on slavery in the Bible… I have perused it and find that the Rabbi arrives at the conclusion that Slavery is not sinful in the eyes of God of Israel, the God of Moses and the Prophets. It is true, he is ‘no friend to slavery in the abstract, and still less friendly to the practical working of slavery.’ He is ‘sorry to find that’ he is ‘delivering a proSlavery discourse.’ He distinguishes between Slavery as practiced by the Hebrews, which was ‘confined within certain limits,’ and according to which a ‘slave was a person in whom the dignity of human nature was to be respected’ and ‘who had rights,’ and the heathen system of Slavery, ‘which’ he is ‘sorry to say, is adopted in the South,’ ‘which reduces the slave to a thing,’ and makes him a pray to ‘two of the worst passions of human nature, lust and cruelty.’… ‘Still, ‘after humbly praying to the Father of Truth and of Mercy,’ he regards it as his duty to proclaim from the pulpit that it is a sin, to preach against slavery in the South! I had read similar nonsense hundreds of times before; I knew that the Father of Truth and of Mercy was daily invoked in hundreds of purpose in this country for a Divine sanction of falsehood and barbarism; still being a Jew myself, I felt exceedingly humbled, I may say outraged, by the sacrilegious words of the Rabbi. Have we not had enough of the ‘reproach of Egypt?’ Must the stigma of Egyptian principles be fastened on the people of Israel by Israelitish lips themselves? Shall the enlightened and humane of this country ask each other, ‘Are these people of God, we have come from His land?’ (my emphasis –gg) I hoped, however, that amid the flood of scum that is now turned up by the turbulent waves of the stormy time, the words of the Rabbi would soon disappear, like so many other bubbles, and the blasphemous teachings of the synagogue find no longer Echols than those of Christian churches. But I am grievously mistaken. Day after day brings hosannas to the Hebrew defamer of the law of this nation; in his words are trumpeted through the land as if he were the messenger of a new salvation. So depraved is the moral sense of our proSlavery demagogues, so debauched the mind of their mammon-worshiping followers, so dense the Egyptian darkness which covers their horizon, that, all other false lights being extinguished, a spark of Hebrew ProSlavery rhetoric is hailed as a new lightning from Sinai, as a new light from Zion, sent to guide the people of the United States safely so the dark campus that threatens to destroy the ship of State…” (Raphall’s sermon can be found on pages 405-418 and Heilprin’s rebuttal from pages 418-428)

Heilprin’s editorial continues for another nine pages refuting point by point Raphall’s arguments. I believe that slavery is the original sin of the United States and we are still suffering the consequences almost 200 years after the emancipation of the Southern slaves. Removing uncomfortable books from the classroom and from the libraries will not make the problem go away.

 

Double clip? TB Nazir 60

On today’s daf TB Nazir 60 Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai’s students asked him a question when it comes to a nazir who has successfully completed his vow of nezirut and is a metzora (badly translated as a leper. This unfortunate person however does not have Hansen’s disease) at the same time, may he double-clip and use one shaving for both of his states? “With regard to one who was a pure nazirite and a leper, what is the halakha concerning the possibility that he may shave one shaving and it will count for him both for this and for that? In other words, can it serve for his shaving of leprosy as well as for his naziriteship?” (Sefaria.org translation) Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai basically gave them a one-word answer, “no.”

He explained his answer. Concerning the hair, the goals of a nazir and the goals of a metzora are different. “Now in actual fact the two shavings have different functions: A nazirite shaves to remove his hair, and a leper shaves to grow hair, so that he can shave again after the days of his counting.” (Sefaria.org translation)

His students asked him another question whether this person can double-clip. “But even if his shaving of naziriteship does not count for him as the shaving of the completion of his days of confirmed leprosy, let it at least count for him as the shaving at the end of the days of his counting, which is not followed by another act of shaving, and therefore is performed only for the purpose of removing his hair.” (Sefaria.org translation) Once again Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai said “no.”

He explained his answer. Concerning the hair, the procedure of the nazir and the metzora is not the same. “A leper shaves before the sprinkling of his offering’s blood, and a nazirite does so after the sprinkling of the blood (of their respective sacrifices-gg). Therefore, the two shavings are not equivalent.” (Sefaria. org translation)

His students asked him a third question. “And granted that his shaving does not count for his days of leprosy and his naziriteship, let it at least count for his days of leprosy and his shaving of naziriteship of impurity, both of which are performed before the sprinkling of the blood.” (Sefaria. org translation) For the third time Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai said “no.”

His explanation is the same as in the second question. Procedurally there is a significant difference. “An impure nazirite shaves after immersion in water, whereas a leper shaves before immersion in water.” (Sefaria.org translation)

In these cases, a person just can’t double-clip when comes to a shave and haircut.

 

 

 

 

Cross-dressing TB Nazir 59

Today’s daf TB Nazir 59 discusses an issue that has attracted national attention as red states have begun to prohibit drag shows and drag queen story hours. Time magazine reports:

 “Tennessee became the first state to explicitly ban drag shows in public spaces on Thursday after Gov. Bill Lee signed the provision into law hours after the measure passed in the state Senate.

“Drag shows have become the latest target of conservative criticism, as a slew of other anti-drag bills have been introduced in at least fourteen other states—including Arizona, Kentucky, Oklahoma and others. Language across the numerous bills is similar to the Tennessee bill, which prohibits ‘adult cabaret performances’ in public places where minors could watch. In Tennessee’s bill, ‘adult cabaret’ is defined as ‘adult-oriented performances’ that include ‘male or female impersonators.’”(For a breakdown state-by-state legislation continued to read the article here: https://time.com/6260421/tennessee-limiting-drag-shows-status-of-anti-drag-bills-u-s/)

The Gemara discusses what constitutes masculine behavior and feminine behavior which should never be erased. Rav permits removing the hair from armpits and the pubic area with the scissors while Rabbi Yoḥanan forbids it. From this we learn that women have removed hair to beautify themselves from the earliest times while men haven’t. There are those who hold that just cross-dressing is forbidden while there are others who hold that cross-dressing in itself is not forbidden, but rather lewd behavior associated with it.

“The Gemara asks: And what does the first tanna, who holds that the prohibition is by rabbinic law, learn from this verse: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in the baraita, where it states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, and a man shall not put on a woman’s garment, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 22:5). What is the meaning when the verse states this? If it teaches only that a man may not put on a woman’s garment, and a woman may not wear a man’s garment, it is already stated in explanation of this prohibition that “it is an abomination to the Lord your God,” and there is no abomination here in the mere act of wearing a garment.

Rather, it means that a man may not wear a woman’s garment and thereby go and sit among the women; and a woman may not wear a man’s garment and sit among the men. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From where is it derived that a woman may not go out with weapons to war? The verse states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, and a man shall not put on a woman’s garment,” which indicates that a man may not adorn himself with the cosmetics and ornaments of a woman, and similarly a woman may not go out with weapons to war, as those are for the use of males. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling follows this opinion.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara cites different conflicting opinions with no halakhic conclusion reached in the Gemara. The conversation continues in the codes which generally takes the stringent position in this matter. For us Conservative Jews Rabbi Gordon Tucker continues the evolution of our understanding of this issue in the book The Observant Life:

“Whatever the reason for the prohibition, however, the clarifiers make it clear that the definition of gender-specific apparel is relative to the society in which one lives. Clearly, a man wearing a skirt is a very different act in traditional parts of Scotland from what it would be in Westchester County, New York! Moreover, the Talmud itself (at BT N’darim 49b) recognizes that there are such things as ‘unisex’ garments, for it describes how Rabbi Judah’s wife made a woolen garment that served them both: she wore it to the marketplace and he wore it to the synagogue. Thus it is clear that, to the extent that it is common and accepted for women to wear pants or for men to carry handbags, there can be no objection raised by the Torah’s decree, and this is the case regardless of whether the apparel or accessory in question is or is not clearly made (i.e., in style or in color) for the gender of the person using it, or if the item of apparel or the accessory rate in question is truly ‘unisex’ in nature.

“Again, as strict a decisor as Ovadiah Yosef not only reports this argument, but accepted it as halakha (Yabbi’a Omer, part six, Yoreh De’ah, 14, ed. Jerusalem, 1986, pp. 189-194). And he also rules there that no violation occurs even when a garment associated with the opposite sex is worn, as long as it is being worn specifically for the purpose of greater comfort-for example, to cope with extremely warm or cold temperatures.)” (pp. 382-383)

As our understanding continues to grow about the multiplicity of sexual identities, so too will Jewish law evolve and take those factors into consideration when discussing how to apply the verse “A woman must not put on man’s apparel, nor shall a man wear woman’s clothing; for whoever does these things is abhorrent to your God”. (Deuteronomy 22:5)

 

 

Getting a kosher haircut TB Nazir 58

Starting with yesterday’s daf and continuing on today’s daf TB Nazir 58, the Gemara is bothered by a problem. Yesterday we learned about two nezirim, one is tamei and the other one is tahor, but we don’t know which one is which. The Mishnah provides a solution that raises a problem. After the third set of sacrifices, both nezirim shave their head. The tamei nazir is observing a mitzvah. However, the nazir who is tahor is violating the prohibition “against rounding the head (hakafat harosh-הַקָּפַת הָרֹאש), i.e., shaving the hair on the sides of the head (see Leviticus 19:27), when he shaves his hair unnecessarily. Since one of them does not need to shave, he thereby transgresses a mitzva by Torah law” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara sees both sides of the question whether or not shaving the entire head and not just the corners violates the prohibition of rounding the head, i.e. the sideburns. The discussions long and complicated. One can recognize a person who observes this prohibition by letting his side locks grow long. The side locks are called Pe'ot, anglicized as payot (פֵּאֹת).

Nevertheless, the Gemara explains how a person can have a normal haircut and still observe this prohibition. “And from where do we derive that a leper must shave with a razor? As it is taught in a baraita: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5). One might have thought that priests should be liable even if they shaved their beards with scissors. The verse states: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), which teaches that the prohibition applies only to the destruction of the beard from its roots. If the sole criterion is the phrase “you shall not destroy,” one might have thought that if he extracted his hair with tweezers or removed his hair with a carpenter’s plane, he should likewise be liable due to the prohibition against destroying his hair.” (Sefaria.org translation) The person can observe this commandment when the barber trims him with an electric hair shaver which motion of removing the hair is a kin to a scissors.

 

Exceptions to two rules TB Nazir 57

 With today's daf TB Nazir 57 we conclude the seventh chapter and begin the eighth chapter of our massekhet. As with most rules there are exceptions. Today's daf highlights the limitations of two rules.

At the bottom of daf TB Nazir 56b, Rabbi Akiva uses a kal vekomer to create a new halakha. “Rabbi Akiva said: I discussed this matter before Rabbi Eliezer and suggested the following a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a bone that is a barley-grain-bulk, which does not render a person impure in a tent, a nazirite must nevertheless shave for touching it or carrying it, then in the case of a quarter-log of blood, which is more stringent in that it renders a person impure in a tent, is it not logical that a nazirite should shave for touching it or carrying it? (One needs a half log of blood to be sufficient to render a nazir tamei by touching-g or carrying-gg)” (Sefaria,org translation)Although this is a strong inference, Rabbi Eliezer, one of his teachers, rejects it. One can apply a kal vekhomer to verses written in the Torah; however, one may not apply it to an oral law which originates from Moses upon Mount Sinai. “And when I came and presented these matters before Rabbi Yehoshua, he said to me: You spoke well, i.e., your logic is flawless, but they indeed said that this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, which cannot be refuted by means of an a fortiori inference.” Today's daf determines that the law concerning the bone chip is the halahka passed down from Moses upon Mount Sinai.

The next massekhet we shall study is TB Sotah. We shall learn that a husband warns his wife not to seclude herself with a specific man. He is afraid she is having an affair with that man. She disregards her jealous husband and witnesses see that she secluded herself with that person. There is a doubt in her status. Did she commit adultery or not? She is now a sotah whether or not she had intimate relations with that man. Until she goes through the rite of the sotah which will prove her innocence or guilt, the Torah calls her tamei. This doubtful classification is a stringency. Because the Torah uses the word tamei to describe this woman, they learn that a doubtful tamei nazir shares the same laws. Below is the case of the doubtful tamei nazir discussed in the Mishnah.

“MISHNA: With regard to two nazirites, where one other person said to them: I saw one of you become impure, but I do not know which one of you it was, they must each complete their naziriteship terms, shave their hair, and both together bring an offering of ritual impurity and an offering of purity, due to the uncertainty. And one of them says to the other: If I am the impure one, the offering of impurity is mine and the offering of purity is yours; and if I am the pure one, the offering of purity is mine and the offering of impurity is yours.

“And because of the uncertainty they each count a further thirty days of naziriteship and both together bring an offering of purity. And one of them says: If I am the previously impure one, that offering of impurity sacrificed earlier was mine, and the offering of purity was yours; and this offering sacrificed now is my offering of purity. And if I am the previously pure one, the offering of purity brought earlier was mine, and the offering of impurity was yours; and this current offering is your offering of purity.” Sefaria.org translation)

Tosefot ד"ה שְׁנֵי נְזִירִים שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶן asks an excellent question. In the doubtful case of the sotah, the law deals stringently with her and classifies her as tamei. In the case of the two nazirs, why doesn't the law deals stringently with them as well? Since one doesn't know which one is tamei, why not declare both of them tamei?

Here is the exception to this rule. The two cases are not similar. There's a real possibility that the woman is an adulterous. On the other hand, for one of the nazirs, there's no possibility that he is tamei. There is a general rule that one cannot draw conclusions from something that is possible and apply it to something that is impossible. Consequently the Mishnah outlines the sequence where only three sets of sacrifices (two for the completion of the nezirut and one for the nazir who really was tamei) are offered up instead of four.

How to bring our final redemption closer TB Nazir 56

 The Mishnah on daf TB Nazir 54a and the Mishna on today’s daf TB Nazir 56 are probably the two more important mishnayot in our chapter. By studying them we have learned that there are two levels of a tamei nazir. In level A, the tamei nazir must shave his head, go through a process of becoming ritually ready, offering up specific sacrifices, and begin his nezirut all over again from the beginning. In level B the nazir does not shave nor bring sacrifices. His nezirut is only suspended until he becomes ritually ready

Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna adds another distinction between the two levels. If a tamei nazir in level A enters the Temple he is liable for the punishment of koreit, a death sentence meted out by God and not humans. The tamei nazir in level B is not culpable for this punishment. “Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to any ritual impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite must shave, one is liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting that impurity. If someone who became impure from one of those sources of impurity enters the Temple, he violates the prohibition against an impure individual entering the sacred space. And with regard to any impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite does not shave, one is likewise not liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Reporting the chain of tradition in the rabbinic mind is of up most importance because they teach in Pirkei Avot 6:6 “And who says a thing in the name of him who said it. Thus you have learned: everyone who says a thing in the name of him who said it, brings deliverance into the world, as it is said: “And Esther told the king in Mordecai’s name” (Esther 2:22).”  (Sefaria.org translation) That is why we the Gemara is troubled by the chain of tradition mentioned in the Mishna.

Apparently he did not learn this from Rabbi Yehoshua but rather he learned it from Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel. “Rabbi Eliezer continued: I said to Rabbi Meir: Are you at all familiar with Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel? He said to me: Yes. I continued: Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel said this to me in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: With regard to any ritual impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite must shave, one is liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. And with regard to any impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite does not shave, one is not liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. This concludes the baraita. The Gemara comments: This is proof that Rabbi Eliezer learned this halakha in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel, not directly from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The answer is simple. If you want to speed our final redemption, you should attribute the quote correctly. Nevertheless, you don’t have to include all the “middlemen.” Sometimes the first and the last are sufficient

 “They said: Learn from this case the following principle: With regard to any statement of halakha that was stated as a tradition of three scholars, we say the first and the last names in the chain but we do not say the middle one. Therefore, the mishna mentions the name of Rabbi Eliezer, the last link in the tradition, and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, the first scholar, but it omits that of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel, the middle scholar in the chain.

“Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, learn in a mishna (Pe’a 2:6): Naḥum the Scribe [lavlar] said: This is the tradition that I received from Rabbi Meyasha, who received it from father, who received it from the pairs of Sages who served during the period of the Second Temple, who received it from the Prophets: It is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to one who sows the plants of dill and mustard in two or three separate locations in a single field, that he leaves a corner to the poor for each and every one of these plots on its own, rather than one corner for all of them.

The Gemara explains the proof from this source: And yet Naḥum the Scribe does not mention the names of Joshua and Caleb, despite the fact that they were the Elders who passed down this halakha from Moses to the Prophets. Learn from this that the middle links in a tradition are not necessarily listed.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

 

 

May a kohen travel in an airplane? TB Nazir 54-55

 The Mishnah on TB Nazir 54a lists sources of tumah, ritual unreadiness, which a nazir does not have to shave and begin counting the days of his nezirut from the very beginning all over again. All the land outside of Israel is on this list. “And the land of the nations, i.e., a nazirite left Eretz Yisrael for another land. The Sages decreed that all land outside of Eretz Yisrael is ritually impure.” (Sefaaria.org translation) The Gemara asks the question what is the source of this tumah? “A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did the Sages decree the land of the nations impure with regard to the air, i.e., is one rendered impure merely by being there? Or perhaps they decreed it impure with regard to the earth, i.e., one who touches the ground or overlays it becomes impure.” (Sefaria. org translation)

At first the Gemara tries to connect the above question to a disagreement between two tanna’im. “Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught: With regard to one who enters the land of the nations not on foot but in a chest, a box, or a cabinet, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him ritually impure. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, deems him pure. What, is it not correct to say that they disagree in this regard: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who deems him impure, holds that the Sages decreed impurity with regard to the air, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the Sages decreed impurity with regard to the earth, and consequently he is not impure, as the container prevents him from overlying the impurity?” (Sefaria.org translation)

Then the Gemara offers different interpretations where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei don’t disagree about the land or the air is the source of contamination, but they disagree on something else. One conclusion caught my attention. “The Gemara concedes that the previous explanation of the dispute is incorrect. Rather, one must say that everyone agrees that the decree of impurity concerning the land of the nations is with regard to its air, and one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that since it is not common for one to move around in an enclosure (earlier the case was a person was in a closed chest, box, or cabinet-gg) the Sages did not decree impurity with regard to this case. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that although it is not common the Sages nevertheless decreed impurity with regard to it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

I agree that back when this law was being discussed, traveling in a closed container was not common all; however, we do it all the time. Who hasn’t flown in an airplane?! We’ve already seen that the laws of a nazir are very similar to the laws of a kohen. Just like the nazir in the past, an observant kohen today will not enter a cemetery except for his closest relatives, mother, father, wife, son, daughter, brother, and sister. Many Jewish funeral homes will have a completely separate room for kohanim so that they will not be under the same roof where the deceased is kept. Should and observant kohen fly?

Rabbi Daniel Wolf has written on this topic. He does not decide Jewish law at all. His goal is to explain the complexity of the issue and why different rabbinic sages disagree whether a kohen should fly in an airplane. It's long and complex, but worth reading and not skipping to the bottom.

“Could the plane itself block the tum'a for the kohen? Two different approaches need to be investigated: 1] ohel; 2] tzamid patil.  As we mentioned before, an ohel can separate from or block the tum'a.  Can the space at the bottom of the plane, since it measures more than a handbreadth above the source of tum'a, serve as an ohel to block it?  This heter (permission-gg) encounters two problems: 1] ohel zaruk (an ohel in motion-gg); 2] anything that is tamei cannot block tum'a.  Let us deal with each problem separately.  The mishna in Ohalot (ch. 8) addresses a situation of an ohel in motion, such as large boxes during transport, and determines that such an ohel loses its formal status as such.  It is considered an ohel for neither spreading nor blocking tum'a.  The gemara in Eruvin (30b) determines that this issue is debated by the tanna'im.  Tosafot and the Rambam concur that an ohel in motion cannot block tum'a.  Though there might be some exceptions (see Tosafot there), it is unlikely that any would exclude an airplane.  However, the Rashba prefers the opinion that an ohel in motion can block tum'a; according to the Rashba, then, this problem (of ohel zaruk) is solved.  The second problem arises from the general rule that anything that is tamei or can become tamei cannot block or separate from tum'a.  Can an airplane contract tum'a? Rav Moshe Feinstein deals with this issue (with regard to the related issue of a corpse transported on the same plane as a kohen).  The question revolves around the issue as to whether aluminum, which, together with its alloys, constitutes 80% of a plane's weight (my thanks to Dr. Farber, an eminent metallurgist), is susceptible to tum'a.  On the one hand, metallic utensils are generally assured capable of contracting tum'a.  On the other hand, the Torah mentions only the six metals that were known to man at that time.  Can tum'a apply to metals that were discovered only after Matan Torah?  Rav Moshe wavers on this very issue, and also questions whether aluminum is a new metal or a combination of the six mentioned.  Scientifically, we know that aluminum is, in fact, a new metal, and not a composite of other metals.

 

“As for Rav Moshe's first question, this point is not new and seems to be a dispute between the Rambam (who holds that all metals are tamei) and Rashi (who limits tum'a to just the six mentioned).  The Vilna Gaon and Tiferet Yisrael concur with Rashi, and in the introduction of the Tiferet Yisrael to Taharot, a parenthetical comment of unknown origin questions the limitation to the six metals.  (Interestingly, in another responsum about tevilat kelim, Rav Moshe determines that aluminum is not tamei as a metal utensil, but it nevertheless requires immersion as it is included in the rabbinic requirement to immerse glass utensils.) Therefore, there is a clear opinion that aluminum objects are not tamei.  The existence of rivets or other parts of the plane can be overlooked so long as all the major components are aluminum or carbon composites.  There might be another possibility, that ships are not defined as "utensils" capable of contracting tum'a because of their size; this may apply to airplanes, as well.  As this possibility is speculative at best, it certainly would not merit a heter on its own right, but it may be included as an additional consideration when reaching a final conclusion ("senif le-hakel"). 

     “In order to accept this heter, both assumptions must be correct.  We must assume that an ohel in motion is an ohel, and that airplanes are tahor (for any reason).  As we noted, however, both assumptions are not at all clear; this heter thus leaves much to be desired.

     “Another possible heter involves the halakha of "tzamid patil."  I struggled to come up with a proper translation and eventually gave up; I will nevertheless try to explain it.  If a sealed utensil is in an ohel with a corpse, it and its contents remain tahor.  Of course, this is not so simple.  There are certain prerequisites for the application of this halakha:  1] The utensil cannot be mekabel tum'a from its exterior. This halakha is thus limited to earthenware utensils (which contract tum'a only from the inside) and utensils which are not mekabel tum'a at all, such as stone or mud utensils.  The inclusion of aluminum planes, then, depends on our previous discussion as to whether they are susceptible to tum'a.

“2] It must be closed and sealed with a lid and a material such as mud, wax, dough, etc. We may consider several reasons why such a seal is required.  Two logical reasons might be a requirement for a hermetical seal or for a seal which is not easily opened.  One could reasonably argue that the seal of airplanes fulfill this requirement since the door seals are hermetic (hopefully) and cannot be opened during flight.  However, given the subject matter in question, it is hard to rule out the possibility of a gezeirat ha-katuv - that the requirement for a seal made from the aforementioned materials - provision constitutes an edict with no explanation.  I have not found any definitive indication in either direction.

     “In summary, there are two possible bases for a heter: 1] ohel 2] tzamid patil (a sealed utensil).  Both, however, are faulty on two accounts, one that they share in common and another unique to each.  The common problem involves the tum'a of airplanes themselves.  The heter based on ohel encounters the problem of an ohel in motion, and the tzamid patil heter raises the question regarding the nature of the seal required.

     ‘How, then, should we deal with this question in pesak, in determining the final halakha? Although it is hard to consider either heter as certain, perhaps both together should yield a lenient ruling.  At first glance, the operative principle we should follow here should be "safek de-oraita le-chumra" (we rule stringently in situations of doubt concerning Torah law). On the other hand, perhaps we may consider this issue a situation of sha'at ha-dechak, extenuating circumstances, which allows reliance on a minority opinion. A leniency on these grounds, however, would naturally apply only to travel for certain purposes and barring reasonable alternatives.  We might also consider the rule, "safek tum'a be-reshut harabim tahor" - any questionable instance of tum'a in public areas is considered tahor.  However, the application of this rule to our case is far from clear.  Although the plane is considered a public area, we must take into account two other issues: 1] does the prohibition against kohanim coming in contact with dead bodies follow the guidelines of the laws of tum'a, or of standard issurim?  The Minchat Chinukh leaves this as an open question;  the Marcheshet and the Noda Be-Yehuda took compromise positions regarding this issue. The provision of "safek tum'a" would apply in our case according to the Noda Be-Yehuda, whereas the Marcheshet would render it inapplicable.  Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor applied it hesitantly (if two other authorities would agree) to the issue of trains riding over cemeteries.  Our issue, regarding airplanes, bears some similarity to the issue of trains (ohel zaruk and the dispute between the Rashba and Tosafot), but, in some respects, differs.  Some of these differences render the situation of planes more problematic (trains have direct contact with the ground), while others render it less problematic (planes have a better chance of being tahor since they contain major components of aluminum).  There seems to have been a minhag in Jerusalem for kohanim to place a board underneath their car when they traveled to Jericho, a trip that required passing over part of the famed cemetery on Har Ha-zeitim.  This minhag is more difficult to justify than either allowing one to travel without a board or forbidding the trip even with a board.  Some Acharonim (Penei Yehoshua and Shevut Yaakov) claim that on the level of Torah law, an ohel in motion is an ohel; it is only as a result of rabbinic enactment that we do not consider it as such.  This would thus allow room for leniency in cases of doubt.  This position, however, though widely quoted, seems to my mind very doubtful. If this were true, then an ohel in motion should spread tum'a, just as it blocks it (recall our earlier discussion as to the two different roles of an ohel), and this is clearly not the case.

“Where does that leave us, if not altogether confused? Hopefully, it leaves us with an understanding of both positions and a bit more knowledge of the fascinating and complex world of taharot (ritual readiness and ritual unreadiness.-gg).  Sometimes it is better to be perplexed and confounded rather than confused.” (https://www.etzion.org.il/en/publications/books-yeshiva-faculty/publications-philosophy-and-current-affairs/kohanim-flying)

I’ll leave it up to the individual kohen whether he will travel via airplane.