It's forbidden to despair #Vayetze#devartorah#parashathashavua

Perhaps you’ve seen the video of the little boy who learns he’s getting another sister. In the middle of his meltdown he laments, “It’s always girls, girls, girls, girls!”

The story gives an amusing glimpse into human expectations, but there’s nothing funny about disappointment. It saturates our world. One story from the Bible seems especially steeped in disappointment. Jacob agreed to work 7 years for the right to marry his uncle’s daughter Rachel. But after fulfilling his contract, Jacob got a wedding night surprise. In the morning he discovered not Rachel but her sister Leah in his bed.

We usually focus on Jacob’s disappointment, but imagine how Leah must have felt! What hopes and dreams of hers began to die that day as she was forced to marry a man who did not love or want her? 

The names of her first three sons tell of her despair. Revuan’s, the first born, name means “The Lord has seen my affliction.” She hopes “Now my husband will love me.” Shimon’s name means “This is because the Lord heard that I was unloved and has given me this one also” Her third son’s name describes her continuing sorrow. “This time my husband will become attached to me, for I have borne him three sons. Therefore she named him Levi.” (Genesis 29:31-34)

Leah’s story teaches us hope that we can overcome our disappointments and despair. At the end of her life, Jacob honored only Leah by burying her in the family grave plot with Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebekah (Gen. 49:31).  Just like in Fiddler on the Roof, when Tevye asks Golde “Do you love me” he ultimately gets a positive answer, so too Jacob tells her in his own way “I suppose I love you too.”

We would do well to remember what Rebbe Nachmen taught his Hasidim. He said “Lo tit’ya-esh – Assur l’hit’ya-esh – It is forbidden to despair.” He also said, “Remember: Things can go from the very worst to the very best…in just the blink of an eye.”

Who is he working for? TB Nedarim 36

The Mishnah on daf TB Nedarim 35b lists other tasks that one may perform for someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him. One of the tasks concerns a Kohen, priest, in his official capacity. “And he sacrifices for him the bird nests, i.e., pairs of birds, pigeons and turtledoves, of zavin (see Leviticus 15:13–15); the bird nests of zavot (see Leviticus 15:28–30); the bird nests of women after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:6–8); sin-offerings; and guilt-offerings.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara immediately asked the obvious question. What is the status of the Kohen? If he is working on behalf of the one who’s bringing the sacrifice, then the priest is benefiting that person by offering up the sacrifice. If he is working on behalf of the Holy One Blessed be He, then the priest isn’t benefiting the one who’s bringing that sacrifice.  “A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Are these priests our agents or agents of Heaven when they perform the Temple service? The Gemara elaborates: What is the practical difference whether they are our agents or God’s agents? The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another. If you say that the priests are our agents, don’t the priests provide benefit for the one for whom benefit is forbidden by vow, and therefore, sacrificing that person’s offering is prohibited? And if you say that they are agents of Heaven, it is permitted. What is the status of priests?” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara on dappim TB Nedarim 35b-36a brings three different case studies to prove whether the Kohen was the agent for the one bringing the sacrifice or was God’s agent. Each proof was deemed insufficient and left the question open.

 Nevertheless, the Ran ד"ה אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הָנֵי כָּהֲנֵי, שְׁלוּחֵי דִידַן הָווּ, אוֹ שְׁלוּחֵי דִשְׁמַיָּא comments that daf TB Kiddushin 23b once and for all answers our question. To be an agent, the agent and the person who he is an agent for must have the same level of obligations. A good example of this is a prayer leader. A prayer leader must have the same level obligations that the people in the pews have in order to be there agent and fulfill their obligations. If a prayer leader has already prayed the evening service and fulfilled his obligation while the congregation hasn’t, he may not lead the congregation in prayer because they don’t have the same obligations at the very moment. The Kohen and the person bringing the sacrifice never have the same level of obligations. Only a Kohen may offer up sacrifices; a non-Kohen is forbidden to offer up sacrifices. Consequently, they do not have the same level of obligations. From this we can deduce that the Kohen are agents of heaven and the people’s agents.

 

Is there liability for misuse of consecrated property (me’ilah) in cases of konamot (vows) or not? TB Nedarim 35

 Daf TB Nedarim 35 discusses the role of misappropriation of the Temple’s sanctified property (me’ilah -מְעִילָה) and vows. There is two ways a person can misappropriate a sanctified object (hekdash-הֶקְדֵּשׁ). He can misappropriate this sanctified object for his own personal use. Let’s say he donates a loaf of bread to the Temple by declaring this loaf of bread is hekdash. After he makes this declaration he forgets he sanctified it and eats this loaf of bread at home. The second way of misappropriating a sanctified object is by accidentally moving it from the Temple’s domain to a different domain. The person who misappropriates the hekdash must do three things. He must make full restitution, pay a fine of 25%, and bring a guilt offering, an asham (אָשָׁם).

When taking a vow prohibiting something, sometimes people compare (hatpasah- התפסה) it to hekdash, sanctified to the Temple. An example would be this loaf of bread is forbidden to me like hekdash. Does this prohibition take on all the penalties of me’ilah?

“Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: Is there liability for misuse of consecrated property in cases of konamot or not? Since the legal status of an item that was rendered a konam is like that of consecrated property in that it is forbidden to the one who one vowed, is it like consecrated property in every sense, including liability for misuse of consecrated property?

“Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned this halakha from a mishna (33a): In a place where one takes payment for returning a lost item, that benefit that he receives for returning the item should fall into the category of consecrated Temple property (because he has forbidden all benefit from that person. The reward for returning a lost item will qualify as a benefit.-gg). That is to say, an item forbidden by a konam is like consecrated property. Just as with regard to consecrated property there is liability for misuse, so too with regard to konamot there is liability for misuse.” (Sefaria.org translation) According to Rav Naḥman the prohibition (אִיסוּר) takes on all the penalties of me’ilah. (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara says that the tanna’im disagreed whether the prohibition (אִיסוּר) takes on all the penalties of me’ilah.

“The Gemara comments on this. This dilemma is like a dispute between tanna’im. If one said: This loaf is konam to all like consecrated property, and he ate it, then, whether he ate it or whether another ate it, the one who ate it misused consecrated property. Therefore, since its status is that of consecrated property, it has the possibility of desanctification through redemption. If one said: This loaf is konam for me like consecrated property and he eats it, he misused consecrated property. If another eats it, he did not misuse consecrated property, as he said: To me. Therefore, it does not have the possibility of desanctification through redemption, since its status is not that of full-fledged consecrated property. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

“And the Rabbis say: In the case of both vows taken in this manner and vows taken in that manner, no one misused consecrated property because there is no liability for misuse of consecrated objects in cases of konamot. Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that there is liability for misuse in konamot.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Interestingly enough the halakhah doesn’t follow the majority, the rabbis, but Rabbi Meir. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Sefer Avodah , Laws of Me’ilah, chapter 4, halakha 9. “The prohibition against me'ilah applies to articles set aside through vows. What is implied? A person said: "This loaf is considered like a sacrifice" or "...consecrated property for me." If he partakes of it, he violates the prohibition against me'ilah, even though the loaf is permitted to others. Therefore such an article cannot be redeemed, for it is only considered as consecrated for this person.
If he said: "This loaf is consecrated" or "...a sacrifice," whether he or someone else partakes of it, the prohibition against me'ilah is violated. Therefore it can be redeemed. If an ownerless loaf was before a person and he said: "This loaf is consecrated," should he take it to partake of it, he is considered to have misappropriated its entire value. If he took it to endow it to others, he is considered to have misappropriated the value of giving such a gift.” (Sefaria.org translation) 

Me'ilah is a terrible trespass. Needless to say we need to be careful how we vow.

 

May you eat that loaf of bread or not? TB Nedarim 34

On daf TB 34 discusses which word in a vow expresses the person’s intent better. “Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin raised a dilemma before Rava. If one said to another: My loaf is konam (i.e. forbidden-gg) For you, and then he gave it to him as a gift, what is the halakha? Should one infer: My loaf is forbidden, i.e., he said to him that when the loaf is in his possession, that is when it is forbidden, but when he gives him a gift, it is no longer in his possession and it is no longer forbidden? Or, perhaps the inference is: Forbidden to you, i.e., he said to him that he rendered the loaf for him like a consecrated item that is forbidden even after the loaf is no longer in his possession.” (Sefaria.org translation) what is the keyword in the sentence “My loaf is konam (i.e. forbidden) for you”? Is it only when the loaf is mine it is forbidden to you or it always forbidden to you even if I give it to you as a gift?

“Rava said to him: It is obvious that although he gave it to the other person as a gift, it is forbidden. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin asked him: But if that is so, when he said: My loaf is forbidden to you, with emphasis on the word my, what does it come to exclude? Does it not come to exclude a case where he stole it from him, as in that case it is permitted? The same would be true if he gave it to him as a gift. Rava said to him: No, it comes to exclude a case where he invited him to eat from the loaf before he vowed. In that case, that part of the loaf that he invited him to eat is his, and the owner cannot render it forbidden. However, even if he invited the other person before he vowed, the entire loaf remains forbidden if he gave it to him as a gift.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The  Shulkhan Aruk poskins Rava’s position as the correct one. That unfortunate loaf of bread is always forbidden to that person. (Yoreh De’ah 216:8)

One story two reasons TB Nedarim 33

Today's daf TB Nedarim 33 begins the fourth chapter of our massekhet.  This chapter defines the parameters of the benefit, הֲנָאָה, one prohibits in a vow. The Mishnah states " With regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another, if that other person chooses, he may contribute the half-shekel to the Temple on his behalf, and repay his debt, and return his lost item to him, and the one prohibited from benefiting is not considered to have benefited from him." (Sefaria.org translation)

Paying somebody's debt really does seem to be a benefit so we should not be surprised that not everybody agrees that this repayment falls outside the parameters of a benefit. In the course of establishing who is the author of our  Mishna, the Gemara quotes a discussion we learned back in massekhet Ketubot daf 107b.

"The mishna allowed one who vowed and imposed the prohibition to pay the financial obligations of the one who is prohibited by vow to derive benefit from him. Based on this, the Gemara concludes: Apparently, repaying his debts is tantamount to merely driving away a lion from him, and it is permitted. He is not actually giving him anything. Rather, he is preventing potential future harm. That is not considered a benefit.

"The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that in performing the actions listed in the mishna one is merely preventing harm? Rav Hoshaya said: This is the statement of Ḥanan in a dispute pertaining to one who pays the debt of another. Ḥanan holds that he cannot demand to be reimbursed for that payment, since he merely prevented potential damage. 

"Rava said: Even if you say that everyone agrees that this is the halakha, it was stated with regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another who borrowed money, and the creditor stipulated that it was on the condition that if he so chooses he does not need to repay the loan. In that case, by repaying the loan, one who vowed and imposed the prohibition did not actually repay his debt.

"The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Ḥanan to which the Gemara referred? The Gemara answers that it is as we learned in a mishna: In the case of a husband who went to a country overseas, and one other man arose and supported his wife on his own initiative and then demanded to be reimbursed for that support when the husband returned, Ḥanan said: The one who took the initiative to support the wife lost his money, since the husband neither asked him to do so nor committed to compensate him.

"The mishna allowed one who vowed and imposed the prohibition to pay the financial obligations of the one who is prohibited by vow to derive benefit from him. Based on this, the Gemara concludes: Apparently, repaying his debts is tantamount to merely driving away a lion from him, and it is permitted. He is not actually giving him anything. Rather, he is preventing potential future harm. That is not considered a benefit.

"The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that in performing the actions listed in the mishna one is merely preventing harm? Rav Hoshaya said: This is the statement of Ḥanan in a dispute pertaining to one who pays the debt of another. Ḥanan holds that he cannot demand to be reimbursed for that payment, since he merely prevented potential damage.

"Rava said: Even if you say that everyone agrees that this is the halakha, it was stated with regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another who borrowed money, and the creditor stipulated that it was on the condition that if he so chooses he does not need to repay the loan. In that case, by repaying the loan, one who vowed and imposed the prohibition did not actually repay his debt.

"The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Ḥanan to which the Gemara referred? The Gemara answers that it is as we learned in a mishna: In the case of a husband who went to a country overseas, and one other man arose and supported his wife on his own initiative and then demanded to be reimbursed for that support when the husband returned, Ḥanan said: The one who took the initiative to support the wife lost his money, since the husband neither asked him to do so nor committed to compensate him.

"The sons of High Priests d hiisagreed with him and said: The one who took the initiative to support his wife will take an oath as to how much he spent and take repayment from the husband. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said in accordance with the statement of the sons of High Priests. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Ḥanan spoke well, as in any case of this type he placed his money on the antler of a deer, i.e., a risky venture with no guaranteed return.

"The Gemara explains the dispute between Rava and Rav Hoshaya with regard to attribution of the mishna: Rava did not say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan, as did Rav Hoshaya, and he preferred a different explanation, as he establishes the mishna in accordance with the statements upon which everyone agrees, rather than attributing it to an individual tanna. Rav Hoshaya did not say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of all the tanna’im as did Rava, as there is basis to issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting repayment of a loan for one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow on the condition that he does not need to repay the loan, due to a standard loan that he is required to repay. Therefore, he prefers to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan.isagreed with him and said: The one who took the initiative to support his wife will take an oath as to how much he spent and take repayment from the husband. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said in accordance with the statement of the sons of High Priests. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Ḥanan spoke well, as in any case of this type he placed his money on the antler of a deer, i.e., a risky venture with no guaranteed return.

"The Gemara explains the dispute between Rava and Rav Hoshaya with regard to attribution of the mishna: Rava did not say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan, as did Rav Hoshaya, and he preferred a different explanation, as he establishes the mishna in accordance with the statements upon which everyone agrees, rather than attributing it to an individual tanna. Rav Hoshaya did not say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of all the tanna’im as did Rava, as there is basis to issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting repayment of a loan for one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow on the condition that he does not need to repay the loan, due to a standard loan that he is required to repay. Therefore, he prefers to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan." (Sefaria.com translation)

The Ran reminds us that two versions of the baraita end differently. The version in Ketubot explains the reason why the Bnai kohanim hold that the husband has to repay the man who supported his wife while he is away even though this loan has no terms and can be repaid  back any time is due to  embarrassment. Every time the husband crosses his paths with the lender, he feels embarrassed that he has not paid back this debt. 

Our Gamarra gives a different reason. It didn't want people to draw the wrong conclusion. "There is basis to issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting repayment of a loan for one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow on the condition that he does not need to repay the loan, due to a standard loan that he is required to repay." (Sefaria.org translation)

One doesn't have to reject one reason over the other. Both make sense to me.

Following Abraham's example TB Nedarim 32

The third chapter our massekhet concludes on daf  TB Nedarim 32 with aggadah.  This daf continues the theme of brit milah, the covenant of circumcision. Brit Milah is the very first mitzvah God commands Abraham and his descendants, the Jewish people. The rabbis teach how we should live by following Abraham's example.

"It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Great is the mitzva of circumcision, for there is no one who was engaged in mitzvot like Abraham our Patriarch, and yet he was called wholehearted only due to the mitzva of circumcision, as it is stated: “Walk before Me and you should be wholehearted” (Genesis 17:1), and it is written in the next verse: “And I will make My covenant between Me and you” (Genesis 17:2), and Abraham was then commanded with regard to circumcision. This indicates that he was not called wholehearted until he performed circumcision.,,,

"Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: At the time that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Abraham our Patriarch: “Walk before Me and you should be wholehearted” (Genesis 17:1), a sensation of trembling seized him and he said: Perhaps there is something disgraceful about me due to a transgression that I committed, and therefore I cannot be called complete. When God said to him: “And I will make My covenant between Me and you” (Genesis 17:2), his mind was set at ease, since he understood that the removal of the foreskin that he was now commanded to do was the reason he had not yet achieved completion.

"The Gemara expounds the verse “and He brought him outside” (Genesis 15:5): Abraham said before Him: Master of the Universe, I looked at my constellation and according to it I will have only one son, and a son has already been born to me, i.e., Ishmael. He said to him: Emerge from your astrology because there is no constellation for the Jewish people, as they are not subject to the influence of astrology.

"Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Anyone who conducts himself with wholeheartedness, the Holy One, Blessed be He, treats him with wholeheartedness, as it is stated: “With the devout You act devoutly, and with the one who is strong in his wholeheartedness You act wholeheartedly” (II Samuel 22:26).

 "Rabbi Hoshaya said: Anyone who acts wholeheartedly, time will stand for him, i.e., he will be successful, as it is stated: “Walk before Me and you should be wholehearted” (Genesis 17:1), and it is written: “And you shall be the father of a multitude of nations” (Genesis 17:4)." (Sefaria.org translation) 

Reading horoscopes may be fun, but we should not rely upon them to guide our daily lives. We should live our lives wholeheartedly and trust in the Holy One Blessed be He. These are two guideposts that will enable us to live a righteous, meaningful, and spiritual life.

Brit Milah: A simkha and not surgery TB Nedarim 31

One of the mishnayot on today's daf TB Nesarim 31 provides another example of the rule "with regard to vows, follow the colloquial language-בִנְדָרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר לְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם." One of the physical characteristics that differentiate Jews from other nations is the obligation of circumcision. Only after World War II did circumcision amongst Americans and Europeans become widespread. The Mishnah points out that when a person makes a vow not to benefit from the uncircumcised, he means only non-Jews. 

"MISHNA: If one says: Benefiting from those who are uncircumcised is konam for me, he is permitted to derive benefit from uncircumcised Jews because they are not regarded as uncircumcised, but he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world.

״Conversely, if he said: Benefiting from those who are circumcised is konam for me, he is prohibited from deriving benefit even from uncircumcised Jews and he is permitted to derive benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world, as the term uncircumcised is used only to name the nations of the world, as it is stated: “For all the nations are uncircumcised, but all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25), and it says: “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be” (I Samuel 17:36), and it says: “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph” (II Samuel 1:20). These verses indicate that ordinary gentiles are referred to as uncircumcised, regardless of whether they are actually circumcised." (Sefaria.com translation)

Today there is a movement against circumcision. Even some Jews are influenced and are reluctant to circumcise their baby boys. When I was a rabbi in Springfield, Massachusetts the Jewish Educational Resource Center had a VHS entitled Simkha or Surgery. The premise of this program was circumcision, brit milah, isn't surgery to rectify the problem. Brit milah is simkha, a joyous occasion celebrating the entrance of a Jewish boy into the covenant of Abraham with God. After surgery one does not invite the community to a festive meal, but we do after a brit milah!

The Mishna extols the greatness of this mitzvah. 

"Rabbi Yishmael says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that thirteen covenants were sealed with regard to it, for the word covenant appears thirteen times in the biblical passage that discusses circumcision (Genesis, chapter 17).

"Rabbi Yosei says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that it overrides the strict halakhot of Shabbat, as circumcision is performed even if the eighth day following the birth of a son occurs on Shabbat, despite the fact that circumcision violates the prohibition of labor on Shabbat.

"Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Great is the mitzva of circumcision, as is evident from the fact that the punishment of Moses the righteous for not circumcising his son when he was capable of doing so was not postponed for even a full hour (see Exodus 4:24–26).

"Rabbi Neḥemya says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that it overrides the prohibitions associated with leprosy. If leprosy is found on the foreskin of an infant, although it is generally prohibited to cut the afflicted area, it is permitted to do so to perform the mitzva of circumcision. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that despite all the mitzvot that Abraham our Patriarch did, he was not called wholehearted until he circumcised himself, as it is stated at the time that the mitzva was given to him: “Walk before Me and you should be wholehearted” (Genesis 17:1).

"Alternatively, so great is the mitzva of circumcision that if not for it the Holy One, Blessed be He, would not have created His world, as it is stated: “Thus says the Lord: If My covenant be not with day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25), and the covenant that exists day and night is the covenant of circumcision, as it is always found on the person’s body." (Sefaria.org translation)

The Ran adds one more proof how great and important brit milah is. "The mitzvah of brit milah is more important than all the other 612 commitments put together  found in the Torah." (My loose translation)

If you are on the fence whether your Jewish son or grandson should have a brit milah, remember how great and important this mitzvah is and it's a simkha, not surgery.

With regard to vows, follow the colloquial language-בִנְדָרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר לְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. TB Nedarim 30

 We have seen through our journey at the Gemara always likes to bring proof texts from verses in the Bible. Today's daf T B Nedarim 30 teaches us the exception to that proclivity. The mishnayot on this daf examine sets and subsets when it comes to vows. When a person vows not to benefit from a subset, he may benefit from the larger set. However, when a person vows not to benefit from the larger set, the subset is included in this vow. Here is one example from our daf.

"One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those that are born [yeludim] is permitted to derive benefit from those who will be born [noladim] after the time of the vow. But if one takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who will be born, he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from those that are already born at the time of the vow." (Sefaria.org translation) 

Rav Pappa and Abaye cite different versus to prove whether noladim means those who will be born or those who are already born. "With regard to the distinction between the terms in the mishna, Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Is this to say that the word noladim means those who will be born in the future? But if that is so, it says in the verse: “Your two sons who were born [noladim] to you in the land of Egypt” (Genesis 48:5), does it also mean those who will be born? The verse is referring to Manasseh and Ephraim, who were already alive. 

"The Gemara responds: But rather, what should one say; that the expression means those already born? However, if that is so, that which is written: “Behold, a son shall be born [nolad] to the house of David, Josiah by name” (I Kings 13:2), is the meaning also that he is already born? But Manasseh had not yet come into this world, and certainly not his grandson Josiah." (Sefaria.org translation) 

The Gemara rejects this approach when it comes vows because language evolves and meanings can change. Another consideration is that the same words can mean something completely different in a different country or culture. Consequently, the Gemara comes to the conclusion "with regard to vows, follow the colloquial language-בִנְדָרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר לְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם." (Sefaria.org translation) 

Where does the sanctity go? TB Nedarim 29

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 29 is another one of those complicated dappim. It tries to resolve the question what happens to the sanctity after a temporary sanctity (kedushat lazman-קדושה לזמן) has elapsed.  “The mishna states that if he said: These saplings are like an offering until they are cut down, they are not subject to the possibility of redemption. The Gemara asks: And are they not subject to redemption forever?” (Sefaria.org translation) Bar Padda provides an interesting interpretation. What the Mishna is describing is a renewable sanctity. As soon as he redeems the saplings, the saplings become re-sanctified automatically. Once the saplings have been cut down, the saplings remain sanctified until redeemed; however, they do not become resanctified after they have been redeemed. Ulla disagrees. Once the saplings are cut down their sanctity disappears. “Bar Padda said: If he redeemed them, they become consecrated again, as they have not yet been cut down. If he redeemed them again, they become consecrated again, until they are cut down. Once they are cut down, he redeems them once and it is sufficient. And Ulla said: Once they are cut down one does not need to redeem them again because they are no longer consecrated.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Hamnuna finds Ulla’s interpretation that the sanctity just disappears difficult. “Rav Hamnuna said to Ulla: Where did their sanctity go? How can the consecrated saplings become non-sacred without being redeemed? And what would happen if one said to a woman while performing betrothal: Today you are my wife and tomorrow you are not my wife? Would she exit the marriage the next day without a bill of divorce? Likewise, in the mishna, once one consecrated the saplings, how is their sanctity withdrawn without redemption?” (Sefaria.org translation) Of course, reason dictates that a man can’t marry a woman just for one day and then dissolve the marriage without a divorce.

Rava supports Ulla’s position by saying there is a qualitative difference between the two cases, marriage and the saplings. The sanctity of the woman’s status or the status of a sacrifice (which will be the subject of a baraita later on our daf) has been invested in the body of the woman or the sacrifice. This sanctity is called kidushat haguf (קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף). This sanctity can’t be unconsecrated without some other action. The sanctity of the saplings is monetary in nature because the donor is giving to the Temple the value of the saplings. This sanctity is called kidushat damim (קְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים). kidushat damim can just disappear after the temporary sanctity has lapsed. “Rava said to him: How do you compare sanctity inherent in its value to inherent sanctity? Sanctity inherent in its value departs with nothing being done, since it is conditional. When the condition is fulfilled and the saplings are cut, the sanctity is removed. However, inherent sanctity, which relates to an entity that itself is consecrated, e.g., a betrothed woman, does not depart with nothing being done. An action must be performed in order to remove it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The rest of the daf litigates whether Rava’s assertion that kidushat haguf does not depart without nothing being done and that’s when the daf becomes complicated and difficult.

The law of the land is the law- דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא TB Nedarim 28 part two

Shmuel’s halakhic principal “the law of the land is the law-dina demalkhuta dina-דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא” found on today’s daf TB Nedarim 28 needs further explication. This principle has many different applications in various areas of Jewish law and due to the many countries Jews have lived in. The sages have weighed in on its implications and ramifications. There are those who believe that this principle only applies to a Gentile king for he is permitted to enact laws because the land is his. He may decide who may reside in his land and who may not. Conversely this principle does not apply to the kings of Israel at all because Israel's right to the land of Israel is not dependent upon the king. (Ran on our daf ד"ה בְּמוֹכֵס הָעוֹמֵד מֵאֵלָיו)

This is not the opinion of Rambam and the Ritba. They hold that this principle derives from the power of kingship in general whether the king is a Jew or a Gentile. The Rosh holds the power of this principle is only applicable to those who wish to live in that specific country or those who wish to cross it. In these cases the kingdom has the right to collect taxes from these people; however, this does not apply to those who do not intend to be in that place at all. Most of the commentators and poskim follow Rebbeinu Tam’s approach. The obligation to obey the laws of the land only apply to laws where everybody is equal under the eyes of this law. If the king discriminates against a certain group or against a specific individual the laws of the land do not apply. He calls this discrimination legal thievery גזלנתא דמלכותא. The Ritba holds that this principle “the law of the land is the law” only applies to ancient laws and not to any new laws a king may enact.

The principal is codified in in the Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat, 369:2, 7-9.

I’m the taxman TB Nedarim 28

 The Mishna on daf TB Nedarim 27b list another case one a vow is not a vow. The Mishna provides three different examples of extortion."One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. " (Sefaria.org translation) 

The Gemara wonders why the tax collector would fall in this category. Taxes are the legal are the legal responsibility of citizens or as Shmuel rules on today’s daf TB Nedarim 28"But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., there is a halakhic principle that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live? Since one must pay the tax determined by the kingdom, how did the Sages permit one to lie in order to avoid paying?" (Sefaria.org translation)

To appreciate the Gemara's answer you have to understand how taxes were collected during the Roman. People would bid to become a tax collector by promising the ruler requisite text no matter how much he in fact collected. When the tax collector would collect the tax, he would impose his fee on top of the tax. This fee could be quite exorbitant. No wonder tax collectors were hated in the Talmud and in the Christian Testament. With this explanation we can appreciate the Gemara's explanation. "Rav Ḥinnana said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who has no fixed amount for collection established by the kingdom, but rather collects the tax arbitrarily. Therefore, this case is not included in the law of the kingdom. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who establishes himself as such independently and was not appointed by the kingdom." (Sefaria.org translation)

Complaints about unfair tax code continue to this very day. The Beatles even wrote a song about the taxman. Follow this link to listen to it. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMdcE8jdz70

A predictable unforeseen circumstance is not a good excuse. TB Nedarim 27

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 27 discusses vows impeded by unforeseen circumstances (Nidrei onsin- נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין), the fourth and the last type of vow that does not need a sage to absolve or nullify it even though a correct vow formula was said. The Mishnah gives several examples of these type of vows. “What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 The Gemara brings a different case where Rava questions Rav Huna decision in a case against a man who made a vow to return to the court within 30 days.

“The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who had a dispute in court with another individual and wanted to postpone the trial to a later time in order to search for more evidence. Meanwhile, he deposited his documents for a favorable verdict, i.e., that supported his claim, in court, and since the other litigant did not believe that he would return, the man said: If I do not come back within thirty days, these documents for a favorable verdict will be void. He was impeded by circumstances beyond his control and did not come back. Rav Huna said: His documents for a favorable verdict are void since he did not return by the specified time.

“Rava said to him: He is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and the halakha is that the Merciful One exempted a victim of circumstances beyond his control from responsibility for his actions, as it is written concerning a young woman who was raped: “But unto the damsel you shall do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death” (Deuteronomy 22:26). (This is the case where a married woman is raped and is not culpable for any punishment because she is the victim-gg)

“And if you would say that with regard to the penalty of death, which is extremely severe, the halakha is different, and she is treated leniently and not executed, but with regard to other transgressions one’s actions are treated as deliberate, but didn’t we learn in the mishna here: What are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control; they are not binding and do not require dissolution. This demonstrates that even here the exemption due to circumstances beyond one’s control should apply.” (Sefaria.org translation)

One of the questions the Gemara poses to Rava where at first glance unforeseen circumstances are not taken into account in the final decision concerns a decision by Shmuel. “The Gemara continues to question Rava: In what way is it different from the following case: There was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came on the thirtieth day but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. And Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, and the condition is considered to have been fulfilled. The Gemara asks: Why is it not considered an arrival; but he was impeded by circumstances beyond his control?”

Rava has a good answer why this is not really a great example of unforeseen circumstances. “The Gemara responds: Perhaps the case of circumstances beyond one’s control that are apparent to everyone and could have been anticipated ahead of time is different, and a ferry is considered an apparent type of circumstance beyond one’s control (מִיגַּלֵּי אוּנְסֵיהּ), which he should have considered and stipulated explicitly. Since he did not do so, it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Let me give you a modern example of anticipated unforeseeable circumstances. We all know that airlines often delay flights or cancel them at the last minute. Once Judy and I went on a cruise leaving from Florida on a Sunday afternoon. We booked a Friday morning flight to Florida to make sure that we would arrive in plenty of time to board the ship. If we waited to the last minute there was a chance we would miss the connection and the ship would leave without us. If one absolutely has to fly somewhere at a certain date and time to make a connection, one would be wise to book an earlier flight because a missed connection would be a predictable unforeseen circumstance.

A predictable unforeseen circumstance is not a good excuse.  

 

Rabba and Rava, two amoraim, reframe the entire disagreement TB Nedarim 25b-26

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 26 is difficult and complex and I shall try to summarize the basic difference between Rabba and Rava. This disagreement actually begins on yesterday’s daf. We have a disagreement between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai concerning a vow that only one clause of the vow is mistaken. “One who saw people entering his courtyard and eating figs, and because he did not want them to do so he said: The figs are forbidden to you like an offering. And then it was found that his father and brother were in the group, and there were others with them as well, and certainly he did not intend to take a vow prohibiting his father and brother from eating the figs. In such a case, Beit Shammai says: They, his father and brother, are permitted to eat the figs, and those others that were with them are prohibited from doing so. And Beit Hillel says: Both these and those are permitted to eat the figs, as will be clarified in the Gemara.” (Sefaria.org translation) Based on another Mishna we learned that Rabbi Akiva taught the underpinning reason of Beit Hillel. “A vow that was partially dissolved is dissolved completely.” (Sefaria.org translation) Beit Hillel, Beit Shammai, and Rabbi Akiva are all tannaim.

Rabba and Rava, two amoraim, reframe the entire disagreement when we apply the rule “A vow that was partially dissolved is dissolved completely.”

“Rabba said: Everyone in the mishna, i.e., Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, holds that wherever one says: Had I known that my father was among you I would have said: All of you are prohibited from eating figs except for father, then in that case all are prohibited from doing so and his father is permitted to do so. They disagreed only in an instance where one said: Had I known that my father was among you then I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so, i.e., all the others, are prohibited from eating figs and father is permitted to do so.” (Sefaria.org translation) There are two aspects to the vow, the intent and the language of the vow. Rabba holds that Beit Hillel would only apply the rule “A vow that was partially dissolved is dissolved completely” when both aspects of the vow, the intention and the language of the vow, are wrong. In the above case the person making vow says “Had I known my father was amongst you” shows a mistaken intent and when he says “I would have said So-and-so and so-and-so” shows that the original language was wrong.

“And Rava said: Everyone holds that anywhere that one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, then all are permitted to partake. They disagree only in a case where one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: All of you are prohibited from partaking except for father.

“The rationale of the dispute is the following: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: If one initially makes one declaration and immediately afterward makes a conflicting declaration, hold him accountable for the first expression. Since he initially said: All of you are prohibited from partaking, this expression is the effective one and they are all prohibited from doing so. The addition of the words: Except for father, is viewed as a clarification of the previous expression, simply indicating that his father is not included in the prohibition. (Rabbi Meir looks at the intent of the first statement. Since you are only adding an addendum, you’re just clarifying the intent of the first statement. The intent hasn’t changed. Consequently, Beit Shammai would hold that everybody except the father is still prohibited from eating the figs.-gg)

“And by contrast, Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: A person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement, and the second formulation is the primary one. Therefore, the fact that one altered his formulation to exclude his father from the prohibition means that the vow is partially canceled, and a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved completely. (The only time Beit Hillel would apply the rule “A vow that was partially dissolved is dissolved completely” is when the vow’s language is redacted with an addendum. This addendum creates a brand new vow and now the rule is applied.-gg)” (Sefaria.org translation)

The disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei originates TB Temurah 25b

Vows of exaggeration and vows that are unintentional TB Nedarim 25

The first Mishna in our chapter describes four vows are not really vows at all. “The Sages dissolved four types of vows without the requirement of a request to a halakhic authority: Vows of exhortation (נִדְרֵי זֵרוּזִין), vows of exaggeration (נִדְרֵי הֲבַאי), vows that are unintentional (or mistaken-gg) (נִדְרֵי שְׁגָגוֹת), and vows whose fulfillment is impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control (נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין).” (Sefaria.org translation) The Gemara finished its analysis of vows of exhortation and began examining vows of exaggeration on TB Nedarim 24. The Mishnah gives two examples of vow based on an exaggeration. “If one said concerning a certain item: It is konam for me if I did not see on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt, or if he said: It is konam for me if I did not see a snake as large as the beam of an olive press, in these cases the speaker did not intend to vow but used hyperbole to demonstrate a point, and it is understood by others that the expression is not to be taken literally.” (Sefaria.org translation) A modern example would be a parent telling his child “I swear that if I told you once, I’ve told you a million times...” We all know that this expression is an exaggeration for no doubt the parent of the child many times and didn’t mean explicitly 1 million times.

Daf TB Nedarim 25 concludes when people use unspecific exaggerated language in an oath, people use language that ordinary people use. “Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And perhaps this man saw an anthill and called them: Those who ascended from Egypt, because the quantity of ants was so numerous, and he took an oath properly. Why, then, do we say that this is an oath taken in vain?

“Rav Ashi said to him: When he takes an oath, he takes an oath based on our understanding, which is that of an ordinary person, and we do not entertain the possibility in our mind that he is referring to ants [shumshemanei]. Therefore, if he took an oath in that manner, it is assumed that he referred to people, like those that left Egypt.” (Sefaria.org translation)

This daf the next category of the above four vows, unintentional or mistaken vows. One of the examples the Mishna provides is “One who saw people entering his courtyard and eating figs, and because he did not want them to do so he said: The figs are forbidden to you like an offering. And then it was found that his father and brother were in the group, and there were others with them as well, and certainly he did not intend to take a vow prohibiting his father and brother from eating the figs. In such a case, Beit Shammai says: They, his father and brother, are permitted to eat the figs, and those others that were with them are prohibited from doing so. And Beit Hillel says: Both these and those are permitted to eat the figs, as will be clarified in the Gemara.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Based on a ruling for another case, we learn the reason underpinning Beit Hillel. “If one vows to fast or not to eat a certain food, dissolution is broached based on Shabbatot and based on Festivals, since one certainly did not intend to include these days when taking the vow. Initially, they used to say: On those days, Shabbatot and Festivals, which he did not include in his vow, he is permitted to partake of the item, and on all other days he is prohibited from doing so. This was the case until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow that was partially dissolved is dissolved completely (נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּתַּר מִקְצָתוֹ הוּתַּר כֻּלּוֹ ). Therefore, one is permitted to partake on other days well. ” (Sefaria.org translation)

In the case when a vow was partially dissolved, the halakha is the vow is completely dissolved as Rabbi Akiva and Beit Hillel hold. (Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim, chapter 8 halakha 6; Shulkhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 229:1)

 

A dog wasn’t always a Jew’s best friend TB Nedarim 24

Our chapter opened teaching that vows said while negotiating a commercial deal are not real vows. Everybody understands that this is just a motivating technique to move the other off their price point. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds vowing when inviting a person over for a meal is not a real vow. He holds that people understand this to be just a motivating technique to break down the resistance of the potential guest’s refusal. The Gemara on today’s daf TB Nedarim 24 wants to know whether the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.

“The Gemara suggests a proof: Come and hear, as we learned in a mishna (63b): One who says to another: Benefiting from you is konam for me if you do not take from me for your son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a gift, this other individual can dissolve his vow without the involvement of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to the one who vowed: Did you say your vow for any reason other than due to my honor, in order to convince me to accept a gift for my son? This is my honor, that I refrain from accepting the gift.

“The Gemara infers: The reason that he may dissolve the vow without a halakhic authority is because the potential recipient said: This is my honor. But if he did not say so, then it is a vow. The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion does this follow? If it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, then it is included in the category of vows of exhortation and is not considered a vow, since the intention was solely to encourage the other individual to accept the gift. Rather, conclude from this mishna that the Rabbis disagree with him and hold that vows of exhortation are also vows.

“(This proof is rejected because the Gemara explains a way that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the rabbis are on the same page.-gg)  The Gemara responds: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov concedes in this case that it is a vow and not just a means of encouragement because the one who took the vow said to him: I am not a dog, that I benefit from you and you do not benefit from me. Therefore, one truly wants the vow to be valid so that the other will accept the gift, and it was not intended merely as a means of encouragement.” (Sefaria.org translation)

According to Wikipedia “The archaeological record and genetic analysis show the remains of the Bonn-Oberkassel dog buried beside humans 14,200 years ago to be the first undisputed (domesticated) dog, with disputed remains occurring 36,000 years ago. The domestication of the dog predates agriculture,^[1] and it was not until 11,000 years ago in the Holocene era that people living in the Near East entered into relationships with wild populations of aurochs, boar, sheep, and goats” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domestication_of_the_dog)

Jewish tradition held dogs mostly in a negative light. They were considered unclean, vicious, and dangerous. Consequently, tradition generally frowned upon having dogs as pets. In this light we can understand what the one who said “one who took the vow said to him: I am not a dog, that I benefit from you and you do not benefit from me” meant. Since dogs were not usually raised in people’s households, most of the dogs roamed the streets and removed food for themselves from the garbage. Since dogs did not provide any benefit for human beings and were only fed out of compassion (think about the people in Jerusalem who feed all those feral cats nowadays), dogs were seen only as takers and not givers. A normal person who is in relationship with others wants a reciprocal relationship and not be compared to a dog who only takes for himself.

Thankfully our understanding of dogs as pets have changed. We appreciate the unconditional love we received from our pet dogs. We know all the benefits that our pet dogs provide us. They probably give us more than they take from us. That’s why all dogs go to heaven.