Dead and buried? TB Yevamot 115

 Yesterday we began the 15^th chapter of our massekhet. The Torah demands the testimony of two witnesses are needed to establish a fact. Chapter 15 may be considered the continuation of chapter 10 where the topic was permitting a woman to marry another man or do yibum when there was only one witness.  The rabbis were lenient in this case because of the unbearable nature of being an agunah or trusting the woman to investigate well whether her husband was truly dead. The Mishnah on daf TB Yevamot 114b highlights the case when the witness was the wife herself and she is believed and delineates the cases when she is not believed.

Today’s daf TB Yevamot 115 wonders whether one witness during a time of war is good enough to allow the woman to remarry. “A dilemma was raised before them: In the case of one witness who testifies to the death of someone during a war, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The reason that one witness is deemed credible when he provides testimony concerning the death of a husband is because the husband being alive is a matter that is likely to be revealed, and one would not lie in a case of this kind. Here, too, one witness would not lie. Or perhaps the reason that one witness is trusted is because his account is supported by the fact that she herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. And here, since sometimes she hates him, and war is a situation that requires especially careful investigation and it is tempting for her to rely on the witness, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again, and therefore the testimony of one witness is not accepted.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Because of the open-endedness of this sugiyah, there are many different opinions amongst the commentators and decisive of Jewish law. What is the basis underlying doubt of this type of testimony? Is the doubt as explained in the Gemara that a person providing testimony will tell the truth and won’t lie because he knows that eventually the truth will be revealed? Or the witness is only trusted on the assumption that the wife will investigate herself that her husband is truly dead, but since there’s a possibility she hates her husband, we cannot rely upon her investigation. Consequently, one witness is not sufficient to allow her to remarry.

There those commentators who say the testimony one witness during time of war is the fear that the witness will jump to the conclusion that the husband is dead without seeing the dead body just as was in the case of a woman. “Rava said: What is the reason that one does not rely on her testimony when there is war? It is because she says what she imagines to be the case: Can it enter one’s mind that among all these people who were killed, her husband alone is saved? If you say: Since there was peace between him and her, she guards herself and waits until she actually sees that he died; even so, at times it might happen that his enemies strike him with an arrow or spear and she thinks that he is certainly dead due to the wound, and yet this is no proof that he is dead, as there are instances when someone prepares medicine [samterei] for the wounded person and he survives, despite his apparently fatal wound.” (TB Yevamot 114b, Sefaria.org translation)

Ramban and the Tosefot ד"ה מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמִלְחָמָה hold that the case of a woman testifying the death of her husband and one witness testifying the death of her husband during a time of war are not similar. The woman has a vested interest in the outcome so her testimony cannot be trusted because she will rush to testify by assuming the death. The one witness has no vested interest in the outcome and he can be believed. Since he is believed when he testifies that he saw the deceased buried, he is also believed if he only says the husband is dead.

The Rif holds that the one witness not only has to testify that the husband is dead, but also he saw him buried for the widow to remarry. Rebbeinu Hannaniel holds the opinion even though the witness testifies the deceased is buried, that this doubt concerns a Torah law (ספקא דאורייתא) whether the woman is indeed a widow or not; consequently, the woman should not be permitted to marry until two witnesses testified that her husband is dead. If she married another man based on the testimony one witness, ex post facto she does not need to divorce her new husband. Rambam explains since the one witness may jump to the conclusion that the person is dead, he is not believed because of the chaotic nature of war. The witness needs to testify that he saw the deceased buried.

 

 

 

Stop in the name of the law TB Yevamot 114

Even though a minor is exempt from observing the commandments because is legally not competent, parents have the obligation to teach him/her to observe faithfully the mitzvot. The child’s education will be the bridge that will allow a smooth transition from being a minor and exempt from observing the commandments to a bar/bat mitzvah.

Today’s daf TB Yevamot 114 raises a very interesting question. When a nonfamily member sees a minor violating a mitzvah, should he intervene and stop the child? “A minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals or violates other prohibitions, the court is not commanded to prevent him from doing so. -קָטָן אוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת אֵין בֵּית דִּין מְצֻוִּוין לְהַפְרִישׁוֹ” (Sefaria.org translation) Or do we say the court is commanded to prevent them from doing so. Here the court means any nonfamily member.

The Gemara brings case after case trying to see whether an adult is commanded to prevent a minor violating a mitzvah. There is agreement that the person doesn’t have to intervene if the child is violating a rabbinic prohibition and is not doing the prohibition on behalf of the adult. The Gemara never comes to a consensus what should an adult to if he sees a child violating a Torah prohibition.

Because of this lack of consensus, Rishonim have different opinions on the proper procedure. The Rashba permits a person to feed something that is forbidden by the rabbis (דברי סופרים) to a young child. Isaiah di Trani ben Mali (the Elder) (c. 1180 – c. 1250) and others hold that there is no distinction between a court and a parent. Neither have been command to prevent the child from transgressing a commandment. Rambam and others hold that a father is obligated to prevent the child from violating commandment because he is commanded to educate his child. Although preventing a child from violating a mitzvah isn’t derived from the Torah (דאורייתא), many Rishonim hold that the source is a rabbinic institution (דברי סופרים) so that the child will not become used to violating the law and cling to the prohibition when he becomes of age. (Isaiah di Trani ben Mali and the Rashba)

 

#Korakh#parashathashavua#devartorah#in praise of compromise

In this week’s Torah portion, Korach, Korach tries to usurp Moses’ position of leadership.  He openly quarrels with Moshe to wrest away his mantle of leadership.  This quarrel is rather unique in the history of human kind.  In this case Moses was 100% right and Korach was 100% wrong.  But in most feuds and arguments even if one side is more correct than the other, both sides are usually making mistakes.

Husbands and wives, parents and children, and siblings often fight over most anything.  After a quarrel, a husband said to his wife, “You know I was a fool when I married you.” She replied, “Yes dear, I know but I was in love and didn’t notice it.”  When two people argue, each person states his position and then blames the other for the problem.  Nobody really listens. He or she is too busy buttressing his/her case. A stalemate occurs, anger festers, and the couple drifts apart.

After hearing the other side, each person in the argument should ask himself or herself “What can I live with.”  Compromise is the key to any solution on any problem When involved in a quarrel, don’t focus on who is more right and who is more wrong.  Focus on making peace by asking yourself “What can I live with so that all the people involved can be satisfied with the outcome.” 

Both the groom and the bride need to acquiesce to the marriage. Daf TB Yevamot 113 compares and contrasts a minor girl and a deaf-mute when it comes to marriage. Since they are not legally competent to understand what is happening to them, the Torah doesn’t sanction their marriage because they can’t acquiesce. Life for a single woman was difficult. Without the protection of a husband and his family, she was easy prey to unscrupulous men or was without a means of support. For the protection of the minor girl and the female deaf-mute, the rabbis provided the necessary acquiescence so they could marry. Their marriage is on a rabbinic level and not a Torah level. Although both are married on a rabbinic level, daf TB Yevamot 113 list three major differences between a minor girl and a deaf-mute.

First of all, a minor girl may reject (me’oon) her husband, but a deaf-mute does not have the option of me’oon. “The Gemara asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may perform refusal, i.e., she can retroactively nullify her marriage by means of a declaration of refusal of her husband, and a female deaf-mute, that she cannot perform refusal, as the Sages did not establish the option of refusal in her case? Since the marriage of a deaf-mute woman also applies by rabbinic law, why didn’t the Sages establish refusal in her case as well? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, i.e., had the Sages enacted refusal for a female deaf-mute, others would refrain from marrying her at all, as she can issue a declaration of refusal indefinitely, whereas in the case of a minor there is a time limit with regard to her option of a refusal.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Secondly, a minor girl married to a priest may eat teruma, but a deaf-mute may not. “What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, and a deaf-mute woman, that she may not partake of teruma when she is married to a priest, despite the fact that both of their marriages apply by rabbinic law? As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce. And he testified with regard to a minor girl, daughter of a non-priest who was married to a priest, that she may partake of teruma, whereas a deaf-mute woman, it may be inferred, may not partake of teruma.

“Gemara answers: The reason that a deaf-mute woman may not partake of teruma, even if she is married to a halakhically competent priest, is due to a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest likewise feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife. The Gemara asks: And which prohibition would that violate? Let him feed her, as he is equivalent to a minor who eats meat from unslaughtered animals. This is referring to the halakha that there is no obligation to prevent minors from committing transgressions. Since a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, has the status of a minor, the same reasoning should apply in this case. Consequently, the court should be under no obligation to prevent this deaf-mute woman from eating teruma unlawfully.

“Rather, it is a rabbinic decree lest a deaf-mute priest feed teruma to a halakhically competent wife. Since by Torah law her marriage to a deaf-mute man is not valid, she may not eat teruma. The Gemara asks: As well, in the case of a deaf-mute priest who wishes to feed a halakhically competent wife, let her partake of teruma that applies by rabbinic law. There are types of produce from which there is no obligation to separate teruma by Torah law, and one separates teruma from them due to rabbinic decree. Just as the marriage of this woman is by rabbinic law, she should be permitted to eat teruma that applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will come to feed her teruma that applies by Torah law.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Last of all, a minor girl is entitled to a ketubah, the marriage contract which spells out the obligations of husband and wife to each other, while a deaf-mute is not entitled to a ketubah. Nevertheless, if the husband wishes to provide for one he may do so. “And what is the difference between a minor girl, that she has a marriage contract, and a deaf-mute woman, that she does not have a marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, if the husband of a deaf-mute would be obligated to give her a marriage contract, men would refrain from marrying her at all.” (Sefaria.org translation)

There are two operating principles guiding the rabbis when making these distinctions. The first is the qualitative difference between a minor and a deaf-mute. The odds are in the minor’s favor that she will reach the age of majority and become legally competent. Especially before Helen Keller, the odds were against the deaf-mute’s ability to improve. She would remain legally incompetent all her life. Secondly, the rabbis wanted to encourage a sustainable marriage, by removing all the stumbling blocks that would discourage a man from marrying either a minor girl or deaf-mute.

 

 

 

Only God knows TB Yevamot 112

The exact meaning of something a woman says on today’s daf TB Yevamot 112 is a matter of debate amongst the commentators.

We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Nedarim 90b): At first they said: Three categories of women are divorced from their husbands against their will, and even so they receive payment of their marriage contract...Likewise, a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you-הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rashi explains this expression “Heaven is between me and you” to mean that only God knows that the husband is incapable of having normal sexual relations with her. In a similar vein the Yerushalmi (Nedarim chapter 1, halakha 1) give this explanation “Just as Heaven is far from Earth, my husband has been far from me.”  Tosefot provides a third explanation quoting TB Nedarim 90b “he does not shoot like an arrow, i.e., his semen is not emitted forcefully,” (Sefaria.org translation)

Even though the exact meaning is unclear, we understand what the woman is claiming. The sexual relationship between the husband and wife is private, consequently, there are no witnesses to testify to the truth of her statement. Only God is capable knows the truth of the matter.

Which version of the Mishnah you have makes all the difference in the world. TB Yevamot 111

Concerning today’s daf TB Yevamot, 111, I have good news and bad news. First the good news. Today’s daf marks that we have finished one third of the entire Talmud! This fact should encourage us to continue on our dafyomi journey to its final destination. The bad news is today’s daf is extremely complicated and difficult. Today’s daf wants to figure out the reason behind this statement in the Mishna on daf TB Yevamot 110b “If one wife is a minor and the other is a deaf-mute, consummation of levirate marriage or ḥalitza with one of them does not exempt her rival wife. Although both women are married by rabbinic law, their statuses are not the same and one cannot exempt the other.” (Sefaria.org translation) According to Rav the deaf-mute because of her disabilities is only partially married by rabbinic law. Rav was doubtful whether the minor was totally married or not married at all according to rabbinic law.

The Gemara brings case after case trying to understand the outcome of all the permutations in this and similar cases. For example, what happens if the brother-in-law does yibum with the minor first? What happens to the deaf-mute? What happens if he subsequently also does yibum with a deaf-mute? Will she ever be able to marry another man? What happens if the brother-in-law does yibum with the deaf-mute first? What happens to the minor?

As you study these cases on your own, you’ll have to remember some basic laws. When one sister falls as a yevama but the brother-in-law is already married to her sister, she is freed from the obligation of yibum and ḥalitza. A minor cannot perform the ceremony of ḥalitza. She has to wait until she reaches the age of majority and then she may perform the ceremony of ḥalitza. A deaf-mute may marry, but she too is forbidden to perform the ceremony of ḥalitza because she cannot say the formula which releases her from her yevam. An invalid sexual act (בִּיאָה פְּסוּלָה) does not exempt a woman from yibum or ḥalitza.

Does the next Mishna on TB Yevamot 111b provide a simple solution to all of our cases? It all depends on what version of the Mishnah you have. Our Mishnah reads: “If the deceased brother had two wives, an adult and a minor, and the yavam engaged in sexual intercourse with the adult, then engaged in intercourse with the minor, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the minor, the yavam or his brother did not disqualify the adult from staying married, as the consummation of the levirate marriage with the adult completely dissolves the levirate bond. If the yavam engaged in intercourse with the minor, and then engaged in intercourse with the adult, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the adult, the yavam or his brother disqualified the minor from staying married. Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse him (me’oon) thereby annulling her marriage retroactively, and then the minor is permitted to marry any man.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Tosefta, Rif, Rashba, Ramban, and the Bartenura have the following version of our Mishnah. “Rabbi Elazar says in all these (cases)-bekulam- בְּכּוּלָם), the court instructs the minor to refuse him.” According to this version even in the case of a deaf-mute and a minor, the court instructs the minor to refuse her husband.  This one word in Hebrew (בְּכּוּלָם) simplifies all the earlier permutations discussed on the daf because me’oon retroactively the minor’s marriage. All the problems disappear.

The Raavad doesn’t have the version “in all these (cases).” Rabbi Elarzar ruling only applies in the case of an adult and a minor as taught in the Mishna. Only in this case does one teach the minor to refuse her husband so that the brother-in-law can fulfill the mitzvah of yibum on a Torah level. In the case of the minor and the deaf-mute this option of me’oon is not available, because they are both married on a rabbinic level and the rabbis taught that person should distance himself from refusals (me’oon).

The power of the court to annul a marriage TB Yevamot 110

A marriage of a minor by a mother or a brother is only on a rabbinic level. When she becomes of age does her marriage automatically rise to a Torah level or does some significant act needs to be performed? Rav holds that the couple must engage in intercourse before the marriage is considered on a Torah level. TB Yevamot analyzes whether this assumption about Rav is true. The Gemara brings a case study.

“The Gemara asks: And did Rav actually say that when he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, yes, the original marriage is valid, and if he did not have intercourse with her, no, it is not valid? Wasn’t there an incident in the city of Neresh where a woman was betrothed when she was a minor, and she reached majority, and the husband seated her in a bridal chair under the marriage canopy and had not yet had intercourse with her, and another man came and seized her from him and married her? And Rav Bruna and Rav Ḥananel, the students of Rav, were there and they did not require her to receive a bill of divorce from the latter husband. Presumably, they regarded her as fully married to the first husband, so the marriage to the second marriage never took effect, despite the fact that the first marriage had not yet been consummated.” (Sefaria.org translation) 

As the case study stands right now, Rav seems to contradict himself. Concerning the married minor who grows up, he states that the couple needs to engage in sexual intercourse for the marriage to be recognized on a Torah level. The case study of Neresh, seemingly teaches that one does not need intercourse for the marriage to be recognized as valid and a Torah level. Does Rav require sexual intercourse to validate the marriage and a Torah level are not?

The Gemara provides two different solutions to resolve this apparent contradiction. “Rav Pappa said: There is a difference, because in Neresh their practice is to first marry a woman and have intercourse with her, and afterward they seat her in the bridal chair. In this incident, the husband had already had intercourse with her once she was an adult, and that is why Rav’s students did not require a bill of divorce from the second man. Rav Ashi says: There was a different reason, even if the practice was not as Rav Pappa describes. This bride snatcher acted improperly. Consequently, they treated him improperly by annulling the legal validity of his actions, and the Sages abrogated his betrothal.

“Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well if the second man betrothed her with money, as then the Sages could declare that money to be ownerless property and void the betrothal. If he betrothed her by means of intercourse, what is the halakha? How can the Sages dissolve the betrothal when the sexual act took place? The Gemara answers: The Sages rendered his sexual act a licentious sexual act, which does not create a bond of betrothal. With regard to the dispute in the mishna” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Ashi’s interpretation highlights the power of the court. The court has the power to annul a marriage since the couple gets married “accordance with the law Moses and the people Israel-על דעת משה וישראל” Even though the first “marriage” was never consummated and never became valid making the second marriage the only valid one, the court had the power to annul this kosher second marriage because the man acted inappropriately.

 

I feel that Jewish courts should exercise this power more frequent when a recalcitrant husband absolutely refuses to give his wife a bill of divorce, a get (גט). This woman is an agunah, doomed according to Jewish law to remarry. When all methods of persuasion fails or when the husband refuses to give a bill of divorce until he gains some economic advantage or complete parental control over the children, this demand is outright blackmail. I think he has acted no less improperly than the case of Neresh according to Rav Ashi’s opinion.

Bar Kappara gives good advice TB Yevamot 109

 Bar Kappara gives good advice on today’s daf TB Yevamot 109. “Bar Kappara taught: A person should always cling to three things:

1.     To ḥalitza; this is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Shaul said: One who marries his yevama for her beauty, or for the sake of matrimony because he wants to be married to her, or for some other reason, such as her money, it is as if he is having intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, and in my eyes it is almost as if his offspring were a mamzer. Therefore, it is preferable that one performs ḥalitza and avoids sin. 2.

2.     One should cling to bringing about peace, as it is written “Seek peace and pursue it” (Psalms 34:15). And Rabbi Abbahu said: It is derived by verbal analogy from the terms pursuit and pursuit. It is written here: “Seek peace and pursue it” (Psalms 34:15) and it is written there: “He who pursues righteousness and mercy finds life, prosperity, and honor” (Proverbs 21:21), indicating that pursuing peace is a mitzva, just as pursuing righteousness and mercy is.

3.     As for the nullification of vows, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: With regard to one who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar when it is prohibited to build an altar outside the Temple. And one who fulfills that vow, it is as if he sacrificed an offering on this personal altar, thereby doubling his sin. Therefore, it is preferable that he ask a halakhic authority to dissolve the vow.” (Sefaria.org translation)

A brother’s widow relationship with the surviving brother is a forbidden relationship under all circumstances except when the husband dies childless. The purpose of yibum is to continue the deceased brother’s line and legacy. Abba Shaul disapproves when the surviving brother marries the yevama for any other reason. Based on this teaching when the need arises, Ashkenazic Jews will only perform the ceremony of ḥalitza. On the other hand, Sephardic Jews are more open to the possibility of yibum.

Rabbi Natan’s position that “one who vows, it is as if he build a personal altar, and one who fulfills that vow, it is if he sacrificed an offering on this personal altar” needs explanation. The Rishonim explained that the basis of this comparison is when a person forbids something upon himself which the Torah permits it is as if he has offered up an unnecessary sacrifice.

Bar Kappara continues. “And one should distance himself from three things: From refusals, as perhaps she will grow up and regret her decision, and it will turn out that she refused a husband who was suitable for her. From deposits entrusted to him by an inhabitant of the same city, as he will treat the bailee’s home as his home. The owner might enter the bailee’s house and take the deposit without the latter’s knowledge, and subsequently falsely sue him for its return. From serving as a guarantor: This is referring to Sheltziyyon guarantees, in which the lender is entitled to demand payment from the guarantor even before the borrower defaults on the loan.” (Sefria.org translation)

What is the common denominator of these three things that a person should distance himself from? Me’oon, accepting deposits, and acting as a guarantor may look good at that moment, but the result of these actions may turn out bad for the person in the long run. I think the Bar Kappara’s advice here is one should always think through the possible consequences of his/her actions before acting. And that is always good advice.

Is the minor girl really married? TB Yevamot 108

The Mishnah on TB Yevamot 107b defines the difference between a minor and a child so young that she completely unable to give consent. A minor has the ability to refuse the marriage consented by her mother or brother with me’oon (מִיעוּן) because she knows what she is doing. A child, who is so young that she cannot even give consent, does not need to refuse for the marriage to be terminated. “Who is a minor girl who needs to perform refusal in order to annul her marriage? Any minor whose mother or brother married her off with her consent. If they married her off without her consent, she need not refuse her husband at all and may leave her husband without a declaration of refusal. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Any girl who is so young that she cannot keep her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, safe does not need to refuse, as the Sages instituted marriage only for a girl old enough to understand what she is doing.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree what is the status or state of the marriage with the minor. Rabbi Eliezer doesn’t consider it a valid marriage at all and Rabbi Yehoshua considers the relationship as a full-fledged marriage with one exception.

“It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor girl is nothing, and therefore her marriage is not valid. And her husband has no rights to items she finds, nor to her earnings; nor does he have the right to annul her vows; he does not inherit her assets if she dies; and if she dies he may not become ritually impure on her account if he is a priest, i.e., through his presence in the same room as her corpse. The principle is: She is not his wife in any sense, except that she must perform refusal in order to marry someone else.

“Rabbi Yehoshua says: In the case of a minor whose mother or brother married her off, her husband has rights to items she finds, and to her earnings; and he has the right to annul her vows; and he inherits her assets if she dies; and if she dies he must become ritually impure on her account even if he is a priest. The principle is: She is his wife in every sense, except that she can leave him by means of refusal and does not require a bill of divorce.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Interestingly Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi weighs in on this disagreement and likes Rabbi Eliezer’s position better because of his consistency. “Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer appears to be more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, as Rabbi Eliezer applied a consistent standard with regard to a minor, while Rabbi Yehoshua applied an inconsistent standard. The Gemara asks: In what way is his standard inconsistent? The Gemara answers: If she is his wife, she should require a bill of divorce from him.

“According to Rabbi Eliezer too, there appears to be an inconsistency, as, if she is not his wife, she should not be required to perform refusal either. The Gemara answers: But shall she leave with no ritual at all? Some sort of act is required to indicate that their relationship is permanently severed. Rabbi Eliezer has a consistent standard, according to which the marriage of a minor has no substance and to dissolve it she need only indicate that she does not want her husband. Rabbi Yehoshua is inconsistent in treating the relationship as a marriage even though it can be dissolved easily.” (Sefaria.org translation)

One might think therefore that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer especially since it is praised by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but one would be wrong. The Gemara in TB Ketubot decides that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yehoshua. Consequently, Rambam and the Shulkhan Aruhk poskin accordingly. (Mishneh Torah, Sefer Nashim, Laws of Marital Status (הלכות אישות), Chapter 22, Halakha 4; Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer, 155:10)

The power of faith #devarTorah#parashathashavua#Shelakh Lekha

After being encamped near Mt. Sinai for two years, the people of Israel were on the verge of entering Canaan—the land God had promised them. In this week’s Torah portion Shelakh Lekha, God told them to send twelve spies to assess the land and the people living there. When the spies saw the strength of the Canaanites and the size of their cities, ten of them said, “We can’t!” Two said, “We can!”

What made the difference?

When the ten compared the giants with themselves and the giants loomed large, the two—Caleb and Joshua—compared the giants with God, and the giants were cut down to size. “The Lord is with us,” they said. “Do not be afraid of them” (Num. 14:9).

Unbelief never lets us get beyond the difficulties—the impregnable cities and the impossible giants. It preoccupies itself with them, brooding over them, pitting them against mere human resources.

Faith, on the other hand, though it never minimizes the dangers and difficulties of any circumstance, looks away from them to God and counts on His invisible presence and power.

What are your “giants”? A habit you cannot break? A temptation you cannot resist? A difficult marriage? If we compare ourselves with our difficulties, we will always be overwhelmed. Faith looks away from the greatness of the undertaking to the greatness of God who is always by our side, strengthening us to meet the challenges of life.

The right of refusal, TB Yevamot 107

With today’s daf TB Yevamot 107 we begin the 13^th chapter of our massekhet. This chapter discusses the laws of me’oon (מִיעוּן), the right of a minor girl to annul a marriage contracted by her mother or brother. Obviously today this protocol is only theoretical because underage marriages are forbidden by law and our society understands these underage marriages as exploitative and abhorrent.

Premodern societies saw underage marriages as something more positive. Life was difficult and life expectancy was not very long. By marrying a minor daughter, the family was trying to ensure that she would have a roof over her head and food on the table that they may not be able to provide or in the case of the parents’ death. Under age marriage was sanctioned because it protected the minor girl.

Marriage needs the consent of both the bride and groom. If either the man or the woman does not consent to the marriage, there can be no marriage.

A minor girl does not have the capacity legally to consent to a marriage. Consequently, consent has to be provided on her behalf. The Torah gives the father the legal right to give consent for his minor daughter to marry. If the father is dead or halakhically out of the picture, the rabbis permitted the mother or the brother to provide consent for their under aged daughter or sister.

The rabbis wanted to protect this underage girl, who they gave permission to her mother or brother to marry her off.  Before she reaches the age of majority, the rabbis give her the right of refusal, me’oon, (מִיעוּן). She not only annuls the marriage, but also expunges it as if the marriage never ever took place. Unlike a divorcee she is permitted to marry her former husband’s relatives or a priest.

The first Mishna presents five different disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Beit Shammai has a more restrictive understanding of me’oon while Beit Hillel has a more expansive one.

“MISHNA: The Sages decreed that in the case of a minor girl whose father died, her mother or brothers may marry her off. However, such a marriage does not have the same legal status as the marriage of an adult. Therefore, if the minor regrets having married, she is allowed to make a declaration of refusal to her husband, thereby annulling the marital bond. The Sages disagreed with regard to the details of this halakha:

1.     Beit Shammai say: Only betrothed girls may refuse. A girl may refuse, upon reaching adulthood, to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father. But Beit Hillel say that both betrothed and fully married girls may refuse.

2.   Beit Shammai say: Refusal may be directed only at her husband and not at her yavam. In such a situation, she must perform ḥalitza in order to dissolve the levirate bond. But Beit Hillel say: It may be directed at her husband or her yavam.

3. Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in the presence of the husband. But Beit Hillel say: It may take place either in his presence or in his absence. 

4. Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in court. But Beit Hillel say: It may take place either in court, or not in court.

5. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: She may refuse as long as she is a minor, even four or five times if her relatives married her off again to another man after each refusal. Beit Shammai said to them: The daughters of Israel are not to be treated with disregard and should not be passed from one man to another. Rather, she refuses once. And then she must wait until she reaches majority, and refuse, and marry.” (Sefaria.org translation)

As in most cases, the halakha follows Beit Hillel. (Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Sefer Nashim, the Laws of Divorce, chapter 11, Halakha 3 and Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer. 155:4-6)

We should note that in disagreement #4 the Gemara clarifies that Beit Hillel also agrees that the me’oon needs to be done before three. They disagree with Beit Shammai because they believe that these three don’t need to be expert judges. “As it is taught in a baraita: Beit Shammai say: Before a court, and Beit Hillel say: Either before a court or not before a court, but both this school and that school concede that three people are required.” (Sefaria.org translation) To review why a court of three is necessary, we reread my TB Yevamot 101 entry.

 

Why does the ceremony of ḥalitza need to be done before a court of three? TB Yevamot101

With daf TB Yevamot 101 we finish the 11^th chapter of our massekhet and begin the 12^th chapter. Up to now we been learning about the mitzvah of yibum, levirate marriage. When a man dies childless his widow marries her late husband’s brother and the child born of this union perpetuates the deceased’s name and inherits his property. The 12^th chapter discusses the laws of ḥalitza (חֲלִיצָה), the ceremony that dissolves the bond between the widow and her brother. Once ḥalitza is accomplished, the widow is free to marry any man she chooses.

The Mishnah begins with the halakha that the ḥalitza ceremony must be done in front of a court. “The mitzva of ḥalitza , the ritual through which the yavam (the brother-in-law –gg) frees the yevama (the widow-gg) of her levirate bonds, must be performed before three judges, and the ritual does not require the judges to be experts fit to adjudicate other matters, as even if all three are laymen, it is acceptable.” (Sefaria.org translation)

I think one of the reasons why this ceremony of ḥalitza must be done in a “courtroom” with judges is to publicize the dissolving of the yibum bond. People will hear that the bond between the yavam and the yevama is dissolved and won’t come to the wrong conclusion about this woman when she marries another man.

The Gemara provides another reason. The court has a more important role than just notarizing that the bond between the yavam and yevama is dissolved. They must advise the brother-in-law if they see that they match is not “made in heaven.” When the Torah describes the ḥalitza ceremony, the Torah uses the phrase “And they shall speak” (Deuteronomy 25:8). The Gemara explains what this phrase means. “‘They shall speak to him’ teaches that they give him counsel appropriate for him concerning whether he should perform levirate marriage or ḥalitza. For example, if he was a young boy and she was elderly, or if he was elderly and she was a young girl, they would tell him not to enter into levirate marriage because: What are you doing with a young girl if you are an old man? What are you doing with an elderly woman if you are a young boy? Go be with someone like yourself, closer to your own age, and do not bring a quarrel into your household, as the age difference will be a cause for disputes and strife later.” (Sefaria.org translation) In other words, the court gives them good advice when the brother-in-law should not marry his brother’s widow. Hopefully the brother-in-law will listen to the court.

 Do remember the movie Sully which dramatized US Airways Flight 1549 emergency landing on the Hudson River. The 155 passengers thought that they were going to die. During take-off from New York City, their plane struck a flock of geese, disabling both engines. In a powerless glide, the captain maneuvered over the densely populated area, then announced: “Brace for impact.” Less than 90 seconds later, the crippled plane made a water landing in the frigid Hudson River, where boats and ferries quickly arrived to rescue the passengers and crew, all of whom survived. People called it the “miracle on the Hudson” and praised the pilot and crew. One grateful passenger said simply, “We have a second chance in life.”

Although not as dramatic this week’s Torah portion, B’ha-alotecha, tells a story of second chances. A year has passed and it was time to celebrate Passover again. Unfortunately some Israelites could not offer up the Paschal Lamb because they were ritually unready. They complained to Moses saying, “Ritually unready though we are by reason of a corpse, why must we be debarred from presenting the Lord’s offering at a set time with the rest of the Israelites?” (Numbers 9:7) God told Moses that people who have legitimate reasons why they could not offer up the Paschal Lamb of Passover, they could offer the Passover sacrifice one month later.  (Numbers 9:9-13) From then on the 15^th day of Iyar is known as Pesach Sheni, giving a second chance to celebrate Passover for the Israelites.

In times of crisis like the US Airways Flight 1549 emergency landing on the Hudson River, we grasp the importance of every hour. During our ordinary routine, however, we often forget that each day is a second chance. Twice a day we recite in the prayer Ashrey, “The Lord supports all fall, and raises all or bow down. All raise their eyes to you and hope….”

We can choose to live with thankfulness for God’s compassion and grace, with confidence in His faithful care, and with hope because He is with us forever. Today, God offers us a second chance in life. Let’s make the most of it!

Two cases when the rabbis took women’s feelings into account TB Yevamot 100

A lot of people may eat teruma if they are connected to a priest. Although a lot of people may eat teruma, daf TB Yevamot 99b lists 10 categories of people who may not go to the granary and collect the teruma. “The Sages taught: There are ten to whom one may not distribute teruma in the granary, and they are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, a person whose sexual organs are concealed [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite, and a slave, and a woman, and an uncircumcised man, and a ritually impure man, and one who marries a woman who is unfit for him, i.e., who is unfit to marry a priest” (Sefaria.org translation) Today’s daf explains why each category may not collect teruma at the granary.

Clarifying the case of a woman, the rabbis differentiate between her ability to collect teruma and ma’aser oni (מַעְשַׂר עָנִי), the tithe that set aside for the poor. Because she is poor and needs the food to survive, she is entitled to the ma’aser oni. Not only that she’s entitled, poor women take precedence over poor men. “This is what it is saying: In a case where the poor man’s tithe is distributed to the poor from the owner’s house, the woman is given teruma first. What is the reason? She is given the tithe first because it is demeaning for a woman to have to wait in the company of men for a lengthy period of time.” (Sefaria.org translation) The rabbis were sensitive to her inherent dignity.

“After learning the importance of maintaining the woman’s dignity, Rava applied this principle to a different case. “Rava said: Initially, when a man and a woman would come for judgment before me, each for a different case, I would resolve the man’s quarrel first. I would say that since he is obligated in many positive mitzvot I should not waste his time by causing him to wait. However, since I heard this baraita, I resolve the woman’s quarrel first. What is the reason? I resolve her quarrel first because it is demeaning for her to be waiting in the company of men.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Back then the sexes did not mix in public. Women probably felt exposed and powerless when they were forced to be waiting in the company a man. The rabbis wanted to diminish her uncomfortableness. In our society women should not feel demeaned waiting in the company of men; nevertheless, there still might be some cases in today’s society where women’s feelings should be taken into account when waiting for a long time in mixed company. Please feel free to suggest examples in the comments.

I believe we should be sensitive to all peoples’ inherent dignity. For example, I’ve heard lots of complaints from people how a scholarship or dues reduction committee treated the supplicant. These people have complained that they felt demeaned by the process. Sometimes there complaints are unfounded. Nevertheless, we should examine how we do business to make sure that we are sensitive to their inherent dignity.

5 brothers- not one is not like the other TB Yevamot 99

Today’s daIf f TB Yevamot 99 deals with a lot of different hypothetical situations. One of the cases is when the same man and woman have five children together; however, each one of the children has a different status.

“It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: A man and a woman can sometimes bear children of five nations, i.e., of five separate categories of lineage.

How so? If a Jew bought a slave and a maidservant from the market, and the slave and maidservant had two children at the time, and one of these children converted, it is found that one child is a convert and the other one is a gentile. If the master immersed the slave and maidservant for the sake of giving them the status of slaves, and they engaged in intercourse with each other and had a child, here there are three children in the family who are a convert, and a gentile, and a slave. If he freed the maidservant, which renders her a Jewess, and her husband the slave engaged in intercourse with her, and they had another child, here there are a convert, a gentile, a slave, and a mamzer. The offspring of a slave and a Jewess, according to Rabbi Meir, have the same status as a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship. If the master subsequently freed both the maidservant and the slave and married them to each other and they had another child, here there are a convert, a gentile, a slave, a mamzer, and a regular Jew.” (Sefaria.org translation)

To better understand this scenario, let’s name the characters in this drama. Moshe bought a male slave, Jim, and a female slave Jennifer. Jim and Jennifer already had two children together, Bob and George. Obviously, Bob and George are not Jewish.

Bob converted and became Jewish while his brother George remained a non-Jew. Moshe immersed Jim and Jennifer in the mikvah in order to give them the status of a Canaanite slaves. Canaanite slaves have some privileges living with the Jewish master and must observe Jewish law just like a Jewish woman. One of the privileges is that Canaanite slaves may have sexual relationships with each other. Now that they have the status as a Canaanite slaves, Jim and Jennifer get it together and father a third son, Joseph, who is born into slave hood.

Each of the three sons has a different status. Bob is convert, George is a non-Jew, and Joseph is a slave.

When Moshe freed Jennifer, she became Jewish. Now being Jewish she is forbidden to have any new sexual relationship with Jim who is a Canaanite slave. Nevertheless, they had sex and as a result another son, Billam, is born. According to Rabbi Meir this son is a mamzer because of the forbidden sexual relationship that his parents had.

Now each of the four sons has a different status. Bob is convert, George is a non-Jew, Joseph is a slave, and Billam is a mamzer.

Finally Jim is freed, converts, and becomes Jewish. Now he may marry Jennifer because they are both Jewish. As a Jewish couple they have a fifth son, Gary, who is Jewish born of Jewish parents.

That’s how the same man and woman can have five sons and each one of them has a different status. Bob is convert, George is a non-Jew, Joseph is a slave, and Billam is a mamzer, and Gary is a Jew.

I wonder what their imaginary family get-togethers are like.

By the way, the halakha is not according to Rabbi Meir. If the mother is a mamzeret who has sex with a non-Jew or slave, the child produced of this union is a mamzer. Whether a woman is single or married and has sex with a non-Jew or slave, the child is kosher Jew in all aspects except one. He cannot be considered a kohain, a priest. (Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer, 4:19)

 

 

 

The disagreement between Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov and Rav Sheshet TB Yevamot 98

Generally speaking when somebody converts and joins the Jewish people, Jewish law considers his/her legal status as “a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all his previous family relationships are disregarded, whether from his father’s side or from his mother’s side (גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּיר כְּקָטָן שֶׁנּוֹלַד דָּמֵי)” (Sefaria.org translation) Daf TB Yevamot 97b records a disagreement between Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov and Rav Sheshet.

“The sons of Yudan the maidservant were freed. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov allowed them to marry each other’s wives after divorce. Rava said to him: Didn’t Rav Sheshet prohibit marriage in that case? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said to him: He prohibited it and I permit it. I disagree with his ruling.

“The Gemara explains: If the two freed slaves or converts are half brothers from their father’s side and not from their mother’s side, everyone agrees that the marriage is permitted, as even a gentile and certainly a convert are considered unrelated to their father’s family. If they are half brothers from their mother and not from their father, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.

“When they disagree, it is a case where they are brothers both from their father and from their mother. The one who permits the marriage claims that we trace them after their father. Their paternal lineage is followed, since they are called the sons of so-and-so, their father. Since they are recognized by their paternal lineage, it is well known that they are considered unrelated, and there is no concern that people will infer that a man may marry his sister-in-law. And Rav Sheshet maintains that they are also called the sons of so-and-so, their mother. Therefore, this concern does exist, as it is not common knowledge that a convert is considered reborn and unrelated to his mother’s family.

“And some say a different version of this dispute: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov disagrees with Rav Sheshet, even with regard to maternal half brothers. And what is the reasoning behind this opinion? The legal status of a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all his previous family relationships are disregarded, whether from his father’s side or from his mother’s side.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Today’s daf TB Yevamot 98 summons a proof bolstering Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov position.

“The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute between Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov and Rav Sheshet. Come and hear another proof: A convert whose birth was in sanctity but whose conception was not in sanctity has maternal kinship, i.e., his relationship to his mother’s relatives is recognized. However, he does not have paternal kinship. How so? If he married his maternal half sister, who was born before him and converted, he must divorce her. Although by Torah law they are considered unrelated, the Sages rendered it prohibited for them to marry, lest he marry a maternal half sister who was born after him and is forbidden to him. If she is his paternal half sister, he may maintain her as his wife. If he married his father’s maternal half sister, he must divorce her.

“If she is his father’s paternal half sister, he may maintain her as his wife. If she is his mother’s maternal half sister, he must divorce her. If she is his mother’s paternal half sister, Rabbi Meir says he must divorce her, and the Rabbis say he may maintain her. This is as Rabbi Meir would say: Any relative forbidden due to kinship with the mother, whether the woman is his paternal relative, e.g., his father’s maternal half sister, or his maternal relative, he must divorce her. However, if she is forbidden due to the father, he may maintain her.

“And he is permitted to marry his maternal brother’s wife and his father’s brother’s wife, and all other forbidden relatives are also permitted to him. The expression: And all other relatives are also permitted to him, is added to include the father’s wife.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rashi ד"ה נָשָׂא אֲחוֹתוֹ מִן הָאֵם explains the reason thusly. A baby is conceived when his mother was still a Gentile She converted and became Jewish before he was born. This baby is of course Jewish. For reasons I don’t really understand, his status can be described as Jewish-. His mother has a previous daughter from another marriage who also converts. He can’t marry this half sister even though halakhicly they are not related. If his mother now has a Jewish baby girl both conceived and born Jewish, her brother with the status Jewish- certainly can’t marry her. The rabbis made an enactment prohibiting him from marrying the half-sister because he can’t marry his full sister.

Another Gemara elsewhere gives a different explanation why he is forbidden to marry his half-sister. According to the Torah Gentiles are obligated to observe the seven commandments of Noah. One of the seven prohibitions is illicit relations. Once siblings convert according to Jewish law they are not “related” to each other. The rabbis were afraid that people would convert only for the purpose of marrying their sister. Consequently, they forbade this marriage even though technically according to Jewish law they are not related.

Tosefot ד"ה נָשָׂא אֲחוֹתוֹ מִן הָאֵם provides a third reason. Even though the boy in our story is Jewish-, he looks Jewish because nobody knows his circumstance that he was conceived while his mother was still a Gentile and his half-sister converted on her own. Consequently Jews will think that one may marry one’s own sister when they see him marrying his half-sister without knowing the facts of the case. Consequently, the rabbis forbade this marriage.