Monday, December 26, 2022

Do their views have to be consistent? TB Nedarim 61

 The Mishnah back on daf TB Nedarim 60 records a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei. “If he takes a vow that wine is forbidden to him until Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. If he said: Until it will be Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover ends, as he may have intended for the vow to apply as long as it was still Passover (Rosh). If he said: Until before Passover (עַד לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח), Rabbi Meir says: It is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. Rabbi Yosei says: It is forbidden to him until it ends.” (Sefaria.org translation) לִפְנֵי can mean before or it could have the meaning close to (לִפְנוֹת) i.e. the end of Passover. Passover is a seven day holiday in Israel and an eight day holiday in the Diaspora. When the person says “until before Passover,” he could be referring to the first day of Passover or the second day of Passover or the third day of Passover, etc. Rabbi Meir says people can live with ambiguity and rules that the vow is over at the onset of Passover. Rabbi Meir believes people can’t live ambiguity. To make sure Passover must be over before the vow has been completed.

Today’s daf TB Nedarim 61 raises a problem consistency between our Mishna and a Mishna found in massekhet Kedushin 64b.

§ It was taught in the mishna that if one vows that wine is forbidden to him until Passover, he is prohibited from drinking wine until the Festival arrives. However, if one vows that wine is forbidden to him until before Passover, there is a dispute as to whether the vow remains in effect until the beginning or the end of the Festival. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Meir, who holds that it is prohibited only until the beginning of Passover, maintains that a person does not place himself in a position of uncertainty, and Rabbi Yosei holds that a person does place himself in a position of uncertainty?

The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following mishna (Kiddushin 64b): In the case of one who has two groups of two daughters born to him from two women, e.g., he has two daughters from his first wife, and after his first wife died he remarried and had two daughters with his second wife, and he said: I betrothed my older daughter to someone, but I do not know if I meant the older of the older group of daughters; or if I meant the older daughter of the younger group; or if I meant the younger daughter of the older group, who is nevertheless older than the older daughter of the younger group, then all three of those daughters are prohibited to marry another man due to the uncertainty, as he failed to clarify which daughter was betrothed. This applies to all the daughters apart from the younger daughter of the younger group, who is certainly not betrothed. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: They are all permitted to marry, apart from the older daughter of the older group. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Meir, one must take into account any of the possible meanings of the imprecise expression: My older daughter, whereas Rabbi Yosei maintains that only the narrowest possible meaning of the phrase is taken into account. This contradicts the mishna here.” (Sefaria.org translation)

In the case of the daughters the position of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei are reversed. Obviously, the Gemara would like the rabbis to hold consistent positions. Our Gemara simply solves this problem thusly. “In response to this question, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Avdimi said that Rav said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, i.e., the views stated in the mishna here must be reversed in order to reconcile them with the mishna in Kiddushin. And it is indeed taught in a baraita that this is the principle: With regard to any vow which specifies a fixed time, i.e., an event that occurs on a particular date, and one said that the vow applies until before that event, Rabbi Meir says the vow applies until the event ends, and Rabbi Yosei says that the vow is in effect only until the event arrives. This is another proof that the opinions in the mishna here must be reversed.” (Sefaria.org translation)

This whole sugiya is also found in massekhet Kiddushin. The Ron on our daf ד"ה והתניא says that one need reverse the opinions. He comments that these tannaim are not arguing about ambiguity, but rather how people speak in their day-to-day life. Rabbi Meir holds that when people say “until before Passover” they mean when Passover is over while Rabbi Yosei holds they mean until Passover begins. The day today language concerning betrothal is completely different; consequently, the tannaim can rule differently than they did in Nedarim. He prefers this explanation because when there is a disagreement between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Meir, the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei. Since were studying vows, having the original Rabbi Yosei position as the halakha is more logical. He knows that Rambam agrees with him, but notes that Ramban poskins like Rabbi Meir.

 

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