Daf TB Nedarim 46 has a different manuscript version which impacts its meaning. “§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he has a bathhouse or an olive press in the city that is leased out and available for public use, the forbidden party may use it only if the owner has forfeited his own right to profits from usage. The Gemara asks: And how much is this right to profits from usage (tefisat yad- תְּפִיסַת יָד) that prohibits the subject of the vow from entering the bathhouse? Rav Naḥman said: In cases where he receives one half, one-third, or one-quarter of the profits of the bathhouse. But in a case where he receives less, it is not forbidden. Abaye said: Even in a case where he receives less (batzir- בְצִיר), it is forbidden. If so, what are the circumstances in which it is permitted and he is not considered to have a right to profits from usage? Where he completely forfeits all profits and receives only an annual rental fee [taska] from a tenant.” (Sefaria.org translation) Rav Naḥman and Abaye disagree what percentage determines a person’s involvement in an enterprise that he has leased out. Abaye holds the stringent point of view that the owner must completely forfeit all the profits and receives only in annual rental fee from the tenant. Whether the tenant makes or loses money is not the owners concern.
Manuscripts in the hands of the Rishonim had a variant reading. Instead of batzir- בְצִיר the text read eggs baytzim-בֵּצִים. You can see the similarity because I’ve highlighted the first three letters in a red font. They explained the Gemara in two different ways.
The first way was the owner of the bathhouse opened up an egg stand in front of it. His egg business is completely separate from the bathhouse. Rav Naḥman holds that this egg stand is not considered “right to profits from usage (tefisat yad- תְּפִיסַת יָד)” at all while Abaye still holds that it is “right to profits from usage (tefisat yad- תְּפִיסַת יָד)” because the owner is still benefiting from this space of his bathhouse.
The second way defines the eggs as clay balls in the shape of eggs. The owner of the bathhouse uses the bathhouse either to dry the clay eggs or to store them there. Rav Naḥman holds that this storage space is not considered “right to profits from usage (tefisat yad- תְּפִיסַת יָד)” at all while Abaye still holds that it is “right to profits from usage (tefisat yad- תְּפִיסַת יָד)” because the owner is still benefiting from this space of his bathhouse.
If the correct version is eggs then Rav Naḥman would agree with Abaye that the owner of the bathhouse cannot receive any percentage of the daily profits of the bathhouse. He may only receive an annual fee from the tenant.
Daf TB Nedarim 47 asks a very interesting question which is never resolved. As a review let me remind you of the following facts. A person may make a vow to prevent somebody else from benefiting from him. A person may make a vow that he is prevented from benefiting from another person. Person “A” cannot forbid person “C” something owned by person “B.” The Gemara asks can I forbid my property to somebody now even when I no longer own it. “Avimi raises a dilemma: If the owner of a house said: Entering this house is konam for you, and then he died or sold it to another, what is the halakha? Do we say that a person can render an item in his possession forbidden even for a time after it will leave his possession, or not?” (Sefaria.org translation)
The Gemara tries to bring a Mishna from
our Gemara (daf 57a) and baraita we’ve seen earlier to resolve
our question. Since these sources can be interpreted in multiple ways, they are
rejected leaving our question unresolved.
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