One of the most tragic figures in Judaism is the agunah. According to classical Jewish law, only the husband can initiate a divorce proceeding. If he refuses to grant his wife a divorce or goes missing without a trace, the wife remains chained to the recalcitrant husband or the missing husband and cannot remarry. The first Mishnah of chapter 10 discusses a case where the husband goes abroad and one witness testifies that he is dead. Usually to establish a fact, two witnesses' testimony is required. Because her state is so tragic, the rabbis allowed her to remarry on the basis of only one witness with the caveat that she do her due diligence to make sure that he is dead.
Our Mishnah has been dealing with what happens when the woman remarries based on the testimony of one witness with the permission of the court and her first husband returns alive and well. Today's daf TB Yevamot 82 discusses the woman's liability to bring a sin offering. Whether she has to bring a sin offering depends on how one views the court's decision. If the court delivered a halakhic ruling (hora-ah- הוֹרָאָה), she is exempt from bringing a sin offering. If the court was just fact-finding and made a mistake (ta'ut- טָעוּת), she is liable for a sin offering. This is the basis of the argument between Ze’eiri and Rav Naḥman.
“The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.
"Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.
" Rav Naḥman said: You can know that her permission to marry is a ruling, as in the entire Torah one witness is not deemed credible, and yet here he is deemed credible. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered a ruling, i.e., she does not rely on the witness but on the decision of the court? By contrast, Rava said that we can know that her permission to marry is an error. His reasoning is that had the court ruled with regard to forbidden fat or with regard to blood that it is permitted, and they went back and saw a reason to prohibit it, if they subsequently retract and say that it is permitted we take no notice of them. If they did not find a conclusive proof but merely offered a new argument, this claim does not cancel the earlier ruling that the substance is forbidden.
" Whereas in the case of marriage, when one witness comes the court permits her, and when two witnesses subsequently come and testify that her husband is alive, they render her forbidden. When one other witness again comes forward, claiming that the husband is dead, they permit her. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered an error of the court, as they did not issue their rulings based on their own reasoning but in reliance on the facts they had garnered from the witnesses? It is therefore considered a factual error, not a mistaken ruling.
"The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Eliezer also maintains that the ruling of the court is an error, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If a woman married by permission of the court and it later turned out that her husband was alive, let the law pierce the mountain, i.e., the matter must be fully investigated. If it turns out that the ruling of the court is incorrect, it is nullified and she brings a choice sin-offering. Granted, if you say that it is an error, it is due to that reason that she must bring an offering. However, if you say it is a ruling, why does she bring an offering? It is the court that should be liable to bring an offering for its incorrect ruling.
"The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an individual who acted by ruling of the court is also liable to bring an offering, and this is why he obligates her to bring an offering, despite the fact that she went ahead with the consent of the court. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: If so, what need is there for the special mention of the rationale: Let the law pierce the mountain? He should simply have said that she is liable to bring an offering. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer evidently maintains that in general an individual does not have to bring an offering for a sin he committed based on the ruling of a court. Here, however, she must bring a sin-offering because there was an error with regard to the facts.” (Sefaria.org translation)
Personally I would side with Rav Naḥman on humanitarian reasons. This poor woman in our case has so much tzuris, that I would try my best to alleviate as much tzuris as possible.
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