We began yesterday the sixth chapter of our massekhet with daf TB Baba Metzia 76. This chapter discusses employer-employee ethical responsibilities towards one another.
When
contracting work to be done there can be three different outcomes. The best
outcome is when work is contracted by the employer and is completed by the
employee. The employer pays the employee the wages due. The second outcome can
be called retraction with grievances (תַּרְעוֹמֶת). This case is when either the
employer or the employee negate the contract before any work is done. No wages
need be paid leaving one side with grievances. The third outcome is when in the
middle of work one side refuses to complete the job, wages are due.
Rava
provides four case studies on wage liability. “This is like that which Rava
said: With regard to one who hires laborers to till, and rain fell and
filled his land with water, preventing the laborers from performing
the work, if he surveyed his land the night before and did all he could,
this is the laborers’ loss, as it is a consequence of their misfortune.
But if he did not survey his land the night before, it is the
employer’s loss, and he gives them the wages of an idle laborer.
“And Rava further said: With regard to
this one who hires laborers to draw water from a river or a trench to
irrigate his field, and rain fell, so that he no longer needs laborers,
this is the laborers’ loss. The employer does not need to pay them, as
he could not have known ahead of time that this would happen. But if the
river comes up and irrigates the field, this is the employer’s loss,
as he should have taken this possibility into consideration. And
therefore he gives them the wages of an idle laborer.
“And Rava says: With regard to this one who
hires laborers to draw water from a river or a trench to irrigate his
field, and the flow of the part of the river used to irrigate the
field stopped midday, the halakha depends on the circumstance. If
it is not prone to stopping, this is the laborers’ loss, a
consequence of their misfortune. If it is prone to stopping, then one
acts in accordance with this consideration: If the workers are residents
of that city and know that this might happen, it is the laborers’
loss; if the laborers are not residents of that city and are
not aware that this is a likely occurrence, it is the employer’s loss.
“And Rava says:
With regard to this one who hires laborers to perform a specific task
and the task is completed by midday, if he has another task that is
easier than the first one, he may give it to them. Alternatively,
if he has other work that is similar to the first one in difficulty, he
may assign it to them. But if he has other work that is more
difficult than it, he may not assign it to them, and he gives them their
full wages. The Gemara asks: Why
must he pay them their full wages? Let him pay them for the additional
time at most as an idle laborer. The Gemara answers: When Rava said
his ruling in this case, he was referring to workers [be’akhlushei]
of Meḥoza, who become weak if they do not work. These laborers were
accustomed to steady, strenuous work, and therefore sitting idle was difficult,
not enjoyable, for them.” (Sefaria.org translation)
The Ritba [1]
formulated the following rules based upon the four above case studies. If both
the employer and employee have equal knowledge or lack of knowledge of the
circumstances, the worker suffers the loss of wages. Similarly, if the worker
had knowledge of the circumstances but not the employer, the employee’s suffer
the loss of wages.
The only
time the employer is obligated to pay is when he has the information or
knowledge of the circumstances and the employee doesn’t. He should have
informed the employee; consequently, he is obligated to pay the wages of an
idle worker, meaning the amount of money the employee would want not to work.
[1] For his biography see https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/yom-tov-ben-abraham-ishbili
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