What’s unique about each of the four categories of damages? TB Baba Kama 5

The amoraim believed that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi aka Rebbe, the editor the Mishnah, chose his words carefully. With some exceptions, they believed that the Mishnah contains no extraneous word. Every word is pregnant with meaning and purpose. Citing all four categories of damages seem superfluous. They wonder why Rebbe needed four different categories of damages in the very first Mishnah of our massekhet. Couldn’t we learn the other three categories from one of them by analogy? If that wasn’t possible, couldn’t we create a binyan av, a principle derived from one Biblical text or from two Biblical texts, out of two them in order to learn the other two?

The Gemara comes to the conclusion that anyone of the other three categories of damages coupled with the damage of a pit could by an analogy learn the other two. The Gemara answers the question if this is the case what was unique about each one of these categories that Rebbe wanted to teach.

“Eating (שֵׁן) and Trampling (רֶגֶל) are written explicitly in order to exempt from liability those whose animals perform the actions in these categories in a public domain.

Pit (בּוֹר) is written explicitly in order to exempt one from liability for damage to vessels caused when they fall into a pit. The Gemara adds: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable even for damage to vessels caused when they fall into a pit, Pit was written in order to exempt one from liability for the death of a person who was killed by falling into a pit. Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the possessor of the pit is exempt because the person who ultimately fell into the pit was capable of avoiding it.

Man (אָדָם) is written explicitly in order to render him liable for four additional types of indemnity, beyond the payment of damages for the diminution in value caused when one injures a person.

Fire (אֵשׁ) is written explicitly in order to exempt one from liability for damage caused to a concealed object, e.g., one hidden by grain, that was consumed by fire. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable even for damage done to a concealed object damaged by fire, to add what halakha does the Torah mention the category of Fire explicitly?

The Gemara answers: It serves to add cases where the fire scorched another’s plowed field and cases in which it singed his stones. Even though the damaged object remains intact and is not consumed by the fire, one is still liable to pay for the damage caused.” (Sefaria.org translation)