Women’s ritual obligations TB Kidushin 33-36

Dappim Kidushin 33-36 outline women’s ritual obligations and their exemptions as explained in the eighth Mishnah of our massekhet. “With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions.”

The inclusions and exclusions seemed arbitrary to me until I read the following section from Judith Hauptman’s book Reading the Rabbis. She explains that the exemptions were based upon women’s lower social status as compared to men. However after the Temple was destroyed and a new reality set in, the rabbis recognize the religious and spiritual needs of women and began to expand those mitzvot they should observe. I highly recommend reading the entire chapter 10 from which the selection was taken

Reading the Rabbis

Why are the rules about women and mitzvot found in this particular place in the Mishnah, right after the rules of acquiring a wife? Their juxtaposition suggests that a woman who is acquired by a man becomes obligated to him primarily. He controls both her time and her money. Once married, she would not have the opportunity to fulfill religious obligations unless her husband allowed her to do so. She thus cannot be independently obligated to perform them. This explanation tallies with the Tosefta’s statement of why a woman is exempt from caring for her parents, which is mentioned in the first half of the same mishnah. That others control her is a fact of married life with far-reaching consequences. It is also true that performance of some of these mitzvot announces to the world that a person is free and independent, in charge of himself. R. Joshua b. Levi says that a slave who dons tefillin is a free man (BT Gittin 40a). Were a woman to don tefillin, she would be proclaiming to all that she is no longer subordinate to her husband. The rabbis could not permit her to take such a step.

The rule of women’s exemption can be understood in yet another, related way. A more literal rendering of the Hebrew phrase mitzvot aseh shehazeman gerama is that these mitzvot are ones that will come your way no matter what, independent of the circumstances of your life. As the seasons, the zemanim, roll around, the time for eating the paschal lamb, hearing the shofar blasts, and sitting in a succah will certainly arrive. The category called mitzvot aseh shelo hazeman gerama, non-time-bound positive mitzvot, in contrast, will not necessarily come your way, ever. If you do not own a home, you will not be obligated to build a railing on the roof; if you do not find someone’s lost object, you will not have an opportunity to return it; if you do not come across a nest with a mother bird and young, you will never have the opportunity to send away the mother and keep the young. A woman is thus exempt from those active mitzvot that a Jew will surely find himself executing in the course of the Jewish day, week, and year, but is obligated to those that may never come her way. Why?

 The Talmud mentions the phrases “positive time-bound” or “non-time-bound” mitzvot only in connection with women. That is, this distinction was created solely for the purpose of distinguishing between women’s ritual obligations and her exemptions. It was not a category that had any other use. For men, who are obligated to perform all positive mitzvot, there is no significance to this distinction. Had there been some other meaning to this categorization of mitzvot, not relating to women, I would have to concede that their exemption could flow from some other reason. If, for the sake of argument, time-bound positive mitzvot required the expenditure of money, then we could explain women’s exemption as flowing from her lack of control of financial assets. But since this distinction was devised only to create a category from which women are exempt, the reason for the exemption has to lie in the meaning of the phrase itself, namely, that these are the key mitzvot of marking Jewish time. It is not that they take time.

Women were exempted from the essential ritual acts of Judaism, those that year in and year out mark Jewish time, in order to restrict their performance to men, to heads of household; only people of the highest social standing, according to the rabbis, does God consider most fit to honor or worship Him in this important way. This hierarchical arrangement is reminiscent of Temple protocol. Only kohanim, the individuals of highest social standing, as evidenced by their more stringent rules for marriage, ritual purity, and physical fitness (Leviticus 21), could serve as Temple functionaries. The point is that those who serve God must themselves be especially worthy. In rabbinic society this meant that only males were fitting candidates for the time-bound positive commandments, the highest form of ritual act. Women are exempt, although not forbidden, because they are individuals of lower social standing, who, therefore, honor God less when serving Him. This status argument, a variation of the previous one that women are controlled by men, is, in my opinion, a reasonable explanation of women’s exemption. The location of the rules of ritual performance in the tractate about betrothals and the meaning of the defining phrases themselves are the clues.

The next mishnah in the chapter, although it concerns Temple sacrifice rather than time-bound mitzvot, will, when read together with its associated Gemara, sharpen our understanding of this one. It is part of the same group of mishnahs.

Laying on of hands [on the head of the sacrificial animal], waving [the minhah sacrifice], bringing it close [to the altar], …, sprinkling the blood, receiving [the blood from the neck of the animal to be sacrificed]—[these acts] are to be carried out by men but not by women [נוהגים באנשים ולא בנשים], except for the minhah [offering] of the sotah and the nezirah [person who vows not to drink wine or cut (his or) her hair for a specified period of time], that the women themselves wave. (M Kiddushin 1:8)

To begin with, this mishnah teaches that laying on of hands on the animal to be offered and waving the minhah sacrifice may be performed by lay Israelite men but not lay Israelite women. The third activity, bringing the animal to the altar, and all those that follow, may be performed only by kohanim, not even lay Israelite men. Since the Torah itself makes clear that men but not women may serve as Temple functionaries, why need the mishnah state that these rituals may be carried out by the sons of Aaron, the kohanim, but not by the daughters of Aaron? On what basis could one have thought that priestly women were allowed to function in the Temple that the mishnah found it necessary to rule it out? Since it is clear that not even Israelite men can perform any of the activities beyond the first two, this mishnah must be addressing only kohanot, women of the priestly clan. Does this passage imply that a question arose in those days about the eligibility of women serving in the Temple and therefore the rabbis issued this set of prohibitions?

I do not think so. The mishnah’s repeated references to women’s absolute exclusion from Temple ritual may lead us to a deeper understanding of M 1:7b (about women’s ritual exemptions): It is only Temple practices that are forbidden to women, none of the other ritual activities. Reading M 1:8 and M 1:7 in reverse order makes their purposes clear. M 1:8 is saying that every single Temple activity is not only not obligatory upon women, but even forbidden to them. M 1:7 goes on to say that the rituals that were able to survive the destruction of the Temple, such as shofar, lulav, and succah, are obligatory upon men, but not women. But it does not forbid women from participation, as it does with respect to the Temple service. It allows them to choose to engage in these activities. The associated Gemara, BT Kiddushin 36a, derives from verses, several times over, that women are forbidden to participate in the offering of sacrifices in the Temple. It is standard practice in Midrash Halakhah to derive or state the same teaching, again and again, in order to emphasize thereby the legitimacy of the derived conclusion. The same is true of M 1:8 here.

This significant difference between the rabbis’ treatment of women’s participation in Temple ritual and post-Temple Jewish ritual strongly suggests an alteration in their basic outlook: Although in post-Temple Judaism women are not obligated to participate in key religious rituals, they are no longer forbidden to do so. Moreover, the many exceptions the rabbis made to these exemptions, as we shall see, give further evidence that the rabbis considered women to be religiously needy. To say it in different words: The rabbis recognized that the practice of Judaism after the destruction of the Temple had to differ significantly from the practice of Judaism during the time of the Temple. So, along with the radical restructuring of Jewish ritual practice that brought the celebration of the Sabbath and holidays from the Temple into the home and from the kohen to the lay Israelite, the rabbis also opened the door to greater participation by women. Rather than compare exemption to obligation, it is more useful to compare exemption (M 1:7) to prohibition (M 1:8). Women could not actively participate in the Temple service, as noted in M 1:8, but they did gain permission (M 1:7) and even acquired obligation to participate in some key rituals in the new configuration of Jewish practice.

A careful look at tannaitic and amoraic statements about women and mitzvot shows that the rabbis made more and more exceptions to the rule of women’s exemption, obligating them, as time passed, to more and more time-bound positive mitzvot….

in the amoraic period, we see marked movement in the direction of greater obligation.

––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to read the megillah, because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Megillah 4a)
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to drink the four cups [of wine that punctuate the Pesah seder], because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Pesahim 108b)
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to light the Chanukah lamps, because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Shabbat 23a)
==[The reason that women are obligated to pray is that] prayer is petitions.
––Said R. Ada b. Ahavah: Women are obligated to recite Kiddush [on the Sabbath], as stipulated by the Torah.…
––Said Rava: Anyone who is bound by the Sabbath restrictions is similarly bound by the Sabbath ritual acts. (Berakhot 20b)
––Said R. Elazar: Women are obligated to eat matzah on Pesah, according to the Torah; for anyone who is bound not to eat hametz (leavened products), is similarly bound to eat matzah. (BT Pesahim 43b)

In all these instances, Amoraim are imposing upon women new obligations to perform ritual acts—all positive time-bound mitzvot—that M Kiddushin 1:7 would have exempted them from. In each case, a reason is given. By the end of the amoraic period, women are locked into observance of the key rituals of Pesah, Chanukah, Purim, and, to a large extent, the Sabbath. I think this development is strong evidence that the rabbis recognized the importance of making religious practice more central to the lives of women.

 (https://www.sefaria.org/Rereading_the_Rabbis%3B_A_Woman's_Voice%2C_10_Ritual.23-32?lang=bi)

 N.B.

I first met Judy Hauptman when I was a sophomore at Ieachers Institute now known as List College, the undergraduate program  ofJTS. She was a Talmud doctoral student and my R.A. in the Windermere Hotel, my dorm. When we didn’t understand the Gemara we were studying, study partner Suzanne Levin and I would go up to her room after ma’ariv services for help. Judy never refusedv helping us. We became friends and I was honored to attend her wedding. Today Judy is the E. Billi Ivry Professor Emerita of Talmud and Rabbinic Culture at The Jewish Theological Seminary.