One serves for an analogy Two are the exception to the rule TB Yoma 60

Yesterday’s daf TB Yoma 59 explains why on a Torah level the precept of misappropriation doesn’t apply to the blood of a sacrifice. “There is nothing whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to misuse (מעילה-me’eelah) of consecrated property.” (Sefaria.org translation) Today’s daf TB Yoma 60 challenges the validity of that rule by citing one example where the mitzvah has been performed and is still subject to misuse, me’eelah.

“But there is the instance of the removal of the ashes (תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן) of offerings burned on the altar. These ashes require burial, and yet any benefit derived from them is misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.” (Sefaria.org translation) Every predawn morning a priest takes a shovelful of ashes from the previous day’s sacrifices and places them on the South East corner of the Altar. This shovelful of ashes are subject to me’eelah.

The Gemara cites another example, the four white linen pieces of clothing the High Priest wore in the Holy of Holies. This linen clothing was removed from circulation immediately after Yom Kippur. If another priest would don them, he was liable for their me’eelah. But this example raises a different problem. One example would set a precedent or in Hebrew a biyan av (בנין אב). With this precedent there will be no need for another example. The Gemara explains the impact of the second example. “The reason is because the mitzva of the removal of the ashes and the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the special halakha that misuse of consecrated objects applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach, i.e., an analogy may not be derived from these two similar cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.” Rabbeinu Hannaniel explains that the second verse comes to teach us that these two mitzvot are the exception to the rule.

This explanation works well within the sages understanding; however, Rabbi Dosa holds that the four linen clothing that the high priest wore on Yom Kippur may be used by another priest the rest of the year. The original validity of “There is nothing whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to misuse (מעילה-me’eelah) of consecrated property.” (Sefaria.org translation) is still in question. Consequently, the Gemara finds another example where one is forbidden to benefit from something whose mitzva has been performed which will prove that the removal of the ashes is the exception to the rule.

“The Gemara responds: The reason is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common feature to other cases. The heifer whose neck is broken is a ritual performed when a murder victim’s body is found outside a town, and it is not known who caused his death.” (Sefaria.org translation)