Love is strong, but is hatred stronger? TB Yevamot 94

To establish a fact two witnesses are required to testify. The only exception when one witness is enough in the case allowing a woman to remarry based on the one witnesses testimony that her husband is dead. Yesterday’s daf TB Yevamot 93b raises the question why should one witness be acceptable 

“They raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In a case of one witness who testifies that a woman’s husband is dead, with regard to a yevama, what is the halakha? Can the court rely on this witness? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is the reason that the testimony of one witness in the case of a missing husband is accepted because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and here, too, he will not lie, in case the husband later arrives? Or, perhaps the reason for the eligibility of one witness is because the woman herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. But here, since she sometimes loves the yavam, as she already knew him beforehand, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again.” (Seforia.org translation)

Starting yesterday daf and continuing on today’s daf TB Yevamot 94 “The Gemara provides an alternative version of the discussion. And some Sages maintain another version that says: Let the dilemma not be raised, as even a wife herself is also deemed credible when she says her husband is dead, as we learned in a mishna (114b): With regard to a woman who said: My husband is dead, she may marry. Likewise, if she claimed: My husband is dead, she should enter into levirate marriage. If so, one witness is certainly deemed credible when he says her husband has died. The case where you could raise the dilemma is with regard to permitting a yevama sto all other men, if a witness claims that the yavam is dead.

In this case as well, the Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma: What is the reason that one witness is deemed credible? Is it because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and therefore here too he would not lie? Or, perhaps the reason for accepting the testimony of one witness is because the wife is exacting in her investigation before she marries again, but this yevama is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. Why not? Because she hates the yavam, and she would therefore take advantage of any testimony to rid herself of him.” (Seforia.org translation)

The real question is whether or not the widow will do her to diligence before remarrying. When the widow already has affections for her brother-in-law, the rabbis trust her that she was still to her to diligence before she enters a levirate marriage because of the resulting 16 penalties enumerated in the first Mishna of our chapter if the testimony of the one witness proves to be erroneous and the husband returns back home.

On the other hand when she hates her brother-in-law and doesn’t want to have anything to do with him let alone marry him, the rabbis don’t trust her to do her to diligence because she wants to be relieved of obligation of marrying her brother-in-law.

Why in one case the Rabbi’s trust her and in another they don’t. Tosefot ד"ה כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ לְמִישְׁרֵי יְבָמָה לְעָלְמָא answers the question simply that hatred is a much stronger emotion than love. Because her hatred is strong, she will be less motivated to do who to diligence.

Which do you believe is stronger, love or hatred?

Is the mitzvah of Oneg Shabbat Torah or rabbinic in origin? Depends on who you ask.

Eight rabbis on Today’s daf TB Yevamot 93 holds the position that one may make a transaction on futures. “Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rav Huna agrees with the opinion of Rav, and Rav agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: A person can transfer to another an entity that has not yet come into the world. This shows that Rabbi Akiva indeed maintains that one can acquire something that does not yet exist.- אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם” (Sefaria.org translation) Only Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak holds the position that one cannot acquire something that does not yet exist.

The Gemara then brings the proof for each one of those eight rabbis. Based on Rabbi Yannai’s story Rashi comes to a conclusion that disagrees with Rambam’s understanding of the nature of Oneg Shabbat. First the story:

“Rabbi Yannai also agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as demonstrated by the following episode: Rabbi Yannai had a sharecropper working his land who would bring him a basket [kanta] of fruit every Shabbat eve. One day he was late and did not come. Rabbi Yannai took tithe from the fruit in his house for the fruit he expected to receive. He did this in case the fruit arrived near the beginning of Shabbat, as one may not tithe on Shabbat. However, Rabbi Yannai was uncertain whether it is indeed possible to separate tithes for an entity that has not yet reached one’s possession. He therefore came before Rabbi Ḥiyya to inquire whether his separation of tithes was effective.

“Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: You acted well, as it is taught in a baraita, with regard to a verse that discusses tithes: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God…in order that you should learn to fear the Lord your God all the days” (Deuteronomy 14:23). With regard to the emphasis of “all,” these are Shabbatot and Festivals. With regard to what halakha was this stated? If we say it was stated in regard to the issue of tithing and eating on Shabbat, this halakha is redundant. Was a verse necessary to permit the prohibition against moving objects, which applies by rabbinic law? Since the prohibition against moving objects is from the Sages, the Torah is certainly not referring to this halakha. Rather, is it not referring to a case like this, of one who tithed an entity that was not yet in the world, in honor of Shabbat?” (Sefaria.org translation)

One may not eat on tithed fruit. Rashi ד"ה אֶלָּא לָאו, כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא comments that one is permitted to tithe fruit that is not yet come into existence hey Jason what’s up but will in the future for the purpose of oneg Shabbat, delighting in the Shabbat. Because of all the other cases of the Gemara are Torah law, we have to conclude that here Rashi holds that Oneg Shabbat is deorita (דאורייתא) a Torah law and not rabbinic ordinance (דרבנן).

Rambam disagrees. He writes: “Four things have been enjoined regarding the Sabbath: two on biblical authority, and two on the authority of the sages and clearly expressed by the Prophets. The Torah says: Remember (Exodus 20:8) and Observe (Deuteronomy 5:12); the Prophets clearly speak of Honor and Delight (Oneg), as it is written: "Call the Sabbath a delight, and the Lord's sacred day an honor" (Isaiah 58:13).” (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat, 30:1, Sefaria.org translation)

The priestly benediction#devartorah#parashathashavua#Naso

In 1979, Dr. Gabriel Barkay and his team discovered two silver scrolls in a burial ground outside the Old City of Jerusalem. In 2004, after twenty-five years of careful research, scholars confirmed that the scrolls were the oldest biblical text in existence, having been buried in 600 b.c.e. What I find particularly moving is what the scrolls contain—the priestly blessing that God wanted spoken over His people:

The Lord bless you and protect you!

The Lord deal kindly and graciously with you!

The Lord bestow [divine] favor upon you and grant you peace! (Numbers 6:24-26)

(Numbers 6:24–25). This blessing originates in this week's Torah portion, Naso.

In giving this benediction, God showed Aaron and his sons (through Moses) how to bless the people on His behalf. The leaders were to memorize the words in the form God gave so they would speak to them just as God desired. Note how these words emphasize that God is the one who blesses, for three times they say, “the Lord.” And six times He says, “you,” reflecting just how much God wants His people to receive His love and favor.

We don't go a day without being blessed. Twice daily in the repetition of the Amidah, during the morning service and afternoon service, the shaliakh tzibbur, the one who is the congregation in prayer, recites the priestly benediction. In Jerusalem the kohanim actually  ascend the bimah and act as a conduit for God's blessing by reciting this ancient prayer. I am always moved when I am so blessed.

Ponder for a moment that the oldest existing fragments of the Bible tell of God’s desire to bless. What a reminder of God’s boundless love and how He wants to be in a relationship with us. If you feel far from God today, hold tightly to the promise in these ancient words. May the Lord bless you; may the Lord protect you.

What's the difference between a court making a factual error and a mistaken halakhic ruling? TB Yevamot 92

One of the most tragic figures in Judaism is the agunah. According to classical Jewish law, only the husband can initiate a divorce proceeding. If he refuses to grant his wife a divorce or goes missing without a trace, the wife remains chained to the recalcitrant husband or the missing husband and cannot remarry. The first Mishnah of chapter 10 discusses a case where the husband goes abroad and one witness testifies that he is dead. Usually to establish a fact, two witnesses' testimony is required. Because her state is so tragic, the rabbis allowed her to remarry on the basis of only one witness with the caveat that she do her due diligence to make sure that he is dead.

Our  Mishnah has been dealing with what happens when the woman remarries based on the testimony of one witness with the permission of the court and her first husband returns alive and well. Today's daf TB Yevamot 82 discusses the woman's liability to bring a sin offering. Whether she has to bring a sin offering depends on how one views the court's decision. If the court delivered a halakhic ruling (hora-ah- הוֹרָאָה), she is exempt from bringing a sin offering. If the court was just fact-finding and made a mistake (ta'ut- טָעוּת), she is liable for a sin offering. This is the basis of the argument between  Ze’eiri and  Rav Naḥman.

“The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.

"Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

" Rav Naḥman said: You can know that her permission to marry is a ruling, as in the entire Torah one witness is not deemed credible, and yet here he is deemed credible. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered a ruling, i.e., she does not rely on the witness but on the decision of the court? By contrast, Rava said that we can know that her permission to marry is an error. His reasoning is that had the court ruled with regard to forbidden fat or with regard to blood that it is permitted, and they went back and saw a reason to prohibit it, if they subsequently retract and say that it is permitted we take no notice of them. If they did not find a conclusive proof but merely offered a new argument, this claim does not cancel the earlier ruling that the substance is forbidden.

" Whereas in the case of marriage, when one witness comes the court permits her, and when two witnesses subsequently come and testify that her husband is alive, they render her forbidden. When one other witness again comes forward, claiming that the husband is dead, they permit her. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered an error of the court, as they did not issue their rulings based on their own reasoning but in reliance on the facts they had garnered from the witnesses? It is therefore considered a factual error, not a mistaken ruling.

"The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Eliezer also maintains that the ruling of the court is an error, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If a woman married by permission of the court and it later turned out that her husband was alive, let the law pierce the mountain, i.e., the matter must be fully investigated. If it turns out that the ruling of the court is incorrect, it is nullified and she brings a choice sin-offering. Granted, if you say that it is an error, it is due to that reason that she must bring an offering. However, if you say it is a ruling, why does she bring an offering? It is the court that should be liable to bring an offering for its incorrect ruling.

"The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an individual who acted by ruling of the court is also liable to bring an offering, and this is why he obligates her to bring an offering, despite the fact that she went ahead with the consent of the court. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: If so, what need is there for the special mention of the rationale: Let the law pierce the mountain? He should simply have said that she is liable to bring an offering. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer evidently maintains that in general an individual does not have to bring an offering for a sin he committed based on the ruling of a court. Here, however, she must bring a sin-offering because there was an error with regard to the facts.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Personally I would side with Rav Naḥman on humanitarian reasons. This poor woman in our case has so much tzuris, that I would try my best to alleviate as much tzuris as possible.

 

Children as enablers or blockers TB Yevamot 87

The Tosefot  ד"ה יש מותרות on TB Yevamot 84a comments that the ninth chapter of our massekhet is a succinct review of a previous discussed halakhot. Such is the case of the last Mishna in our chapter on today’s daf TB Yevamot 87. Depending on the status of the father and if the father is deceased, the couple’s child can either enable his mother to eat terumah or ma’aser or prevent her from doing so.

“MISHNA: An Israelite woman married to a priest may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she has a child from him, she may continue to partake of teruma. If she subsequently married a Levite, she may no longer partake of teruma but she may partake of the first tithe on his account. If he, too, died and she had a child from him, she may continue to partake of tithe on account of the child. If she then married an Israelite, she may partake of neither teruma nor tithe. If her Israelite husband died and she had a child from him, she still may partake of neither teruma nor tithe.

“If her child from the Israelite also died, while her son from the Levite remained alive, she may partake of tithe on account of the Levite’s child. If her child from the Levite died, leaving her with a son from the priest, she may once again partake of teruma. If her child from the priest died as well, she may no longer partake of either teruma or tithe.

“The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. If the Israelite died and she has a son from him, she may not partake of teruma as long as that son is alive. If she subsequently married a Levite she may partake of tithe. If he died, and she had a son from him, she may still partake of tithe. If she subsequently married a priest, she may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she had a son from him, she may partake of teruma.

“If her son from the priest also died, she may not partake of teruma, but she may partake of tithe, as she has a son from a Levite. If her son from the Levite died, she may no longer partake of tithe. If her son from the Israelite died, she returns to her father’s house and may once again partake of teruma. And with regard to this woman, it is stated: “And she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13).” (Sefaria.org translation)

Our chapter ends discussing the difference between terumah and yibum when the child has died. When it comes to terumah we look at the original status of the woman. A deceased child will impact her status and her ability to eat terumah. When it comes to yibum we look at the status of the man. If the husband dies childless, his brother-in-law must either do yibum or halitzah. However if the couple had a child and this child predeceases his father, the wife is exempt from either yibum or halitzah.

I am not advocating that we return to the time when women were best second-class citizens or at worst objects. I’m just sharing discussion found on today’s daf. The Talmud is not the last word on the subject I women’s rights. Judith Hauptman in her conclusion of her book Rereading The Rabbis: A Woman’s Voice writes: “AS A TALMUDIST, I HAVE TRIED, throughout this book, to read the sources in as accurate a fashion as possible, applying to them the comparative and contextual analytical techniques described in the Introduction. As a feminist, I have tried to ferret out from these texts the thinking about women, their social status, their relationship to men, and the impact of rabbinic law on them. In addition, I have tried to point out the flaws in the two reigning theories, namely, that the rabbis—in grossly oversimplified terms—either hated women or else loved and respected them. The situation, to my mind, is much more complicated: On the one hand, the rabbis operated in a patriarchal framework and continued to treat women as secondary to men; on the other, they instituted many significant changes to benefit women. Although at any given moment in time Jewish law assigns women fewer rights and lower status than men, not always treating them as well as surrounding cultures, when we trace developments in Jewish law over time we see distinct movement, in a wide variety of legal and social institutions, from lesser status for women to greater.” (https://www.sefaria.org/Rereading_the_Rabbis%3B_A_Woman's_Voice%2C_Conclusion.2?ven=Rereading_The_Rabbis:_A_Woman%27s_Voice._By_Judith_Hauptman&lang=bi)

 Further study is definitely required.

 

Connecting to God's core values

A successful advertising agency has inscribed these words on the floor of a rotunda in its headquarters: Community, Integrity, Restlessness, Freedom and Responsibility, Curiosity and Winning. As employees pass by, they are reminded of the company’s core values.

It has become common for businesses to display their central beliefs in prominent places. But it’s not exactly a new idea.

At a critical time when God’s people moved from desert wandering into the Promised Land, the Lord charged them in the first paragraph of the Shema to take His core values and demonstrate them in a variety of ways: “You shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them . . . . You shall bind them as a sign on your hand . . . . Write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates” (Dt. 6:7-9).

How would it revolutionize your life, for example, if you viewed the Ten Commandments (Ex. 20:1-17) as God’s core values? Have the character traits of loyalty to God (v.3), faithfulness in marriage (v.14), and honesty (vv.15-16) become the principles that guide your thinking and actions?

On Shavuot we re-experience revelation from atop Mount Sinai by reading how our ancestors received the 10 Commandments. As the 10 Commandments are read we stand and renew each year the covenant between God and us the Jewish people.

This year let us recommit ourselves to God’s core values by putting them in your heart, home, and workplace on public display 

A super Levite? TB Yevamot 86

Before we can appreciate today’s daf TB Yevamot 86 we have to review some basic information. The Israelite farmer had to pay his “taxes” before he may enjoy eating his produce. Terumah (תְּרוּמָה ) is 2% of the grain and seven species harvest given exclusively to the priests. Moses Maimonides also ruled it includes all fruits. Terumah is holy. No non-priest may eat of it. After terumah is separated, ma’aser rishone (מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן) equaling 10% is given to the Levites. The Levites may share ma’aser rishone with whom anybody he chooses.

According to the Torah the priests are a subset within the Levites. Amram the Levite had three children, Aaron, Miriam, and Moses. Aaron and his descendants became the priests. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was a descendent of Ezra, appointed the head of the Jewish people when the sages deposed Rabban Gamliel for his haughty behavior, and was very wealthy. We shall see that he believed that the priests were also entitled to ma’aser rishone because he consider them Levite plus or super Levites. On the other hand, Rabbi Akiva believed that the ma’aser rishone belong exclusively to the Levites.

“The Sages taught: Teruma is given to a priest, and the first tithe is given only to a Levite; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: The first tithe is given to a priest. The Gemara is puzzled: To a priest and not to a Levite? But the Torah expressly states that the first tithe is for Levites. The Gemara answers: Say he means it can be given also to a priest. The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion? As it is written: “You shall speak to the Levites, and you shall say to them” (Numbers 18:26). Clearly, the verse speaks of Levites, not priests. And the other tanna, Rabbi Eliezer, maintains in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: In twenty-four places in the Bible the priests are called Levites. And this is one of those verses: “And the priests the Levites, the sons of Zadok” (Ezekiel 44:15).” (Sefaria.org translation)

This sugiyah concludes with these two sages confronting each other when Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya tries to collect ma’aser rishone. “The Gemara relates: There was a certain garden from which Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, a priest, would take the first tithe, in accordance with his opinion that priests are also entitled to this tithe. Rabbi Akiva went, closed up the garden, and changed its entrance so that it would be facing toward the cemetery, to prevent Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya from entering the garden. Rabbi Elazar said in the form of a lighthearted exaggeration: Akiva, a former shepherd, comes with his satchel, but I have to live; from where will I receive my livelihood if I cannot claim the first tithe? Rabbi Elazar was actually a very wealthy man and did not need the produce from this garden. However, his point was that Rabbi Akiva acted in order to stop him from receiving something that he felt was rightfully his.” (Sefaria.org translation) Remember a priest may not enter a cemetery and become ritually unready except for his seven closest relatives, mother, father, sister, brother, son, daughter, wife.

The Meiri explains that Rabbi Akiva picked up his shepherds satchel to show that just as he was able to survive without ma’aser rishone, so too Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya could survive without it because he was a wealthy man.

The Meharsha explains that Rabbi Akiva used his shepherds satchel to collect tzedakkah and wanted to give the ma’aser rishone to the poor Levites. He interprets “but I have to live” to mean that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was a tenth generation descendent of Ezra and Ezra fined the Levites and ordained that the ma’aser rishone be given to the priests. According to Rambam Ezra fined the Levites because they did not return en masse to Israel from the Babylonian exile. The Kesef Mishneh added that afterwards a person still could give the ma’aser rishone to the Levites if he so chose. (Mishneh Torah, Sefer Zera’im, Hilkhot Ma’aser, chapter 1, halakha 4.)