TB Baba Metzia 30 contains another story with the value concept lifnim mishurat hadin (לפנים משורת הדין). I’m sharing what I learned from Dr. Elana Stein Hain’s lecture answering the question do we compel people to go above and beyond the letter of the law. All translations are hers. You may find this lecture by following this link: https://hadran.org.il/author-post/din-daf-lifnim-mishurat-hadin/.
Lifnim mishurat hadin is usually translated as going above and beyond the letter
of the law. Dr. Christine Hayes defines it differently in “Legal Truth, Right Answers and
Best Answers: Dworkin and the Rabbis,” Diné Israel Vol. 25,
2008, pp. 73-121 “As indicated,
a norm or ruling may represent ‘‘(shurat)
ha-din’’ (lit., [the line of] the
law), which refers to the theoretically correct position, or ‘‘lifnim mishurat ha-din’’ – within, or
just short of the line of the law. The metaphor of law’s line strongly implies
a ‘‘correct’’ answer – represented by the line. One who crosses over the line (avar)
commits a transgression (an avera (עָבֵרָה), a
sin) – a negative deviation from the correct law. But one who stops short of
the line of the law – renouncing the full rights and entitlements due to him in
law while remaining within the area bounded by the line of the law – is acting
piously and mercifully.”
There
are three relevant sugiyot that will
help us answer the question do we compel people to go above and beyond lover of
the law. Of course were going to have three different answers.
1.
Baba Metzia 24: Rav
Yehuda was moving along behind Mar Shmuel in the market where pounded grain was
sold. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: If one found a purse [arnakei] here,
what is the halakha? Shmuel said to him that the halakha is
as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rav Yehuda asked him: If a Jew came
and provided a distinguishing mark to describe it, what is the halakha?
Shmuel said to him: The finder is obligated to return it. Rav Yehuda asked:
These are two contradictory rulings. Shmuel said to him: By law, it belongs to
him. When I said the finder is obligated to return it if he learns the identity
of the owner, that was beyond the letter of the law. This is like that incident
where Shmuel’s father found these donkeys in the desert and returned them to
their owner after the passage of twelve months of the year, as he acted beyond
the letter of the law (lifnim
mishurat hadin).
Rava was moving along behind Rav
Naḥman in the tanner’s market, and some say in the marketplace frequented by
the Sages. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: If one found a purse here, what is
the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that the halakha is
as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rava asked him: If a Jew came and
provided a distinguishing mark to describe it, what is the halakha?
Rav Naḥman said to him that in this case as well, the halakha is
as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rava asked: But isn’t the owner
justifiably standing and screaming that the purse belongs to him? Rav Naḥman
said to him: He becomes as one who screams to no avail about his house that
collapsed or about his ship that sank in the sea.
2.
Rabbi Yishmael, son
of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and
that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down
the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them
upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of
Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they
worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei,
gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood
ownerless.
The man then reacquired the wood
and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for
him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again
took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw
that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of
Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard
to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you.
But is property rendered
ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1)
that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby
rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the
property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during
the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all.
Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of
Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without
exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from
reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even
though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition.
But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of
Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to
tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order
to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation
to do so in the first place? In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei,
he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply
refused the request for help.
As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with
regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and
shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must
perform” (Exodus 18:20). “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the
structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that
they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness;
“they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is
referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in
accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is
referring to acting beyond the letter of the law (lifnim mishurat hadin).
…Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem
was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of
Torah law in the city. Rather, what else should they have done? Should they
rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]?
Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and
did not go beyond the letter of the law. (lifnim mishurat hadin)
3 3, Baba
Metzia 83b: Some porters [negligently (see Rashi and Maharsha)] broke a barrel
of wine belonging to Rabbah Bar Channah.
Thereupon he seized their garments; so, they went and complained to
Rav. “Return their garment” he
ordered. “Is that the law,” he
inquired? “Yes,” he rejoined, “that you
shall walk in the way of good people” (Mishlei 2:20). Their garments having been returned, they
observed, “We are poor men, have worked all day, and are hungry. Are we to get nothing?” “Go and pay them” he ordered. “Is that the law,” he asked? “Yes,” he rejoined, “and keep the path of the
righteous” (Mishlei 2:21).
The answers
1. A person cannot be compelled to give up his rights as dictated by the law. Rebbainu Hanniel (an 11th-century Kairouanan rabbi and Talmudist, who was in close contact with the last Geonim) poskins according to Rava in our first source. Going within the letter of the law is completely discretionary. “Rav Yehuda followed Shmuel in the marketplace. He said to him: If one found a purse here, what (should one do)? He responded, “It belongs to the finder. If a Jew came and articulated distinguishing marks of the item, what (should one do)? He responded: If one wishes to act within the letter of the law, one should/may return it, like the case of the Shmuel’s father who found a donkey in the wilderness and returned it after 12 months.”
2. On the other hand according to Rabbi Yoḥanan in the second source, the court can compel the person to act lifnim mishurat hadin. According to him Jerusalem was destroyed because the courts only decide cases as the law dictates.
3. Yoel Sirkis (born 1561 - March 14, 1640 is
considered one of the greatest Talmudic scholars in Poland) holds a middle
position. “…The end of perek Amoraim cites the anecdote of
Rabbah bar bar Hannah where the porters broke his wine barrel, and he took
their clothing (as payment/collateral). They went and told Rav, and Rav to him
to give them their clothes. And he asked: Is this the law? And he responded,
“In order to walk in the ways of the good.” And our teacher brought this in
siman 304. And Rashi explained, “in the way of the good” – within the line of
the law, end quote. It sounds like rav forced Rabbah bar bar Hannah (to act
within the line of the law), for if not, what did he mean by “this is the law”
if he did not mean to force him…And likewise in the case of one who found a
purse in the marketplace in chapter Eilu metziot, where he says that one is
obligated to return the item in order to act within the line of the law: it at least sounds like the person is
required to do so in order to fulfill one’s Divine requirement (even if there’s
no earthly court requirement-my emphasis, gg) as is said in the latter
chapter Ha-gozel regarding the mishnah that One who says to another person,
I’ve stolen from you, etc., who is obligated if they are trying to fulfill a
Divine obligation. If not, what does being obligated mean? And and thus fulfill God’s requirement of us, you should do so.
And therefore the Mordechai ruled that we force a person to act within
the line of the law if the person has the financial means to do so; and
likewise the Ra’avan and the Aviezri and the Agudah in chapter Eilu metziot,
and this is is language: one is required to return it for the sake of acting
within the line of the law; and such is our practice to return it; and likewise
the Ra’avan and Ra’avyah ruled to force the founder to return it if the finder
has means, end quote.” If one has the means and the ability to go
within the letter of the law Christine Hayes concludes: “The pious individual, who prioritizes religious values such
as humility, compassion, modesty, peace, or charity should at times forego his
right to the theoretically correct norm or ruling (stop short of the strict
law) for in so doing he upholds these other values. While not exercising the ‘‘correct’’
option, the pious individual who remains lifnim
mishurat ha-din chooses what is in that particular situation a superior
(though not more legally correct) option.”
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