Yesterday’s daf TB Pesakhim 61a cites a disagreement between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda. “If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for people who are circumcised on condition that uncircumcised people achieve atonement through the sprinkling of its blood, i.e., although the uncircumcised people are prohibited from eating the Paschal lamb, it was his intention that they achieve atonement through the blood of the offering, Rav Ḥisda said: The offering is disqualified. Rabba said: It is valid. The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥisda said it is disqualified because intent that the offering should be for uncircumcised people has sufficient force to disqualify the offering at the time of the sprinkling. Rabba said that it is valid because intent that the offering should be for uncircumcised people can only disqualify the offering during the slaughter and not during the sprinkling.” (Sefaria.org translation)
Today’s daf TB Pesakhim 62 analyzes the basis of the argument. They are arguing about the principle of “ho-il (הואיל), if something could happen do we consider it as already happened.
“Rather, Rav Ashi said: Rav Ḥisda and Rabba disagree with regard to this verse, which
is stated with regard to a different offering: “And it shall be accepted for
him to make atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4). It is inferred: For him and not
for his fellow. One cannot achieve atonement through an offering that has
been designated for someone else. Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree with regard to the halakhic
conclusions that should be drawn from this law. Rabba holds
that the law applies to another who is similar to him: Just as he is
eligible for atonement through the sprinkling of the blood of this
offering, so the law applies to another who is eligible for
atonement. This comes to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not
eligible for atonement. Since an uncircumcised person is not fit for the
Paschal lamb, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering.
“And Rav Ḥisda holds that with
regard to this uncircumcised person as well, since he is obligated to
bring the Paschal lamb, he is considered eligible for atonement
through the Paschal lamb. Why is an uncircumcised person seen as obligated to
bring the Paschal lamb? Since if he wants, he can make himself fit
through circumcision, and the obligation will automatically apply to him. There
is a way for him to include himself among those who eat the offering;
therefore, he cannot categorically be considered someone who is not eligible
for atonement. Consequently, slaughtering the Paschal lamb for him disqualifies
the offering.
“The Gemara challenges this explanation: But does Rav Ḥisda accept this
argument of since? Does he maintain that one can discuss a situation
that does not exist due to the possibility that the present circumstances might
change? But it was said that Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree about this as it pertains to the
case of one who bakes on a Festival for use during the week: Rav Ḥisda said he is flogged
for having violated the Festival by baking in order to eat the food on a
weekday; Rabba
said he is not flogged.
“The Gemara explains: Rabba said he is not flogged for the
following reason: Since if guests arrive, whatever he bakes will be fit
for him to use on the Festival itself, and he will not be guilty of any
transgression, now too, although guests have not yet arrived, the food
is considered fit for him, and he is not flogged. At the time of the
baking, the act was not unequivocally prohibited. Rav Ḥisda said he is
flogged; we do not state the principle of since. At first glance,
there is an internal contradiction with regard to the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Ḥisda.
“The Gemara notes: Granted, the apparent contradiction between the
first statement of Rabba and the second statement of Rabba is not
difficult. Here, in the case of the Paschal lamb whose blood is sprinkled
for an uncircumcised person, an action is lacking, as the person must
undergo circumcision in order to become eligible to eat from the Paschal lamb.
However, there, in the case of one who bakes on a Festival, no action
is lacking on the part of the baker. But the first statement of Rav Ḥisda and the second
statement of Rav Ḥisda
are difficult to reconcile. They say, in answer to this
contraction: When Rav
Ḥisda does not accept the principle of since, it is only to
be lenient and exempt a person from lashes; however, to be stringent
and disqualify the Paschal lamb, he does accept this line of reasoning.”
(Sefaria.org translation)
I appreciate that this is a lot
of text to read. I wanted to share the Passover case and the Shabbat case in
their entirety so we can fully understand the point of contention concerning matters
of Shabbat and holidays between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda. Rabbi Yosef Engel[1]
teaches that the point of contention between them is what is more important,
the intention (מחשבה) or the action
(מעשה)?
Rabba holds that the action is more important. In the case of cooking on Shabbat, guests could really come and food will be needed. No further action is required; consequently, he considers the guests as if they were already present. In the case of the Passover sacrifice, an additional action, that is the uncircumcised person would need to be circumcised, is required. Consequently, he could not be considered changing the registered group because he could never participate in the Passover sacrifice.
What do you think is more
important the intention (מחשבה) or the action (מעשה)?
[1] For
short biography go to http://revach.net/stories/gedolim-biographies/Rav-Yosef-Engel-A-Modern-Day-Solomon/2914
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