Monday, March 21, 2022

The key is respect and communication TB Yevamot 13-14

Throughout rabbinic literature there is a tension between unifying the Jewish people by observing one halakha and recognizing the validity of opposing halakhic views. We have to remember that within rabbinic Judaism there was some leeway between dissenting opinions and that there were groups that were outside the pale of Judaism by rabbinic definition like the Samaritans and the Karaites.

This tension is explored on dappim TB Yevamot 13b-14.  The Gemara provides the underpinning derasha for the ideal of unity. “Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: I should read here the verse: “You shall not cut yourselves [titgodedu]” (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted as meaning: Do not become numerous factions [agudot]. In other words, the Jewish people should be united, rather than divided into disparate groups that act in different ways.” (Sefaia.org translation) Rashi explains what’s wrong with factionalism. When different Jewish groups observe halakha differently, to the outsider it appears that there are two Torahs and not just one.

The Gemara notes that the disagreement concerning the co-wives of a forbidden relative Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is one example of this tension. “Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a difficulty: But Beit Shammai permit rival wives to the brothers, and Beit Hillel prohibit this practice. This is an example of a clear prohibition, and yet two different traditions were followed.” (Sefaria.org translation) Beit Shammai would require these co-wives the either observe yibum, levirate marriage, or halitza, while Beit Hillel would free them from their link to the surviving brothers and allow them to marry any person. The Gemara comes to the conclusion that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai put into practice their approach concerning yibum.

Both Abaye and Rava try to resolve this tension by limiting the scope of the derasha “Do not become numerous factions.”

Abaye said: When we say that the prohibition: “You shall not cut yourselves” applies, we are referring to a case where two courts are located in one city, and these rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and those rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in two different cities, we have no problem with it.

Rava said to him: But the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is considered like a case of two courts in one city, as these two schools of thought were found everywhere, not in any specific place. Rather, Rava said: When we say that the prohibition: “You shall not cut yourselves” applies, we are referring to a case where there is a court in one city, a section of which rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and another section rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in one city, we have no problem with it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The continuation of the sugiya teaches us a very important lesson on how the Jewish people can be unified with diverse opinions.

“The Gemara continues to discuss the question of whether Beit Shammai followed their own rulings. Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: Although Beit Hillel prohibit and Beit Shammai permit, and these disqualify the women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they did not have to refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel. However, if you say that they did act in accordance with their opinion, why didn’t they refrain from marrying one another?

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying into Beit Hillel, as even if Beit Shammai maintain in a certain case that a rival wife required levirate marriage or ḥalitza, if she went ahead and married another man their children are born to a union whose partners are liable by a regular prohibition: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside” (Deuteronomy 25:5). Since this transgression does not entail karet, the children of this relationship are not mamzerim.

However, why did Beit Hillel not refrain from marrying into Beit Shammai? In the opinion of Beit Hillel the children of these rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are born of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet, as the prohibition of a brother’s wife was never nullified in this case, which means that the children are mamzerim. If so, how could Beit Hillel allow these marriages?

And if you would say that Beit Hillel maintain that the child of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet is not a mamzer, as a mamzer is only one whose parents violated a prohibition that entails the death penalty, didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet? Consequently, the children of rival wives are mamzerim according to Beit Hillel. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own opinion?

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No; actually, Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion. As for the problem with these marriages, the answer is that they would inform Beit Hillel and Beit Hillel would withdraw from the match. When those who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel would come to marry women from those who followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, they would be notified that certain children were born of rival wives and that those people were considered mamzerim in the opinion of Beit Hillel, who therefore declared them forbidden in marriage. (Sefaria.org translation)

The key to diversity within unity is mutual respect and real communication.

 

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