With daf TB Sanhedrin 40 we begin today the
fifth chapter of our massekhet. Our
fourth chapter transitions us from civil cases to capital cases. The first
Mishna outlines the court procedure. There are two types of questions. I’ll
call essential or interrogations questions khakirot
(חקירות) and they deal
primarily with when and where. This is essential knowledge in case scheming
witnesses (eidai zommemim-עֵדֵי זוֹמְמִים). This is a special
case which we shall learn more about in detail later. In a nutshell, a second
set of witnesses come forward and testify that they don’t know anything about
the current court case, but the scheming witnesses can’t be telling the truth
because they were with us in a different place at that time. The second type of
questions are examinations bedikot (בדיקות) and are secondary
details concerning the case. Remember the goal is at all possible is to find
the defendant innocent.
As always I shall add my commentary
in parentheses.
“MISHNA: The court would examine the
witnesses in capital cases with seven interrogations (khakirot (חקירות)), i.e., interrogatory questions, and
they are: In which seven-year period, that is, in which cycle of seven
years within a jubilee did the event occur; in which year of the
Sabbatical cycle did the event occur; in which month did the event
occur; on which day of the month did the event occur; on which
day of the week did the event occur; at which hour did the event
occur; and in what place did the event occur. Rabbi Yosei says:
The court would examine the witnesses with only three interrogations: On
which day did the event occur, at which hour, and in what place.
“They would
also ask: Do you recognize him as the man who committed the
transgression? (Rashi identifies “him” as the murder victim. He explains that
if the victim was not Jewish the murder is not liable for the death penalty
according to halakha-gg) Did you
warn him? They would then ask the witnesses about the particulars of the
incident. For example, in the case of one who is an accused idol
worshipper, they ask the witnesses: Whom, i.e., which idol, did
he worship, and in what manner did he worship it, and so on.
“With regard
to all judges who increase the number of examinations (bedikot (בדיקות)), i.e., who add questions about the
details of the event, this is praiseworthy, as this may clarify that the
witnesses are lying. An incident occurred and ben Zakkai examined
the witnesses by questioning them about the color and shape of the
stems of figs in order to unearth a contradiction between the witnesses. (This
has to be a very early Mishna because the great and important Rabban Yoḥanan
ben Zakkai.- רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי is only
called ben Zakkai as he would have been when he was only a student. Rabban
Yochanan b. Zakkai's escape from besieged Jerusalem and negotiation with
Vespasian ensured the survival and future of Jewish learning and leadership.
The talmudic tractate Gittin includes narratives about the destruction of the
Temple, including Rabban Yochanan's strategic plan.-gg)
“The mishna explains: What is
the difference between interrogations and examinations? With regard to interrogations,
if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their
testimony is void immediately. With regard to examinations, if one
says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not
know the answer, their testimony still stands. Both with
regard to interrogations and examinations, at a time when the witnesses contradict
one another, their testimony is void.
“The mishna clarifies: If one
witness says the event occurred on the second of the month, and one
witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month,
this is not regarded as a contradiction and their testimony stands,
since it is possible to say that this witness knows of the addition
of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event
occurred on the second of the month, and that witness does not know
of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according
to his tally the event occurred on the third of the month. Their testimony is
not considered incongruent.
“By contrast, if this witness
says the event occurred on the third of the month and one
witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their
testimony is void, as this disparity cannot be attributed to a mere error.
Therefore, their testimony is not congruent.
“Similarly, if one witness says
that the event occurred at two hours, i.e., the second hour of the day
from sunrise, and one witness says that the event occurred at
three hours, their testimony stands, as one could reasonably err this
amount in estimating the hour of the day. By contrast, if one says that
the event occurred at three hours, and one says that the event
occurred at five hours, their testimony is void.
“Rabbi Yehuda says: Also in
this case their testimony stands, as one could reasonably err concerning
even this length of time. Rabbi Yehuda adds: But if one says that the
event occurred at five hours, and one says that the event
occurred at seven hours, their testimony is void. Here the
difference is recognizable to all, since at five hours the sun is
in the east and at seven the sun is in the west, and one could
not err concerning this. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent.
“The mishna continues: And
afterward, after the court examines the first witness, they bring in the
second witness and examine him. If the statements of the witnesses are
found to be congruent, the court begins to deliberate the matter. They
open the deliberations with an appeal to anyone who can find a
reason to acquit the accused. If one of the witnesses said: I can
teach a reason to acquit him, or if one of the students
sitting before the judges said: I can teach a reason to deem him
liable, the judges silence him, i.e., both the witness and the
student. The reason is that these people are not allowed to offer information
such as this. But if one of the students said: I can to teach a reason
to acquit him, they raise him to the seat of the court and seat him
among them, and he would not descend from there the entire day, but would
sit and participate in their deliberations.
“If the statement of that
student has substance, the court listens to him. And if even
the accused says: I can teach a reason to acquit me, the court listens
to him and considers his statement, provided that his statement has
substance.
“And if the court found
it fit to acquit him during the deliberations, as all or a majority of
the judges agreed to acquit him, they excuse him. But if a majority does
not find it fit to acquit him, they delay his verdict to
the following day, and they then assign pairs of judges to
discuss the matter with each other. They would minimize their food
intake and they would not drink wine all day. And they would deliberate
all night, and the following day they would arise early and come to
court (according to Rashi the judges really didn’t deliberate all night but
at a certain time each would go home individually and then arise early to come
to court -gg) and then vote again and tally the votes of the judges.
“One who yesterday was of the
opinion to acquit the defendant says: I said to acquit, and I
acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who
yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem
him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught
a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit,
but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then
teach a reason to deem him liable. If they erred in the matter,
as one of the judges forgot what he had said the previous day, two judges’
scribes, who recorded the statements of the judges, remind him. If
the court then found it fit to acquit him unanimously, they
excuse him, and if not all of the judges determine to acquit, they stand
to count the vote. If twelve judges vote to acquit him and
eleven judges deem him liable, he is acquitted.
“The mishna continues: In a case
where twelve judges deem him liable and eleven judges acquit;
or even if eleven judges acquit and eleven deem him liable
and one judge says: I do not know; or even if twenty-two
judges acquit or deem him liable and one judge says: I do not
know, the judge who said he does not know is disregarded, and the judges
add additional judges to the court until they reach a definitive ruling. And
how many judges do they add? They add pairs of two judges
each time they do not reach a ruling until there are seventy-one
judges, but no more than that.
“At that point, if thirty-six
judges acquit and thirty-five judges deem him liable, he
is acquitted. If thirty-six judges deem him liable and
thirty-five judges acquit, they continue to deliberate the
matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those
who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those
who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn a
defendant to death by a majority of one judge.” (Sefaria.org translation)
though he previously argued on behalf of his innocence. vote his
conscience. If he believes the defendant is truly guilty, he can vote thusly
even though he previously argued on behalf of his innocence.