Should I listen to my parents? TB Baba Metzia 32

Although I grew up in a very proud Jewish home, it wasn’t very observant. We didn’t keep Shabbat nor kashrut. When I came home from a summer intensive Hebrew program that determined my placement in the Teachers Institute, now known as List College, of the Jewish theological seminary, I told my parents that I have decided to keep Shabbat and kashrut. That was 54 years ago and I have been a rabbi for 46 years. Consequently, I no longer consider myself anymore a blt, ba’al teshuvah, and newly observant Jew. I was very lucky that my parents put up with all my newfound religion and accommodated me to the best of their ability. Not all my friends were so lucky. Today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 32 deals with the conflict between observing the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents by listening to them who tell you not to observe Jewish laws. What should the poor child do when such a conflict?

“§ The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or that if one’s father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: “I am the Lord,” it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command.

“The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father’s command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord”; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: “To the dead among his people he shall not defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva.

"The Gemara answers that the derivation from “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one’s father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father’s command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The answer is clear. One should not listen to a parent who tells the child not observe a mitzvah. Nevertheless, the child should decline respectfully.

 

 

Can we compel somebody to go above and beyond the letter of the law? TB Baba Metzia 30

TB Baba Metzia 30 contains another story with the value concept lifnim mishurat hadin (לפנים משורת הדין). I’m sharing what I learned from Dr. Elana Stein Hain’s lecture answering the question do we compel people to go above and beyond the letter of the law. All translations are hers. You may find this lecture by following this link: https://hadran.org.il/author-post/din-daf-lifnim-mishurat-hadin/.

Lifnim mishurat hadin is usually translated as going above and beyond the letter of the law. Dr. Christine Hayes defines it differently in “Legal Truth, Right Answers and Best Answers: Dworkin and the Rabbis,” Diné Israel Vol. 25, 2008, pp. 73-121 “As indicated, a norm or ruling may represent ‘‘(shurat) ha-din’’ (lit., [the line of] the law), which refers to the theoretically correct position, or ‘‘lifnim mishurat ha-din’’ – within, or just short of the line of the law. The metaphor of law’s line strongly implies a ‘‘correct’’ answer – represented by the line. One who crosses over the line (avar) commits a transgression (an avera (עָבֵרָה), a sin) – a negative deviation from the correct law. But one who stops short of the line of the law – renouncing the full rights and entitlements due to him in law while remaining within the area bounded by the line of the law – is acting piously and mercifully.”

There are three relevant sugiyot that will help us answer the question do we compel people to go above and beyond lover of the law. Of course were going to have three different answers.

1.    Baba Metzia 24: Rav Yehuda was moving along behind Mar Shmuel in the market where pounded grain was sold. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: If one found a purse [arnakei] here, what is the halakha? Shmuel said to him that the halakha is as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rav Yehuda asked him: If a Jew came and provided a distinguishing mark to describe it, what is the halakha? Shmuel said to him: The finder is obligated to return it. Rav Yehuda asked: These are two contradictory rulings. Shmuel said to him: By law, it belongs to him. When I said the finder is obligated to return it if he learns the identity of the owner, that was beyond the letter of the law. This is like that incident where Shmuel’s father found these donkeys in the desert and returned them to their owner after the passage of twelve months of the year, as he acted beyond the letter of the law (lifnim mishurat hadin).

Rava was moving along behind Rav Naḥman in the tanner’s market, and some say in the marketplace frequented by the Sages. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: If one found a purse here, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that the halakha is as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rava asked him: If a Jew came and provided a distinguishing mark to describe it, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that in this case as well, the halakha is as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rava asked: But isn’t the owner justifiably standing and screaming that the purse belongs to him? Rav Naḥman said to him: He becomes as one who screams to no avail about his house that collapsed or about his ship that sank in the sea.

2.    Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless.

The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you.

But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all.

Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition.

But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help.

As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law (lifnim mishurat hadin).

…Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law. (lifnim mishurat hadin)

3            3, Baba Metzia 83b: Some porters [negligently (see Rashi and Maharsha)] broke a barrel of wine             belonging to Rabbah Bar Channah.  Thereupon he seized their garments; so, they went and                      complained to Rav.  “Return their garment” he ordered.  “Is that the law,” he inquired?  “Yes,” he         rejoined, “that you shall walk in the way of good people” (Mishlei 2:20).  Their garments having             been  returned, they observed, “We are poor men, have worked all day, and are hungry.  Are we to         get nothing?”  “Go and pay them” he ordered.  “Is that the law,” he asked?  “Yes,” he rejoined, “and     keep the path of the righteous” (Mishlei 2:21).

 

The answers

1.     A person cannot be compelled to give up his rights as dictated by the law. Rebbainu Hanniel (an 11th-century Kairouanan rabbi and Talmudist, who was in close contact with the last Geonim) poskins according to Rava in our first source. Going within the letter of the law is completely discretionary. “Rav Yehuda followed Shmuel in the marketplace. He said to him: If one found a purse here, what (should one do)? He responded, “It belongs to the finder. If a Jew came and articulated distinguishing marks of the item, what (should one do)? He responded: If one wishes to act within the letter of the law, one should/may return it, like the case of the Shmuel’s father who found a donkey in the wilderness and returned it after 12 months.”

2.     On the other hand according to Rabbi Yoḥanan in the second source, the court can compel the person to act lifnim mishurat hadin. According to him Jerusalem was destroyed because the courts only decide cases as the law dictates.

3.     Yoel Sirkis (born 1561 - March 14, 1640 is considered one of the greatest Talmudic scholars in Poland) holds a middle position. “…The end of perek Amoraim cites the anecdote of Rabbah bar bar Hannah where the porters broke his wine barrel, and he took their clothing (as payment/collateral). They went and told Rav, and Rav to him to give them their clothes. And he asked: Is this the law? And he responded, “In order to walk in the ways of the good.” And our teacher brought this in siman 304. And Rashi explained, “in the way of the good” – within the line of the law, end quote. It sounds like rav forced Rabbah bar bar Hannah (to act within the line of the law), for if not, what did he mean by “this is the law” if he did not mean to force him…And likewise in the case of one who found a purse in the marketplace in chapter Eilu metziot, where he says that one is obligated to return the item in order to act within the line of the law: it at least sounds like the person is required to do so in order to fulfill one’s Divine requirement (even if there’s no earthly court requirement-my emphasis, gg) as is said in the latter chapter Ha-gozel regarding the mishnah that One who says to another person, I’ve stolen from you, etc., who is obligated if they are trying to fulfill a Divine obligation. If not, what does being obligated mean? And and thus fulfill God’s requirement of us, you should do so. And therefore the Mordechai ruled that we force a person to act within the line of the law if the person has the financial means to do so; and likewise the Ra’avan and the Aviezri and the Agudah in chapter Eilu metziot, and this is is language: one is required to return it for the sake of acting within the line of the law; and such is our practice to return it; and likewise the Ra’avan and Ra’avyah ruled to force the founder to return it if the finder has means, end quote.” If one has the means and the ability to go within the letter of the law Christine Hayes concludes: “The pious individual, who prioritizes religious values such as humility, compassion, modesty, peace, or charity should at times forego his right to the theoretically correct norm or ruling (stop short of the strict law) for in so doing he upholds these other values. While not exercising the ‘‘correct’’ option, the pious individual who remains lifnim mishurat ha-din chooses what is in that particular situation a superior (though not more legally correct) option.”

Proper care for a lost book TB Baba Metzia 28

How should a person care for a lost book? A lot of what we are going to learn is just plain common sense. We also have to remember that before the printing press hand written scrolls were the medium. 

Today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 28 provides us with the answer to the above question. “MISHNA: If one found scrolls, he reads them once in thirty days in order to ventilate them and prevent mold. And if he does not know how to read, he rolls and unrolls them in order to ventilate them. But he shall not study passages in them for the first time, as he would leave the scroll exposed to the air for a lengthy period, thereby causing damage. And another person shall not read the scroll with him, as each might pull it closer to improve his vantage point, which could cause the scroll to tear.” (Sefaria.org translation)

“The Gemara elaborates. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who borrows a Torah scroll from another, that person may not lend it to another, i.e., a third person. He may open it and read it, provided that he does not study passages in it for the first time, lest the scroll be exposed for a lengthy period of time and sustain damage. And another person shall not read the scroll with him, lest the scroll tear.” (Sefaria.org translation)

“And likewise, in the case of one who deposits a Torah scroll with another, the bailee rolls it every twelve months, and he may open it and read it. If it is for himself that he opened it, it is prohibited. Sumakhos says: In the case of a new Torah scroll, one rolls it every thirty days because the ink is not yet dry and must be more frequently ventilated. By contrast, in the case of an old Torah scroll, one rolls it every twelve months. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In the case of both this new Torah scroll, and the case of that old Torah scroll, one rolls it every twelve months.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 Why would a Torah scroll be any different from any other borrowed object? Of course, we would assume that the borrower is not permitted to lend out something he does not own.

 “Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said: In the case of one who borrows a Torah scroll from another, that person may not lend it to another, i.e., a third person. The Gemara asks: Why did the tanna teach this halakha specifically with regard to a Torah scroll? This is the halakha with regard to any item as well, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Here in a mishna (Gittin 29a), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught: A borrower is not allowed to lend the item that he borrowed to someone else, and a renter is not allowed to rent out the item that he rented to someone else.

"The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the tanna to mention the halakha specifically with regard to a Torah scroll, lest you say that a person is amenable to having a mitzva performed with his property and would consequently not mind if his Torah scroll was lent to another. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that the borrower may not lend even a Torah scroll.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

There’s something about books and rabbis. Most rabbis haven’t met the book they haven’t like to own (just ask my wife). Just as we treat respectfully Torah scrolls, we should treat all our books with care and dignity.

 

 

 

 

Gratitude benefits our souls #shabbatparah#devartorah#parashathashavua

This week’s Torah portion, Tzav, continues to discuss aspects of the sacrificial cult.  Our ancestors sought to draw close to God through the animal sacrifices offered up first in the portable Tabernacle and then in the Temple in Jerusalem.  In fact the Hebrew word for sacrifice is korbon and its root meaning is “to draw close”.  We no longer offer up sacrifices as our mode of worship. Today we worship God through prayer. 

According to a prominent Duke University Medical Center researcher, “If thankfulness were a drug, it would be the world’s best-selling product with [health benefits] for every major organ system.”

For some, being thankful means simply living with a sense of gratitude—taking time to recognize and focus on the things we have, instead of the things we wish we had. Prayer, specifically saying brachot or blessings, takes the idea of thankfulness to a deeper level. The act of giving thanks causes us to recognize the One who provides our blessings.

David knew that God was responsible for the safe delivery of the Ark of the Covenant in Jerusalem (1 Chron. 15:26). As a result, he penned a song of gratitude that centered on God instead of simply expressing his delight in an important event. The ballad began: “Oh, give thanks to the Lord! Call upon His name; make known His deeds among the peoples!” (16:8). David’s song went on to rejoice in God’s greatness, highlighting God’s salvation, creative power, and mercy (vv.25-36).

This Shabbat is a special Shabbat called  Shabbat Parah. The second Torah reading reminds us to prepare ourselves spiritually for the upcoming Passover holiday. We can be truly thankful by worshiping the Giver instead of the gifts we enjoy. Focusing on the good things in our lives may benefit our bodies, but directing our thanks to God benefits our souls.

 

Shabbat Shalom,

Rabbi Gary Greene

 

Identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks by Torah law (deoraita -דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא) or is it by rabbinic law? TB Baba Metzia 27-28

 There are three different categories of distinguishing marks (simonim-סִימָנִין). The best category is a simon muvhak (סִימָן מוּבְהָק), clear-cut distinguishing mark. A person’s face is an example of a simon muvhak. The worst category is a simon garu’a (סִימָן גָרוּעַ). These are pretty nondescript distinguishing marks like the item’s color. Of course the in between category is simon bainoni (סִימָן בֵּנוֹנִי), an average distinguishing mark. In all the discussions about distinguishing marks on dappim TB Baba Metzia 27-8  fall in the middle category. If the distinguishing mark was a simon muvhak, of course one will return the lost object. If the distinguishing mark was nondescript, of course one wouldn’t return it without further investigation.

The Gemara on dappim TB Baba Metzia 27-8 discusses the second major sugiyah in our chapter. It analyzes whether “identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks by Torah law (deoraita -דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא) or is it by rabbinic law? (derabanan- דְרַבָּנַן)”  (Sefaria.org translation) 

There is a real-life difference. “The practical difference is with regard to returning the bill of divorce of a woman that was lost by an agent before its delivery, on the basis of distinguishing marks. If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, we return the document and allow the agent to transmit it to the woman. But if you say that it is by rabbinic law, we do not return the document, because when the Sages institute an ordinance, it is only with regard to monetary matters they have the authority to declare property ownerless; but with regard to ritual matters, the Sages do not institute an ordinance. They lack the authority to abrogate the prohibitions by Torah law that are associated with a woman’s marital status. (If the rabbis allow a woman to marry based on that invalid get, she would become an adulterous and be subject to all its penalties. That would be a serious transgression; consequently, if distinguishing marks were only of rabbinic ordinance, they would not give the lost get to the woman out of extreme caution.-gg) ” (Sefaria.org translation)

Although the Gemara never conclusively answers the question, it certainly leans to the conclusion that distinguishing marks are deoraita. “Rava said: Identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, as it is written: “And if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [derosh] it, and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that he would give the lost item to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. Scrutinize him [darshehu] to determine whether the claimant is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. Only then may you return the lost item to him. What, is it not that the one who claims the lost item proves that he is not a swindler on the basis of distinguishing marks that he provides? Rava affirms: Conclude from it that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The last discussion of this sugiyah weighs the merits of competing simonim.

“If you say that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, then in a case where an item is found and two people claim it as theirs, and one describes distinguishing marks on the item and the other describes distinguishing marks on the item, the finder shall leave it in his possession and not give it to either claimant (Rashi adds until Elijah comes who will herald the Messiah-gg). In a case where one person describes distinguishing marks on the item and the other brings two witnesses to support his claim of ownership, the item shall be given to the claimant with witnesses. In a case where one person describes distinguishing marks on the item and the other describes distinguishing marks on the item and brings one witness to support his claim of ownership, the one witness is as one who is not there, and the finder shall leave it in his possession. The testimony of a single witness has no legal standing in this case.

“In a case where one claimant to a found garment brings witnesses who testify that the garment was woven for him, and the other claimant brings witnesses who testify that the garment had fallen from him, the garment shall be given to the claimant whose witnesses testified that the garment had fallen from him, as we say that perhaps the one for whom it was woven sold the garment and it fell from another person, who is the current owner.

“If one claimant provides the measure of length of a lost garment and the other provides the measure of its width, the garment shall be given to the claimant who provided the measure of its length, as one can approximate the measure of its width when its owner dons the garment and stands, but the measure of its length cannot be approximated in that manner. Therefore, it is a more clear-cut distinguishing characteristic.

“If one claimant provides the measure of its length and the measure of its width and the other provides the measure of its gamma, its combined length and width, which together form the Greek letter gamma, but does not provide each measure individually, the item shall be given to the claimant who provided the measure of its length and the measure of its width separately.

“If one claimant provides the measure of its length and the measure of its width and the other provides the measure of its weight, the item shall be given to the claimant who provided the measure of its weight, which, because it is more difficult to approximate, is a more clear-cut distinguishing characteristic.

“Rava continues: In a case where a bill of divorce is found and it is unclear whether it had been delivered to the wife, and the husband, who reconsidered, states the distinguishing marks of the bill of divorce and claims that he did not yet give it to his wife, and the wife, who wants to be divorced, states the distinguishing marks of the bill of divorce and claims that she already received it, the document shall be given to the wife. The Gemara asks: With what distinguishing mark did she describe the bill of divorce? If we say that she described it with the measure of its height and its width, that is not a clear-cut distinguishing mark; perhaps while her husband was holding the bill of divorce, she saw it, although he had not yet given it to her. Rather, it must be that she says that there is a perforation alongside such and such letter in the document, which she could know only if the bill of divorce had been in her hand.

“In a case where the husband states the distinguishing marks of the string with which the bill of divorce is bound, and she states the distinguishing marks of the string, the document shall be given to the wife. The Gemara asks: With what distinguishing mark did she describe the string? If we say that she described it by saying that the string is white or by saying that it is red, this cannot be the mark based on which she proves her ownership, as perhaps while her husband was holding the bill of divorce, she saw the string. Rather, it must be that she stated the measure of its length. As the string was wrapped around the document, she would know its length only if the bill of divorce had been in her hand.

“In a case where the husband claims that the bill of divorce was not given to the wife and states that it was stored in a case, and the wife claims that she received the bill of divorce and states that it was stored in a case, the document shall be given to the husband. What is the reason? Identification of the document based on its storage cannot prove her ownership, as she knows that he places any valuable item that he has in his possession in the case.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

Returning a lost object is a mitzvah as it is written in the Torah: “If you see your fellow Israelite’s ox or sheep gone astray, do not ignore it; you must take it back to your peer. If your fellow Israelite does not live near you or you do not know who [the owner] is, you shall bring it home and it shall remain with you until your peer claims it; then you shall give it back. You shall do the same with that person’s ass; you shall do the same with that person’s garment; and so too shall you do with anything that your fellow Israelite loses and you find: you must not remain indifferent.” (Deuteronomy 22:2-3)

We know that every word in the Torah is significant; consequently, today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 27 explains with one exception why the Torah needs to enumerate all those examples of an ox, sheep, donkey, and garment especially when verse 3 concludes with “so too shall you do with anything that your fellow Israelite loses and you find…”

“Rava says: Why do I need all the specific items that the Merciful One writes that one must return: An ox, a donkey, a sheep, and a garment? One of them would seem to suffice.

“Rava answers: They are all necessary, as a unique halakha is derived from each example. As, if the Merciful One had written only “garment,” I would say: This matter, i.e., the mitzva to return a lost item, applies only in a case where the owner brings witnesses capable of testifying about the item itself or he describes distinguishing marks concerning the item itself; but with regard to returning a donkey to its owner in a case where he brings witnesses with regard to the saddle or describes distinguishing marks concerning the saddle and not on the donkey, say that we do not return the donkey to the owner. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: “Donkey,” from which it is derived that a donkey is returned to its owner even in a case where he describes distinguishing marks on the saddle.

“Rava continues: With regard to the specific mentions of “ox” and “sheep” that the Merciful One writes, why do I need them? Rava answers: From “ox” it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail; and from “sheep” it is derived that one must return even its sheared wool. The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write only “ox,” from which it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail, and derive all the more so that one must return the more substantial sheared wool of a sheep… and the term “sheep” stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone, are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara tries to find what the word sheep comes to teach us, but each attempt is rejected. For example, the Gemara suggests that the word sheep comes to teach that the finder also has to return the sheep’s manure. Manure is not valueless. It could be used for fertilizer or even kindling for fire. “The Gemara answers: One need not return dung, because the owner has renounced its ownership.” (Sefaria.org translation)

To this day the answer to our question is an unresolved mystery.

TB Baba Metzia 26 3 strikes and you’re out

When a person returns a lost object he has observed a positive commandment. If he doesn’t, he potentially violates one, two or three transgressions. First let me share with you, the relevant verses from the Torah.

“You shall not commit robbery.” (Leviticus 19:13)

“If your fellow Israelite does not live near you or you do not know who [the owner] is, you shall bring it home and it shall remain with you until your peer claims it; then you shall give it back.” (Deuteronomy 22:2; my emphasis)

“If you see your fellow Israelite’s ass or ox fallen on the road, do not ignore it; you must raise it together.” (Deuteronomy 22:4; my emphasis)

Rava explains how a person can violate three different commandments by not returning a lost object.

Three strikes: “And Rava says: In a case where one saw a sela coin that fell from another, if he took the coin in order to steal it, before the despair of the owner, he violates all of the following mitzvot: He is liable due to the prohibition: “You shall not…rob” (Leviticus 19:13); and due to the positive mitzva, stated with regard to found items, of: “You shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1), and due to the prohibition, stated with regard to one who finds an item: “You may not disregard” (Deuteronomy 22:3).

Two strikes: “Rava continues: If he took the coin in order to return it, before the despair of the owner, and then, after the despair of the owner, he intended to steal it; he violates a commandment, due to his failure to fulfill the positive mitzva of: “You shall return them to your brother.” He does not violate the prohibition: “You shall not…rob,” because at the time he took the coin he did not intend to keep it. And he does not violate the prohibition: “You may not disregard,” because he did not disregard the lost item. He took it with the intention of returning it. (To be guilty of robbery the thief must have the intent to steal from the very outset. In the case above the person who found the lost coin originally had the intention to return it to the owner. However, the yetzer hara (the evil inclination) got the worst of him and decided to keep it. Since he originally didn’t have in mind to steal it and by the time he kept it, the original owner has despaired of ever retrieving his money, he is not considered a robber.-gg)

One strike:  “If he waited until the owner despaired of recovering the lost item and only then took it, he violates a commandment, but only due to his failure to fulfill the positive mitzva of: “You may not disregard,” as he took no action to return the lost item to its owner.” (Sefaria.org translation)

TB Baba Metzia 25 What about a garbage dump?

We have been learning the circumstances when we can apply the old saying “finder keepers, loser weepers.” Obviously, there is a mitzvah to return lost objects. If the lost object has a distinguishing mark, the finder has to announce he found the lost object so that the original owner can identify it and reclaim it. If the lost object doesn’t have a distinguishing mark, the finder may keep it because the original owner has given up hope of ever retrieving it. 

Daf TB Baba Metzia 25 provides a third possibility, don’t pick it up. “In a case where one found a vessel in a garbage dump, if it is concealed, he may not touch it, as a person certainly concealed it there. If it is exposed, the finder takes the item and proclaims his find.” (Sefaria.org translation) The logic is simple. If the object is concealed, there is a good chance that the owner hid it there. It’s not really lost it all; consequently, don’t even touch it.

The Gemara brings a seemingly contradictory Baraita. “The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: If one found a vessel concealed in a garbage dump, the finder takes the item and proclaims his find, because it is routine for a garbage dump to be cleared. Therefore, presumably it was not placed there; rather, it is a lost item and one is obligated to proclaim his find.”

Both Rav Zavid and Rav Pappa provide solutions to explain the difference between the Mishna and the Baraita. “Rav Zevid said that this is not difficult: This mishna is referring to containers or cups. That baraita is referring to knives or a fork [vehamnik]. The Gemara elaborates: In the case of containers or cups, which are large, it is inconceivable that they fell there inadvertently, so he may not touch them. In the case of knives or forks, which are small, there is room for uncertainty as to whether it was placed there or whether it fell, so the finder takes the item and proclaims his find.

“Rav Pappa said: Both this baraita and that mishna are referring to containers and cups, and nevertheless, it is not difficult: Here, the baraita is referring to a garbage dump that is designed to be cleared; therefore, he must take the vessel and proclaim his find to prevent it from being cleared with the garbage. There, the mishna is referring to a garbage dump that is not designed to be cleared; as it is possible that the owner placed it there, the finder may not touch it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Can you trust a rabbi? TB Baba Metzia 24

Can you trust a rabbi? Daf TB Baba Metzia 24 teaches it depends on the circumstances and the rabbi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar taught if one finds a brand-new vessel, he is not obligated to proclaim his find because the owner hasn’t used it long enough for him clearly to identify it. Even if this new vessel does not have a distinguishing mark and a rabbi is certain that it is his, the rabbi is believed and the vessel is returned to him. If the rabbi is not certain that the new vessel is his, it is not returned to him. A rabbi may tell a little white lie in three specific circumstances. But if he is a perpetual liar, don’t believe him.

“When the eye of a Torah scholar has not sufficiently seen them, he is not certain about them, and we do not return a lost item to him, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: With regard to these three matters alone, it is normal for Sages to amend their statements and deviate from the truth: With regard to a tractate, if he is asked whether he studied a particular tractate, he may humbly say that he did not, even if he did (He did not want to sound arrogant; however, if someone is in need of a teacher, Tosefot ד"ה במסכת writes that the rabbi should be forthcoming-gg). And with regard to a bed, if he is asked whether he slept in a particular bed, he may say that he did not, to avoid shame in case some unseemly residue is found on the bed (in other words for modesty sake-gg)

“And he can lie with regard to a host [ushpiza], as one may say that he was not well received by a certain host to prevent everyone from taking advantage of the host’s hospitality. What is the practical difference that emerges from this statement with regard to matters in which Torah scholars deviate from the truth? Mar Zutra says: The practical difference is with regard to returning a lost item on the basis of visual recognition. If we know about him that he alters his statements only with regard to these three matters, we return the lost item to him, but if he alters his statements with regard to other matters, we do not return the lost item to him.” (dappim 23b-24a, Sefaria.org translation)

Unfortunately rabbis are human and some lie, cheat, and steal as the next story shows. “The Gemara relates: A silver goblet was stolen from the host of Mar Zutra Ḥasida. All saw a certain student of Torah who washed his hands and dried them on the cloak of another. Mar Zutra said: This is the one who does not care about the property of another. He bound that student, and the student then confessed that he stole the goblet.” (Sefaria.org translation)

What exactly did Mar Zutra do? The Rosh explains that he lashed him until he confessed and returned the goblet. The Shita Mekubetzet writes that Mar Zutra threatened to excommunicate and that did the trick.

Regrettably we know from today’s headlines Jewish newspapers somethings never change.

 

 

 

The sounds of despair TB Baba Metzia 23

Once the owner of a lost object despairs (yayush-יֵאוּשׁ) of ever retrieving it, the lost object becomes ownerless (hefkeir-הפקר) and anyone may pick it up and acquire it. Today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 23 teaches us what yayush (יֵאוּשׁ) sounds like. How does the owner articulate his despair or resignation that he will never retrieve the lost object?

“§ Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava that this is the principle of a lost item: Once the owner of a lost item says: Woe is me for the monetary loss, this indicates that he has despaired of its recovery.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rashba rules the only time one needs to articulate his despair by saying, “Woe is me for the monetary loss” is when the lost object has a distinguishing mark (seeman- סִימָן). As long as he can identify the lost object through a distinguishing mark, he has hope to reclaim it. The object becomes ownerless when he gives up hope of ever finding it by articulating his resignation. However, if the lost object does not have a distinguishing mark there is no need for a verbal articulation of despair or resignation that he will never ever retrieve the lost object. Yayush is almost immediate.

Abaye wins the argument TB Baba Metzia 22

Today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 22 continues analyzing whether there is retroactive yayush, despair of retrieving the lost object. Rava holds that there is retroactive yayush, יֵאוּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, and Abaye doesn’t. The last challenge will prove that Abaye is correct and there’s no such thing as retroactive yayush. 

“The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.

“And the prohibition written in the verse against keeping an item that is lost only to its owner is similar to the allowance to keep an item lost to all people that is inferred from the verse; just as in the case of the allowance, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is permitted for the finder to keep it, so too in the case of the prohibition, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is prohibited for the finder to keep it, until there is proof that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Generally a halakha follows Rava; however, this is one of the six times the halakha follows Abaye. “Gemara further notes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye when he has a dispute with Rava with regard to six halakhot, as represented יֵאוּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַתby the mnemonic yod, ayin, lamed, kuf, gimmel, mem: Despair that is not conscious [yeush shelo mida’at], conspiring witnesses [eidim] who are disqualified retroactively, a side post [leḥi] standing alone, betrothal [kiddushin] that is not given to consummation, revealing intent with a bill of divorce [get], and an apostate [mumar] who sins rebelliously. Although the halakha generally is in accordance with the opinion of Rava in his disputes with Abaye, in these six cases the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.” (Kiddushin 52a, Sefaria.org translation) this explanation follows Rashi’s commentary.

The Gemara never explains what the letters of the mnemonic yod, ayin, lamed, kuf, gimmel, mem mean. We shouldn’t be surprised that not everybody agrees with Rashi’s explanation. Rebbeinu Tam explains that the lamed stands for the figuring the days of the menstrual flow after birth (laydah). The Sages of Narbona explain that the lamed stands for לא אפשר ומתכוון בענין הנאה שלא מרצונו מאיסור . I wish I could can translate their explanation, but I can’t. If somebody can help me, I would be very happy.

Finders keepers? TB Baba Metzia 21

With today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 21 we begin the second chapter of our massekhet. It too deals with finding lost objects other than documents. Simply put, when can we say finders keepers losers weepers or when we can’t keep the lost object. Rashi provides the three necessary steps when the finder can keep the lost object. 1, The object has no distinguishing sign, simon-סִימָן. 2, The original owner has despaired of retrieving it, yayush- יֵאוּשׁ. 3, Since there is yayush, the lost object becomes ownerless, hefkeir-הֶפְקֵר.

We begin to study a classic discussion whether there can be retroactive yayush between Rava and Abaye. Let’s say somebody dropped his brand-new notebook but didn’t realize it. Sometime later another person picked up the lost notebook. When the person finally goes home much later, he realizes that he dropped his notebook and has yayush of ever retrieving it. The finder found the notebook before the owner had yayush.

“With regard to one’s despair of recovering his lost item that is not a conscious feeling, i.e., were he aware of the loss of his property, he would have despaired of its recovery, but he was unaware of his loss when the finder discovered the item, Abaye said: It is not considered despair; the owner maintains ownership of the item, and the finder may not keep it. And Rava said: It is considered despair and the finder may keep it.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara limits the disagreement. They both agree if the object has a distinguishing sign, there is no retroactive yayush. If the finder keeps it, he is a thief. They both agree that when the object fell into a body water and the tide swept it onto dry land or the water overflowed its banks, even if it has a distinguishing sign, the finder gets to keep it. Rava and Abaye only disagree “is with regard to an item in which there is no distinguishing mark. Abaye said: Despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, as he did not know that the item fell from him; therefore, he cannot despair of recovering it. Rava said: Despair that is not conscious is considered despair, as when he discovers that it fell from him, he will despair of its recovery; as he says upon this discovery: I have no distinguishing mark on the item. Therefore, it is considered from now, when the item fell, that he despairs.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

Which holiday is greater, Purim or Passover? #shabbatzakhor#devartorah#parashathashavua

Two Hassidim were arguing which one of their respective rebbes was greater.  The first said: “Our rebbe is greater for what he says, God fulfills.”  The second Hassid replied: “We consider greater when God says something and the rebbe fulfills.”  

Saturday night begins the holiday of Purim. We might ask the question which holiday is greater Passover which is full of extra-ordinary miracles or Purim which has no overt miracle at all.  At first glance we would immediately say Passover.  Who could forget the 10 plagues and the splitting of the sea?  Those were awe inspiring events in our history.

Rabbi Mechachem Schneerson argues in his commentary on the Book of Esther that Purim is greater.  He writes:

“Chasssidic thought explains that Purim’s failure to break nature belies a superior quality. If witnessing an outright miracle is to see God at work, then a miracle garbed in nature-argues Chassidus-is, in fact a more profound revelation. Why? Because if God has to suspend the laws of physics in order to get the job done, then we have only demonstrated that He is the ‘God of the heavens’ and not truly the ‘God of the earth.’ A breach of nature is a moment when God appears to proclaim ‘It is impossible for Me to achieve this result without breaking the rules.’

“But in truth, God can do anything; He does not have to break the laws of nature to achieve any desired result, however impossible it may be. When we witness the impossible occur without any overt change in the natural order-such as that which transpired at Purim-we are seeing God work in a much more profound truly omnipotent way.

“Or, to put it in other words, the ‘spiritual source’ of the Puirm miracle was higher, therefore it was able to reach lower, penetrating and acting through the natural order of this lowly physical world.

“And this is the inner reason why, ‘All the Books of the Prophets and all the Writings will in the future Messianic Era be annulled, except for Megilas Esther’ (Rambam, Laws of Megillah 2:18)-because the Megillah contains such a lofty form of Divine revelation that it will shine forth even in the Messianic Era.” (page 56)

Purim asks of us to find other Purim-like miracles that we might miss because we are not looking in all the right places.

Shabbat Shalom,

Rabbi Greene 

A heavenly sign, but not what they thought TB Baba Metzia 20

When I was a rabbinical student, we joked that Rabbi Eleazar funniest one-liner in the Talmud.  “Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Torah scholars increase peace in the world, as it is said: “And all your children [banayikh] shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of your children” (Isaiah 54:13). If all the children of Israel are taught of the Lord, there will be peace for all.

“The Sages interpreted this verse homiletically: Do not read your children [banayikh], but your builders [bonayikh]. Torah scholars are those who build peace for their generation.” (TB Barakhot 64a, Sefaria.org translation)

Peace? Every page of whole Talmud cite all the disagreements and arguments amongst the sages. The story on today’s daf TB Baba Metzia 20 shows that the sages did not respond appropriately to each other.

“The Gemara relates: There was a certain bill of divorce that was found in the court of Rav Huna, in which it was written that the bill of divorce was written in Sheviri City, which is located on the Rakhis River. Rav Huna said about this: We are concerned for the possibility that there are two cities named Sheviri, and that this bill of divorce may belong to someone else who lives in the other Sheviri, and therefore it should not be returned. Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba: Go out and examine this halakha, as in the evening Rav Huna will ask you about it. He went out, examined it, and discovered a relevant source, as we learned in the mishna: With regard to any court enactment, the one who found it must return it to its presumed owner. Since this bill of divorce was found in court, it belongs to this category and should be returned.

“Rav Amram said to Rabba: How can the Master resolve the halakha in the case of a bill of divorce, which is a ritual matter, from the mishna, which discusses monetary matters? Rabba said to him: Fool, we learned in the mishna that this halakha applies in the case of documents of ḥalitza and documents of refusal as well, which are ritual matters. “

At that point, the supporting cedar beam of the study hall dislodged. One Sage said: It was due to my fortune that it dislodged, as you spoke to me offensively, and the other Sage said: It was due to my fortune that it dislodged, as it was you who spoke to me offensively.” (Sefaria.org translation)

As you can see each rabbi saw the cracked beam as a sign from heaven that his honor was disparaged. I understand that heavenly sign differently. I think God was displeased with both of them. Just reading the text one can’t hear Rav Amram’s tone of voice. However, judging by Rabba’s response I can hear either a condescending or disparaging tone of voice. That’s not how we hold a civil conversation. On the other hand, Rabba escalated the argument by name-calling. He should have responded and disagreed respectfully.

In our polarized country we need to learn how to speak and disagree with others respectfully if we truly want peace.

 

 

TB Baba Metzia17-9 Virtual Ketubot and Returning lost Gittin

TB Baba Kama 17 A virtual Ketubah

We live in a world that knows all about virtual documents. Even though a woman should always have her ketubah handy for her protection in case of the death of the husband or divorce, she should not fear if the document is lost. Because the rabbinic courts have established the minimum amounts found in the ketubah, she can demand those sums as payment even case of death or divorce without the ketubah. It is as if she has a virtual ketubah and that is exactly what Rabbi Yoḥanan is claiming.

“§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who claims to have repaid a debt that has already been established by a court enactment, i.e., a rabbinic ordinance obligating one to pay a debt, e.g., the main sum in a marriage contract, but he has no witnesses, he has said nothing. His claim is not accepted. What is the reason that he is not believed? It is because one who is owed any money based on a court enactment is considered like one who is holding a promissory note in his hand, against which a claim of repayment is not accepted without supporting evidence.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Without proof that the former husband or the heirs have paid the ketubah, they cannot just claim that “I paid it.” Otherwise the rabbinic decree is unenforceable and useless.

TB Baba Kama 18-9 Retuning a lost Get, a bill of divorce

The Mishnah on TB Baba Kama 18a states “If one found bills of divorce…, he may not return these items to the one who is presumed to have lost them, as I say it is possible that they were written and then the writer reconsidered about them and decided not to deliver them.” (Sefaria.org translation) The Gemara then asks what happens if the husband says that he gave his wife the found get.

Rabba teaches that the lost get may be returned to the wife unless two conditions are met. If these two conditions are not met, then the get may be returned to her. To understand his two conditions we have to remember what we learned back in massekhet Gittin. The get has to be written explicitly for the couple (leshma-לשמה) mentioned in the document. The first condition is “a place where caravans passing through are common, and there is a concern that the found bill of divorce belongs to someone else with the identical name. ” In other words, a very public place where many people gather. The Gemara cites two other such places that are equivalent to the concept of caravans passing through are common. They are a court and a place that sells cotton (this could be comparable to the mall in its heyday). The second condition is “And even in a place where caravans passing through are common, there is not always a concern that the bill of divorce may belong to another man with an identical name, and this concern is only where it has been established that there are two men named, for example, Yosef ben Shimon in that one city.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rabbi Yirmeya provides the second explanation when you may return a lost get to the wife. The witnesses who signed the get will testify and determine whether one may return the get or not. “Rabbi Yirmeya states A found bill of divorce should be returned only in a case where the witnesses who signed the bill of divorce say: We have never signed a bill of divorce of a person named Yosef ben Shimon other than this one, in which case there is no concern that the bill of divorce belongs to someone else.” (Sefaria.org translation) The probability that there are two couples with the exact same names and divorced with the exact same two witnesses are so small that the rabbis felt they didn’t need to refuse to return the lost get.

Rav Ashi provides the third explanation when you may return a lost get to the wife. “Rav Ashi stated another resolution to the contradiction: The bill of divorce should be returned only in a case where the person claiming to have lost it provides a clear-cut distinguishing mark, e.g., he says: There is a hole in the bill of divorce next to such and such a letter. The Gemara comments: And Rav Ashi permits one to return such a bill of divorce specifically when the one claiming to have lost it says that the hole is next to such and such a letter, as that is a clear-cut distinguishing mark. But if he said only that it had a hole without mentioning its precise location, one should not return the bill of divorce, as that is not considered a clear-cut distinguishing mark.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Alternatively if a Torah scholar can recognize this specific get as kosher then it may be returned to the wife. His recognition is as good as a clear-cut distinguishing mark. “The Gemara relates that Rabba bar bar Ḥana lost a bill of divorce, which had been given to him to deliver, in the study hall. When it was found, he said: If they request a distinguishing mark, I have one for it. If it depends on visual recognition, I have methods of recognition for it. They returned the bill of divorce to him. He said afterward: I do not know if they returned it to me due to the distinguishing mark that I supplied, and they hold that distinguishing marks are used to return lost items by Torah law, or if they returned it to me due to my visual recognition, and it was specifically because I am a Torah scholar, as Torah scholars are relied upon when they say that they recognize an item, but an ordinary person would not be relied upon to recognize the item and have it returned to him.” (Sefaria.org translation)