Mistakes were made but not by me #Kitisa#devartorah#parashathashavua

“Mistakes were made,” said the CEO as he discussed the illegal activity his company had been involved in. He looked regretful, yet he kept blame at arm’s length and couldn’t admit he had personally done anything wrong.

Some “mistakes” are just mistakes: driving in the wrong direction, forgetting to set a timer and burning dinner, miscalculating your checkbook balance. But then there are the deliberate deeds that go far beyond—God calls those sin. When God questioned Adam and Eve about why they had disobeyed Him, they quickly tried to shift the blame to another (Genesis 3:8-13). Aaron took no personal responsibility when the people built a golden calf to worship in the desert. He explained to Moses, “[The people] gave me the gold, and I threw it into the fire, and out came this calf!” (Exodus 32:24).

He might as well have muttered, “Mistakes were made.”

Sometimes it seems easier to blame someone else rather than admitting our own failings. Equally dangerous is to try to minimize our sin by calling it “just a mistake” instead of acknowledging its true nature.

Our High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, have taught us the true path of teshuva, repentance. The four Rs of teshuva are: 1, Recognize that you’ve done something wrong; 2, Regret what you have done something wrong; 3, Repent with words by confessing and making restitution if applicable; 4, Resolve not to commit the sin again when the opportunity arises a new.

Every day we have the opportunity to make our relationship God and our fellow human beings right again with true teshuva.

 

Stolen goods? TB Baba Kamma 119

With today’s daf TB Baba Kamma 119 we conclude our massekhet! Even though the Mishna on daf TB Baba 118b prohibits purchasing objects from some people for the fear that they are stolen, today’s daf limits this prohibition to suspicious circumstances.

“The Sages taught (Tosefta 11:8): With regard to produce watchmen, one may purchase produce from them when they are sitting and selling the produce, and the baskets are before them and the scales [veturtanei] are before them, as in these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that they are not selling stolen merchandise. But in all cases where they said to the buyer: Conceal your purchase, it is prohibited to purchase from them, as there is good reason to suspect that the merchandise is stolen. The baraita adds: One may purchase from a watchman from the entrance of the garden, but not from the back of the garden, because if the produce is being sold inconspicuously, there is a concern that it might have been stolen.” (Sefaria.org translation) A modern comparison in my mind would be buying something out in the open on the sidewalk where the public walk including policeman on their beat as opposed to buying something out of sight from the trunk of a car. I remember on my way to the Statue of liberty, somebody was hawking his goods on the sidewalk saying his watches were “fresh off the truck.” Was he kidding or was he suspiciously selling stolen goods? I’ll leave this question as a תֵּיקוּ-Tayku, a unresolved question.

Context is also important. “When Ravina arrived at Bei Meḥoza, the women of Bei Meḥoza came and tossed chains and bracelets before him so that he could distribute the jewelry as charity, and he accepted it from them. Rabba Tosfa’a said to Ravina: But isn’t it taught in the baraita: Charity collectors may accept something worth a small amount from women, but not something worth a large amount? (The fear was that these wives did not have their husbands permission to give away expensive jewelry. Without permission these women would be considered stealing. -gg) How can you accept jewelry, which is worth a significant sum? Ravina said to him: For the residents of Meḥoza, these chains and bracelets are considered something small, and it is therefore permitted for me to accept them.” (Sefaria.org translation) I guess Meḥoza could have been the Beverly Hills of its time.

Tomorrow we begin massekhet Baba Mertzia!

Suspicious goods

 

Today’s daf TB Baba Kamma 118 warns people to be suspicious of buying stolen goods.

“MISHNA: One may not purchase wool, milk, and kids from the shepherds who tend the flocks of others, due to the concern that they have stolen these items from the owners of the flocks. And similarly, one may not purchase wood and produce from produce watchmen.” (Sefaria.org translation) Shepherds graze their sheep away from civilization and from the watchful eyes of the herd’s owner. If a person feels needs a watch person, the field must be away from the fields owner’s house. The purchaser needs to be suspicious that the shepherd and the watchmen has taken advantage of the owners lack of knowledge to sell the wool, milk, kids, wood, or produce they don’t own.

The Mishna continues to cite cases the purchaser doesn’t have to be suspicious of buying stolen goods. “But one may purchase from women woolen goods in Judea, and linen goods in the Galilee, and calves in the Sharon, as women in these locations often work with those commodities and it can be assumed that they are selling the items with the owner’s consent. And with regard to all these items, in a case where the seller told the buyer to conceal the purchase, it is prohibited, as there is good reason to suspect that the items are stolen. And one may purchase eggs and chickens from everywhere, as it is unlikely that one would steal and sell these commodities.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara continues to distinguish what a person may buy without hesitation and not buy for fear of purchasing stolen goods.

“The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 11:9): One may purchase from shepherds neither goats, nor kids, nor fleeces, nor torn pieces of wool, but one may purchase sewn garments from them, because they are presumed to be theirs. And one may purchase milk and cheese from them in an unsettled area, but not in a settled area.”

The basic assumption why a person may buy milk and cheese from the shepherd in the desert is simple. Returning the milk and cheese from the desert to the owner’s house is difficult. Either schlepping it back home is hard or by the time these milk products are returned they would have spoiled. Consequently, we assume either the owner has awarded the shepherd these products to keep and sell as his own or come to some agreement that the money shepherd collected for the milk and cheese will be returned to the owner of the sheep.

“And one may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time, because it is unlikely that a shepherd would risk stealing such a significant quantity at once. But one may not purchase two sheep, and similarly, one may not purchase two fleeces at a time, as it is reasonable to assume that the shepherd would attempt to steal this amount from the owner.

“The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, as it is unlikely that the shepherds would steal them from their owner, who would notice if they did not return home. Conversely, one may not purchase desert, i.e., non-domesticated, animals from them, as it is more likely that a shepherd would steal these animals. The principle of the matter is that with regard to anything that the shepherd sells and the owner would perceive its absence if it were stolen, one may purchase it from them. But if the owner would not perceive its absence, one may not purchase it from them.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The bottom line for the consumer is use your common sense. If the deal smells funny, don’t buy the product.

There has always been rivalry between colleges. Sometimes this rivalry is more pronounced in the athletic arena is sometimes in the academic arena. The schools of “Eretz Yisrael” and “Babylonia” were no different as this story demonstrates. The text comes from Sefaria.org and my comments are found in the parentheses.

There was a certain man who desired to show another individual’s straw to the gentile authorities, who would seize it. He came before Rav, who said to him: Do not show it and do not show it, i.e., you are absolutely prohibited from showing it. The man said to him: I will show it and I will show it, i.e., I will certainly show it. Rav Kahana was sitting before Rav, and, hearing the man’s disrespectful response, he dislodged the man’s neck from him, i.e., he broke his neck and killed him.

Seeing Rav Kahana’s action, Rav read the following verse about him: “Your sons have fainted, they lie at the head of all the streets, as an antelope in a net” (Isaiah 51:20). Just as with regard to this antelope, once it falls into the net, the hunter does not have mercy upon it, so too with regard to the money of a Jew, once it falls into the hand of gentiles, they do not have mercy upon him, i.e., the Jew. Since gentiles who seek a Jew’s money will kill him in order to seize the property, Rav Kahana acted appropriately when he broke the miscreant’s neck, as he protected the Jew’s property and, by extension, the Jew himself.

This Rav then said to Rav Kahana: Kahana, until now there were Persian rulers who were not particular about bloodshed. But now there are Greeks who are particular about bloodshed, and they will say: Murder [meradin], murder, and they will press charges against you. Therefore, get up and ascend to Eretz Yisrael to study there under Rabbi Yoḥanan, and accept upon yourself that you will not raise any difficulties to the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan for seven years.  (Rav apparently knows Rav Kahana best. Rav Kakana is not only self-assured but also a hothead whose actions can get himself into trouble. He has to flee to Eretz Yisrael for his life. Rav advises to keep a low profile for seven years so he won’t get into any trouble. Once people get to know him well, he can conduct himself in his usual manner without upsetting anybody.-What are the odds that he can’t control himself?-gg)

Rav Kahana went to Eretz Yisrael and found Reish Lakish, who was sitting and reviewing Rabbi Yoḥanan’s daily lecture in the academy for the Rabbis, i.e., the students in the academy. When he finished, Rav Kahana said to the students: Where is Reish Lakish? They said to him: Why do you wish to see him? Rav Kahana said to them: I have this difficulty and that difficulty with his review of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s lecture, and this resolution and that resolution to the questions he raised. They told this to Reish Lakish. Reish Lakish then went and said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: A lion has ascended from Babylonia, and the Master ought to examine the discourse he will deliver in the academy tomorrow, as Rav Kahana may raise difficult questions about the material.

The next day, they seated Rav Kahana in the first row, in front of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan stated a halakha and Rav Kahana did not raise a difficulty, in accordance with Rav’s instruction. Rabbi Yoḥanan stated another halakha and again, Rav Kahana did not raise a difficulty. As a result, they placed Rav Kahana further back by one row. This occurred until he had been moved back seven rows, until he was seated in the last row. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: The lion you mentioned has become a fox, i.e., he is not knowledgeable. (Rav Kahana’s ego must be terribly bruised. We shall see they just couldn’t keep silent.-gg)

Rav Kahana said to himself: May it be God’s will that these seven rows I have been moved should replace the seven years that Rav told me to wait before raising difficulties to the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan. He stood up on his feet and said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Let the Master go back to the beginning of the discourse and repeat what he said. Rabbi Yoḥanan stated a halakha and Rav Kahana raised a difficulty. Therefore, they placed him in the first row, and again, Rav Yoḥanan stated a halakha, and he raised a difficulty.  

Rabbi Yoḥanan was sitting upon seven cushions [bistarkei] so that he could be seen by all the students, and since he could not answer Rav Kahana’s questions, he removed one cushion from under himself to demonstrate that he was lowering himself out of respect for Rav Kahana. He then stated another halakha and Rav Kahana raised another difficulty. This happened repeatedly until Rabbi Yoḥanan removed all the cushions from underneath himself until he was sitting on the ground. (We can understand the removal of the cushions as a metaphor for the lowering of the Rabbi Yoḥanan’s status.-gg)  Rabbi Yoḥanan was an old man and his eyebrows drooped over his eyes. He said to his students: Uncover my eyes for me and I will see Rav Kahana, so they uncovered his eyes for him with a silver eye brush. (Rabbi Yoḥanan was blinded and could see the Rav Kahana for the scholar that he was. Even with his eyes open we shall see that Rabbi Yoḥanan really didn’t see Rav Kahana.-gg)

Once his eyes were uncovered, Rabbi Yoḥanan saw that Rav Kahana’s lips were split and thought that Rav Kahana was smirking at him. As a result, Rabbi Yoḥanan was offended, and Rav Kahana died as punishment for the fact that he offended Rabbi Yoḥanan. The next day, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the Rabbis, his students: Did you see how that Babylonian, Rav Kahana, behaved in such a disrespectful manner? They said to him: His usual manner of appearance is such, and he was not mocking you. Hearing this, Rabbi Yoḥanan went up to Rav Kahana’s burial cave and saw that it was encircled by a serpent [akhna], which had placed its tail in its mouth, completely encircling the cave and blocking the entrance. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to it: Serpent, serpent, open your mouth and allow the teacher to enter and be near the disciple, but the serpent did not open its mouth to allow him entry. He then said: Allow a colleague to enter and be near his colleague, but still the serpent did not open its mouth. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Allow the disciple to enter and be near the teacher, referring to Rav Kahana as his own teacher. The snake then opened its mouth for him to allow him entry. (Who is the master and who is the student is clear now.-gg) Rabbi Yoḥanan requested divine mercy from God and raised Rav Kahana from the dead.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Kahana: Had I known that this was the Master’s manner of appearance, I would not have been offended. Now let the Master come with me to the study hall. Rav Kahana said to him: If you are able to request divine mercy so that I will not die again, I will go with you, and if not, I will not go with you. The Gemara comments: Since the time decreed for his death had passed, it had passed.

Rabbi Yoḥanan then completely awakened him and stood him up. Thereafter, he asked him about every uncertainty that he had, and Rav Kahana resolved each of them for him. And this is the background to that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says to his students on several occasions: What I said was yours is in fact theirs, i.e., I thought that the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael were the most advanced, but in fact the scholars of Babylonia are the most advanced, as evidenced by Rav Kahana’s knowledge.

I’m not so surprised that the Babylonian Talmud would hold their scholars in higher esteem than scholars from Eretz Yisrael. Go team!

 

Robbing a non-Jew TB Baba Kamma 113

The last several chapters of massekhet Baba Kamma discuss the laws concerning thievery. The Gemara differentiates between two kinds of thieves. The first is a ganav (גָנָב). This thief breaks into a person’s home either the middle that night or when the person is not at home. Consequently, his victim does not know his identity. The second category of a thief is a gazlan (גָזְלָן). This thief robs a person in bright daylight; consequently, the victim actually knows his identity.

When I first studied the following passage from the Gemara, I was quite taken aback by the permissibility of robbing a non-Jew. I’m sharing with you what I learned from the Rabbanit Yafit Clymer (https://hadran.org.il/author-post/stealing-from-a-gentile-on-second-thought/). She has set the record straight.

Sefaria.org translates the word goy (גוי) as gentile. Today we think of a Gentile as a Christian because we live amongst a majority of Christians. The text really means somebody who is not Jewish. That person could be a Christian, but also he could be a pagan or a Zoroastrian for these are the people that the Jews lived amongst in the land of Israel or Babylonia. All quotes are from the Rabbanit’s source sheet.                                                                               

“Gemara cites another statement related to stealing from a gentile. Rav Beivai bar Giddel says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: It is prohibited to rob a gentile, but it is permitted to retain his lost item, i.e., one is not required to return it to him. The Gemara examines the basis for each of these rulings: It is prohibited to rob a gentile, as Rav Huna says: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to rob a gentile? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And you shall consume all the peoples that the Lord your God shall deliver unto you” (Deuteronomy 7:16), indicating that it is permitted to consume the other nations’ property only when they are delivered into your hand, i.e., in times of war, but not when they are not delivered into your hand. (TB Baba Kamma 113)       

This passage is relevant today than ever before as the October 7 war in Gaza rages. Just based on the above passage alone one might come to the incorrect conclusion that the Israeli soldiers have permission take whatever they wish from the Palestinian population. Delving deeper into the proof text we see that our classical commentators were also disturbed about the possibility of robbing non-Jews and consider this thievery a desecration of God’s name.

Commenting on the verse in Deuteronomy quoted above “You shall destroy all the peoples that your God delivers to you, showing them no pity. And you shall not worship their gods, for that would be a snare to you.” Rabbeinu Bahya[1] (1255–1340)) writes “which the Lord your God is about to give to you.” Our sages in Baba Kama 113 state that this was true only at the time when the Canaanites were being delivered into the hands of the Israelites during the years of conquest. Nowadays, stealing from or robbing Gentiles is certainly prohibited. In fact, the Talmud there describes stealing from Gentiles as a greater sin than stealing from Israelites as it involves the desecration of the name of the Lord. The Jewish people are to be models of morality. If we steal, we drag God’s Torah into disrepute.”

Leviticus 25:50 talks about the treatment of the resident alien who was forced to sell himselves into slavery and who will be redeemed during the Jubilee year. Commenting on this verse, Rabbeinu Bahya disabuses any notion it might be permissible to steal from a non-Jew.

Concerning this resident alien he explains: “’he will make a reckoning with the one who purchased him.’ The verse warns that one must make a meticulous accounting and not try and trick the Gentile in one’s calculations. The reason is that stealing from pagans is prohibited as a form of desecrating the holy name of the Lord. The Torah demands such careful accounting when the Gentile in question is under Jewish authority. I might have thought that seeing the Torah permits charging interest to Gentiles, something which the Torah elsewhere appears to view as a form of unethical conduct, that stealing, at least indirectly, from a pagan is permitted; therefore, the Torah makes a point of telling us that this is not so. We know already from Joseph’s brothers whose money had been returned to them by the Egyptians (at least they thought so) that they took it back to Egypt with them (Genesis 43,13) in response to their father Yaakov’s instructions. 

“If Yaakov thought (as he said) that even if the pagans had made an error, we must not take advantage of it to their detriment, how much more so must we not disadvantage them deliberately. All of this occurred before the Torah was given, when we did not have these limitations imposed upon us. How much more meticulous must one deal with a Gentile now that the laws of the Torah apply to us! …”

In fact the Tosefta Baba Kama 113 states expressly that if one has robbed a pagan one must return the stolen goods. It adds that such robbery is a graver crime than robbing a Jew because the crime includes the sin of desecrating the Lord’s name. When one robs a fellow Jew, the victim does not use this as an excuse to question the rules of the Torah and the fairness of God.

Rabbi Moshe ben Ya'akov of Coucy[2] (the first half of the 13^th century) codifies the law in his book Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, positive mitzvah 74 that it is forbidden to rob a non-Jew for three reasons.

“I have already talked to the exile of Jerusalem which is in Spain and the rest of Galuyot Edom (the exile in Christian lands-gg), because now that the exile has been prolonged it is more than likely that Israel must distinguish itself from the vanities of the world and grasp the seal of God Almighty who is truth and not to lie to Israel or to the Gentiles and not to mislead them in any matter and to sanctify themselves even in what is permitted to them as it is said: The remnant of Israel Shall do no wrong And speak no falsehood; A deceitful tongue Shall not be in their mouths. Only such as these shall graze and lie down,With none to trouble them (Tsefanya 2:13)

 “And when the Almighty comes to save them, the Gentiles will say they are righteous and they are people of truth and the Torah is true in their mouths.

“But if they behave deceitfully with the Gentiles, they will say, look what the Almighty has done, who chose thieves and cheats, and it is also written, ” I will sow her in the land as My own;(Hosea 2:25).  Does One-man sows one portion in the land, but to find a few. This is how God sows Israel in the lands, so that they will be join by converts. And as long as they behave deceitfully toward them, who will stick to them.” Note that he consider s conversion to Judaism something that is positive.

 Finally Moshe Chaim Luzzatto[3] in his book on ethics Messilat Yesharim writes in his introduction that we are  always obligated to do what is just and ethical. “Walking in His ways – this includes all matters of uprightness and correction of character traits. This is what our sages of blessed memory explained (Shab.133b) “just as He is merciful, be also merciful…” The general principle of all this is for one to conduct all of his traits in all the variety of his deeds according to what is just and ethical.

I should have remembered that the Talmud is not the last word in the discussion, but the beginning of the conversation.

 

 

 

---

[1] Bahya was a pupil of Rabbi Shlomo ibn Aderet (the Rashba). Unlike the latter, Bahya did not publish a Talmud commentary; he is, however, considered by Jewish scholars to be one of the most distinguished of the biblical exegetes of Spain. He "discharged with zeal" the duties of a darshan (Hebrew for "expounder") in his native city of Zaragoza, sharing this position with several others. He is buried in Kadarim, Israel, a few minutes walking distance from the prophet Habakkuk. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahya_ben_Asher)

[2] Rabbi Moses ben Jacob of Coucy, also known as Moses Mikkotsi (Hebrew: משה בן יעקב מקוצי; Latin: Moses Kotsensis), was a French Tosafist and authority on Halakha (Jewish law). He is best known as the author of one of the earliest codifications of Halakha, the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moses_ben_Jacob_of_Coucy codifies)

[3] Moshe Chaim Luzzatto (Hebrew: משה חיים לוצאטו, also Moses Chaim, Moses Hayyim, also Luzzato) (1707 – 16 May 1746 (26 Iyar 5506)), also known by the Hebrew acronym RaMCHaL (or RaMHaL, רמח"ל‎), was a prominent Italian Jewish rabbi, kabbalist, and philosopher. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshe_Chaim_Luzzatto)

Clothes maketh the man? #Tetzaveh#devar Torah#parashathashavua

I once saw an ad for a brand of clothing geared toward youth. It consists of blue jeans and all the accessories designed to go with them. There is nothing novel about that. What got my attention, however, was the name of this clothing line. It is called “True Religion.” That caused me to stop and think. Why was that name chosen? Am I missing some deeper significance? What is the connection between a brand of jeans and true religion? What do they mean by it? My musings left me with questions for which I had no answers.

This week’s Torah portion, Tetzaveh, helps us understand what true religion really means.  We read about the special clothing the kohanim, priests wore serving God in the Temple.  Those vestments point us in the correct direction of “True Religion.”  The commentary below the line in the Etz Hayyim Humash describes the purpose of each vestment.

“The Talmud understand the priestly vestments as designed to protect human beings against the sins to which they are prone.  Thus the breastplate-called ‘the breastplate of judgment’ (mishpat) in28:15 –was meant to prevent miscarriages of justice.  The jacket (m’il, similar to the word for betrayal, ma-al) would discourage gossip. The ephod (a coat also used to decorate idols, as in Hos. 3:40 would protect them against the danger of succumbing to idolatry.  The fringed tunic (the same Hebrew phrase used for Joseph’s coat in Gen. 37) would protect against bloodshed (as the brothers nearly killed Joseph). The robe, covering the entire body, would protect them against sins of unchastely, and the headdress against prideful arrogant thoughts (BT Zev. 88b)” (page 505 below the line)

True religion is not a garment to be taken on and off. It is a lofty challenge about how we live a holy life before God and others.

You don’t advertise your religion by wearing a label—you do it by living a life.

 

How to serve God best #Terumah#Parashathashavua#devartorah

This week’s Torah portion, Terumah, describes the construction of the mishkan, the tabernacle. Acacia wood planks were used to construct the walls of the mishkan. The Torah then describes “You shall make bars of acacia wood: five for the planks of the one side wall of the Tabernacle, five bars for the planks of the other side wall of the Tabernacle, and five bars for the planks of the wall of the Tabernacle at the rear to the west. The center bar halfway up the planks shall run from end to end.” (Exodus 26:26-28)

Our tradition teaches a deep religious truth we should constantly remember from what looks like simple IKEA instructions. Even when serving God, we should remember to do acts of kindness. “Targum Yonatan states that the center cross beam was made with wood that came from trees that Abraham planted. I heard Rabbi Mordechai Mann of B’nai Brak comment on this that those trees were planted by Abraham for the purpose of doing kindness for travelers. The center cross beam was placed right in the middle of the tabernacle to remind us that even when we are devoting ourselves to serving the Almighty we should never forget they have compassion for fellow man, who was created in the image of the Almighty.” (Growth Through Torah by Zelig Pliskin, page 207-8)

Too many people mistakenly believe that a truly pious person is one who meticulously observe the commandments between God and a human being at the expense of observing those commandments between two human beings. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Gemara asks: “Who is considered a foolish man of piety? For example, it is one who sees that a woman is drowning in a river, and he says: It is not proper conduct to look at her while she is undressed and save her.” (TB Sota 21b, Sefaria.org translation)

We serve God best when were kind and compassionate to all those around us.

It’s not worth a peruta -lo shaveh peruta -לא שוה פרוטה.” TB Baba Kamma 105

According to Jewish law if something is worth less than one peruta, then is considered to have no value at all. This understanding gives rise to a Hebrew expression denoting something has no value, “it’s not worth a peruta -lo shaveh peruta -לא שוה פרוטה.” A thief has to return the item he stole. But what happens when the object he stole is no longer worth a peruta? That’s exactly Rava’s question on today’s daf TB Bab Kamma 105.

“Rava raises a dilemma: If one robbed another of two bundles of goods that were worth one peruta in total, and he returned one of them to the robbery victim, what is the halakha? Do we say that now there is no longer a stolen item in the possession of the robber, as the remaining bundle is worth less than one peruta, and he has therefore fulfilled his obligation to return the stolen item; or perhaps we say that since the robber did not return the stolen item that was in his possession in its entirety, he is obligated to return the second bundle?” (Sefaria.org translation)

He answers his own question, but it’s in the enigmatic and needs further explanation 

“Rava himself then resolves the dilemma: There is no stolen item here, as the remaining bundle is worth less than one peruta; there is no returning of a stolen item here. The Gemara expresses surprise at this expression: If there is no stolen item here, as what remains is insignificant, it follows that there is fulfillment of the mitzva of returning the stolen item here, and the robber ought to be exempt, as he is no longer considered to be in possession of a stolen item. The Gemara explains that this is what Rava is saying: Even though the robber is exempt from returning the second bundle, as there is no stolen item here, there is nevertheless no fulfillment of the mitzva of returning a stolen item here, since the returned bundle was worth less than one peruta as well.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Although the thief is no longer liable for his theft and he still wants to right the wrong he committed, he must return the stolen object even though it’s no longer worth a peruta.

 

 

We learn two things from a debate between Rav Yosef and Rav Huna TB Baba Kamma 102

We learn two things from a debate between Rav Yosef and Rav Huna on today’s daf TB Baba Kamma 102. We shall learn a rule in deciding the halakha and the origin of our massekhet.

Concerning the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda about the dyer who accidentally dyes some wool the wrong color back in the Mishna on daf TB Baba Kamma 100b the Gemara relates the following story:

“Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rabbi Abba, and they were both sitting before Rav Huna. And Rav Huna was sitting and saying: … the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Yosef turned his face in disdain of Rav Huna’s statement…

“But with regard to the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why do I need it? This is an example of the Mishna recording a dispute, and afterward recording only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion. And the principle is that when the Mishna records a dispute, and afterward records only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion, then the halakha is in accordance with the unattributed opinion.

“The Gemara identifies the dispute and the unattributed mishna. The dispute is found in tractate Bava Kamma: If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool (Rabbi Meir holds when the dyer dyes the wool the wrong color, he becomes an accidental thief. When a thief changes the item he stole, he acquires it and only has to pay the victim the cost of the original object at the time of theft-gg). Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the expenses, the owner of the wool gives the expenses to the dyer. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement (Rabbi Yehuda doesn’t hold in this case the dyer is an accidental thief who acquires dyed wool. He has to give this unfortunate customer the dyed wool as a fine. This dyed wool is worth more than undyed wool. Nevertheless, the customer has to pay whatever is less, the enhancement to the product or the expenses of dying the product-gg). And the unattributed mishna appears in tractate Bava Metzia, as we learned in a mishna there (76a): Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges from an agreement is at a disadvantage. This unattributed mishna accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a craftsman who deviates from his assignment receives either the expenses or the enhancement, whichever is of lesser value.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Although Rabbi Huna agrees with the above general principle, he pushes back saying that it is necessary to decide that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda because these two mishnayot are not sequential. “And Rav Yosef would respond: All of Nezikin, i.e., Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra, is one tractate.” (Sefaria.org translation) That’s enough to make them sequential.

This is the second thing we learn from this discussion. At one time there was a 30 chapter massekhet Nezikin (damages). It was broken into three equal massekhtot; each containing 10 chapters. I’m guessing that it was easier to memorize the Gemara broken down into three different massekhtot.

 

Going above and beyond the letter of the law TB Baba Kama 100

The Gemara on daf TB 99 taught that a true expert in a field is exempt from liability when he makes a mistake. Since the person is an expert he is not considered negligent. The daf concludes with the story that teaches an important value lesson.

“There was a certain woman who presented a dinar to Rabbi Ḥiyya to assess its authenticity. He said to her: It is a proper coin. The next day she came before him and said to him: I presented it to others, and they told me that it is a bad dinar, and I am not able to spend it. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: Go exchange it for her, and write on my tablet [apinkasi]: This was a bad transaction, as I should not have assessed the coin.

“The Gemara asks: But what is different about Dankhu and Issur, who are exempt due to the fact that they do not need to learn about assessing currency? Rabbi Ḥiyya too did not need to learn, as he was also an expert. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Ḥiyya was not actually required to return a dinar to this woman, but when he did so he acted beyond the letter of the law (לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין).” (Sefaria.org translation)

The sugiyah ends on daf TB Baba Kamma 100 by giving the source for going beyond the letter of the law. Each phrase of the verse is explained in order to teach an important value. “This is as that which Rav Yosef taught concerning the verse: “And you shall show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do” (Exodus 18:20): “And you shall show them”; this is referring to the core of their existence, i.e., Torah study, which is the source of life. “The way”; this is referring to acts of kindness. “They must walk”; this is referring to visiting the sick. “Wherein”; this is referring to the burial of the dead. “The work”; this is referring to conducting oneself in accordance with the law. “That they must do”; this is referring to conducting oneself beyond the letter of the law. This indicates that the Torah mandates that people conduct themselves beyond the letter of the law.” (Sefaria.org translation)

I discovered on the Internet Judge Frank Caprio who epitomizes this quality of showing compassion and willingness to go beyond the letter of the law. Here is just one example of how he treats those who come before him. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyEkMXv9EtU

Our world would be a better place if we followed Rabbi Ḥiyya and Judge Caprio’s example and go beyond the letter of the law in all our relationships.

What does “a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel- אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי,” really mean? TB Baba Kamma 99

 Today’s daf TB Baba Kama 99 litigates whether Rav Asi’s position, a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel- אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי, stated on the previous daf is correct.

“The mishna teaches that if one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to fix, and he damaged it, the carpenter is liable to pay for the damage. Rav Asi says: The Sages taught that a carpenter is liable to pay damages only in a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to drive a nail into them, i.e., he gave the carpenter complete vessels to repair, and he drove the nail into them and broke them. But if one gave wood to a carpenter to build a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he built a chest, a box, or a cabinet from the wood, and before giving it to the owner the carpenter broke them, he is exempt from paying for the damage caused to these vessels, and must pay only for the damage caused to the wood.

“What is the reason for this? It is because a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel. The craftsman is considered to have acquired the vessel through his work, which enhances its value, and it remains in his possession until he returns it to the owners. Consequently, if he damages the vessel in any way, he is damaging his own item, and must return only the value of the raw materials to the owners.” (Sefaria.org translation)

We have learned previously that a change in an item will transfer ownership. For example, if the thief makes a change in the stolen object, the thief acquires the stolen object (שנוי קונה) and pays the victim the cost of the stolen object at the time of the theft.

The Schottenstein edition of the Talmud Bavli on our massehket writes:  

“Rav Asi maintains that when one contracts a craftsman to complete a specific job for a specific amount of money, we do not view the craftsman as earning a wage. Rather, we view him as becoming a partial owner in the product that he creates. Thus, in the case of the carpenter, the owner owns the wood and the carpenter owns the improvement he made to the wood. When he subsequently returns the finished product to the owner, he is in effect ‘selling’ his portion in the finished product to the owner, and the payment he receives from the owner is considered ‘proceeds of a sale,’ rather than a wage. As such, if the contractor fashioned the wood into a utensil and then broke it before returning it, he is liable to pay only for the value of the wood that he received from the owner, not from the value of the finished utensil. For he- the craftsman- was the owner of the improvement at the time that he damaged it.

“Rashba explains that the craftsman acquires all the improvement (even the amount in excess of his fee) in the event that he ruins the utensil, since it is certain they did not improve it in order to be liable to pay the owner for ruining that improvement. And in the event they does not ruin the utensil, he acquires only a portion of the improvement corresponding to his fee.” (daf 98b5, note 49)

Disagreeing, Rebbeinu Baruhk explains that the craftsman acquires the entire vessel because of his improvement. The Rebbeinu Yisheyahu of Trani rights that this concept was only said concerning the obligation of the craftsman. He is not liable for the enhancement of the vessel if he damages it. He has no right to the object itself.

Just as the Gemara remains inconclusive whether Rav Asi is correct or not, so too poskin arrive at different conclusions.