Is the law based on logic or textual analysis? TB Zevakhim 3

Yesterday we learned that Rav Pappa missed Rava’s excellent class the night before. Rava raised a contradiction between two mishnayot and then resolved the contradiction. On today’s daf TB Zevakhim 3 Ravina continued to fill in Rav Pappa what he missed the night before.

“Rava further raises another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering (khatat חַטָאת) that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering (olah עוֹלָה) is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered the animal for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat (khulin-חוּלִין ), it is fit? Apparently, only improper intent that is of its type, i.e., for the sake of another offering, ruins the offering and renders it unfit, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type, i.e., for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, is disregarded and does not ruin it. (דְּמִינַהּ מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ, דְּלָאו מִינַהּ לָא מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ)” (Sefaria.org translation) In other words, since the khatat and the olah are similar in the fact that they are both sacrifices offered up on the altar and the Temple, the wrong intention disqualifies the original sacrifice. Since a khatat is a sacrifice offered up in the Temple and khulin cannot be offered up in the Temple and it is eaten as part of any meal anywhere in the world.

The Gemara tests whether this principle of similarity ruins the sacrifice while difference does not by bringing a Mishna in Kelim dealing with ritual unreadiness. Ultimately the Gemara resolves this contradiction as well. This ruling is not based on logic, but rather on textual analysis “And he resolves the contradiction as follows: There, with regard to deviation from the type of offering, the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). And here a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit.” (Sefaria.org translation)