Help facing our fears #Shavuot#devartorah

A phobia is defined as the “irrational fear” of certain things or situations. Arachnophobia is a fear of spiders (though some might argue that is a perfectly rational thing to be afraid of!). Then there’s globophobia and xocolatophobia. These and some 400 other phobias are real and documented. It seems we can become afraid of most anything.

On our holiday of Shavuot we shall read about the Revelation on Mount Sinai. Our Torah reading tells of the Israelites’ fear of receiving the 10 Commandments: “When the people saw the thunder and lightning… they trembled with fear” (Exodus 20:18) Moses comforted them saying, “Be not afraid (תִּירָ֒אוּ֒); for God has come only in order to test you, and in order that the fear (יִרְאָת֛וֹ) of God may be ever with you....” (Verse 20) Moses seems to contradict himself: “Don’t be afraid but be afraid.” In fact, the root of Hebrew word for fear “ירא” contains at least two meanings-a trembling terror of something or a reverent awe of God.

We may laugh to learn that globophobia is the fear balloons and xocolatophobia is a fear of chocolate. The more serious bottom line about phobias is that we can be afraid of all kinds of things. Fears creep into our lives like spiders, and the world can be a scary place. The rise of anti-Semitism throughout the world is real and well documented. As we face our fears and fight anti-Semitism in our midst, Shavuot reminds us that God is awesome. We trust in God’s love to give us strength for today and hope for tomorrow so that bitterness will be kept far from us and despair not overcome us in the midst of darkness.

 

When can I get a Mulligan? TB Makkot 28

In golf the golfer can ask for a Mulligan which is a do over. Similarly if a person regrets the shavuah he has taken, he can ask a Sage to release him from his vow. Today’s daf TB Makkot 28 discusses when it’s too late to be released from the vow. “Rava says: If one took an oath about a (whole-gg) loaf and then ate it, if he left an olive-bulk of it, he may request that his oath about the loaf be dissolved. If he ate the whole loaf, he may no longer request that his oath about it be dissolved.” (daf 27b, Sefaria.org translation) Obviously after the person has completely violated the vow, the opportunity to be released has passed. There’s no point of return.

What is that point of no return? As long as the “story” hasn’t come to a conclusion, a person can ask to be released from the oath. Ameimar defines the conclusion of the oath’s violation.

“Ameimar said, in contrast to the opinion of Rava: Even if he ate the entire loaf he may still request dissolution of the oath. If he ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the oath, it is a situation where he has not yet brought the offering he is liable to bring. If he ate it intentionally, it is a situation where he has not yet received lashes. But if he was already tied to the stake in order to receive lashes, he can no longer request that his oath be dissolved, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: If one had already been tied to the stake in order to receive lashes, and he ran away from the court and escaped, he is exempt from receiving lashes, as being tied to the stake is regarded as the beginning of receiving the lashes; once he has escaped, he is treated as though he were already flogged.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rambam poskins like Ameimar. “When a person takes a sh'vuat bitui regarding the future and violated his oath, e.g., he took an oath that he would not eat a loaf of bread and ate it, if he changes his mind, he may ask a sage to repeal it after eating it before bringing his sacrifice if he [ate it] inadvertently or before he was lashed if he did so willingly. [If the sage] releases the oath, he is exempt from the sacrifice or from the lashes. Moreover, even if they bound him [in preparation for lashes], he asked for the repeal of the oath and it was released before they began to administer lashes, he is exempt.” (Mishneh Torah, Oaths 6:18, Sefaria.org translation)

 

More interesting facts about Shavuot TB Shavuot 25-27

Starting with daf TB Shavuot 25 the Gemara fine tunes the definition of a shavua (שְׁבוּעָה), an oath. What’s the difference between a neder and a shavuah? A person makes a neder on an item or object. For example, a neder would be “this apple is forbidden to me as if it were a sacrifice.” A shavuah applies to the person. For example, a shavuah would be “I make an oath that I will not derive any benefit from my neighbor.”

Both Rav and Shmuel agree for a shavuah to be valid it has to work in a positive statement as well as a negative statement. For example of such a shavuah would be “I take an oath that I will go to the synagogue tomorrow.” “I make a shavuah that I won’t go to the synagogue tomorrow.”

Shmuel adds another criteria for a shavuah to be valid. It has to work both in the future tense as well as the past tense. For example, “I take a shavuah that I did not go to the synagogue yesterday.” “I take a shavuah they won’t go to the synagogue tomorrow.”

They disagree about taking an oath involving another person. “With regard to one who says: On my oath so-and-so threw a stone into the sea, or: On my oath he did not throw it, Rav says: If it was later discovered that what he said was false, he is liable to bring an offering for his oath. And Shmuel says: He is exempt.” (daf 25a, Sefaria.org translation) Shmuel argues this is not a valid shavuah because the one taking the oath has no control over what the person will do in the future.

For a shavuah to take effect it has to be verbalized. “Shmuel says: Even after one decided to take an oath, he needs to express it with his lips for it to take effect, as it is stated in the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4).” (daf 26b, Sefaria.org translation)

A shavuah only deals with things that are optional and volitional. Making a shavuah to observe a mitzvah or to annul a mitvah is an invalid shavuah. “The Sages taught in a baraita: One might have thought that when one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he would be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Just as doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and does not refrain, so that he is exempt from bringing the offering.” (Sefaria.org translation)  For example, one cannot make a valid shavuah saying “I will eat matza on Passover” or “I won’t eat matza on Passover.

“The baraita continues: One might have thought that when one takes an oath to perform a mitzva and does not perform it, that he would be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good.” Just as doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to perform a mitzva and does not perform it, so that he is exempt from bringing the offering.”

According to TB Makkot 27a one may take an oath to harm himself! “One might have thought that when one takes an oath to harm himself and he does not harm himself, that he could be exempt from liability. The verse states: “To do evil, or to do good.” Just as doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action. I include as liable one who takes an oath to harm himself and does not harm himself, since it is his prerogative to harm himself or not.” (Sefaria.org translation) Tosefot ד"ה אָבִיא נִשְׁבַּע לְהָרַע לְעַצְמוֹ cites the Gemara in TB Baba Batra 91b to show that this is not a universal position. Rambam poskins “If a person took an oath to harm himself, e.g., he took an oath to inflict injury upon himself, the oath takes effect even though he is not allowed to do so. If he does not harm himself, he is liable for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.” (Mishneh Torah, Oaths 5:17)

 

 

 

The warning of the Jubilee year and all Trump’s big beautiful bill #Behar-Bekhokotai#devartorah#parashathashavua

“At the heart of the first half of week’s parasha, Behar-Bekhukotai, is the visionary concept of returning land to its original owner at the end of a 50-year cycle.  This prevents the polarization of society into two classes: wealthy, powerful landowners on the one hand and permanently impoverished people on the other. In an agrarian society, a farmer who sold all the land to pay debts had no prospect of being anything other than a servant…(One of the moral objectives of this law is that) no person should be condemned to permanent servitude.” (Etz Hayyim commentary below the line, page 738)

Unfortunately Israel did not always live up to this goal and our ancestors paid the price for their behavior. “The prophet Jeremiah predicted 70 years of exile in Babylonia to make up for the 70 sabbatical years the people neglected during their approximately 500 years of living in Israel as is written, ‘Those who survived the sword he exiled to Babylon, and they became his and his sons’ servants till the rise of the Persian kingdom, in fulfillment of the word of the LORD spoken by Jeremiah, until the land paid back its sabbaths; as long as it lay desolate it kept sabbath, till seventy years were completed.’” (II Chronicles 36:20-21) (Ibid)

Today I am terribly concerned about continued growing economic gap between the very rich and the rest of our countrymen. The top 1% already owns 30% of our nation’s wealth. Pres. Trump’s and the GOP’s proposed budget continues the growing income disparity between the top 1% and the rest of us. “High-income households and profitable corporations would grow even wealthier under Republican proposals for trillions of dollars in new or extended tax cuts, even as Republican proposals for trillions of dollars of cuts to health assistance, food assistance, and other programs would leave more children in poverty, more families without stable housing, and more people without health coverage. Families would also face an additional burden: higher prices for many basic goods due to the tariffs that President Trump has begun to impose, which would act as a large tax increase on U.S. consumers.” (https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/2025-budget-stakes-high-income-tax-cuts-price-hiking-tariffs-would-harm) in the words of Robert Reisch, “It is reverse Robin Hood.”

As in the case of ancient Israel, I shudder the price our country will pay if this trend continues.

 

 

 

 

 

What is Ravin’s definition of a shevua? TB Shavuot 21

Yesterday we learned when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia he cites Rabbi Yoḥanan’s definition of a shevua.

Shevuat Sheker (שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר) “When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, relating to the future, and does not fulfill it, it is a false oath. And its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). ” (Sefaria.org translation) The shevua deals with something the future.

Shevuat Shav (שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא) “(the continuation Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement-gg) “. If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, relating to past actions, and it is a lie, it is an oath taken in vain, and its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7).” (Sefaria.org translation) The shevua deals with something the future.

Today’s daf TB Shavuot 21 we learned when Ravina came to Babylonia he cites a different version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s definition of a shevua.

Shevuat Sheker (שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר) “When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, it is a false oath if it is not true. And its prohibition in the Torah is from: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12).” (Sefaria.org translation)

Shevuat Shav (שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא) “(the continuation Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement-gg) “And which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true.” An example of this would be: I swear that this is a gold bar when everybody can easily see that it is a lead bar.

Rambam defines a Shevuat Sheker: “If a person takes an oath concerning one of these four categories and does the opposite, he has taken a false oath (שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר). For example, he took an oath not to eat and he ate, that he would eat and he did not eat, that he ate, when he did not or that he did not eat, when he had eaten. With regard to these matters, [Leviticus 19:12] states: "Do not swear falsely in My name." If he willfully swears falsely, he is liable for lashes. If he does so inadvertently, he must bring an adjustable guilt offering, as [ibid. 5:4] states: "And it became concealed from him and he did not know and became guilty." (Mishneh Torah, Oaths 1:3)

He defines Shevuat Shav: “[The prohibition against taking] a sh'vuat shav (שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא), an oath taken in vain, also subdivides into four categories: the first, a person took an oath concerning a known matter that was not true, e.g., he took an oath that a man was a woman, a woman was a man, that a marble pillar was gold, or concerning other similar factors.” (Mishneh Torah, Oaths 1:4)  (Sefaria.org translation)

 

 

What is a shevua and what is a neder? TB Shavuot 20

Today we begin the third chapter of our massekhet with TB Shavuot 20. We have studied almost 48% of our massekhet without learning anything about shavuot (the plural of shevua)! That changes now. To best understand today’s daf and going forward, I think we need a short introduction of the terms we shall come across as we study.

Shevua (שְׁבוּעָה)-an oath. A shevua is binding on the person taking the oath. For example, I take an oath I take a shevua not to eat this loaf of bread. The prohibition is going on the individual. If he transgresses his shevua intentionally, he is punished with lashes. If he transgresses his shevua unintentionally, he brings to the Temple a sliding scale sacrifice (קרבן עולה ויורד). The person cannot make a shevua what is already prohibited in the Torah since all of Israel took a vow to uphold the laws in the Torah. “וַיִּקַּח֙ סֵ֣פֶר הַבְּרִ֔ית וַיִּקְרָ֖א בְּאׇזְנֵ֣י הָעָ֑ם וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ כֹּ֛ל אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּ֥ר יְהֹוָ֖ה נַעֲשֶׂ֥ה וְנִשְׁמָֽע: -Then he took the record of the covenant and read it aloud to the people. And they said, “All that YHVH  has spoken we will faithfully do!” (Exodus 24:7)

Neder (נֶדֶר)-a vow. A neder is on the object itself. For example, the contents of this coffee cup is prohibited to me. There are no legal consequences for violating a neder. One can make a neder on a mitzvah because is on the mitzvah and not the individual.

Shevuat Sheker (שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר) “When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, relating to the future, and does not fulfill it, it is a false oath. And its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). ” (Sefaria.org translation) The shevua deals with something the future.

Shevuat Shav (שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא) “(the continuation Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement-gg) “. If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, relating to past actions, and it is a lie, it is an oath taken in vain, and its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7).” (Sefaria.org translation) The shevua deals with something the future.

Association (הַתְפָּסָה) only works according to Rava with nedarim (the plural of neder will will). (As Shmuel teaches) “The verse states: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord” (Numbers 30:3). The redundancy in the phrase “vows a vow” teaches that when one associates a vow with another prohibition, it does not take effect unless he vows by associating it with an item forbidden by means of a vow. Association is derived from this verse and is limited to vows.” (Sefaria.org translation) The halakha follows Rava.

 

What’s the difference between mit’asek (מִּתְעַסֵּק) and shogeg (שׁוֹגֵג)? TB Shavuot 19

Both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva agree when one only brings a sliding scale sacrifice (korbon ‘oleh vyored-קרבן עולה ויורד). “The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing, whether it is the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). The juxtaposition of the words “and it is hidden” to the words “a creeping animal” teaches that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering when it was hidden from him that he had contracted ritual impurity from a creeping animal, but not when it was hidden from him that he was entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food. Rabbi Akiva says that it is from the words “and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” that it is derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for a lapse of awareness about his impurity, but not for a lapse of awareness about the Temple or the sacrificial food.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Although they agree, their interpretation of verses are different. For Rabbi Eliezer the word “ba-בָּהּ” in the verse אֽוֹ־הוֹדַ֤ע אֵלָיו֙ חַטָּאת֔וֹ אֲשֶׁ֥ר חָטָ֖א בָּ֑הּ -or the sin of which he is guilty is made known (Leviticus 4:23) is extraneous. “These words emphasize the fact that one is liable only when he intends to do the prohibited act, to the exclusion of one who acts unawares (mit’asek-מִּתְעַסֵּק)and has no intention to perform the action. That is to say, if one was preoccupied with another matter and, acting unawares, he transgressed a prohibition, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.” (Sefaria.org translation)

What’s the difference between mit’asek and shogeg (שׁוֹגֵג)? Steinsaltz defines mit’asek: “acting unawares, i.e. a person who performed an act by accident without having any intention of doing so. Not to be confused with shogeg -“acting unwittingly”-when a person performs an act by mistake, because of lack of information

With regard to prohibitions: (1) There is no need to bring sacrificial atonement for transgressions committed while unaware, unless the transgression entailed physical pleasure, such as eating prohibited food or engaging in prohibited sexual relations. (2) with regard to positive commandments: According to some authorities, one who performs a mitzvah while unaware does not fulfill his obligation, even according to those who maintain that mitzvot can be fulfilled without the express intention of doing so. (The Talmud: A Reference Guide)

A modern example of mit’asek for person who doesn’t use electricity on Shabbat is one who enters a room on Shabbat and accidentally brushes against the light switch and turns the lights on or off. A modern example of shogeg is one who forgets that today is Shabbat altogether and does one of the 39 forbidden prohibitions like gardening or writing a letter.

 

Size doesn’t matter TB Shavuot 15

When the Temple stood in Jerusalem we had the power to enlarge the Courtyard of the Priests (the ‘azarah-עֲזָרָה). Today’s daf TB Shavuot 15 discusses in detail the procedure of sanctifying the extension. In the procession delineating the new boundary was two thanks-offerings (todot-תּוֹדוֹת). 40 loaves of bread, 30 of which were  matzah and 10 were hametz, leavened, accompanied each  todah sacrifice. What was carried the animal or the bread? And if it was the bread, was it the matzah or the hametz? The Gemara answers these questions.

“And with regard to the two thanks-offerings that are mentioned here, the reference is to their loaves, but not to their flesh. An animal thanks-offering is accompanied by forty loaves of bread that are brought as a meal-offering. Ten loaves are leavened, and the remainder is comprised of ten each of three types of unleavened bread. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Ḥisda said: As the verse states with regard to the consecration of the wall of Jerusalem in the days of Ezra: “And I placed two large thanks-offerings, and we went in procession to the right upon the wall” (Nehemiah 12:31).

“The Gemara clarifies the meaning of this verse: What is meant by “large”? If we say that the animals of the thanks-offering were literally from a large species, i.e., oxen, rather than from a small species, i.e., sheep, let the verse state that they were oxen. Rather, let us say that he took animals from among the largest and the finest quality of their species.

“The Gemara challenges this: Is the size of the offering of any importance before Heaven? But isn’t it taught in a mishna (Menaḥot 110a): It is stated with regard to an animal burnt-offering: “A fire offering, a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 1:9), and it is also stated with regard to a bird burnt-offering: “A fire offering, a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 1:17), and it is also stated with regard to a meal-offering: “A fire offering, a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 2:2). The same term is used in all three cases even though the three offerings are of different value. This teaches that one who brings a substantial sacrifice and one who brings a modest sacrifice have equal merit, and both offerings are accepted as having a pleasing aroma, provided that one directs his heart to his Father in Heaven.

“Rather, let us say that “large thanks-offerings” means the larger element in the thanks-offering loaves. And what is that? The leavened loaves, as we learned in a mishna (Menaḥot 76b): The meal part of the thanks-offering came from five Jerusalem se’a of flour, which are equivalent to six wilderness se’a. The se’a referred to in the Bible when the Jewish people were in the wilderness is smaller than the se’a used later in Jerusalem. This is equivalent to two ephahs, each ephah being three wilderness se’a. These two ephahs are twenty measures of a tenth of an ephah. Ten of these tenths were used to make leavened loaves and ten of these tenths were used to make unleavened loaves. And the unleavened loaves were of three types: Loaves of matza, wafers, and measures of flour mixed with water and oil. Accordingly, the leavened loaves were three times the size of the unleavened ones, and it was the leavened loaves that were used to consecrate additions to the city.” (Sefaria.org translation)

By reason of deduction the loaves of bread had to be shlepped in this parade and not animal sacrifices. The leavened loaves of bread were carried because they were larger in size than the matzah loaves.

I think a key lesson from this daf is the importance of a person’s kavanah. Kavanah refers to the intention, concentration, and sincerity a person brings to a mitzvah. It emphasizes the importance of focusing the mind and heart during rituals to ensure they are not performed mechanically but with genuine purpose and connection. The Gemara is teaching us what makes an acceptable sacrifice is not the size or the cost of the sacrifice, but rather the person’s kavanah. “one who brings a substantial sacrifice and one who brings a modest sacrifice have equal merit, and both offerings are accepted as having a pleasing aroma, provided that one directs his heart to his Father in Heaven.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The same is true for the observance of all mitzvot. We need to be mindful that our prayers and all other commandments don’t devolve into mechanical performance.

 

 

 

 

Do the kohanim, priests, contribute to the half-Shekel or are they exempt? TB Shavuot 14

Everybody agrees that the bull (פָּר) the High Priest sacrifices on Yom Kippur atones the priests for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. Everybody agrees that the scapegoat (שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ) sent into the desert on Yom Kippur atones for the other transgressions of the Jewish people. And finally, everybody agrees Israel gains atonement on Yom Kippur through the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary (שָׂעִיר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בִּפְנִים).

Today’s daf TB Shavuot 14 wants to know how do the priests gain atonement for their other transgressions. Rabbi Shimon holds that they gain this atonement from the bull the High Priest sacrifices on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yehuda holds that they gain atonement from the scapegoat. The Gemara explains why Rabbi Shimon doesn’t believe that the scapegoat atones for the priests’ other transgressions.

“What is different about the goat of the people that explains why it does not atone for the priests? The difference is that the priests did not forfeit any money over the purchase of it. Therefore, it does not atone for the priests, but only for the Israelites, as it is written with regard to the internal goat: “Of the people.” With regard to the bull of Aaron as well, the priests do not forfeit any money over the purchase of it, so it follows that they should not achieve atonement through it. And therefore, to explain why they do achieve atonement, the baraita states that all of the priests are collectively referred to as: His household.” (Sefaria.org translation)

This position necessitates that the priests do not contribute the half-Shekel like the rest of Israel for all public sacrifices. However there is an opinion in daf TY Shekalim 2 and daf TB Menakhot 21b that the priests do contribute that half-Shekel. According to this opinion they should gain atonement for other transgressions through the scapegoat. Tosefot ד"ה דְּלָא קָא חָסְרִי בֵּיהּ מָמוֹנָא answers that the priests participation is not absolute. For example, if there’s not enough ready money to purchase the scapegoat and they have to solicit funds for its purchase, the priests do not have to participate in this fundraiser. The Tosefot also ask if the priests are not partners in the half-Shekel donation, how can they gain atonement through the sin offering which is a goat of Rosh Hodesh (the new month) and the Pilgrimage holidays? The answer is that Yom Kippur is unique because the atonement is not uniform amongst the entire people of Israel. On the other hand all public sacrifices atone for the entire public and certainly priests are also part and parcel of the public.

Where to look for happines #Emor#Parashathashavua#devartorah

In this week’s Torah portion, Emor, we read about the cycle of holidays. Of course you know in the fall, we celebrate Rosh Hashana, Yom Kippur, and Sukkot.

Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch noted that Rosh Hashana in the Torah is observed for only one day (Rabbinical law renders it two days.) Yom Kippur is only one day, while Sukkot is seven days. Rosh Hashana is a day of shaking us out of ways of life displeasing to the Almighty. Yom Kippur is a day of fasting and awareness of our faults and mistakes. In counter distinction Sukkot instructs us to enjoy God’s blessings and be happy before the Almighty. There is only one day for Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur but a whole week for the joyful celebration of Sukkot. This is what is most characteristic of Judaism. One shouldn’t be bowed down and broken before God. The normal mood of one’s life should be the joy of life which runs equally throughout the year thanking the Almighty for His abundant gifts. (Based upon Growth Through Torah by Zelig Pliskin, page 287)

If we’re supposed to be happy why is it so hard for so many people? Hopefully this wonderful sufi story which will inspire us to find happiness in our lives.

The Sack

Mula came upon a frowning man walking along the road to town. “What’s wrong?” he asked. The man held up a tattered bag and moaned, “All that I own in this wide world barely fills this miserable, wretched sack.”

“Too bad,” said Mula and with that, he snatched the bag from the man’s hands and ran down the road with it. Having lost everything, the man burst into tears and more miserable than before, continued walking.

Meanwhile, Mula quickly ran around the bend and placed the man’s sack in the middle of the road where he would have to come upon it. When the man saw his bag sitting in the road before him, he laughed with joy, and shouted, “My sack! I thought I’d lost you! Watching through the bushes, Mula chuckled. “Well, that’s one way to make someone happy!”

If you want to be happy everyday starting today, cultivate a gratitude attitude by identifying the happiness that is already there in your lives, in the present, and to experience it for what it is worth.

As the story shows, happiness is not a distant bird somewhere in some bush. It is often perching right upon our own shoulders. Often we fail to recognize it unless it flies away or as in the story, gets taken away.

I wish all of you this Shabbat and the days that follow a pleasant discover of this already existing happiness.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yehuda Ilai disagree on the extent of Yom Kippur’s ability to grant atonement TB Shavuot 13

Dr. Lisa Miller in her book The Awakened Brain: the New Science of Spirituality and Quest foran Inspired Life writes synchronicity occurs when our inner and outer lives are aligned. One of her students Lydia Cho discovered the more aware of synchronicity people became, the more synchronicity they experienced. The more people pay attention to synchronicity, the more it becomes apparent, as the when our eyes are more open to it, synchronicity picks up steam, growing more forthcoming and abundant. Cho also found this enhanced perception of synchronicity goes hand-in-hand with increased spiritual awareness-and better mental health. (Pages 93-94) Dr. Abraham Twersky put it simply “coincidences are only God working His miracles in incognito.”

 Ever since I was an undergraduate student at the Jewish Theological Seminary I am amazed how interconnected my Torah Leshma (Torah for its own sake ) studies came up in my classes or other obligations. Synchronicity happened again today. This week’s Torah portion Emor concludes with the holiday cycle. I wondered what I was going to speak about in my short devar Torah this Shabbat. I’m going to share on Shabbat today’s daf TB Shavuot 13 because it presents an interesting disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbe) and Rabbi Yehuda Ilai on the power of Yom Kippur to grant atonement.

 Rebbe holds that Yom Kippur grants atonement even if the person hasn’t repented for all transgressions except three.

 “As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For all transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether one repented, or whether one did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, except for one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven, by denying God’s existence, and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning, and one who nullifies the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. For these, if one repented, Yom Kippur atones, and if not, Yom Kippur does not atone.

“The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as it is taught in a baraita in interpretation of the verse: “For he scorned the word of the Lord and nullified His commandment; that person will be cut off [hikkaret tikkaret], his sin is upon him” (Numbers 15:31): “For he scorned the word of the Lord”; this is referring to one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning. “And nullified His commandment”; this is referring to one who nullified the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. The use of the double verb form hikkaret tikkaret teaches that he will be cut off, i.e., he is liable to receive karet, before Yom Kippur, and he will still be cut off after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur does not atone for him.

“One might have thought that this applies even if he repented. To counter this, the verse states: “His sin is upon him,” by which God indicates: I said that Yom Kippur does not atone for these sins only when his sin is still upon him, as he did not repent. It is apparent from this baraita that it is only for the three sins mentioned that Yom Kippur does not atone without repentance, but Yom Kippur atones for other sins even if one did not repent.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rabbi Yehuda Ilai holds that the person must repent if Yom Kippur is going to have any effect to atone for sins.

“As it is taught in a baraita recorded in the Sifra[1]: One might have thought that Yom Kippur would atone for those who repent and for those who do not repent, and this assertion is supported by the following logical inference: Although it would appear that since a sin-offering and a guilt-offering atone and Yom Kippur atones, it should follow that just as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering atone only for those who repent, so too, Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent, this comparison is flawed. One can claim: What is notable about a sin-offering and a guilt-offering? They are notable in that they do not atone for intentional sins like they do for unwitting sins. Can you say the same about Yom Kippur, which does atone for intentional sins as it does for unwitting sins?

“The baraita continues: Since it is the case that the atonement of Yom Kippur is more far-reaching in that it atones for intentional sins as it does for unwitting sins, it follows that it should atone both for those who repent and for those who do not repent. To counter this, the verse states: “Yet on the tenth day of this seventh month it is Yom Kippur” (Leviticus 23:27). The word “yet” serves to divide and limit the atonement of Yom Kippur in that it atones only for those who repent.

“Rav Yosef attributes the baraita to Rabbi Yehuda: Whose opinion is expressed by the unattributed baraitot in the Sifra? Rabbi Yehuda. And he says: For those who repent, yes, Yom Kippur atones, but for those who do not repent, Yom Kippur does not atone.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rambam poskins: “Yom Kippur, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings do not generate atonement unless one repents and believes in the atonement they grant. If, however, one rebels against them, they do not generate atonement for him.

“What is implied? A person was in a state of rebellion, but brought a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, saying or thinking in his heart that these will not generate atonement. Accordingly, even though they were offered as commanded, they do not generate atonement for him. When he repents from his rebellion, he must bring another sin-offering and/or guilt-offering.

“Similarly, when one is in a state of rebellion on Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur does not atone for him. Therefore if he was obligated to bring a tentative guilt-offering and Yom Kippur passed while he was in a state of rebellion, Yom Kippur does not generate atonement for him. When he repents after Yom Kippur, he is obligated to bring all the tentative guilt-offerings for which he is liable.” (Sefaria.org translation)

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[1] The Sifra is Midrash Halakha on the book of Leviticus

Even the altar likes dessert TB Makkot 12

Rabbi Shimon doesn’t hold the principal “לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן-The court tacitly stipulates concerning them that they should be consecrated for the day on which they are ultimately brought” (Sefaria.org translation) Consequently, any leftover ‘ola sacrifice, a complete burnt offering, can be repurposed as another ‘ola sacrifice. The same is not true with a Khatat sacrifice, a sin offering. It cannot be used as an ‘ola sacrifice. In order to desanctify it and repurpose it as an ‘ola, one must put the animal out to pasture and wait until develops a blemish. Once it has a blemish, it can be redeemed and that money is used to buy ‘olot sacrifices.

Even the altar has a slow “season” when no one is offering up sacrifices. These repurposed ‘olot are offered up on the altar during this slack time so that the altar is constantly being used. These sacrifices are called desserts because they come after “the main meal.”

“Rabbi Yoḥanan explained that Rabbi Shimon holds that lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings that remain unused at the end of the fiscal year are offered as supplementary offerings. The Gemara notes: This is also taught in a baraita: What type of offerings would they bring from the surplus lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings? They would bring from them dessert, like white figs, for the altar. The Gemara asks: Are white figs ever offered on the altar? But isn’t it written: “For any leavening or fruit honey you shall not cause to go up in smoke as a fire-offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? The term “fruit honey” includes all tree fruits. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥanina teaches: The supplementary offerings are to the altar like white figs for a person.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Not all animals are eligible to be “dessert.” “The Gemara discusses what may be used for the supplementary offerings: Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught: One does not supplement the offerings of the altar with a bird burnt-offering. Rava said: This ruling is an absurdity [burkha]. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: What is the absurdity? The ruling has a basis. I said this ruling to Rav Naḥman, and said it to him in the name of Rav Shimi of Neharde’a, as Rav Shimi of Neharde’a says: The surplus lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings are allocated for communal gift offerings, and there is not a bird burnt-offering that is offered by the community.” (Sefaria.org translation) Only bulls, goats, and sheep are offered up as communal gift offerings.

What do you do with leftovers? TB Shavuot 10-11

Some introductory remarks are needed to understand today’s dappim TB Shavuot. 10-11. There are two categories of sanctification, kedushat haguf (קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף) and kedushat damim (קְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים). Kedushat haguf the body of the item is sanctified. For example, when somebody sanctifies an animal for the altar, the very body of the animal is sanctified. It has been endowed with inherent sanctity. The only time a person may redeem it for money is when the animal has a blemish that makes it unfit for the altar. The animal is sanctified forever. On the other hand, kedushat damim signifies only the value of the item is sanctified. For example, if I sanctified a piece of property as a gift to the Temple, I am only sanctifying its value. I can desanctify the piece of property by redeeming it and give the proceeds to the Temple.

Two daily sacrifices the temidin (תְּמִידִין) are offered up in the Temple. One in the morning and one in the afternoon. Each tamid sacrifice has a four day waiting period before being offered up on the altar. Each day the tamid sacrifice is checked for any blemishes. On the fourth day the morning and afternoon tamid sacrifice is offered up. That means that there are six more temidin in the queue each day.

The Temple’s fiscal year begins on 1 Nisan. Money for the new fiscal year is collected during the month of Adar. Once the new fiscal year begins all new sacrifices have to be purchased with money collected during the month of Adar. The question arises on 1 Nisan what do you do with the temidin that remain in last year’s queue? These sacrifices have kedushat haguf and cannot be redeemed.

“Animals purchased with funds collected for public offerings may be sacrificed only during the fiscal year in which those funds were given. For this purpose, the fiscal year begins on the first of Nisan. Generally, once an animal has been consecrated as an offering, then even if for some reason it may no longer be sacrificed, it still cannot be redeemed unless it develops a blemish. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches an exception to this halakha: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Lambs consecrated for the daily offerings that were not needed by the public during the fiscal year in which they were purchased are redeemed, even if they are unblemished, and they may then be used for non-sacred purposes.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Ḥisda is incredulous. “Rabba was sitting and reciting this halakha. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Who will listen to you and Rabbi Yoḥanan, your teacher, with regard to this halakha? Rav Ḥisda clarified: But the sanctity that was inherent in them, to where has it gone? Since these animals were consecrated as offerings, they should have been endowed with inherent sanctity. Only sanctity that inheres in an item’s value, i.e., an item consecrated to the Temple treasury, can be desacralized through redemption, but an item with inherent sanctity can never be desacralized.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara’s answer is quite surprising. “Rabba said: With regard to the consecration of items for public offerings such as the daily offerings and incense, the court tacitly stipulates concerning them as follows: If they are ultimately required to be used as offerings that year, then they are required for that, and they should be consecrated as offerings. But if they are not required that year, then they are only to be consecrated for their value, i.e., for them to be sold and then for their proceeds to be used toward the purchase of offerings.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The same is true with the ketoret (קְּטוֹרֶת), the incense which was prepared at one time for the entire year, and the red heifer. The court tacitly stipulates concerning the as follows: if they are ultimately required to be used as offerings that year, then they are required for that, and they should be consecrated as offerings. But if they are not required that year, then they are only to be consecrated for their value.

Rabbi Akiva’s son Yehoshu is not Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karkha TB Shavuot 6

On daf TB Shavuot 6 Rabbi Akiva’s son Yehoshu asked him a question. “For what reason did the Sages say that the different shades of leprous marks are two types that are four, and proceed to specify their names? Rabbi Akiva said to him: But if not that, what else could they say?” (Sefaria.org translation) First of all, I want to remind everybody that tzara’at isn’t leprosy i.e. Hansen’s disease. The body becomes discolored with the possible four different shades of white. Secondly, if you’re interested, the conversation between father and son continues in the Gemara. I am more interested in Rashi’s identification of Rabbi Yehoshu ben Rabbi Akiva’s identity.

He identifies Rabbi Yehoshu ben Rabbi Akiva to be the one in the same as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karkha because karha means the bald one and everybody knows that Rabbi Akiva was bald. Tosefot disagrees with this identification. They argue that nobody would substitute “the bald one” for one of the greatest rabbi in the tannatic period. Furthermore, we’ve learned in massekhet Baba Metzia that one is forbidden to call somebody by his derogatory nickname like the bald one.

Modern scholarship agrees with Tosefot. Rabbi Yehoshu ben Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karkha are not the same man. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karkha was a fourth-generation tana who lived a long life. Little is known about his relationship with his teachers and colleagues. He was a student of Rabbi Yokhanan ben Nuri. He was a colleague of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yishmael. He also lived during the time of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

He is more known for his aggada then halakha. Some of his more famous quotes are: “One who pretends not to see the opportunity to give tzadakka is as if he has worshiped idolatry” ( Tosefta Peah 4:20) “One who studies Torah but does not review it is like the person who sows seeds but does not harvest.” (Sanhedrin 99a at the bottom) Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karkha also enjoyed to engage in theological disputations with idolaters and heretics in order to defend Judaism. The following is one example.

“A certain heretic asked Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, saying to him: ‘Do you not say that the Holy One blessed be He foresees the future?’ He said to him: ‘Yes.’ [The heretic continued:] ‘But is it not written: “He was saddened in his heart”?’ He said to him: ‘Has a male offspring ever been born to you in your lifetime?’ He said to him: ‘Yes.’ He said to him: ‘What did you do?’ He said to him: ‘I rejoiced and encouraged everyone else to rejoice.’ He said to him: ‘But did you not know that he would ultimately die?’ He said to him: ‘At a time of rejoicing there is rejoicing; at a time of mourning there is mourning.’ He said to him: ‘So was the situation before the Holy One blessed be He, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Seven days the Holy One blessed be He mourned His world before the Flood came to the world. What is the source? “He was saddened [vayitatzev] in his heart,” and atziva is nothing other than mourning, just as it says: “The king is grieving [ne’etzav] over his son”’ (II Samuel 19:3).” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi changed his mind TB Shavuot 4

Since the Mishnah doesn’t attribute Tannaitic authorship, the Gemara analyzes who it could be. There are three possibilities, Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbe).

In order for the Mishnah to be according to Rabbi Yishmael, we have to understand that the perpetrator had to purposely violate the halakha in the cases to receive lashes instead of how we originally understood it that the perpetrator accidentally transgressed. In our Mishna we come to the conclusion that a person receives lashes for an oath even when there’s no action is taken (שבועה שאין בן מעשה). For example, the person swears that he will eat this loaf of bread sometime today, but he never does.

A problem arises with another unattributed Mishna found on daf TB Shavuot 27b. “If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and he then says again: On my oath I will not eat it, and again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he then ate it, he is liable only once. Once the first oath had taken effect, the subsequent oaths could not, as a prohibition cannot take effect where another prohibition is already in place. This is an oath on an utterance, for which one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally breaking it, and for unwittingly breaking it one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.” (Sefaria.org translation) From this Mishna we come to the conclusion that one does not receive lashes for an oath when no action is taken.

We know as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was the final editor of the Mishna, how can we explain the contradiction between our Mishna and the Mishna on daf 27b? Shouldn’t Rebbe be consistent when teaching us the halakha! How do we explain this mixed message? The Gemara on daf TB Shavuot 4 first asks the question and then answers it:

“…according to your reasoning that both mishnayot carry equal weight, then with regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself, when he redacted the Mishna, how could he teach us as unattributed both this opinion in the mishna here and that opinion in the mishna there? This would result in a contradiction.

“Rather, it is apparent that initially Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and so he taught it as an unattributed mishna, and later he retracted his opinion and held that one is not flogged for a violation of such a prohibition, and so he taught that opinion as an unattributed mishna. And he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because a mishna does not move from its place.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rashi ד"ה מִשְׁנָה לֹא זָזָה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ explains that even though Rebbe changed his position from the first Mishna concerning an oath where there’s no action taken, his students had already learned this Mishna and later generations could not forget it and remove it from the Beit Midrash, the study house. Both mishnayot were left in their original place. Nevertheless the wise will understand that the latter is the essence of the law and that Rebbe changed his mind.

We see the evolution of Rebbe’s thoughts on the matter.

The Gemara proves that Rabbi Akiva could not be the author and explains how it’s possible that Rebbe was the author of our Mishna. To see how study the rest of today’s daf.