Tattoos TB Makkot 21

Today’s daf TB Makkot 21 discusses the prohibition of tattooing. “Mishna: One who imprints a tattoo, by inserting a dye into recesses carved in the skin, is also liable to receive lashes. If one imprinted on the skin with a dye but did not carve the skin, or if one carved the skin but did not imprint the tattoo by adding a dye, he is not liable; he is not liable until he imprints and carves the skin, with ink, or with kohl [keḥol], or with any substance that marks. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He is liable only if he writes the name there, as it is stated: “And a tattoo inscription you shall not place upon you, I am the Lord. GEMARA: Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Is Rabbi Shimon saying that one is liable only if he actually inscribes the words “I am the Lord” in his skin? Rav Ashi said to him: No, he is saying as bar Kappara teaches: One is liable only if he inscribes a name of an object of idol worship, as it is stated: “And a tattoo inscription you shall not place upon you, I am the Lord,” which means: Do not place an idolatrous name on your skin, as I am the Lord, and no one else.” (Leviticus 19:28).” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Observant Life: The Wisdom of Conservative Judaism for Contemporary Jews pages 385-386 explains Conservative Judaism’s approach to tattooing.

               All the more significant, then, is the fact that there has been unanimity in

all subsequent legal codes (including that of Maimonides himself- who holds

a similar view of the context of the biblical prohibition according to Rabbi

Shimon in his Mishneh Torah-gg) that the prohibition on tattooing is general and

independent of context. When such things occur in the legal literature, is not

possible to critique the rulings in question on the grounds that they are based on

mistaken views of original contexts. And so, despite the fact that tattooing has

become quite fashionable in recent years (including among Jews, and especially,

and perhaps surprisingly, and secular Israeli society), it cannot be reconciled

with the commitment to live according to traditional Jewish norms. Independent

of its original context, though how could the mandate of those traditional norms

be understood today? Perhaps it can be best understood in our time as the

commitment to be as careful as possible to preserve the integrity of the body

with which each of us is gifted by God (except when that integrity is breached

for medical reasons, or for minimal or nonpermanent cosmetic alterations, such

as ear piercings). This will be, for many, sufficient reason for maintaining

the age-old prohibition of tattooing, and for finding other avenues for

self-expression. It should be noted, however, they having tattoos on one’s body

does not entail any enduring loss of standing in the Jewish community

(despite a mysteriously persistent, though completely mistaken, notion that

 somehow precludes burial in the Jewish cemetery).

 

The halakhic issues attached to tattooing and body piercing are discussed in

detail in a responsum by Rabbi Alan Lucas and published by the Rabbinical

Assembly in CJLS Responsa 1991-2000, pp, 115-120

I once saw a cartoon depicting two old men sitting in rocking chairs at an older age facility talking to another. Each man was covered with tattoos and piercings from head to toe. One man turns to the other and says, “I see that you were an idiot in the 90s too!” When somebody asks me about tattooing, I always advise them to think about it very carefully because tattooing is relatively permanent. Over time the tattoo may change due to the person’s body’s change or what was meaningful when a person was 20 may no longer being meaningful later in life. To remove an unwanted tattoo it’s painful, costly, and time consuming.

If you are interested in an in-depth study of tattooing I recommend following this link https://www.talmudology.com/ for today’s daf.

Hopefully his movie debut will be much better than his haircut. TB Makkot 20

The Torah prohibits a man from rounding the edge of his head based on a verse in Leviticus “You [men] shall not round off the side-growth on your head-לֹ֣א תַקִּ֔פוּ פְּאַ֖ת רֹאשְׁכֶ֑ם” (19:27) The Mishnah on today’s daf TB Makkot 20 enumerates one who runs off the side growth of his head is liable for lashes. “For rounding the edges of his head, one is liable to receive two sets of lashes, one from here, the hair adjacent to one ear, and one from there, the hair adjacent to the other ear.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara goes into much greater detail about this prohibition.

“The Sages taught: The edge of his head is the extremity of his head. And what is the extremity of his head? This is a reference to one who levels the hairline of his temples to the hairline behind his ear and to the hairline of his forehead. There is no hair behind the ears or on the forehead. One who removes the hair from the temples so that they are like those areas violates the prohibition against rounding the edges of his head.

The tanna taught a baraita before Rav Ḥisda: Both one who rounds the edges of his head and one for whom the edges of his head are rounded are flogged. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Is one who eats dates that are in a sieve [arbeila] flogged? By analogy, if a person rounded the edges of another’s head, why should the person whose head was rounded receive lashes? He performed no action. Rav Ḥisda proceeded to explain to the tanna: In response to one who says to you: Who is the tanna of the baraita? Say that it is Rabbi Yehuda, who says: In the case of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is flogged for its violation.

“Rava says: This baraita can be explained as referring to one who rounds the edges of his head for himself, and he is liable both for rounding the edges of his head and for having the edges of his head rounded; and everyone agrees that he is flogged because he performed an action. Rav Ashi says: This baraita can be explained as referring to a case where the one for whom the edges of his head are being rounded assists the person rounding his head, by repositioning his head to facilitate that rounding, and everyone agrees that he is flogged.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Both Rambam (Mishneh Torah, The laws of idolatry, 12:1) and the Shulkhan Arukh (Yoreh De’ah 181:2) poskin one who violates this prohibition by removing the hair with a razor is lashed. 

I’ve been reading Green Lantern, comic books for decades. Earth is the only planet in entire universe that has produced more than one Green Lanter. The original Green Lantern is Alan Scott. The most famous Green Lantern is Hal Jordan. On and off our planet there are these Green Lanterns: Jon Stewart, Kyle Rayner, Jessica Cruz, Guy Gardner, Simon Baz, Jade, and Jo Mullien. At one time Guy Gardner had his own comic book series and in it he ran his bar called Warriors.

Guy Gardner, played by Nathan Fillion, makes his debut in James Gunn's upcoming "Superman" movie, which is scheduled to be released on July 11, 2025. While the character is also slated to appear in the HBO series "Lanterns," the release date for that series is currently unknown, but it's expected to be in early 2026. 

 

Guy has a distinctive haircut and if he was Jewish and lived during Talmudic times, his haircut would be a big no-no as you can see. https://www.facebook.com/p/Guy-Gardner-Warrior-Core-100088675005047/

Hopefully his movie debut will be much better than his haircut.

 

 

  

What is the status of Jerusalem’s holiness today? TB Makkot 19

Today’s daf TB Makkot asks the question what is the status of Jerusalem’s holiness today now that the Temple is destroyed? Is Jerusalem’s holiness in perpetuity or only when the Temple stands? The initial consecration of Jerusalem’s sanctity occurred during King David and King Solomon’s reign If the initial consecration sanctified Jerusalem and the Temple in perpetuity, there’s no need to re-sanctify when the second Temple was built or perhaps even when the third Temple will be built. If it is not sanctified, then at the appropriate time we have to re-sanctify it. The answer to this question determines whether the mitzvot of the firstborn animal and the second tithe. Ma’aser sheni still needs to be observed in Jerusalem today.

“The Gemara asks: And what opinion does Rabbi Yishmael hold that led to his initial assumption that one is obligated to bring a firstborn animal to Jerusalem only when the Temple is standing? If he maintains in general that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified Jerusalem for its time and sanctified Jerusalem forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed, then one should also be obligated to bring a firstborn animal to the place of the Temple and sacrifice it on an altar and eat it. If he maintains that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified Jerusalem for its time but did not sanctify Jerusalem forever, then he should raise a dilemma even with regard to a firstborn, whether it may be eaten in Jerusalem. Ravina said: Actually, Rabbi Yishmael maintains that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified Jerusalem for its time but did not sanctify Jerusalem forever;” (Sefaria.org translation).

Ultimately the Gemara decides that the Temple with the altar needs to stand to observe these two commandments. Interestingly Rambam poskins:

With the first consecration performed by Solomon, for he consecrated the Temple Courtyard and Jerusalem, for that time and for eternity.

Therefore, we may offer all the sacrifices [on the Temple site], even though the Temple itself is not built. Similarly, sacrifices of the most holy order can be eaten in the entire [area of the] Courtyard, even though it is in ruin and not surrounded by a divider.

We may also eat sacrifices of lesser sanctity and Ma'aser Sheni throughout Jerusalem, even though [it is not surrounded by] a wall, for through its original consecration, it was consecrated for that time and for eternity.

Why do I say that the original consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for eternity, while in regard to the consecration of the remainder of Eretz Yisrael, in the context of the Sabbatical year, tithes, and other similar [agricultural] laws, [the original consecration] did not sanctify it for eternity?

Because the sanctity of the Temple and Jerusalem stems from the Shechinah, and the Shechinah can never be nullified. Therefore, [Leviticus 26:31] states: "I will lay waste to your Sanctuaries." The Sages declared: "Even though they have been devastated, their sanctity remains."

In contrast, the [original] obligation to keep the laws of the Sabbatical year and tithes on the Land stemmed from the fact that it was conquered by the [Jewish people, as a] community. Therefore, when the land was taken from their hands [by the Babylonians,] their [original] conquest was nullified. Thus, according to Torah law, the land was freed from the obligations of the Sabbatical year and of tithes because it was no longer Eretz Yisrael.

When Ezra returned [to Eretz Yisrael] and consecrated it, it was not sanctified by means of conquest, but rather through Chazzakah. Therefore, every place which was repossessed by the [exiles returning from] Babylon and consecrated when Ezra consecrated [the land] the second time, is sacred today.

Thus, as explained in Hilchot Terumah, it is necessary to keep the laws of the Sabbatical years and the tithes [on this land] even though it was taken from [the Jewish people in later years].” (Sefaria.org translation)

Since all of us are in a state of ritual unreadiness, tumah, and we have no means of becoming ritually ready, we may not offer up sacrifices. On the other hand, “In Israel today, Ma'aser Sheni (the second tithe) is observed by transferring its sanctity to a coin, typically worth at least 50 agorot (a peruta). This practice is followed because, without the Beit HaMikdash, individuals are not in a state of purity to consume the Ma'aser Sheni produce in Jerusalem. The coin is then disposed of according to halachic requirements, usually by damaging it to render it unusable.” (https://www.google.com/search?q=How+is+ma%27aser+sheni++observed+today+in+Israel&sca_esv=d4f6be32e80b988c&sxsrf=AHTn8zq3p0u-95qRbvDyorfn7uKEihkguA%3A1745776835876&source=hp&ei=w3AOaPLRMufS5NoPn-CeyAg&iflsig=ACkRmUkAAAAAaA5-0-jpfpzhBu_10V4yPrgzgC5qySFN&ved=0ahUKEwiyv6DB5fiMAxVnKVkFHR-wB4kQ4dUDCBk&uact=5&oq=How+is+ma%27aser+sheni++observed+today+in+Israel&gs_lp=Egdnd3Mtd2l6Ii5Ib3cgaXMgbWEnYXNlciBzaGVuaSAgb2JzZXJ2ZWQgdG9kYXkgaW4gSXNyYWVsMgcQIRigARgKMgcQIRigARgKMgcQIRigARgKMgcQIRigARgKSLnfAVAAWNvDAXAAeACQAQSYAZQBoAGWEaoBBDI1LjK4AQPIAQD4AQGYAhegAt4OwgIEECMYJ8ICChAjGIAEGCcYigXCAg4QABiABBixAxiDARiKBcICBRAAGIAEwgILEC4YgAQYsQMY1ALCAggQABiABBixA8ICBhAAGBYYHsICBxAAGIAEGA3CAggQABgWGAoYHsICBRAhGKABwgIIEAAYCBgNGB7CAgsQABiABBiGAxiKBcICCBAAGIAEGKIEwgIIEAAYogQYiQXCAgUQABjvBcICBRAhGKsCmAMAkgcEMjIuMaAH7bABsgcEMjIuMbgH3g4&sclient=gws-wiz)

 

Pray for child like him TB Makkot 17

The Mishna “In the case of a priest who eats first fruits before the one who brought the fruits to the Temple recited over those fruits the Torah verses that he is obligated to recite (see Deuteronomy 26:3–10)” teaches that a priest who eats first fruits before the one who brought the fruits to the Temple recited the accompanying Torah verses is liable to receive lashes.

This is not only the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, but also Rabbi Shimon who learns this from an a fortiori inference. The Gemara provides the entire baraita.

“What is the statement of Rabbi Shimon? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to food items that may not be eaten outside the walls of Jerusalem. It is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you vow, nor your gift offerings, nor the donation of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). The Sages explain that with regard to the phrase “nor the donation of [terumat] your hand,” these are first fruits.

“Rabbi Shimon said: What does this phrase come to teach us? If it is to teach the prohibition to eat the first fruits outside the wall of Jerusalem, there is no need for a verse, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the lenient case of second-tithe produce. If with regard to the lenient case of second-tithe produce, one who eats them outside the wall is flogged, then with regard to first fruits, all the more so is it not clear that he is flogged? Rather, the verse comes to teach only with regard to a priest who partakes of first fruits before the person who brought the fruits to the Temple recited the accompanying Torah verses over them, teaching that he is flogged.

“The baraita continues: “Nor your gift offerings”; this is a thanks-offering and a peace-offering that one donates voluntarily. Rabbi Shimon says: What does this phrase come to teach us? If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a thanks-offering and a peace-offering outside the wall of Jerusalem, there is no need for a verse, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of second-tithe produce, for whose consumption outside the wall one is flogged, despite the fact that it is not an offering. Rather, the verse comes to teach only with regard to one who partakes of a thanks-offering or of a peace-offering before the sprinkling of its blood on the altar, before the consumption of its flesh is permitted, that he is flogged.

 

The baraita continues: “Or the firstborn”; this is the firstborn. Rabbi Shimon says: What does this verse come to teach us? If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a firstborn animal outside the wall of Jerusalem, there is no need for a verse, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of second-tithe produce. If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a firstborn animal before the sprinkling of the blood, it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a thanks-offering and a peace-offering, which are offerings of lesser sanctity, as even non-priests may partake of their flesh. Rather, the verse comes to teach only with regard to a non-priest who partakes of the flesh of a firstborn even after the sprinkling of its blood, that he is flogged.

 

“The baraita continues: “Of your herd or of your flock”; this is a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, which are offerings of the most sacred order, which may be eaten only within the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: What does this verse come to teach us?

. “If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a sin-offering and a guilt-offering outside the wall, there is no need for a verse, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of second-tithe produce. If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a sin-offering and a guilt-offering before the sprinkling of the blood, it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a thanks-offering and a peace-offering, which are offerings of lesser sanctity. If it is to teach that it is prohibited for a non-priest to eat a sin-offering and a guilt-offering after the sprinkling of its blood, it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a firstborn animal. Rather, the verse comes to teach only with regard to one who partakes of the flesh of a sin-offering or a guilt-offering even after the sprinkling of its blood, which is the correct time to partake of it, but he partakes of it outside the curtains surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard or outside the Temple courtyard, that he is flogged.

 

The baraita continues: “Your vows”; this is the burnt-offering, which is an offering of the most sacred order and is entirely consumed upon the altar, and is brought as a gift offering, not as an obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: What does this verse come to teach us?

 

“If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a burnt-offering outside the wall of Jerusalem, there is no need for a verse, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of second-tithe produce. If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a burnt-offering before the sprinkling of the blood, it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a thanks-offering and a peace-offering, which are offerings of lesser sanctity. If it is to teach that it is prohibited for a non-priest to eat a sin-offering and a guilt-offering after the sprinkling of its blood, it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the case of a firstborn animal. If it is to teach that it is prohibited to eat a burnt-offering outside the curtains surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard or outside the Temple courtyard there is an a fortiori inference from a sin-offering and a guilt-offering. Rather, the verse comes to teach only with regard to one who partakes of the flesh of a burnt-offering after the sprinkling, even inside the courtyard, that he is flogged.” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

Rava is so impressed with Rabbi Shimon says “With regard to anyone whose mother is bearing a child who is like Rabbi Shimon, she should bear that child, and if not, it is preferable that she does not bear him at all” (Sefaria.org translation) Even though the Gemara shows that Rabbi Shimon’s a fortiori logic is far from perfect, he appreciates his creativity. Instead of explaining the verse from beginning to end, he explained the verse starting at the end and working his way towards the beginning! We find this type of praise in Pirke Avot where “Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai … says about Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah happy is the woman that gave birth to him;” (2:8) In essence both Rava and Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai were praising the extraordinary wisdom and knowledge of these two men.

Rashi explains that Rava’s intention was that every mother giving birth should pray that her child would be like Rabbi Shimon.  

They prayed that their children will be talmedai hakhamim, Torah scholars. What do you pray for your children and grandchildren?

 

Mistakes were made but not by me #Shemini#devartorah#parashathashavua

“Mistakes were made,” said the CEO as he discussed the illegal activity his company had been involved in. He looked regretful, yet he kept blame at arm’s length and couldn’t admit he had personally done anything wrong.

How unlike the CEO is Moses in this week’s Torah portion!  Moses became angry at his nephews Eleazar and Itamar for not eating the purification offering at all. They should have sprinkled the blood on the altar and eaten the meat in the sanctuary in order to gain atonement for the Israelites. Aaron replied that since his other sons, Nadav and Avihu, sinned and paid the ultimate price publically, it was not appropriate for his family to stand before God bearing the sins of the people.  “And when Moses heard, this, he approved.” (Lev. 10:20)

When Aaron corrected him, Moses could just have said “Mistakes were made” and dropped the whole issue.  But he didn’t for he approved what Aaron had taught him.  According to Rashi, “Moses admitted that Aaron was right and was not ashamed to say, “I had not heard this law.” In fact according to S’forno “Moses rejoiced in the good reasoning of his brother and his sons who understood and decided the law so well.”

Sometimes it seems easier to blame someone else rather than admitting our own failings. Equally dangerous is to try to minimize our wrong doings by calling it “just a mistake” instead of acknowledging its true nature.

Moses’ willingness to admit he was wrong should serve as our model to strive for.

 

A violation that can be fixed TB Makkot 14-15

I learned this teaching from Dr. Elana Stein Hain. To listen to the same shiur I did to prepare for this blog follow this link: https://hadran.org.il/author-post/a-violation-that-can-be-fixed-din-daf/ Stein writes as an introduction: Some violations in the Torah are followed by positive commandments that apply even if one has already transgressed the violation. A prominent example, as understood by Chaza,l is sending away a mother bird even AFTER one already violated the Torah by taking her along with her chicks (Devarim 22:6-7). The Gemara calls this kind of negative-followed-by-positive commandment a לאו הניתק לעשה or מצות לא תעשה שיש בה קום עשה, and it rules that one who violates such a commandment does not get lashes.

Why shouldn’t a person who transgressed get lashes even if they fulfill the positive commandment later? Does fulfilling the positive commandment somehow stem the damage of the original transgression?  Are we giving people a second chance here, or does this open the possibility of people exploiting the law by violating it and just making up for it by doing the positive commandment later?

There are two approaches to a negative-followed-by-positive commandment a לאו הניתק לעשה. Reish Lakish holds קִיֵּים וְלֹא קִיֵּים (he fulfilled the mitzvah -he didn’t fulfill). קִיֵּים וְלֹא קִיֵּים (he fulfilled the mitzvah -he didn’t fulfill) implies one must observe the positive commandment to avoid lashes. If you don’t observe the positive commandment, you’re liable for lashes. The Tosefta Makkot 4:6 teaches: “One who takes the mother along with the birds: R. Yehuda says in the name of R. Yose the Galilean: all who violated negative commandments that have positive commandments attached, if they performed the positive commandment, they are exempt from lashes, but if they did not do so, they are liable to receive lashes.”

Rabbi Yokhanan holds בִּטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּטְּלוֹ (he nullified the possibility to observe the mitzvah-he didn’t nullify the possibility to observe the mitzvah). בִּטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּטְּלוֹ (he nullified the possibility to observe the mitzvah-he didn’t nullify the possibility to observe the mitzvah) implies that as long as you have the potential to do the positive commandment you don’t get lashes. An example of annulling the possibility of observing the positive mitzvah is sending a mother bird away from the nest before collecting the eggs. The perpetrator annuls the possibility of observing the positive commandment by killing the mother bird. Obviously he cannot send away a dead bird.

 

When do you have to fulfill the positive commandment?

• תוך כדי דיבור להתראה-within a few seconds of the warning

Any violation that has a positive commandment within it, such as when the negative and the positive commandments are connected – which sounds like: Don’t take (the mother with the children), but if you did, fulfill the positive commandment in it. And when they warned the person: Don’t take; but the person took it anyway, but then sent away the mother -within a few seconds of the warning, that person is exempt from lashes even though the violated the law of “Do not take.” For this is why the Torah connected it to a positive commandment, to say that if you violated this warning, do this action and be exempted (from lashes). If one did not perform the positive commandment in it with in a matter of seconds which we consider to be as part of the original utterance, because the person violated the official warning, that person is now liable for lashes even if they end up sending away the mother bird eventually. Rashi Massekhet Hulin 141 ד”ה קיימו ולא קיימו

• כשבית דין מזהיר לקיים את העשה- When the court warns the perpetrator to observe positive commandment. The correct version of the Rif  on Makkot 3b should read immediately after the court warns the perpetrator to correct his violation (by sending the mother bird away) and he refuses, there is no longer a possibility to correct the situation. Consequently, the perpetrator is lashed. Nimukai Yosef Makkot 3b ד”ה קיימו

 

• כל שעוד שיש אפשרות לקיים את העשה שבה- Whenever there is a possibility to observe the positive commandment

If the entire harvest that was reaped was destroyed or consumed by fire before one gave pe’ah, one is liable for lashes. [The reason is that] one has violated a negative commandment and did not fulfill the positive commandment that could correct it.

Similarly, with regard to leket: When one harvests or binds sheaves, one should not gather the stalks that fall during the harvest. Instead, one should leave them for the poor, as it is stated [ibid.]: “You shall not gather the gleanings of your harvest.” If one transgresses and gathers them – even if one already ground them [into flour] and baked [them], one must give it to the poor, as it states [ibid.]: “Leave it for the poor and the stranger.” If [this produce] is lost or consumed by fire after one gathered it, but before one gave it to the poor, one is liable for lashes. Rambam, Mishna h Torah, Gifts to the Poor, 1:3-4

Another example: Although it is said with regard to a rapist: “He may not send her away as long as he lives,” since [this prohibition] is preceded by a positive commandment, as it is said, “He must take [the girl] as his wife,” the Torah made the prohibition [rectifiable] by the observance of the positive commandment. Thus, this is a negative commandment [whose violation] can be rectified by [the observance of] a positive commandment. Lashes are not given [as punishment for the violation of such a commandment] unless one does not fulfill the positive commandment, as will be explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin.

Therefore, when a rapist violates [this prohibition] and divorces [his wife], he is compelled to remarry her and is not punished by lashes. If, however, his divorcee dies or is consecrated by another man before he remarries her, or if he is a priest, who is forbidden to marry a divorcee, he should be punished by lashes. For he transgressed the negative commandment, and is unable to fulfill the positive commandment associated with it. Rambam, Mishnah, a maiden virgin, 1:7

• אם ביטל.ה בידים- the perpetrator actively nullifies the positive commandment

But according to the one who learns that if one performed the positive commandment one is exempt from lashes, but if one did not do so, one is liable for lashes: for from the time that one transgressed, the violation is complete, but the positive commandment can uproot the lashes. And when one comes to court, one must either fulfill the positive commandment and be exempted from lashes or receive the lashes. According to this perspective, one cannot say that the rapist is always subject to the ability to remarry her as you said. For if he does not remarry her as soon as he comes to the court, they will lash him, for he cannot say that he will do the positive commandment later, because if so, how is there such a thing as “one who did not perform”? After all, he can always say, I will do it (in the future). Rashi, Makkot 15a ד”ה הניחא

 

To summarize when the timeline when a violation can be fixed:

Position #1 Immediately; consequently, it is as if the prohibition never happened.

Position #2 After the court warns to observe the positive commandment you can fix it the plight you are in. You are given a second chance.

Position #3 The observance of the positive commandment is always available at the end of the story.

Position #4 The only possibility of receiving lashes is if the perpetrator himself uproots the possibility of observing the positive commandment. Besides being the most liberal position, it is also not the halakha,

 

 

  

What is the hiddush of the Mishnah TB Makkot 13

Today’s  daf TB Makkot 13 we begin the third and final chapter of our massekhet.  This is the longest of the three chapters and names our massekhet. Of the 365 negative prohibitions in the Torah, Rambam counts only 207 of them to be subject to the penalty of makkot, lashes. Obviously the Mishna cannot list all 207 cases. Rashi ד"ה  אֵלּוּ הֵן הַלּוֹקִין

comments that the cases included contains a hiddush, a novelty that you might not have known. I shall break the Mishna into four groupings and explain each’s hiddush. All translations come from Sefaria. org.

The first group: “One who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with a menstruating woman.” This grouping are forbidden sexual relationships, ‘arayot (עֲרָיוֹת). They all have in common when purposefully sinned the punishment is karet. One might have thought that since the punishment is karet, there will be no lashes, but that is not so. There is a tana who holds that a person  who is liable for the punishment of karet receives no lashes; however, we do not poskin like him.

The second group: “one is flogged in the case of a widow who married a High Priest, a divorcée or a ḥalutza who married an ordinary priest, a mamzeret, i.e., a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, or a Gibeonite woman who married a Jew of unflawed lineage, and a Jewish woman of unflawed lineage who married a Gibeonite or a mamzer, i.e., a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship.” These are forbidden relationships that are not ‘arayot.

The third group is: “A ritually impure person who ate sacrificial food and one who entered the Temple while ritually impure. And one who eats the forbidden fat of a domesticated animal; or blood; or notar, leftover flesh from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption; or piggul, an offering invalidated due to intent to sprinkle its blood, burn its fats on the altar, or consume it, beyond its designated time; or one who partakes of an offering that became impure, is flogged.” The penalty for these Temple related transgressions is karet, but one still receives lashes.

The fourth group is: “one who eats unslaughtered animal or bird carcasses, or tereifot, which are animals or birds with a condition that will lead to their death within twelve months, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, is liable to receive lashes. If one ate untithed produce, i.e., produce from which terumot and tithes were not separated; or first-tithe produce whose teruma of the tithe was not taken; or second-tithe produce or sacrificial food that was not redeemed; he is liable to receive lashes.” The common denominator of this group is that they are all dealing with forbidden consumption of foods.

 

 

Did Pharaoh have Free Will? TB Makkot 10

Daf TB Makkot 10b asserts that God has given us free will. “Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rav Huna says, and some say it was a statement that Rav Huna says that Rabbi Elazar says: From the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings one learns that along the path a person wishes to proceed, one leads and assists him (בַּדֶּרֶךְ שֶׁאָדָם רוֹצֶה לֵילֵךְ בָּהּ  מוֹלִיכִין אוֹתוֹ).

“One learns this from the Torah, as it is written that initially God said to Balaam with regard to the contingent dispatched by Balak: “You shall not go with them” (Numbers 22:12). After Balaam implored Him and indicated his desire to go with them, it is written: “Arise, go with them” (Numbers 22:20). One learns this from the Prophets, as it is written: “I am the Lord your God, Who teaches you for your profit, Who leads you on the path that you go” (Isaiah 48:17), indicating that along the path that one seeks to go, God will direct him. One learns this from the Writings, as it is written: “If one seeks the cynics, He will cause him to join the cynics, but to the humble He will give grace” (Proverbs 3:34), indicating that if one chooses cynicism God will direct him there and if he opts for humility God will grant him grace.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Meiri, 13^th-late 14^th century Provençal rabbi, and Talmudist, commenting on “along the path a person wishes to proceed, one leads and assists him (בַּדֶּרֶךְ שֶׁאָדָם רוֹצֶה לֵילֵךְ בָּהּ  מוֹלִיכִין אוֹתוֹ) writes: God does not decree either for good or for evil whether or not a person will annul a mitzvah in the Torah as it is written “See, I set before you this day life and prosperity, death and adversity. (Dt. 30:15) this principle is learned from the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings.

The free will is also central theme in Moses Maimonides.. If human beings lack of free will, Maimonides argues that it follows that the Almighty is unjust:

“If God decreed that a person should be either righteous or wicked, or if there was some force inherent in his nature which irresistibly drew him to a particular course… how could God have commanded us through the prophets ‘Do this and do not that, improve your ways, and do not follow your wicked impulses,’ when, from the beginning of his existence a person’s destiny had already been decreed?... What room with there be for the whole of the Torah? By what right or justice should God punish the wicked or reward the righteous? ‘Shall not the Judge of all the earth act justly?’ (Genesis 18:25). (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance, 5:4)

Rambam holds that free will in the moral realm is absolute. “Every human being may become righteous like Moses our teacher, or wicked like Jeroboam (the king who reintroduce idolatry and Israel; see I Kings 12:26-33;…merciful or cruel, miserly or generous, and so with all other qualities.” (Ibid., ibid., 5:2) (from Jewish Wisdom by Rabbi Joseph Telushkin page 245)

Yesterday was the last day of Passover and we have to ask ourselves the question did Pharaoh have free will or not when it came to freeing the Israelites. On the verse “And the Lord said to Moses, ‘When you return to Egypt, see that you performed before Pharaoh all the marbles that have put within your power. I, however, will stiffen his heart so that he will not let the people go.’” (Exodus 4:21) Prof. Sarna in the new JPS commentary on the book of Exodus writes:

The motif of the stiffening, or hardening, of Pharaoh’s heart runs through the entire Exodus story; it appears exactly 20 times. Half of the references are to an essential attribute of the man’s character, half are attributed to divine causality. In the biblical conception, the psychological faculties are considered to be concentrated in the heart. Regarded as the seat of intellectual, moral, and spiritual life of the individual, this organ is the determining of behavior. The ‘hardening of the heart’ thus expresses a state of arrogant moral degeneracy, unresponsive to reason and incapable of compassion. Pharaoh’s personal culpability is beyond question.

It is to be noted than the first five plagues Pharaoh’s obduracy is self-willed. His only thereafter that it is attributed to divine causality. This is the biblical way of asserting that the king’s intransigence has by then become habitual and irreversible; his character has become his destiny. His deprived of the possibility relenting and is irresistibly impelled to his self-wrought doom. (Page 23)

On the verse in the Etz Hayyim Humash commentary below the line “But I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, that I may multiply my signs and my marbles in the land of Egypt.” (7:3) comments:

The verse raises major moral and theological problems. If Pharaoh is foreordained to reject Moses’ plea, if God will arrange for the confrontation to continue, how can Pharaoh be held responsible for his actions and how can we justify his being punished for what God causes him to do? “Although ‘hardening of the heart’ seems deterministic, events flow naturally from the ambitions and conflicts of the human being, Pharaoh, who is seized with the illusion of self-sufficiency. What events unfold under the providence of God, the unfolding is always according to the motives of the human beings through whom God’s will is done without their realizing it…. Pharaoh conducted himself in conformity with his own motives and his own godless view of his status. God made it so, but Pharaoh had only to be himself to do God’s will” (Moshe Greenberg)

We note that for the first five plagues, the text reads: “Pharaoh’s heart was hardened.” That is, he himself chose to be stubborn. Only the last five plagues do we read “God hardened Pharaoh’s heart.” In the beginning of the process, Pharaoh was equally free to be generous or to be stubborn. Every time he chose the option of stubbornness, however, he gave away some of his free will. Each choice made it more likely they would choose similarly the next time, both to spare himself the embarrassment of admitting that he was wrong and because he now had to self-image of a person who would not yield to Moses’ pleading. “At first, it was you who harden your heart. Henceforth I shall contribute to the hardening.”

Similarly, Maimonides writes: “Sometimes a man’s offense is so grave that he forecloses the possibility of repentance. At first (Pharaoh) sinned repeatedly of his own free will, until he forfeited the capacity to repent.” Eric Fromm has written, “Pharaoh’s heart hardens because he keeps on doing evil. It hardens to a point where no more change or repentance is possible…. The longer he refuses to choose the right, the harder his heart becomes…until there is no longer any freedom of choice left him.” God is structure the human heart in such a way that Pharaoh prevents himself from changing. (page 356)

Who is eligible for a city of refuge? TB Makkot 8

The second chapter of our masssekhet deals with the laws concerning the cities of refuge. The cities of refuge (Hebrew: ערי המקלט ‘ārê ha-miqlāṭ) were six Levitical towns in the Kingdom of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah in which the perpetrators of accidental manslaughter could claim the right of asylum.  Outside of these cities, blood vengeance against such perpetrators was allowed by law.^[2] The Bible names the six cities of refuge as follows: Golan, Ramoth, and Bosor to the east (left bank) of the Jordan River;^[3] and Kedesh, Shechem, and Hebron on the western (right) side (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cities_of_Refuge#:~:text=The%20cities%20of%20refuge%20(Hebrew,claim%20the%20right%20of%20asylum.)

Daf TB Makkot 8 delineates only one of the five case studies grants the accidental murder asylum in a city of refuge. They are:

1, A victim of circumstances beyond his control, ‘onuss (אָנוּס). “One who threw a stone into the public domain and killed a person is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If after the stone left his hand the other person placed his head out into the public domain and received a blow from the stone, he is exempt, as when he cast the stone into the public domain there was no one there” (Sefaria.org translation)

2,  A person who should have taken a bit more precaution, karov leshogag (קָרוֹב לְשׁוֹגֵג). Examples of this would be: if one was pulling a roller toward him and it fell from his hands upon a person and killed him, or if one was lifting a barrel and the rope was severed and it fell upon a person and killed him. The worker was working against gravity so the accident is not completely his fault. He is not entitled to flee to the city of refuge.

3, A person who was negligent or irresponsible, shogag (ְשׁוֹגֵג). An example would be “In the case of one who threw the stone into his courtyard and killed a person, if the victim had permission to enter into there, the murderer is exiled,” (Sefaria.org translation) The owner of the courtyard should have made sure there is nobody in his pushing before he threw the stone.

4, A person who should have taken much more precaution, but did not intentionally murder, Karov lemayzeed (קָרוֹב לְמֵזִיד). Examples of this would be: if one was pulling a roller downward away from him and it fell from his hands upon a person and killed him, or if one was lowering a barrel and the rope was severed and it fell upon a person and killed him. The murderer should have taken into consideration the force of gravity, but didn’t. He acted in a more negligent or responsible way.

5, An intentional murder, mayzeed  (מֵזִיד). If convicted guilty of murder, the court sentences him to death.

To sum up, a victim of circumstances beyond his control is not punished at all. A shogag has to flee to the nearest city of refuge. An intentional murder is put to death. The two in between cases the accidental murder is not given the right to flee to a city of refuge because he does not fit the exact definition of a shogag or a mayzeed.

 

  

God can create roads where we see only obstacles. #seventhdayofpassover#devarorah

The Channel Tunnel opened on May 6, 1994 nearly two centuries after it was first proposed in 1802 by Napoleon’s engineer, Albert Mathieu. Today the 31 mile passage beneath the English Channel allows thousands of people, cars, and trucks to travel by train each day between England and France. For centuries, the people had sailed across the Channel until this surprising new way to go under it was completed.

God planned an unexpected route for our ancestors-one we read about in Exodus 14:10-22. Faced with certain death, either from Pharaoh’s army or by drowning, the Israelites were near panic. But God parted the Sea of Reeds and they walked through on dry land. Because according to tradition God parted the Sea of Reeds allowing the Israelites to escape Pharaoh’s clutches on the seventh day of Passover, we relive this moment in our history during that day’s Torah reading.

Years later, the psalmist  Asaph use this event as evidence of God’s mighty power, “Your road led through the sea, Your pathway to the mighty waters-a pathway no one knew was there! You lead your people along that road like a flock of sheep, with Moses and Aaron as their shepherds.”  (Psalm 77:19-20)

God can create roads where we see only obstacles. When the way ahead of us seems uncertain, it’s good to remember what God has done for us in the past. We should never lose hope. He specializes in pathways in any circumstance-pathways that ultimately lead us to our salvation.

 

Jewish views of capital punishment TB Makkot 7

The Mishnah that concludes chapter 1 of our massekhet on daf TB Makkot 7 is one of the most famous mishnayot in the entire Talmud. It discusses the Jewish views of capital punishment.

“A Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seven years is characterized as a destructive tribunal. Since the Sanhedrin would subject the testimony to exacting scrutiny, it was extremely rare for a defendant to be executed. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: This categorization applies to a Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: If we had been members of the Sanhedrin, we would have conducted trials in a manner whereby no person would have ever been executed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In adopting that approach, they too would increase the number of murderers among the Jewish people. The death penalty would lose its deterrent value, as all potential murderers would know that no one is ever executed.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Louis Jacobs in his book What Does Judaism Say About…? writes: “The first thing to be noted is that the discussion in this passage is purely academic. There is a good deal of uncertainty about the actual nature of the Sanhedrin when it did function, but in any event we are told that the right to inflict capital punishment was taken away from the Sanhedrin by the Romans 40 years before the destruction of the Temple (Sanhedrin 41a). All the teachers mentioned in the Mishna flourished at a time when the Sanhedrin had been defunct for about 150 years. For all that, the opening statement that it was rare for criminal to be executed by the Sanhedrin may well be an authentic tradition to this effect.

“Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s argument is the stock argument of anti-abolitionists even today. Capital punishment is the most powerful deterrent and its abolition will only lead to an increase in crimes of violence and murder. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon argue otherwise… They evidently believed that the biblical law was intended as a solemn warning as to the extreme seriousness of the crime but that the courts were justified in circumventing the law, so that it becomes a dead letter. A good illustration of this method of procedure is the rabbinic treatment of the biblical law regarding the stubborn and rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18-21) who was to be stoned to death and an idolatrous city which was to be raised and whose inhabitants were to be destroyed (Deuteronomy 13:13-19). The Talmud (Sanhedrin 71a) declares that these punishments were never actually carried out nor are they ever likely to be carried out in a recorded in the Torah for one purpose only, that we might study them and benefit from doing so…

“According to another statement in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 52b) the Sanhedrin can only function while the Temple is standing, so that after the destruction of the Temple it was illegal for any Jewish court to inflict capital punishment...

“The question of whether Judaism would have Jews living outside Israel support abolitionist or anti-abolitionists policies in the countries in which they reside is rather more complicated. From the evidence produced here it would seem to be suggested that the abolitionists are closer to the Jewish spirit and should be supported. However there is no dogmatic statement to this effect, and sincere anti-abolitionists, convinced despite the weighty statistical evidence to the contrary that the death penalty is a deterrent, do have Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on their side and can support this policy with a clear conscience.” (Pages 66-68)

Abigail N. Sosland discusses capital punishment in the book The Observant Life: The Wisdom of Conservative Judaism for Contemporary Jews.

“One cannot, therefore, derive anything even remotely approaching an unequivocal sense from Jewish codes or Jewish history the executing a criminal is inherently wrong or by its very nature unjust. But the modern world has much to learn from the caution and seriousness with which the rabbis of the Mishnah in the Talmud handled capital cases. For Americans, in particular, this should be an especially sensitive issue. Given the number of cases in the United States in recent years, for example, in which death row inmates were exonerated after years of incarceration-not to mention instances in which already executed individuals were unequivocally vindicated and post humorously cleared of wrongdoing-the American death penalty system seems to require revamping along the lines of halakha. In addition, statistics show that there’s a strong racial aspect to the death sentence as it is carried out in the United States, in so far as black Americans are far more likely to be sentenced to death for murder than white Americans convicted of the same crimes. (When the victim is white, the likelihood of the death penalty also increases dramatically.) The biblical notions of pursuing justice and judging others without concern for social status demanded Jewish jurists and jurors alike look at the evidence carefully and take into account all the possible loopholes in any capital case. The concept of dina d’malkhua dina (the law of the land is the law-gg) cannot be ignored and the requirements to convict or acquit need not-and, in the secular justice system, should not-come directly from rabbinic sources, both from the secular law of the land. Still, the values of Jewish tradition, the level of deliberation with which the rabbinic courts were to handle death penalty cases, and their sense of grave responsibility should still form our participation in such matters.” (Pages 466-7)