TB Menakhot 4- 5 What happens when the ’omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake?

On the second day of Passover , the 16^th day of Nisan, an ’omer of barley was offered up on the altar. All new grains were permitted to be eaten after this minkhat ha’omer, the omer of meal offering, was placed on the altar. What happens when the ’omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake? The Gemara provides three different answers.

Opinion #1 “Rav says: With regard to the omer meal offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:9–14), if the priest removed a handful from it not for its own sake it is disqualified. It is disqualified since an omer meal offering came for a specific purpose, namely, to permit the consumption of the new crop, and this meal offering did not permit the consumption of the new crop because its rites were performed not for its own sake” (Sefaria.org translation) In other words, a brand-new minkhat ha’omer needs to be offered up and no new grain can be eaten until this is accomplished. (TB Menakhot 4a, Sefaria.org translation)

Opinion #2 “And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, with regard to an omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake, that it is valid and the handful is burned on the altar. But its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until a priest brings another omer meal offering on the same day and thereby permits the first offering for consumption, as the prohibition against consuming the new crop remains in effect.

“The Gemara asks: But if its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until they bring another omer meal offering, how can the handful removed from this omer meal offering be sacrificed upon the altar? Before the omer meal offering is sacrificed, the new crop is forbidden for consumption, and the verse states: “From the well-watered pastures of Israel; for a meal offering, and for a burnt offering, and for peace offerings” (Ezekiel 45:15), from which it is derived that one may sacrifice only from that which is permitted to the Jewish people.

“Rav Adda bar Ahava said in response: Reish Lakish holds that an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day. Accordingly, since the new crop will be permitted for consumption on the same day that this handful was removed from the omer meal offering, it is already considered fit to be sacrificed upon the altar.” (TB Menakhot 5, Sefaria.org translation) Reish Lakish presents a middle position where the minkhat ha’omer is permitted on the altar (which is but a handful from the container with the barley) and the left over which is usually consumed by the priest cannot be eaten until a new minkhat ha’omer is offered.

Opinion #3 “The Gemara previously cited the opinion of Rav that an omer meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified. The Gemara also cited the opinion of Reish Lakish that this meal offering is valid but another omer meal offering is necessary to permit the new crop for consumption. And Rava says: With regard to an omer meal offering from which the priest removed a handful not for its own sake, it is valid and its remainder is consumed, and it does not require another omer meal offering to permit it for consumption. The reason is that improper intent is effective [mo’elet] to disqualify an offering only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.

“Rava elaborates: The condition that improper intent disqualifies only when expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the intent of a blemished priest, who is disqualified from performing the Temple service. The condition that it disqualifies only when expressed with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the omer meal offering, which is generally unfit for the Temple service, as it is a novelty, in that it is brought from barley whereas most meal offerings are brought from wheat. And finally, the condition that it disqualifies only when expressed in a place that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude sacrificial rites that were performed with improper intent while the altar was damaged. At such a time improper intent does not disqualify an offering, and therefore if the altar is repaired on the same day, the offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rava has the most lenient opinion. No do over is necessary at all because the minkhat ha’omer is kosher and the new grain now is allowed to be eaten. Rashi explains that barley under most circumstances is not fit for the Temple service. Consequently, we can conclude that Rava doesn’t believe that the minkhat ha’omer isn’t a real Temple service to permit the new grain. It’s just a mitzvah. What allows new grain to be eaten? As soon as the sun rises over the eastern horizon we may eat the new grain.

Rambam poskins according to Rava’s position because he is quoted last in this sugiya. (Sefer Avodah, Laws of sacrifices rendered unfit, chapter 14, halakha 3)

Love and patience will help your words be heard #Vaera#devartorah#parashathashavua

Winnie the Pooh famously said, “If the person you are talking to doesn’t appear to be listening, be patient. It may simply be that he has a small piece of fluff in his ear.”

I’ve learned over the years that Winnie might be on to something. When someone won’t listen to you even though following your counsel would be to their advantage, it may be that their reticence is nothing more than a small piece of fluff in their ear. Or there may be another hindrance: Some folks find it hard to listen well because they’re broken and discouraged.

In this week’s Torah portion  Vaera God tells Moses to say to the Israelites: “I will free you from the labors of the Egyptians and deliver you from their bondage. I will redeem you with an outstretched arm and through extraordinary chastisements. And I will take you to be My people, and I will be your God. And you shall know that I, YHVH, am your God who freed you from the labors of the Egyptians. I will bring you into the land which I swore to give to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and I will give it to you for a possession, I YHVH” (6:6-8) Thanking God for delivering us out of slavery, we drink 4 cups of wine, one for each language of redemption at the Seder table.

Despite promising to redeem the Jewish people by emphasizing it with four and possibly different languages of redemption, they didn’t listen because their spirits were broken and their lives were hard. “But when Moses told this to the Israelites, they would not listen to Moses, their spirits crushed by cruel bondage.” (6:9). Who can blame them? They were discouraged as the result of their bitter enslavement in Egypt. That being the case, Israel’s reluctance to listen to Moses’s instruction called for understanding and compassion, not censure.

What should we do when others won’t listen? Winnie the Pooh’s words enshrine wisdom: “Be patient.” Love and patience along with understanding and compassion will help your words being heard.

 

 

 

Daf TB Menakhot 2 cites Rabbi Shimon in two different baraitot which contradict each other.

Baraita #1 “Rabbi Shimon says: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice and they even satisfy the obligation of the owner. The baraita continues: Conversely, consecrated animals that were sacrificed not for their sake do not fulfill the obligation of the owner, as in this regard meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. The difference is that when one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, its mode of preparation proves that it is in fact for the sake of a pan meal offering, as the two offerings differ in appearance. Similarly, with regard to a dry meal offering, e.g., the meal offering of a sinner, which contains no oil, whose handful is removed for the sake of a meal offering that is mixed with oil, its mode of preparation proves that it is for the sake of a dry meal offering, and one’s improper intent is therefore disregarded. But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so, as there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings. Since the differentiation between slaughtered offerings is established only through intention, one who sacrifices an animal offering not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. Rabbi Shimon apparently disagrees with the tanna of the mishna on two counts: First, he claims that if the handful of a meal offering was removed not for its own sake it satisfies the obligation of the owner, whereas the mishna teaches that the obligation is not fulfilled. Second, Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy, and the other types of meal offerings.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Baraita #2 “§ The Gemara cites the baraita that is the basis for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon, which was mentioned in the previous discussion: And a Sage raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse written concerning the meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), indicates that there are some meal offerings whose halakha is like that of a sin offering, and there are some whose halakha is like that of a guilt offering.

"Rabbi Shimon elaborates: The halakha with regard to the meal offering of a sinner is like that of a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is disqualified, just like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Conversely, the halakha with regard to a voluntary meal offering is like that of a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is valid, like a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake.  

Rabbi Shimon adds: And a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering in another aspect as well: Just as a guilt offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, so too, a voluntary meal offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon here apparently contradicts his ruling that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake satisfy the obligation of the owner.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The contradiction is easily summarized. In baraita #1 the minkha offering not for its sake is kosher and the owners get a check mark for fulfilling their obligation. In baraita #2 the minkha offering not for its sake is kosher and the owners don’t get a check mark for fulfilling their obligation.

Three different sages try to resolve this contradiction beginning on daf 2 and continuing on today’s daf 3.

Rabba’s solution: “Rabba said in resolution of this contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rava’s solution: “The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Rav Ashi’s solution: “The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.

“Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara concludes why each Sage didn’t agree with the other two.

“§ Three resolutions have been suggested for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two baraitot concerning whether or not a meal offering whose handful was removed not for its own sake fulfills the obligation of its owner. Rabba’s answer was that there is a difference between intent for another meal offering, in which case the owner fulfills his obligation, as the intent is recognizably improper, and intent for someone else, which is not recognizably improper. The Gemara comments: All the other Sages, i.e., Rava and Rav Ashi, do not say as Rabba did in resolving the contradiction, as they do not accept his reasoning, claiming that on the contrary, the Merciful One disqualifies recognizably false intent.

“The Gemara continues: Rava resolved the contradiction by saying that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicating that there is one law for all meal offerings, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering does not effect acceptance. Rabba and Rav Ashi do not say as Rava did in resolving the contradiction, as the verse that states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” does not indicate to them that there should be one law for all meal offerings.  

“The Gemara continues: Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction by saying that when one removes the handful from a meal offering for the sake of a vessel the meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as intent concerning the vessel itself is inconsequential, whereas when one removes the handful for the sake of another meal offering, the meal offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Rabba and Rava did not say as Rav Ashi did in resolving the contradiction because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, from a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of a mixed one. Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation even though his intent concerns the meal offering itself, not the vessel.

“The Gemara notes: The matter that is obvious to Rabba in one way, i.e., that with regard to meal offerings recognizably false intention is disregarded, but when the false intention is not recognizable the offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, and that is obvious to Rava in the other way, i.e., that in cases of recognizably false intention the offering should not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is a dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. ” (Sefaria.org translation)

 

Menakhot 2 an introduction to massekhet Menakhot.

 Today we begin massekhet Menakhot with daf 2 which deals with the flour or meal offering (minkha) that is described in the second chapter of Leviticus.

“When a person presents an offering of meal to YHVH: The offering shall be of choice flour; the offerer shall pour oil upon it, lay frankincense on it, and present it to Aaron’s sons, the priests. The priest shall scoop out of it a handful of its choice flour and oil, as well as all of its frankincense; and this token portion he shall turn into smoke on the altar, as an offering by fire, of pleasing odor to YHVH. And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from YHVH’s offerings by fire. When you present an offering of meal baked in the oven, [it shall be of] choice flour: unleavened cakes with oil mixed in, or unleavened wafers spread with oil. If your offering is a meal offering on a griddle, it shall be of choice flour with oil mixed in, unleavened. Break it into bits and pour oil on it; it is a meal offering. If your offering is a meal offering in a pan, it shall be made of choice flour in oil. When you present to YHVH a meal offering that is made in any of these ways, it shall be brought to the priest who shall take it up to the altar. The priest shall remove the token portion from the meal offering and turn it into smoke on the altar as an offering by fire, of pleasing odor to YHVH. And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from YHVH’s offerings by fire. No meal offering that you offer to YHVH shall be made with leaven, for no leaven or honey may be turned into smoke as an offering by fire to YHVH.” (Leviticus 2:1-11)

Massekhet Menakhot is a continuation of massekhet Zevakhim in terms of what is offered on the altar. In massekhet Zevakhim the sacrifice is an animal while in massekhet Menakhot the offering is a meal offering. Many of the laws concerning animal sacrifices also apply to meal offerings. Just as there are four important stages of an animal sacrifice, there are four parallel important stages of a meal offering. These four stages are: 1, קְמִיצָה (kemitza )- taking a fistful of flour; 2, נְתִינָה בְכָלִי שָרֵת - placing the flour in a second vessel to sanctify it; 3, הולָכָה - bringing it to the altar; 4, הַקְטָרָה- burning the offering on the altar.

The Mishnah begins “When one brings a meal offering to the Temple, the priest removes a handful from it, places the handful into a service vessel, conveys it to the altar, and burns it. At that point, the remainder is permitted to the priests for consumption and the owner has fulfilled his obligation. In this context, the mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who must therefore bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all meal offerings except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy, which is brought as part of the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]. In those cases, if the priest removed the handful not for its own sake, the offering is disqualified.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Tosefot ד"ה  כׇּל הַמְנָחוֹת שֶנִקְמְצוּ שֶלֹא לִשְמָן  כְשֵירוֹת comments even though the Mishnah only mentions the kemitza, the law is the same for the other three important stages of the minkha sacrifice. They add that waving the minkha offering (תְנוּפָה) and bringing the first bowl containing the flour and touching it to the altar (הַרְגָשָה) do not invalidate the minkha even when the priests having a invalidating type of thought.

Just like with animal sacrifices, there are two different types of changes that effect the validity of a minkha offering. These two changes are: 1, שִׁינּוּי קֹדֶשׁ- changing one sub-category of a minkha offering to another; 2, שִינּוּי בְעָלִים -changing for whom the minkha is being offered. Tosefot ד"ה שֶלֹא לִשְמָן also comments that even though the Mishnah deals with changing one subcategory of a minkha offering to another, the same is true when it comes to changing for whom the minkha is being offered.

Zevakhim 120 The difference between a private altar and a public one

 Today we finish massekhet Zevakhim. We previously learned that private altars were permitted only for 57 years between the erection of the altar in the wilderness after the Exodus from Egypt until King Solmon built the Temple in Jerusalem. The rules of sacrifice are relaxed for a private altar as opposed to the great altar. Today’s daf TB Zevakhim 120 delineates the differences and similarities.

“It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: What are the matters that are different between a great public altar and a small private altar? The corner of the altar, the ramp, the base of the altar, and the square shape are required in a great public altar, but the corner, the base, the ramp, and the square shape are not required in a small private altar. The Basin and its base are required in a great public altar, but the Basin and its base are not required in a small private altar. The breast and thigh of a peace offering, which are given to a priest, are waved at a great public altar, but the breast and thigh are not waved at a small private altar.

“And there are other matters in which a great public altar is identical to a small private altar: Slaughter is required at both a great public altar and a small private altar. Flaying a burnt offering and cutting it into pieces is required at both a great public altar and a small private altar. Sprinkling the blood permits the meat to be eaten, and if at that time the priest thought of eating or sacrificing this offering outside its appropriate time, this renders the offering piggul both at a great public altar and at a small private altar. Likewise, the halakha that blemishes disqualify an offering and the halakha that there is a limited time for eating offerings are in effect at both a great public altar and a small private altar.

“Following the detailing of the differences between a communal altar and a private altar, the mishna teaches: But the halakha that portions of the offering left over [notar] beyond the time it is permitted must be burned and that one who eats them incurs karet, and the halakha that intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul, and the prohibition against performing the sacrificial service or eating consecrated meat while ritually impure are equal in this, i.e., a private altar, and that, i.e., a public altar.” (Sefaria.org translation)

All this is academic for us today since all private altars are banned from then on once the Temple was erected.

Tomorrow we begin massekhet Menakhot which discusses the minkha (flour, meal) offerings. In other words now that we have finished with the proteins, we’re going be studying the carbohydrates.

TB Zevakhim 115 How did revelation unfold?

Beginning with TB Zevakhim 115 the Gemara discusses the history of the sacrificial cult. Originally the firstborn served as a “priest” and offered up the sacrifices on the bamot, family alters in the backyard. At a certain point the kohanim took over this position. The Gemara wants to know when this transition took place. While discussing the different possibilities, there is a tannaitic disagreement on how the revelation unfolded. Was it a one-time event at Mount Sinai or did it happen throughout the Israelites’ journey in the wilderness?

“This is a dispute between the opinions of two tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael says: The general statements, i.e., the principles of the Torah, were said at Sinai, and the details of the mitzvot that are explicated in Leviticus were said to Moses in the Tent of Meeting. This includes the halakha that the burnt offering must be flayed and cut into pieces. Consequently, it could not have been in effect before the construction of the Tabernacle.

“Rabbi Akiva says: Both general statements and the details of mitzvot were said at Sinai and later taught again in the Tent of Meeting, and taught a third time by Moses to the Jewish people in the plains of Moab, when he taught the Torah to the people (see Deuteronomy 1:1). According to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the halakha of flaying and cutting into pieces was in effect when the Torah was given, even before the construction of the Tabernacle.” (Sefaria.org translation)

As a traditionally observant Conservative Jew who still believes that the documentary hypothesis is correct, I highly recommend Benjamin Sommer’s book Revelation and Authority: Sinai in Jewish Scripture and Tradition. At once a study of biblical theology and modern Jewish thought, this volume describes a “participatory theory of revelation” as it addresses the ways biblical authors and contemporary theologians alike understand the process of revelation and hence the authority of the law. Benjamin Sommer maintains that the Pentateuch’s authors intend not only to convey God’s will but to express Israel’s interpretation of and response to that divine will. Thus Sommer’s close readings of biblical texts bolster liberal theologies of modern Judaism, especially those of Abraham Joshua Heschel and Franz Rosenzweig. This bold view of revelation puts a premium on human agency and attests to the grandeur of a God who accomplishes a providential task through the free will of the human subjects under divine authority. Yet, even though the Pentateuch’s authors hold diverse views of revelation, all of them regard the binding authority of the law as sacrosanct. Sommer’s book demonstrates why a law-observant religious Jew can be open to discoveries about the Bible that seem nontraditional or even antireligious.

Zevakhim 113-4 The extent of the flood and where did all the bodies go

Massekhet Zevakhim contains hardly any aggadah. The place where the Red Heifer a slaughtered and burned created an opportunity on dappim TB Zevakhim 113-144 to discuss the extent of Noah’s flood. Obviously, Red Heifer’s ritual had to take place in an area where it could not come in contact with a dead body outside of Jerusalem. Reish Lakish requires the spot to be inspected for impurity while Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the entire land of Israel is already inspected for impurity. All this leads to the discussion of the extent of the flood waters.

“The Master says that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: But is not all of Eretz Yisrael inspected for impurity? Since Reish Lakish’s response to this question is not mentioned, the Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the flood in the time of Noah descended upon Eretz Yisrael, and its residents perished. It is therefore necessary to inspect the place where the red heifer is burned to ascertain whether it is a gravesite. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael, and there is no reason to suspect there are lost graves there.” (Sefaria.com translation)

The argument in counterargument goes on for more than an amud, one side of a daf. Hear is but one example to the lengths the discussion goes. “Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to the flood, it is stated: “All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life, whatsoever was on the dry land, died” (Genesis 7:22). Granted, according to my opinion, that I say the flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael, due to that reason all living creatures on Earth died, even those in Eretz Yisrael. But according to your opinion that the flood did not descend on Eretz Yisrael, why did they die there? Rabbi Yoḥanan responds: They died due to the heat that accompanied the floodwaters, and that spread to Eretz Yisrael as well. Those corpses were then buried in known locations.” (Sefaria.org translation)

The Gemara also explains that the fish survived the flood waters. “And why does the Torah call it “dry land” during the flood? There was no dry land during the flood. It is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: During the generation of the flood no decree was decreed upon the fish in the sea, as it is stated: “Whatsoever was on the dry land, died” (Genesis 7:22), i.e., only those creatures that had been on dry land, but not the fish in the sea.” (Sefaria.org translation) I remember learning somewhere that the fish were saved because they did not corrupt their ways like humankind and other animals. Rashi on Genesis 6:12 comments: “FOR ALL FLESH HAD CORRUPTED— even cattle, beasts and fowl did not consort with their own species (Genesis Rabbah 28:8).”

The rabbis had a great imagination. If the floodwaters did descend upon the Land of Israel, they had to answer why there were no unknown dead bodies’ graves. Where did they go? “But even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that the flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael and the corpses of those who perished in the flood might impart impurity there, though the flood did indeed descend upon Eretz Yisrael, no trace of the dead remains there. As Reish Lakish says: Why is Babylonia called Metzula (see Isaiah 44:27)? It is because all the dead of the flood, throughout the world, sank [nitztalelu] there. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why is Babylonia called Shinar? It is because all the dead of the flood were deposited [ninaru] there. Evidently, even Reish Lakish says that all who died in the flood, including those from Eretz Yisrael, sank in Babylonia.” (Sefaria.org translation)

Even the Gemara says in its own way “Come on!” “The Gemara responds: It is impossible that the corpses of some of those in Eretz Yisrael who perished in the flood were not stuck in the mud and remained there.” (Sefaria.org translation)

If you enjoy the back-and-forth of the aggadah’s imagination, go study these two dappim.