Dappim Kidushin 33-36 outline women’s ritual
obligations and their exemptions as explained in the eighth Mishnah of our massekhet. “With regard to all
positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at
specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are
exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound,
both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to
all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether
they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe
them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of
your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are
derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you
shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a
prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from
a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women,
despite the fact that they are prohibitions.”
The
inclusions and exclusions seemed arbitrary to me until I read the following
section from Judith Hauptman’s book Reading the Rabbis. She explains
that the exemptions were based upon women’s lower social status as compared to
men. However after the Temple was destroyed and a new reality set in, the
rabbis recognize the religious and spiritual needs of women and began to expand
those mitzvot they should observe. I highly recommend reading the entire
chapter 10 from which the selection was taken
Reading the
Rabbis
Why are the
rules about women and mitzvot found in this particular place in the Mishnah,
right after the rules of acquiring a wife? Their juxtaposition suggests that a
woman who is acquired by a man becomes obligated to him primarily. He controls
both her time and her money. Once married, she would not have the opportunity
to fulfill religious obligations unless her husband allowed her to do so. She
thus cannot be independently obligated to perform them. This explanation
tallies with the Tosefta’s statement of why a woman is exempt from caring for
her parents, which is mentioned in the first half of the same mishnah.
That others control her is a fact of married life with far-reaching
consequences. It is also true that performance of some of these mitzvot
announces to the world that a person is free and independent, in charge of
himself. R. Joshua b. Levi says that a slave who dons tefillin is a free man
(BT Gittin 40a). Were a woman to don tefillin, she would be proclaiming to all
that she is no longer subordinate to her husband. The rabbis could not permit
her to take such a step.
The rule of women’s exemption can be
understood in yet another, related way. A more literal rendering of the Hebrew
phrase mitzvot aseh shehazeman gerama is that these mitzvot are ones
that will come your way no matter what, independent of the circumstances of
your life. As the seasons, the zemanim, roll around, the time for eating
the paschal lamb, hearing the shofar blasts, and sitting in a succah
will certainly arrive. The category called mitzvot aseh shelo hazeman gerama,
non-time-bound positive mitzvot, in contrast, will not necessarily come your
way, ever. If you do not own a home, you will not be obligated to build a
railing on the roof; if you do not find someone’s lost object, you will not
have an opportunity to return it; if you do not come across a nest with a
mother bird and young, you will never have the opportunity to send away the
mother and keep the young. A woman is thus exempt from those active mitzvot
that a Jew will surely find himself executing in the course of the Jewish day,
week, and year, but is obligated to those that may never come her way. Why?
The Talmud mentions the phrases “positive
time-bound” or “non-time-bound” mitzvot only in connection with women.
That is, this distinction was created solely for the purpose of distinguishing
between women’s ritual obligations and her exemptions. It was not a category
that had any other use. For men, who are obligated to perform all positive
mitzvot, there is no significance to this distinction. Had there been some
other meaning to this categorization of mitzvot, not relating to women, I would
have to concede that their exemption could flow from some other reason. If, for
the sake of argument, time-bound positive mitzvot required the expenditure of
money, then we could explain women’s exemption as flowing from her lack of
control of financial assets. But since this distinction was devised only to
create a category from which women are exempt, the reason for the exemption has
to lie in the meaning of the phrase itself, namely, that these are the key
mitzvot of marking Jewish time. It is not that they take time.
Women were exempted from the essential
ritual acts of Judaism, those that year in and year out mark Jewish time, in
order to restrict their performance to men, to heads of household; only people
of the highest social standing, according to the rabbis, does God consider most
fit to honor or worship Him in this important way. This hierarchical
arrangement is reminiscent of Temple protocol. Only kohanim, the
individuals of highest social standing, as evidenced by their more stringent
rules for marriage, ritual purity, and physical fitness (Leviticus 21), could
serve as Temple functionaries. The point is that those who serve God must
themselves be especially worthy. In rabbinic society this meant that only males
were fitting candidates for the time-bound positive commandments, the highest form
of ritual act. Women are exempt, although not forbidden, because they are
individuals of lower social standing, who, therefore, honor God less when
serving Him. This status argument, a variation of the previous one that women
are controlled by men, is, in my opinion, a reasonable explanation of women’s
exemption. The location of the rules of ritual performance in the tractate
about betrothals and the meaning of the defining phrases themselves are the
clues.
The next mishnah in the
chapter, although it concerns Temple sacrifice rather than time-bound mitzvot,
will, when read together with its associated Gemara, sharpen our understanding
of this one. It is part of the same group of mishnahs.
Laying on of hands [on the head of
the sacrificial animal], waving [the minhah sacrifice], bringing it
close [to the altar], …, sprinkling the blood, receiving [the blood from the
neck of the animal to be sacrificed]—[these acts] are to be carried out by men
but not by women [נוהגים באנשים ולא בנשים],
except for the minhah [offering] of the sotah and the nezirah
[person who vows not to drink wine or cut (his or) her hair for a specified
period of time], that the women themselves wave. (M Kiddushin 1:8)
To begin with, this mishnah
teaches that laying on of hands on the animal to be offered and waving the minhah
sacrifice may be performed by lay Israelite men but not lay Israelite women.
The third activity, bringing the animal to the altar, and all those that
follow, may be performed only by kohanim, not even lay Israelite men.
Since the Torah itself makes clear that men but not women may serve as Temple
functionaries, why need the mishnah state that these rituals may be
carried out by the sons of Aaron, the kohanim, but not by the daughters
of Aaron? On what basis could one have thought that priestly women were allowed
to function in the Temple that the mishnah found it necessary to rule it
out? Since it is clear that not even Israelite men can perform any of the
activities beyond the first two, this mishnah must be addressing only kohanot,
women of the priestly clan. Does this passage imply that a question arose in
those days about the eligibility of women serving in the Temple and therefore
the rabbis issued this set of prohibitions?
I do not think so. The mishnah’s
repeated references to women’s absolute exclusion from Temple ritual may lead
us to a deeper understanding of M 1:7b (about women’s ritual exemptions): It is
only Temple practices that are forbidden to women, none of the other
ritual activities. Reading M 1:8 and M 1:7 in reverse order makes their
purposes clear. M 1:8 is saying that every single Temple activity is not only
not obligatory upon women, but even forbidden to them. M 1:7 goes on to say
that the rituals that were able to survive the destruction of the Temple, such
as shofar, lulav, and succah, are obligatory upon men, but not women.
But it does not forbid women from participation, as it does with respect to the
Temple service. It allows them to choose to engage in these activities. The
associated Gemara, BT Kiddushin 36a, derives from verses, several times over,
that women are forbidden to participate in the offering of sacrifices in the
Temple. It is standard practice in Midrash Halakhah to derive or state the same
teaching, again and again, in order to emphasize thereby the legitimacy of the
derived conclusion. The same is true of M 1:8 here.
This significant difference between
the rabbis’ treatment of women’s participation in Temple ritual and post-Temple
Jewish ritual strongly suggests an alteration in their basic outlook: Although
in post-Temple Judaism women are not obligated to participate in key religious
rituals, they are no longer forbidden to do so. Moreover, the many exceptions
the rabbis made to these exemptions, as we shall see, give further evidence
that the rabbis considered women to be religiously needy. To say it in
different words: The rabbis recognized that the practice of Judaism after the
destruction of the Temple had to differ significantly from the practice of
Judaism during the time of the Temple. So, along with the radical restructuring
of Jewish ritual practice that brought the celebration of the Sabbath and
holidays from the Temple into the home and from the kohen to the lay
Israelite, the rabbis also opened the door to greater participation by women.
Rather than compare exemption to obligation, it is more useful to compare
exemption (M 1:7) to prohibition (M 1:8). Women could not actively participate
in the Temple service, as noted in M 1:8, but they did gain permission (M 1:7)
and even acquired obligation to participate in some key rituals in the new
configuration of Jewish practice.
A careful look at tannaitic and
amoraic statements about women and mitzvot shows that the rabbis made more and
more exceptions to the rule of women’s exemption, obligating them, as time
passed, to more and more time-bound positive mitzvot….
in the amoraic period, we see marked movement in the
direction of greater obligation.
––Said R.
Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to read the megillah, because they too were
part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Megillah 4a)
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to drink the four cups [of wine
that punctuate the Pesah seder], because they too were part of the miracle [of
deliverance]. (BT Pesahim 108b)
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to light the Chanukah lamps,
because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Shabbat 23a)
==[The reason that women are obligated to pray is that] prayer is petitions.
––Said R. Ada b. Ahavah: Women are obligated to recite Kiddush [on the
Sabbath], as stipulated by the Torah.…
––Said Rava: Anyone who is bound by the Sabbath restrictions is similarly bound
by the Sabbath ritual acts. (Berakhot 20b)
––Said R. Elazar: Women are obligated to eat matzah on Pesah, according to the
Torah; for anyone who is bound not to eat hametz (leavened products), is
similarly bound to eat matzah. (BT Pesahim 43b)
In all these instances, Amoraim are imposing upon
women new obligations to perform ritual acts—all positive time-bound mitzvot—that
M Kiddushin 1:7 would have exempted them from. In each case, a reason is given.
By the end of the amoraic period, women are locked into observance of the key
rituals of Pesah, Chanukah, Purim, and, to a large extent, the Sabbath. I think
this development is strong evidence that the rabbis recognized the importance
of making religious practice more central to the lives of women.
(https://www.sefaria.org/Rereading_the_Rabbis%3B_A_Woman's_Voice%2C_10_Ritual.23-32?lang=bi)
N.B.
I first met Judy Hauptman when I was
a sophomore at Ieachers Institute now known as List College, the undergraduate
program ofJTS. She was a Talmud doctoral student and my R.A. in the Windermere
Hotel, my dorm. When we didn’t understand the Gemara we were studying, study
partner Suzanne Levin and I would go up to her room after ma’ariv services for help.
Judy never refusedv helping us. We became friends and I was honored to attend
her wedding. Today Judy is the E. Billi Ivry
Professor Emerita of Talmud and Rabbinic Culture at The Jewish Theological
Seminary.