Generally speaking, the Gemara does not decide which tanna’s position we follow as Jewish
law. At the end of yesterday’s daf TB Eruvin 46 we learned the rules whose decision
is accepted as the correct practice “Since the Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic
decision-making, it cites additional principles.
“Since the
Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic decision-making,
it cites additional principles. Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Zerika said: The
halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva
in disputes with any individual Sage, and the halakha is
in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even in disputes with
other Sages, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with any individual Sage.
“The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha do these
principles apply, meaning, to what degree are they binding? Rabbi Asi said:
This is considered binding halakha. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said:
One is inclined toward such a ruling in cases where an individual asks, but
does not issue it as a public ruling in all cases. And Rabbi Yosei, son of
Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It appears that one should rule this way, but it is not
an established halakha that is considered binding with regard to issuing
rulings.
“Rabbi Ya’akov
bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of a dispute
between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in
accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; in the case of a
dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is
in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; and, needless to say,
in the case of a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha
is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As now, if in
disputes with Rabbi Yehuda, the opinion of Rabbi Meir is not
accepted as law, need it be stated that in disputes with Rabbi Yosei,
Rabbi Meir’s opinion is rejected? Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is not accepted in
disputes with Rabbi Yosei.
“Rav Asi said:
I also learn based on the same principle that in a dispute between Rabbi
Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the
opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:
In cases of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha
is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Now, if where
it is opposed by Rabbi Yehuda the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is not
accepted as law, where it is opposed by the opinion of Rabbi Yosei,
with whom the halakha is in accordance against Rabbi Yehuda, is it
necessary to say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion
of Rabbi Yosei?
“The Gemara raises
a dilemma: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, what is
the halakha? No sources were found to resolve this dilemma, and it stands
unresolved. (Sefaria.org translation)
Immediately “Rav Mesharshiya said: These
principles of halakhic decision-making are not to be relied upon.” (Sefaria.org translation) Starting here and continuing into
today’s daf Eruvin 47, the Gemara brings six case studies from throughout the
entire Talmud to test whether these principles are relied upon. The general
conclusion is that they are relied upon to decide Jewish law with exceptions
that make the rule. The analysis did discover one amora who did not agree to these principles as Rav Mesharshiya claimed.
“Rather, the proof is from that which we learned in the mishna. And that is
what the Sages meant when they said: A pauper can establish an eiruv with his
feet; that is to say, he may walk to a place within his Shabbat limit and
declare: Here shall be my place of residence, and then his Shabbat limit is
measured from that spot. Rabbi Meir says: We apply this law only to a pauper,
who does not have food for two meals; only such a person is permitted to
establish his eiruv by walking to the spot that he wishes to acquire as his
place of residence.
“Rabbi Yehuda says: This allowance applies both
to a pauper and to a wealthy person. Indeed, they said that one can establish
an eiruv with bread only in order to make placing an eiruv easier for a wealthy
person, so that he need not trouble himself and go out and establish an eiruv
with his feet, but the basic eiruv is established by walking to the spot one
will acquire as his place of residence.
“And
Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi once taught this law to Ḥiyya bar Rav in the
presence of Rav, saying: This allowance applies both to a pauper and to
a wealthy person, and Rav said to him: When you teach this law, conclude
also with this ruling: The halakha is in accordance with the
opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara asks: Why do I need a second ruling? Didn’t you
already say: When there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi
Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi
Yehuda? The fact that Rav needed to specify that the halakha is in
accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda on this matter indicates that he
does not accept the general principle that when there is a dispute between
Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the
opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
“The Gemara rejects this reasoning: What is the
difficulty here? Perhaps Rav does not accept these principles, but
the other Sages accept them.”
(Sefaria.org translation)
These accepted principles
in deciding halakha in our toolkit
are good to have as we continue to study our daf yomi even though Rav wouldn’t
agree.